THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution2 dated October 5, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which denied the petitioner's appeal and motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6616.3redarclaw
On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision4 declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio as null and void, the dispositive portion of which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is hereby declared null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code. The status of their children, however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the petitioner.
As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated but since the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory of such property, the court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for the purpose of liquidation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.12
This Court keenly observes that only testimonial evidence was presented by the parties respectively, to prove and dispute the claim of the other with regard to the properties and assets acquired during the marriage. In the absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove the contrary, all the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are presumed conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed at establishing that respondent took no part in acquiring said properties failed to convince this Court that the latter be given only a meager share thereof.
While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein may have been actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without the invaluable help of respondent. Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties acquired by the marriage. In the same breadth, respondent must be considered to be entitled to the same extent. Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business was provided by her mother and that, had it not been for that reason, the properties now subject of controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true but the Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made but the testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his indiscretion.16
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2112 dated July 16, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-38.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, replacing Justice Ruben C. Ayson who has retired from the service, per raffle conducted on March 23, 2011; with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 49-50.
3Rollo pp. 51-56.
4 Id. at 61-69.
5 Id. at 69.
6 Id. at 70-74.
7Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 394, 411 (2004.)
8 Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:LawlibraryofCRAlaw(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.9Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets.1âwphi1
In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
10 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227).
11 See Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1295 (1996).
12 Emphasis ours.
13 See Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014.
14 Id.
15 Supra note 10, at 1296.
16 Rollo, p. 73.
17 Id. at 72-73.
18 See Villanueva v. CA, supra note 7, at 413.