THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204738, July 29, 2015
GLENDA RODRIGUEZ-ANGAT, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2012 and its Resolution3 dated December 4, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 116748 which reversed and set aside the Resolutions4 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and affirmed the Decision5 of respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dated September 23, 2009 finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct with the penalty of dismissal from the service with the attendant accessory penalties.
Petitioner Glenda Rodriguez-Angat was a former employee of the GSIS holding the position of Acting Senior Social Insurance Specialist detailed at the then Loans Department of the then Social Insurance Group. Petitioner was assigned a personal IP address with a Terminal ID to enable her to perform her functions and access GSIS databases.6 Respondent GSIS is a government owned and controlled corporation duly organized and existing pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended.
Respondent charged petitioner with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations consequent to the following antecedent facts:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case stemmed from the audit conducted by the Internal Audit Services Group (IASG) from 27 to 28 January, 2006 of salary loans with outstanding balances but tagged as fully paid in the central office. One of the cases uncovered was that of Ms. Sy, of the Manila Health Department, with CM No. 215839, who retired from government service on 26 April 2003. Apparently, the gross amount of her loan was [P]135,608.00 but the posted payments were only [P]56,301.00 at the time the same was tagged in the database as fully paid. Based on the Certification issued by the Information Technology Services Group (ITSG) dated 20 July 2006, signed by Managers Ethelda A. Antonio of the Systems Administration Department (SADMD) and Eduardo B. Naraval, Network and Telecom Department (NTD), the Terminal ID used in the tagging of the salary loan of Ms. Sy as fully paid was A7C4 which belonged to respondent Angat.7
x x x x
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryOn November 17, 2003, Respondent used, or allowed others to use, her terminal with terminal ID A7C4 to tag as fully paid the salary loan of Mercy M. Sy using the operator code VPAO which belonged to Ms. Vicenta P. Abelgas.
The full payment tagging was erroneous as the salary loan amount was Php135,608.00, whereas the posted payments as of the date of tagging only amounted to Php56,301.00.
The use of Respondent’s computer terminal in such erroneous tagging is prohibited under SVP Order No. 02-99, which imposes upon computer terminal owners the duty to take extra care and measure in protecting their terminals from distortion, tampering or unauthorized use by anyone.
WHEREFORE, Respondent is hereby directed to submit two (2) copies of her written answer under oath to the charge against her within five (5) working days from receipt hereof and to present whatever evidence she may so desire in support of her defense. x x x10
The respondent’s postulation, that the tagging is attributable to computer error or to procedural lapses of the claims processor cannot be given credence as it is bereft of any supporting evidence. It is axiomatic that a party has the burden of proof to establish his claim or defense. While the prosecution satisfactorily discharged its burden of proving that full payment tagging was done using the respondent’s computer terminal as shown by the ITSG Certification, the respondent failed to prove that such transaction was due to technical glitches only and that it was not deliberately done by herself or any other individual.
The evidence presented by the respondent to prove her claim that terminal ID “A7C4” has not been assigned to her is inconclusive at best. Ms. Garcia, her own witness, testified that she did not know if the respondent was assigned terminal IDs other than “A7BN”. x x x [R]espondent has failed to discharge her burden of submitting sufficient evidence to refute the ITSG Certification showing that she is the owner of the computer terminal with ID “A7C4”.
x x x x
Under [SVP Order No. 02-99], the computer terminal owner carries the greater accountability as the presumed author of any transaction done on his or her terminal even assuming, for arguments’ sake, there is sharing of both the USER ID and computer terminal. Office Order No. 2-99 creates a presumption of control by the owners over their respective USER IDs and computer terminals. Practically, however, a USER ID is useless without a computer terminal. Conversely, anybody who has complete access to a computer terminal can use the same for any transaction using his or her own USER ID or somebody else’s. Thus, where a USER ID is used on another person’s computer terminal, it behooves the computer terminal owner to prove lack of complicity with the owner of the USER ID, or lack of opportunity to perform the subject transaction.
There is no showing that there was no way for the respondent to perform the unlawful and fraudulent full payment tagging using her computer terminal. That Ms. Abelgas has been identified as the owner of USER ID “VPAO” does not necessarily mean that the respondent had no involvement in the performance of the subject transaction. Her ownership of the computer terminal carries with it the presumption of control. x x x Indeed, there is nothing in the evidence presented that would support, or tend to support, a conclusion that the respondent had no control over her computer terminal or opportunity to commit the irregularity.
x x x The respondent failed not only in proving that somebody else, aside from herself, used her computer terminal for the purpose of authoring a crime, she also failed to prove that she could not have authored the said crime.
