THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194969, October 07, 2015
CONVOY MARKETING CORPORATION AND/OR ARNOLD LAAB, Petitioners, v. OLIVER B. ALBIA,* Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 31, 2010 and the Resolution2 dated December 28, 2010 inCA-G.R. SP No. 98958.
The factual antecedents, as found by the CA, are as follows:cralawlawlibrary
Based on his sinumpaang salaysay, it appears that the petitioner Oliver Alvia started working as a common laborer for the respondent Convoy Marketing, a distributor of bottled wines, liquor and bottled water, in 2001. He was assigned the job of a pahinante, or one who loads and unloads cargoes transported to customers by the delivery vehicles of the company. A year later, he was promoted to delivery van driver.
As a driver, he was paid a fixed salary of P290 per trip regardless of route. The delivery van he drove belonged to the company which shouldered its maintenance and gasoline costs. He was on the road from Mondays to Saturdays, observing working hours that often exceeded the usual 8 hours, and despite his perseverance, he was not given holiday pay, vacation leave with pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
On July 22, 2004, he did something that cost him his job. He smelled of liquor upon his arrival from the delivery route. He gave the explanation that after completing the delivery, he and his two pahinant.es decided to rest a little in a store outside the company compound. They drank several bottles of beer before going back to the compound to start loading for the next morning's delivery.
It was, however, reported to the logistics manager, the respondent Arnold Laab, that he was under the influence of liquor. As a result, he received his marching orders. In a memo on July 23, the next day, he was told - we regret to inform that management decided to terminate your delivery agency agreement with Convoy Marketing Corporation effective July 23, 2004. The petition was addressed in the communication signed by Laab as a per trip driver with notice to the HRAD manager, the present-day title for the company official who supervises the company's rank-and-file, the personnel manager.
The petitioner did not delay in protesting his dismissal, filing on July 26, 2004, only days later, a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wage benefits. The respondents Convoy Marketing and Laab joined issue by contending in substance that the petitioner was not an employee of the company but an independent contractor, and presenting papers to document it. x x x
The respondents came forward with a series of delivery agency agreements signed by the petitioner to correspond to particular periods of service. There are, on record, four of these agreements relating to the periods November 22, 2002 to April 22, 2003, May 29, 2003 to October 29, 2003, November 11, 2003 to April 10, 2004, and April 13, 2004 to September 13, 2004. In all these documents, it was made to appear that the respondent company would furnish the delivery vehicle and take care of its maintenance and upkeep and pay the petitioner a fixed per trip fee to drive the vehicle according to a schedule prepared by it. The petitioner, in turn, would post a cash bond of P3,000 to answer for damages to the vehicle and be responsible for such payments to the government as SSS premiums and Pag-IBIG contributions. The agreement ends with this stipulation - under no circumstance shall the driver be deemed an employee of the principal, and the driver shall not represent himself as an employee of the principal to any person, it being clearly understood that the driver is an independent service contractor for a fixed period.
Indeed, at the end of every service period stated in the contracts, the petitioner was studiedly made to sign a quitclaim and release in which he acknowledged receiving a certain sum, at most P5,172.28, in satisfaction of all claims that he may have against the company, and confirmed the termination of the agreement due to the expiration of the stated period, x x x
The petitioner signed his last two quitclaims and releases in April and August 2004. The April 2004 quitclaim saw him receiving P2,716.42 for releasing the respondents forever from liability in connection with the contract ending April 10, 2004. When the petitioner signed the August 2004 quitclaim, on the other hand, his case against the respondents was already on-going. During the conference held that month before the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was recorded as having admitted that his claim for non-payment of salaries and refund of the cash bond deposit were already settled. The minutes of the conference read - Non-payment of salaries and cash bond deposit as per manifestation of the complainant was already settled. The minutes also stated - By agreement of the parties, case reset on August 24, 2004 at 10 AM.
In the same month, the petitioner executed the quitclaim and release in connection with the termination of his agreement on July 23, 2004 accepting payment of the sum of P1,805.72. In spite of this development, the case went on to its conclusion.3
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Be it pointed out and emphasized that the record shows that herein complainant signed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of the respondent corporation on 19 April 2004. That during one of the settings herein (on 17 August 2004), complainant manifested in open proceedings that his claims for unpaid salaries and cash bond had already been settled.
