SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September 20112 and Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24660.4 The land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.
On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint5 for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).
In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.
Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale7 from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."
On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,8 another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.
Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land, together with the house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal partnership properties.
In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.
In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter, on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.
In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be admitted for registration.
SO ORDERED.12
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are rendered of no force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against both parties.
SO ORDERED.23
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each other, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."
Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).
Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when filling up his civil status therein.
Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status was single.
Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.
Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by presenting public documents, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";
Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;
Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;
Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;
Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca admitting her status as married;
to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more superior evidence presented by the defendants.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.35
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Endnotes:
*Also referred to in the Records as Rosauro Mendoza.
[1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 45-63. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting concurring.
3 Id. at 7-8.
4 Sometimes designated as TCT No. (T-24660)-T-1296 in the records. Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits for the plaintiffs.
5 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6, Docketed as Civil Case No. 1832.
6 In the original and amended complaints, the date indicated is 29 May 1964.
7 Records, Vol. I, p. 7.
8 Id. at 8.
9 Records, Vol. I, pp. 225-226.
10 Docketed as LRC Consulta No. 1194.
11 Exhibit "3," folder of exhibits for the defendants.
12 Resolution p. 4. Exhibit "3," folder of exhibits for the defendants.
13 As evidenced by a Certificate of Death. Records, Vol. I, p. 146.
14 As evidenced by Certificate of Death Registry No. 96- 0527. Records, Vol. II, p. 698.
15 As evidenced by Certificate of Death Registry No. 91-278. Id. at 699.
16 Records, Vol. I, pp. 223-224.
17 Exhibit "11," folder of exhibits for the defendants.
18 Records, Vol. I, p. 12.
19 Id. at 228.
20 Id. at 227.
21 Id. at 232.
22 CA rollo, pp. 82-94.
23 Id. at 94.
24 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.
25 Supra note 2.
26 Supra note 2, at 63.
27 Supra note 3.
28 Recognized exceptions to this rule are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd., 648 Phil. 572, 580-581 (2010).
29 Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
30Delgado vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs ofMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian, 516 Phil. 130 (2006).
31 114 Phil. 781(1962).
32 G.R. No. 84464, 21 June 1991, 198 SCRA 472.
33 Approved on 4 December 1929. Effective six months after its approval.
34An Act to Amend the Marriage Law, so as to Grant Facilities for Securing Marriage Licenses, Among Other Purposes. Approved and effective on 3 November 1936.
35 Records, Vol. II, pp. 997-999.
36 Supra note 11.
37 Supra note 7.
38 Supra note 17.
39Pisuena v. Heirs of Unating, 372 Phil. 267, 281 (1999).
40 Id., citing Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).
41 See Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084 (1962). Citations omitted.
42 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).