Verily, that the respondent used her computer terminal for the unwarranted and fraudulent tagging, despite being aware of its repercussions on the processing of the member’s claims and benefits is a clear manifestation of her mal-intent, more than just an unhealthy regard for her duty and responsibility to protect her computer terminal from all forms of unauthorized use. She is, therefore, liable for Grave Misconduct, and not just for Simple Neglect of Duty or Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.15
WHEREFORE, respondent Glenda Rodriguez-Angat is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal with all the attendant accessory penalties.16
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Glenda Rodriguez-Angat, Acting Senior Social Insurance Specialist, Loans Department, Social Insurance Group, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated September 23, 2009 of GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, finding Rodriguez-Angat guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with all the attendant accessory penalties, is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Glenda Rodriguez-Angat is REINSTATED to her former position and shall be paid her back salaries and other benefits corresponding to the period of her illegal termination.19
x x x Pertinent is the case of People vs. Ramos (296 SCRA 559) where the Supreme Court ruled, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary“An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.”20
In the instant case, Rodriguez-Angat was formally charged with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, which under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) are only less grave and light offenses, respectively. Hence, applying the abovementioned pronouncement of the Supreme Court, Rodriguez-Angat cannot be held guilty of the higher or grave offense of Grave Misconduct. To do so would constitute a denial of her right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which she was charged.
As regards the issue of whether substantial evidence exists to find Rodriguez-Angat guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, the Commission likewise rules in the negative. Records show that the GSIS failed to sufficiently prove that Rodriguez-Angat did the tagging of the salary loan account of Mercy M. Sy of the Manila Health Department as fully paid despite its outstanding balance or that she allowed others to use her computer terminal in the performance of such act. What was merely established is that the loan account of Sy was tagged as fully paid using Terminal ID A7C4 which allegedly belonged to Rodriguez-Angat. The GSIS, however, failed to present any evidence to prove that, indeed, Terminal ID A7C4 belongs to Rodriguez-Angat. At this juncture, it is worth stressing that a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. (Dela Cruz vs. Sison, 451 SCRA 754), and that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence – mere allegation is not evidence (Ramoran vs. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Co., Inc., 326 SCRA 208).21
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, CSC Resolution No. 10-0896 dated May 4, 2010 STANDS.24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS Decision dated September 23, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.28
A reading of the formal charge against her reveals that Angat had allegedly used or allowed the use of her terminal in fraudulently tagging the salary loan of Mercy Sy as fully paid when it still had an outstanding balance. Clearly then, Angat was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against her. Angat’s constitutional right to be informed of the charge against her was therefore not violated. And the failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.30
x x x [T]hat the respondent used her computer terminal for the unwarranted and fraudulent tagging, despite being aware of its repercussions on the processing of the member’s claim and benefits is a clear manifestation of her mal-intent, more than just an unhealthy regard for her duty and responsibility to protect her computer terminal from all forms of unauthorized use. She is, therefore, liable for Grave Misconduct and not just for Simple Neglect of Duty or Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.31
At this point, We must stress that as an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies. Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This hornbook doctrinal distinction undergirds our parallel findings of administrative liability and criminal acquittal on reasonable doubt for charges arising from the same facts.34
- Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the appeal/petition of GSIS?
- Does the evidence presented warrant the conviction of Angat?