Indeed, although waivers[,] releases and quitclaims are generally looked down with disfavor as the workers concerned either are unaware of the consequences thereof or have signed the same under factors tending to vitiate consent, not all waivers and quitclaims are to be considered invalid. It is to be pointed out that absent any pellucid showing of the above-mentioned factors or variables surrounding the execution of said documents, the same must be deemed valid and binding between and among the parties.
In the case at bench, there is absolutely nothing on record tending to show the existence of such factors or variables which may have the tendency of invalidating or affecting the validity and binding effect of the quitclaim and release executed by herein complainant in respondents' favor.
All told, complainant's cause for illegal dismissal must necessarily fail.5chanrobleslaw
An examination of the minutes of the August 17, 2004 proceedings indeed shows that the admission by complainant as to the settlement of his claims merely referred to non-payment of salaries and refund of cash bond. However, the Quitclaim and Release executed by the complainant on August 4, 2004 clearly contained an admission of his engagement as an "independent service contractor" and the termination of the said contract on July 23, 2004. Such admission of the nature of complainant's work accords credence to the claim of the respondents that they acted upon complainant's representation as an independent contractor as he conducted his own business on his own account and free from their supervision and control. This is further supported by a contract otherwise being referred to as a "Delivery Agency Agreements."
It is, therefore, incorrect for the complainant to state that the quitclaim only covered his money claims. Said quitclaim specifically made reference to the termination of the juridical relationship between the parties on July 23, 2004 which was the same date when complainant alleged that he was dismissed from employment. And, there being no contest raised by the complainant with respect to the genuineness and due execution of the said quitclaim, the presumption to that effect accorded to a public document, it being notarized, mu[s]t be acknowledged.6chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed NLRC resolutions of November 28, 2006 and March 30, 2007 are set aside. The private respondent Convoy Marketing Corporation is ordered to reinstate the petitioner to his former position and pay him full backwages from the date of his termination on July 23, 2004 until (sic) payment,8 plus 10% of the monetary award of attorney's fees. This case is remanded to the NLRC for computation of the award.
SO ORDERED.9
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I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF BOTH THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE HONORABLE COMMISSION.II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE DECISION DATED 31 MAY 2010, AND THE RESOLUTION DATED 28 DECEMBER 2010, OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.10chanrobleslaw
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.17chanrobleslaw
x x x [W]hether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials, and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.21chanrobleslaw
1. The truck/s being driven by Albia belongs to Convoy;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The gasoline and fuel expenses, maintenance, repair and spare parts for the upkeep of the delivery truck, provided they are not abnormal and patently disproportionate to his gross sales for the month, are for the account of Convoy; but if the expenses and repair on the vehicle are caused by his carelessness or that of his helper, then he must assume full responsibility therefor;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. The truck assigned to him shall be used solely and exclusively to carry the products of Convoy, and that he cannot directly or indirectly handle/deliver products other than those which it is handling; and
4. Any violation of the said agreement, and any act of Albia against Convoy, its officers, employees and properties which shall result to harm or damage, directly or indirectly, shall be constituted as a violation thereof and shall give the company the right to unilaterally terminate him.chanrobleslaw
The petitioner [Albia] is not an independent contractor of the respondent [Convoy] but only a regular rank-and-file employee. He has been hired for a fixed wage, and the means and methods of his work are absolutely controlled by the respondent which exercises full power to discipline and terminate him. He has none of the qualifications of an independent contractor. He is only a paid hand. He has no independent resources to conduct the business of contracting, and, in fact, works for no one else but the respondent. The vehicle he operates belongs and is maintained by the respondent, and his pahinantes are the respondents' admitted employees.24chanrobleslaw
1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; orIn GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga,31 the Court stated that "these indications, which must be read together, make the Brent doctrine applicable only in a few special cases wherein the employer and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering into the contract. The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties' freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of the employee."32
2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter.30
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.38chanrobleslaw
ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x xchanrobleslaw
It is also clear that there was no valid grounds for the termination of petitioner. His misconduct was not gross. He was not guilty of any seriously offensive conduct, nor was there any untoward incident that occurred. The penalty of dismissal was certainly not commensurate to the infraction committed. It has not been shown that he has by his conduct become unfit to continue working for the respondents.46chanrobleslaw
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(l) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.chanrobleslaw
Indeed, at the end of every service period stated in the contracts, the petitioner [Albia] was studiedly made to sign a quitclaim and release in which he acknowledged receiving a certain sum, at most P5,712.28, in satisfaction of all claims that he may have against the company, and confirmed the termination of the agreement due to the expiration of the stated period. On overview, the quitclaim was nothing but a formality, because as soon as one delivery agency agreement terminates, another is signed to replace it and reflect the continuity of the petitioner's service.53
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Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice, x x x55chanrobleslaw
Endnotes:
* Also spelled as "Alvia" in some parts of the rollo and records.
