THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195547, December 02, 2015
MA. CORAZON M. OLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 9, 2010,2 December 14, 2010,3 and February 14, 20114 in CA-GR. CR No. 32066.
The instant petition traces its origin to an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, dated October 23, 2006, charging herein petitioner and a certain Manuel Hurtada (Hurtada) and Aida Ricarse (Ricarse) with the crime of estafa as defined and punished under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of September 2006, and prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ELIZABETH T. LAUZON in the following manner to wit: that accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representations which they made to the complainant that they are authorized to sell, dispose or encumber a parcel of land located at Las Piñas City covered by TCTNo. T-19987 issued by the [Register] of Deeds of Las Piñas City and that they promised to transfer the Certificate of Title in the name of the complainant, said accused fully knew that their manifestation and representations were false and untrue, complainant was induced to part with her money in the amount of P420,000.00, as she in fact gave the amount of P420,000.00 representing part of the purchase price of the said parcel of land and for which accused received and acknowledge[d] the same, and after complainant conducted the necessary verification with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City it turned out that the registered owner of the said parcel of land is Marita F. Sanlay and mortgaged to Household Development Bank then assigned to National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), and that accused are not authorized to sell, dispose or encumber the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-19987, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the amount of P420,000.00.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryAfter trial, the RTC found petitioner and her co-accused guilty of other forms of swindling under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, as the crime was committed with abuse of confidence reposed on Manuel Hurtada by Elizabeth Lauzon without any mitigating circumstance to offset, all three accused, namely: 1) Manuel Hurtada, Jr. y Buhat; 2) Aida Ricarse y Villadelgado and 3) Ma. Corazon Ola, are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code and each sentenced to undergo imprisonment of Six (6) months straight penalty and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the complainant Elizabeth T. Lauzon in the amount of P320,000.00 and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 and to pay the cost of the suit.Petitioner and the other accused appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. Petitioner and Ricarse jointly filed their Brief for Accused-Appellants7 dated June 10, 2009, while Hurtada filed his Brief for the Accused-Appellant8 dated September 9, 2009.
SO ORDERED.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals (CA) by wholly adopting the stance of the Honorable Office of the Solicitor General has overlooked the evidence on record, from the pleadings and four affidavits of merits filed with the CA, and in the process violated the due process of law of the petitioner as enunciated in Ang Tibay v. CIR, and subsequent SC decisions thereto.At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from a procedural infirmity which this Court cannot ignore as it is fatal to petitioner's cause.
(b) whether or not the petitioner has made a second motion for reconsideration.
(c) whether or not the governing law or rule is Rule 10 on amendments of pleading, and not Section 6, both of Rule 6 and 11, in relation to Section 9 of Rule 44 and Section 4 of Rule 124 on matter of reply, all of the Rules of Court; and
(d) whether or not the liberality rule for amendment of pleadings instead of the general rule on liberality must be applied in favor of the petitioner.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party's remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:In the present case, the Court agrees with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are interlocutory orders, as they do not dispose of the case completely but leave something to be decided upon.19 What has been denied by the CA was a mere motion to amend petitioner's appeal brief and the appellate court has yet to finally dispose of petitioner's appeal by determining the main issue of whether or not she is indeed guilty of estafa. As such, petitioner's resort to the present petition for review on certiorari is erroneous.As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Endnotes:
* Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Raffle dated January 10, 2012.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 2289 dated November 16, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now members of this Court), concurring.
2Rollo, pp. 86-88.
3Id. at 90-91.
4Id. at 92-93.
5Id. at 167-168.
6Id. at 168-169.
7Id. at 180-196.
8Id. at 198-218.
9Id. at 219-242.
10Id. at 243-248.
11Id. at 13-22.
12Id. at 27-35.
13Id. at 118.
14Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, et al., 680 Phil. 334, 339 (2012).
15Id.
16Id.
17 678 Phil. 358 (2011).
18Id. at 387-388. (Citations omitted)
19Australian Professional Realty, Inc., et al. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, 684 Phil. 283, 291 (2012).
20 Sec. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. -The appeal may be dismissed motu propio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:21 118 Phil. 385 (1963).
(a) Failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period; (b) Lack of merit in the petition; (c) Failure to pay the requisite docket fee and other lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs; (d) Failure to comply wilh the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition; (e) Failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause; (f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal; and (g) The fact that the case is not appealable to the Supreme Court.
22Constantino, et al. v. Hon. Reyes, et al., supra at 388-389.
23Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 127, 132-133; Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, etc., et al., 151-A Phil. 815, 827 (1973).
24 See CA Resolution dated September 9, 2010, rollo, p. 11.
25De Liano v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033, 1040 (2001).
26Id.
27Id.