EN BANC
G.R. No. 215995, January 19, 2016
VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND WINSTON B. MENZON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc dated January 20, 2015 which upheld the Resolution2 of the COMELEC Second Division dated July 5, 2013, denying due course to and/or cancelling petitioner's certificate of candidacy; annulling her proclamation as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte; and proclaiming private respondent in her stead.
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (the May 13, 2013 Elections, for brevity). Petitioner's late husband, James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on February 2, 2013.3 Due to this development, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy4 on February 22, 2013 as a substitute candidate for her deceased spouse.
In response, private respondent filed, on February 25, 2013, a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy5 (COC) of petitioner arguing in the main that the latter misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute her husband, who was declared an independent candidate by the COMELEC. It would appear that James L. Engle's Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) Leyte Chapter President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez (Romualdez). However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law Department the authorization of Romualdez to sign the CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as independent candidates.6 For this reason, private respondent charged petitioner with violation of Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of an independent candidate. He argued that petitioner's declaration that she was a member of the political party, Lakas-CMD, was intended to deceive the electorate that she was qualified to substitute her husband. Additionally, private respondent claimed that "[t]he false representation of the [petitioner] that she is qualified for public office consisted of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In petitioner's Verified Answer,8 she countered that: (1) the ground relied upon in private respondent's petition was not the ground contemplated by Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523; (2) the COMELEC did not issue an official declaration that petitioner's husband was an independent candidate; and (3) James L. Engle's CONA was signed by an authorized person acting on behalf of LAKAS-CMD.
With regard to her first counter-argument, petitioner posited that, under Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, the exclusive ground for denial or cancellation of a COC is the falsity of a material representation contained therein that is required by law. Private respondent's assertion that petitioner's statement in her COC regarding her affiliation with a political party was such a false representation is "absurd" considering that her CONA was signed by Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. and Mr. Raul L. Lambino, President and Senior Deputy Secretary-General of Lakas-CMD, respectively. Assuming the veracity of private respondent's allegations, his contention that petitioner is disqualified to run as a substitute is not a proper subject of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC. The qualification or disqualification of a candidate is allegedly covered by Sections 12, 68, 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In petitioner's view, the petition to cancel her COC is dismissible according to the second paragraph of Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which provides that "[a] petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed."
As for petitioner's counter-arguments on the substantive issues, she contended that there was no official declaration from the COMELEC that her deceased husband was an independent candidate. Private respondent's reliance on a mere print out of the COMELEC website listing her husband as an independent candidate was misplaced as the same cannot be considered authoritative as opposed to official documents that showed James L. Engle's nomination by Lakas-CMD and his acceptance of said nomination to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte under the banner of Lakas-CMD. Moreover, petitioner stressed that Romualdez was authorized to sign James L. Engle's CONA. She attached to her Verified Answer a copy of the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dated September 11, 2012 which was signed by Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (National President) and Jose S. Aquino II (Secretary-General) of Lakas-CMD in favor of Romualdez.
The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC was still pending with the COMELEC Second Division when the May 13, 2013 Elections were held. James L. Engle's name remained on the ballot. On May 15, 2013, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a certificate of canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for Babatngon Mayor and Vice-Mayor9 wherein petitioner was declared as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner was credited with the Six Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Seven (6,657) votes cast for her husband as against private respondent's Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifteen (3,515) votes.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It was only on July 5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate the assailed Resolution which denied due course to and cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner's previous proclamation as duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of private respondent as winner of the contested position. The dispositive portion of the July 5, 2013 Resolution is reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to DENY DUE COURSE to and/or CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Respondent MARCELINA S. ENGLE for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte, for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. Moreover, Respondent MARCELINA S. ENGLE's proclamation as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte is hereby ANNULLED. Accordingly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers for the municipality of Babatngon, Leyte; andLet the Executive Director implement this Resolution.11chanrobleslaw
2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to immediately notify the parties, reconvene and proclaim Petitioner WINSTON B. MENZON as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for LACK OF MERIT. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is AFFIRMED.12chanrobleslaw
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT ENGLE DID NOT COMMIT ANY MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON EVEN THOUGH NO LEGAL GROUND EXISTS TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL ENGLE'S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS CASE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED DUE COURSE TO AND CANCELLED PETITIONER'S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY EVEN THOUGH THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON IS CLEARLY THE WRONG LEGAL REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE SUPPOSED INVALIDITY OF PETITIONER'S SUBSTITUTION THUS VIOLATING ENGLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT ROMUALDEZ HAS NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN THE CON A OF LAKAS-CMD's CANDIDATES IN LEYTE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON AND PENALIZED THE PETITIONER FOR AN OMISSION DONE BY ANOTHER PARTY AS THIS RUN CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RES INTER ALIOSACTA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryVI
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER ENGLE CANNOT VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE HER DECEASED HUSBAND, JAMES L. ENGLE, AS THE LAKAS-CMD CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryVII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED AND BYPASSED THE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE BY IGNORING THE OVERWHELMING AND PROMINENT NUMBER OF VOTES OBTAINED BY ENGLE DURING THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED MAY 13, 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryVIII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE PROCLAMATION OF MENZON, THE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, FOR THE POSITION OF VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I.