- assuming that the evidence presented warrant the conviction of Angat, is it lawful to convict her of a higher or graver offense of Grave Misconduct and impose upon her the penalty of Dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties?37
- The stamp on the face of the envelope containing the assailed resolution of the CSC, the original of which had been duly submitted before the Honorable CA, which clearly reflects that GSIS received the same on 27 October 2010. x x x
- The original receipt-stamp x x x by the GSIS General Services Department, also states that Registered Mail No. 07984 was duly received by the GSIS on 27 October 2010;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- In a verification made by the GSIS Investigation Department with the Pasay City Central Post Office, it was revealed that the transmittal slip or “bill of particulars” that included Registered Mail No. 07984 had two dates of receipt bearing the Pasay City Central Post Office’s stamp: one is dated 22 October 2010, the other one is dated 27 October 2010 x x x. However, Postmaster IV [Lita L. Villaseñor] of the Pasay Central Post Office issued a Certification x x x clarifying this matter and explaining that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryThis is to certify that as per records of this Office, Registered [Mail] # 07984, posted on October 20, 2010 at Batasang Post Office Quezon City addressed to Atty. Carmel F. Quintos and Atty. Ana Zita B. Abuda of GSIS Financial Center, was received and delivered by LC Jamel Musa on October 27, 2010, see attached copy dispatched, in contradiction to the certification issued on Feb. 8, 2011 the given date was October 22, 2010.41
Q: So in this Certification pertaining to Item No. 25, Glenda Rodriguez, you were also not told if this is actually the IP address of Glenda Rodriguez, as you have mentioned? A: No, it’s just like this. When that office Manila District was formed, we were the ones who gave those IP assignments, bagong office kasi iyan eh. Q: Were you the one who gave Ms. Glena Rodriguez this[?] A: Yes. Q: Aside from this Certification, do you still have any document stating that that particular IP address was assigned to Ms. Glenda Rodriguez-Angat? A: Well hindi na kami na-update after that ma-open iyang office na iyon kung me mga movements. Q: So you do know if this IP address really belongs to Ms. Glenda Rodriguez-Angat? A: Originally, as per my record. Q: But you don’t know if there are movements already? A: Yes. Iyong movements ng tao[,] hindi kami na-u-update. Q: So what does your office do if your office is not being [updated] with [regard] to the movements of the employees? A: Well[,] marami pa kaming ibang jobs. Q: So you do not do anything with [regard] to have your office being updated with [regard] to the movement of employees? A: Kung ini-informed kami[,] i-u-update namin iyong records. Q: But if you are not informed[,] you will not do anything? A: Wala kaming magagawa.46
During this period, access to the network was difficult because of the slow network connection such that selected personnel of the District Office [were] recalled to the Head Office in September 2003. This was done to facilitate transactions and to speed up the delivery of services to members. Employees and their respective workstations were constantly moved such that terminals were not functioning or else were not connected to the Mainframe network.
To remedy the situation, and in the best interest of service, it became necessary to allow the use of the personal computer (PC) with network connection by another personnel with or without the knowledge or consent of the personnel to [whom] the same was assigned. However, while another personnel was allowed the use of the PC, the User ID of the borrowing personnel was used to access the database.
Thus, while the questioned transaction of the erroneous tagging of the salary loan account of Ms. Sy may have happened on the terminal of the undersigned, she was not the one who processed the transaction. As may be clearly gleaned from Schedule A of the Report of IASG, it was not the User ID of the undersigned which was used to access the database and process the transaction in question.
Not being in full control of the use of her computer given the situation obtaining at the time the transaction in question was processed, and the indubitable fact that it was not the undersigned who processed the same since it was not her User ID which appeared in the log files extracted by ITSG, undersigned is without doubt free of any involvement or participation, directly or indirectly, in the erroneous tagging of the salary loan account of Ms. Mercy M. Sy.48
To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for another, at the expense of the rights of others. Nonetheless, “a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct.”50
Verily, that the respondent used her computer terminal for the unwarranted and fraudulent tagging, despite being aware of its repercussions on the processing of the member’s claims and benefits is a clear manifestation of her mal-intent, more than just an unhealthy regard for her duty and responsibility to protect her computer terminal from all forms of unauthorized use. She is, therefore, liable for Grave Misconduct, and not just for Simple Neglect of Duty or Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.51
x x x Office Order No. 2-99 creates a presumption of control by the owners over their respective USER IDs and computer terminals. Practically, however, a USER ID is useless without a computer terminal. Conversely, anybody who has complete access to a computer terminal can use the same for any transaction using his or her own USER ID or somebody else’s. Thus, where a USER ID is used on another person’s computer terminal, it behooves the computer terminal owner to prove lack of complicity with the owner of the USER ID, or lack of opportunity to perform the subject transaction.52
There is no showing that there was no way for the respondent to perform the unlawful and fraudulent full payment tagging using her computer terminal. x x x Indeed, there is nothing in the evidence presented that would support, or tend to support, a conclusion that the respondent had no control over her computer terminal or opportunity to commit the irregularity.
x x x The respondent failed not only in proving that somebody else, aside from herself, used her computer terminal for the purpose of authoring a crime, she also failed to prove that she could not have authored the said crime.54
x x x As the records show, the respondent did not deny that she might have made the false salary updates. What she contests is the sufficing circumstance as substantial evidence to support her participation in the fraudulent scheme against the GSIS.