** Per Special Order No. 2203 dated September 22, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2245 dated October 5, 2015.
**** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 2204 dated September 22, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo, pp. 543-551.
2 Id. at 541.
3 Id. at 543-546. (Citations omitted.)
4 Id.at 158-162.
5 Id. at 161-162. (Citations omitted.)
6 Id. at 184-185. (Citations omitted)
7 Id. at 453-455.
8 Should be "actual reinstatement."
9Rollo, pp. 550-551.
10 Id. at 23.
11 Id. at 52-59.
12Alberto J. Raza v. Daikoku Electronic Phils., Inc. and Mamoru Ono, G.R. No. 188464, July 29, 2015.
13Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company and/or Ernani Tumimbang v. Henry Estranero, G.R. No. 192518, October 15,2014.
14General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, G.R. No. 18 1738, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 598, 606-607.
15 Chavez v. NLRC, 489 Phil. 444,459 (2005).
16 Id.
17 Emphasis added.
18Rollo, pp. 78-111, 125-130.
19 Id. at 52-59.
20Polyfoam-RGC International Corp. v. Conception, G.R. No. 172349, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 148, 160.
21 Id., citing San Miguel Corporation v. Semillano, et al., 637 Phil. 115, 126 (2010).
22Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, et al., 682 Phil. 359, 374 (2012), citing Avelino Lambo and Vicente Belocura v. NLRC and J.C. Tailor Shop and/or Johnny Co., 375 Phil. 855, 862 (1999), and Makati Haberdashery, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 Phil. 52, 60 (1989).
23Rollo, pp. 52-59.
24 Id. at 549.
25AMA Computer College Parañaque and/or Am able C. Aguiluz IX v. Austria, 563 Phil. 745, 757 (2007); Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 260 Phil. 747 (1990).
26Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, supra, at 755.
27Palomares v. NLRC, 343, Phil. 213, 223 (1997).
28Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, supra note 25, at 757.
29Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, G.R. No. 176419, November 27, 2013, 710 SCRA 690, 700.
30 Id., citing Romares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 355 Phil. 835, 847 (1998) and Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, 471 Phil. 355, 372-373 (2004).
31Supra note 29.
32GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, supra note 29, at 710.
33Rollo, pp. 148, 155.
34 Id. at 52-59.
35Gonzales v. NLRC, 372 Phil. 39, 46 (1999).
36Alberto J. Raza v. Daikoku Electronic Phils., Inc. and Mamoru Ono, supra note 12.
37First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Calimbas, G.R. No. 179256, July 10, 2013, 701 SCRA 1.
38 Id. at 17.
39Alberto J. Raza v. Daikoku Electronic Phils., Inc.and Mamoru Ono supra note 12.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42Rollo, p. 516.
43 Id. at 517.
44 Id. at 60; 1820 Hours.
45 Id. at 513.
46 Id. at 549-550.
47 G.R No. 192190, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 410, 421-422, citing King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 553 Phil. 108, 115-116 (2007).
48Goodrich Manufacturing Corp. et al. v. Ativo, et al, 625 Phil. 102, 108 (2010), citing Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, 264 Phil. 1115, 1122 (1990).
49Rollo, p. 62.
50 Id. at 63-64.
51 Id. at 148, 155.
52 Id. at 52-59.
53 Id. at 545. (Citation omitted)
54 583 Phil. 564 (2008).
55Sari-Sari Group of Companies v. Piglas Kamao, et al., supra, at 581, citing Carino v. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, 124 Phil. 782, 790(1966).
56 Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended; Polyfoam-RGC International Corp. v. Concepcion, supra note 20, at 164.
57 Tangga-an v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 340, 354.
58Rollo, pp. 78-111; 125-130.
59 Art. 111. Attorney's fees.
a. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
b. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
60 Cheryll Santos Lens v. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015.