THE NAME AND SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF THE PARTY OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THE CONA SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE COMELEC WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED IN RESOLUTION NO. [9518].chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryII.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CANDIDATES THEMSELVES KNEW OF RESOLUTION NO. 9518 AS IT WAS THE GUIDELINES PROMULGATED FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE MAY 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIII.
OTHER CANDIDATES WERE SIMILARLY DEEMED INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION NO. 9518.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIV.
THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST THE SUBSTITUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE WHO DIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION IS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryV.
PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VOTED FOR IN THE MAY 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryVI.
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HER COC WAS CANCELLED BY THE COMELEC.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryVII.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY COMELEC IN CANCELLING PETITIONER'S COC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- Whether or not petitioner Engle can validly substitute for her late husband James Engle who was an independent candidate for Vice- Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte;
- Whether or not private respondent (sic) the Commission En Bane erred in ordering the proclamation of private respondent Menzon as the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte;
- Whether or not the Commission En Bane erred in granting private respondent's Petition in the absence of a finding of material misrepresentation of this case; [and]
- Whether or not petitioner's prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or status quo ante order and/or preliminary injunction is meritorious.18
I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S COC WAS VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE COMELECchanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryII
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE HER HUSBAND JAMES L. ENGLE AFTER HIS UNEXPECTED DEMISEchanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIII
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN BE VALIDLY PROCLAIMED AS VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE DESPITE HAVING PLACED ONLY SECOND IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a [candidate] shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a candidate's COC refers to a material fact relating to the candidate's qualification for office such as one's citizenship or residence. Thus, citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC and Lluz v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court, in the case of [Ugdoracion], Jr. v. COMELEC, et al, ruled as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIn case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x.
x x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain [s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a material representation, the court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
x x x x
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Official Candidates of a Political Party / Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) of the official candidates of the duly registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be, in five (5) legible copies, attached to and filed simultaneously with the Certificate of Candidacy. The CONA shall also be stamped received in the same manner as the Certificate of Candidacy.
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed and attested to under oath, either by the Party President, Chairman, Secretary-General or any other duly authorized officer of the nominating party and shall bear the acceptance of the nominee as shown by his signature in the space provided therein.
For this purpose, all duly registered political parties or coalition of political parties shall, not later than October 1, 2012, submit to the Law Department, the names and specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of their official party nominations.
No duly registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be allowed to nominate more than the number of candidates required to be voted for in a particular elective position; otherwise, in such a situation, all of the nominations shall be denied due course by the Commission. (Emphases supplied.)
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate. Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a candidate's eligibility and fitness for office. Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the following clarification:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryWe distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will.
Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC provided the following test:
[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. (Citations omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been questioned before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done. In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, the Court held that the "will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the [election], but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy."33chanrobleslaw
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 42-54.
2 Id. at 55-68.
3 Id. at 78-79.
4 Id. at 81.
5 Id. at 69-76.
6 Id. at 145-146.
7 Id. at 72.
8 Id. at 86-96.
9 Records, p. 134.
10 Rollo, p. 44.
11 Id. at 63-64.
12 Id. at 53.
13 Id. at 14-16.
14 Id. at 190-193.
15 Id. at 207-225.
16 Id. at 212-213.
17 Id. at 228-244.
18 Id. at 232.
19 Id. at 59.
20 373 Phil. 896, 908 (1999).
21Romualdez had previously sent a letter to the Municipal Election Officer of Babatngon, Leyte informing the latter of the death of James L. Engle and submitting the certificate of candidacy of petitioner as a substitute candidate. Romualdez's letter was forwarded by the Municipal Election Officer to the COMELEC Law Department.
22Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 690 (2004).
23Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
24 Id.
25 Section 77 provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. ~ If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. (Emphasis supplied.)
26 Section 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 provides:
Sec. 15. Substitution of Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of Certificates of Candidacy, an official candidate of a duly registered political party or coalition of political parties dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute of a candidate who has withdrawn on or before December 21, 2012 may file his Certificate of Candidacy for the office affected not later than December 21, 2012, so that the name of the substitute will be reflected on the official ballots.
No substitution due to withdrawal shall be allowed after December 21, 2012.
The substitute for a candidate who died or is disqualified by final judgment, may file his Certificate of Candidacy up to mid-day of election day, provided that the substitute and the substituted have the same surnames.
If the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute candidate may file his Certificate of Candidacy with any Board of Election Inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for Senator, with the Law Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila, provided that the substitute and the substituted candidate have the same surnames. (Emphasis supplied.)
27Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134, 148.
28Luna v, Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, 214 (1918).
29 636 Phil. 753, 792-793 (2010); reiterated in Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, 288.
30 COMELEC Resolution No. 9385 issued on April 3, 2012.
31 443 Phil. 649, 655-656 (2003).
32Sinaca v. Mula, supra note 20 at 912.
33 Id. at 913-914.
34See, for example, Alialy v. Commission on Elections, 112 Phil. 856, 860 (1961).
35 Supra note 27.
36Sinaca v. Mula, supra note 20 at 912.