The records also disclose that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. The records do not contain any proof that the respondent’s encoding of false salary updates was intentional and had been made in bad faith. We note that the GSIS failed to adduce evidence that the respondent’s work in making updates in the GSIS’ records was more than “clerical.” x x x
Second. There is no basis to support the GSIS’ and the CSC’s conclusions that there had been “close coordination” between the respondent and the other perpetrators; there was no evidence to establish a causal link between the fact of encoding (which was part of the respondent’s regular assigned task) and the haste in the grant and release of salary loans (which were done in the Manila District Office).
Notably, the GSIS failed to show proof that she was actually a part of the fraudulent scheme. The records show that all the documents supplied to the respondent were prepared and executed at the Manila District Office and submitted to her by the applicants. The evidence does not show that she had a hand in the preparation of these documents. Neither is there evidence that she knew the employees working in the Manila District Office or the applicants. In fact, the records show that the liaison officer of the Philippine Postal Corporation, who was found to have been part of the anomalous transactions, barely knew the respondent. The records also show that, prior to this administrative complaint, the respondent was among the top employees in the Pasig District Office in her six (6) years of service and had not been involved in any anomalous transaction. Incidentally, no evidence was adduced establishing that the respondent derived any form of benefit in performing the acts complained of.
x x x The respondent admitted that she failed to follow SVP Order No. 02-99 and by allowing other individuals to use her computer terminal and the operator’s code despite her knowledge of the prohibition under the rules. In addition, considering the nature of her work, she should have been more circumspect in observing the GSIS rules to ensure the integrity of the information found in its database. Lastly, the element of corruption by the respondent in violating SVP Order No. 02-99 and in encoding false salary updates was not proven. “Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.” All these, taken together, only amount to simple misconduct.56
Thus, in Ayo v. Violago-Isnani, we found respondent clerk of court guilty of simple neglect of duty for causing the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution and suspended him from office for one (1) month and one (1) day. In Alvarez v. Martin, we found a sheriff guilty of “failure/refusal to perform official duty” for failing to implement a writ of execution and suspended him for three (3) months without pay. In another case, we found the same sheriff guilty of dereliction of duty for failing to implement writs of execution in several civil cases and imposed against him a fine of P10,000.00.
Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.
1 Rollo, pp. 10-34.
2 Id. at 39-52. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Francisco P. Acosta concurring.
3 Id. at 54-55.
4 Id. at 81-87, 89-92.
5 Id. at 68-79.
6 Id. at 40, 68.
7 Id. at 69. Emphasis supplied.
8 CA rollo, p. 72.
9Rollo, p. 41.
10 CA rollo, pp. 77-78. Italics and emphasis in the original.
11 Id. at 87-89.
12 Id. at 87.
13 Supra note 5.
14 Id. at 74.
15 Id. at 73-77. Citations omitted.
16 Id. at 79.
17 Id. at 84; CA rollo, p. 191.
18 Supra note 4, at 81-87.
19 Id. at 87. Emphasis in the original.
20 Id. at 85. Italics and emphasis in the original.
21 Id. Additional emphasis supplied.
22 CA rollo, pp. 244-258.
23 Supra note 4, at 89-92.
24 Id. at 92. Emphasis in the original.
25 CA rollo, pp. 4-46.
26 357 Phil. 559 (1998).
27 Supra note 2.
28 Id. at 51. Emphasis in the original.
29 Id. at 46.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 47. Emphasis supplied.
32 Id. at 49.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 50-51. Italics in the original.
35 Id. at 93-105.
36 Supra note 3.
37 Id. at 15.
38 Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
39 CA rollo, p. 317.
40Rollo, p. 106.
41 Id. at 279. Emphasis omitted.
42Menor v. Guillermo, 595 Phil. 10, 15 (2008). Citations omitted.
43Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 667, 680. Citations omitted.
44Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee, 464 Phil. 548, 570-571 (2004).
45Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., 570 Phil. 464, 473 (2008), citing Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 432, 442 (2006) and Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486, 490-491 (1999).
46 TSN (Joseph Sta. Romana), October 30, 2007, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 144-146.
47 CA rollo, p. 264. Emphasis supplied.
48 Id. at 75-76. Emphasis supplied.
49Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, supra note 43, at 683. Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
50 Id. at 683-684. Citations omitted.
51Rollo, pp. 76-77. Emphasis supplied.
52 Id. at 75. Emphasis supplied.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 75-76. Emphasis supplied.
55 G.R. No. 202914, September 26, 2012, 682 SCRA 118, 119 & 123.
56 Id. at 123-125. Citations omitted. Emphasis in the original.
57Escobar vda. de Lopez v. Luna, 517 Phil. 467, 479 (2006).
58 Id. at 479-480 (2006). Citations omitted.
59Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, supra note 43, at 683.