FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192389, September 23, 2015
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. ROLANDO F. OBLIGADO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 28 July 20092 and Resolution dated 18 May 20103 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 105347. The CA set aside the Decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission4 (NLRC) and Labor Arbiter (LA) Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona5 and ordered the payment of permanent total disability benefits and sickness allowances to respondent Rolando F. Obligado.
A disability is total and permanent if, as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.Respondent was also awarded sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days pursuant to Section 20(B)(3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).35 His claim for reimbursement of medical expenses was, however, rejected for lack of evidentiary basis.36
Applying the foregoing standards, this Court finds petitioner entitled to permanent total disability. In the present case, records disclosed that the fit-to-work certification was issued by Dr. Alegre on June 9, 2003. Petitioner was repatriated on January 12, 2003. It is undisputed that petitioner was unable to perform his job for more that [sic] 120 days from the time of his repatriation, which entitles him to permanent disability benefits. Even in the absence of an official finding that petitioner is unfit for sea duty, he is deemed to have suffered permanent total disability because of his inability to work for more than 120 days.
Private respondents' contention that petitioner was found fit-to-work is of no moment. Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Petitioner was under continuous medical evaluation and treatment for more than 10 months after he was certified fit to work by Dr. Alegre. During that period, he was unable to resume his work as a seaman. In fact, when he applied as a Utility on board a vessel in April 2004, he was denied employment because Dr. Abesamis certified that he was not fit to resume sea duties. Certainly, the foregoing evidence conclusively established that petitioner's disability is not only permanent but also total.34
The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar, by explaining as follows:The mere failure of the company to issue a disability rating within the prescribed 120-day period gives rise to a conclusive presumption that respondent is totally and permanently disabled.50 Consequently, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss petitioner's arguments on the conflicting findings of Dr. Alegre and Dr. Abesamis with regard to respondent's medical condition.Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.Since respondent's complaint was filed on 2.4 January 2004,45 or more than four years before this Court's clarification in Vergara, the CA correctly applied to this case the following ruling in Crystal Shipping:
Thus, based on Kestrel, if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6 October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies.
In this case, Montierro filed his Complaint on 3 December 2010, which was after the promulgation of Vergara on 6 October 2008. Hence, it is the 240-day rule that applies to this case, and not the 120-day rule.44 (citations omitted and boldface supplied)Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.It is undisputed that respondent was declared fit to work by Dr. Alegre only on 9 June 2003,46 or 148 days after the former's repatriation on 12 January 2003.47 Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was made beyond the 120-day period prescribed in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare that respondent suffered permanent total disability.48 This condition entitles him to the maximum disability benefit of USD 60,000 under the POEA-SEC.49
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
x x x x
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work, (citations omitted and boldface supplied)
Endnotes:
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who is under the Court's Wellness Program from 16-30 September 2015, per S.O. No. 2188 dated 16 September 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 9-27; filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 28-37; penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Antonio L. Villamor.
3 Id. at 39; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Rodil V. Zalameda.
4 CA rollo, pp. 19-25.
5 Id. at 71-73.
6Rollo, p. 28.
7 Id. at 29.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. Also see: CA rollo, p. 38.
12 Id.
12 Id
13Rollo, p. 29.
14 CA rollo, p. 40.
15 Id.
16Rollo, p. 29.
17 CA rollo, p. 48.
18Rollo, p. 30.
19 CA rollo, p. 26.
20 Id. at 41-48.
21 Id. at 42.
22 Id.
23 CA rollo, pp. 71-73.
24 Id. at 73.
25 Id. at 58-69.
26 Id. at 66.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 61-62.
29 Id. at 19-25.
30 Id. at 21-22.
31 Id. at 22.
32Rollo, p. 36-37.
33 Id. at 33.
34 Id. at 32-33.
35 Id. at 33-34. See POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000. This was the Standard Employment Contract in effect at the time respondent was employed by NCL.
36Rollo, p. 36.
37 Id. at 9-27.
38 Id. at 45.
39 Id. at 17.
40 510 Phil. 332 (2005).
41 588 Phil. 895 (2008).
42Rollo, pp. 18-19.
43 Id. at 20.
44 G.R. No. 210634, 14 January 2015.
45Rollo, p. 30.
46 Id. at 21, 29.
47 Id.
48Eyana v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 193468, 28 January 2015.
49 2000 POEA Standard Contract of Employment, section 32.
50Eyana v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., supra.
51Rollo, p. 51.
52Eyana v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., supra.
53Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 41 at 911; Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. v. Penales, G.R. No. 162809, 5 September 2012, 680 SCRA 95, 105-106; Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, G.R. No. 198501, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 795, 812.
54 CA rollo, pp. 26-36.
55Rollo, p. 22.
56 Id. at 47-53.