FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 194906, September 09, 2015
LORALEI P. HALILI, Petitioner, v. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL, ROB MORRIS, AND GUNDELINA A. VELAZCO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated December 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107209, which reversed the Decision3 dated July 30, 2008 and the Resolution4 dated November 25, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 12-003358-07, and thereby found petitioner Loralei P. Halili (Halili) to have been validly dismissed by respondent Justice For Children International (JFCI).chanrobleslaw
WRITTEN AGREEMENT REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF [HALILI] BY [JFCI] AS CONSULTANT PROGRAM COORDINATOR FOR AFTERCAREWhile said clause is silent on the requirement of a legal cause for the same to be operative, the fundamental principle — as above-stated — is that the law is read into every contract. Hence, the contract's termination clause should not be interpreted as a form of blanket-license by which each of the parties may just abdicate the contract at will. Rather, it is a clause which allows any of the parties to pre-terminate the employment contract within the stipulated fixed-term period of one year, provided that the party invoking the same has: (a) a legal cause for terminating it; and (b) notifies the other party in writing four (4) weeks prior to the intended date of termination.
This Agreement is made between [JFCI] and [Halili], for mutual consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is acknowledged by the parties, who agree:
1. Term. [Halili] is independently contracted by JFCI to serve as Consultant Program Coordinator for Aftercare of JFCI for a contracted period of 46 weeks within one year, beginning May 15, 2006 and ending May 14, 2007, with said term being capable of extension by mutual review and written agreement of both parties.
x x x x
5. Termination of Agreement. Either party may terminate this agreement at anytime by giving four weeks written notice.36
x x x x (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a final observation, the Court also takes note of several other provisions in petitioners' employment contracts that display utter disregard for their security of tenure. Despite fixing a period or term of employment, i.e., one year, INNODATA reserved the right to pre-terminate petitioners' employment under the following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryHere, it is clear that the first requisite of legal cause was not complied with by JFCI. No just or authorized cause was proven by substantial evidence in support of its invocation of the termination clause stated in its contract with Halili. As such, the pre-termination of the contract was infirm. Thus, considering further that respondents' argument on its purported loss of trust and confidence in Halili cannot be taken into account at this stage since it was belatedly raised for the first time on appeal,39 the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Halili's dismissal was illegal. The CA's issuance of a writ of certiorari was perforce improper.6.1 x x x Further should the Company have no more need for the EMPLOYEE'S services on account of completion of the project, lack of work (sic) business losses, introduction of new production processes and techniques, which will negate the need for personnel, and/or overstafiing, this contract maybe pre-terminated by the EMPLOYER upon giving of three (3) days notice to the employee.Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions, petitioners have no right at all to expect security of tenure, even for the supposedly one-year period of employment provided in their contracts, because they can still be pre-terminated (1) upon the completion of an unspecified project; or (2) with or without cause, for as long as they are given a three-day notice. Such contract provisions are repugnant to the basic tenet in labor law that no employee may be terminated except for just or authorized cause.
x x x x
6.4 The EMPLOYEE or the EMPLOYER may pre-terminate this CONTRACT, with or without cause, by giving at least Fifteen - (15) [day] notice to that effect. Provided, that such pre-termination shall be effective only upon issuance of the appropriate clearance in favor of the said EMPLOYEE.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution, it is the policy of the State to assure the workers of security of tenure and free them from the bondage of uncertainty of tenure woven by some employers into their contracts of employment. This was exactly the purpose of the legislators in drafting Article 280 of the Labor Code - to prevent the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment.38 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-62.
2 Id. at 66-72. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring.
3 Id. at 117-122. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Benedicto R. Palacol with Commissioners Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and Nieves Vivar-De Castro concurring.
4 Id. at 123-124.
5 Id. at 118.
6 See id. at 14-15 and 118.
7 Id. at 227-228.
8 See id. at 118 and 228.
9 See Letter dated July 13, 2006; id. at 231.
10 See id. at 118 and 231.
11 Id. at 232.
12 Id. at 125-147.
13 See id. at 135-140.
14 See id. at 144-145.
15 See respondents' Position Paper dated November 9, 2006; id. at 148-161.
16 See id. at 157-158.
17 See id. at 159-160.
18 Id. at 259-270. Penned by Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. Ancheta.
19 Id. at 270.
20 See id. at 265-266.
21 See id. at 267-269.
22 See Notice of Appeal dated November 12, 2007; id. at 271.
23 Id. at 117-122.
24 See id. at 120-121.
25 See id. at 121.
26 Id.
27 See motion for reconsideration dated August 13, 2008; id at 298-302.
28 Id. at 123-124.
29 Id. at 73-111.
30 Id. at 66-72.
31 See id. at 71.
32 See id. at 69-71.
33Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. v. Pozzolanic Phils., Inc., 671 Phil. 731, 763-764 (2011).
34 Article 1700 of the Civil Code reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryArt. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary35Intra-Strata Assurance Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 579 Phil. 631, 640 (2008), citing Maritime Company of the Phil. v. Reparations Commission, 148-B Phil. 65, 69-70 (1971).
36Rollo, pp. 227-228.
37 588 Phil. 568 (2008).
38 Id. at 586-587.
39 "[W]ell-settled is the rule, also applicable in labor cases, that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by the reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule." (Pag-Asa Steel Works, Inc. v. CA, 520 Phil. 1006, 1023-1024 [2006].)