SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207355, February 03, 2016
JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE AND ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND JOHN I.C. TURALBA, ACTING DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
This Office finds that the delay in the preliminary investigation of OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218 could not be validly attributed to respondent Casimiro, whose participation in the disposition of the case is his initial review as Director, submission of the Memorandum of 7 July 2005 and the Information in accordance with the Resolution dated 12 April 1996, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, and his approval of the final resolution of the case by delegated authority and of the various Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the accused, now docketed as SB-09-CRM-0184 to 0189 of the Sandiganbayan.On the issue of whether Casimiro and Turalba violated the rules on confidentiality, the OP stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Office agrees with respondent Casimiro that as a mere Director of a Bureau of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and other Law Enforcement Offices and who was thereafter appointed Deputy Ombudsman only on December 16, 1999, he had every right to presume regularity in the investigation of the case.
In fact, no less than the Office of Legal Affairs of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluded that the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 had never become final.
x x xx
No delay, therefore, may be attributed to respondent Casimiro who came across the records of the case nine (9) years after he signed the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 recommending the filing of informations to his superior, if the Office of the Ombudsman itself never considered that the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 as final and executory.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Memorandum dated January 5, 2010 is not confidential or classified information within the ambit of R.A. No. 6713 and R.A. No. 3019.On 2 November 2011, the OP denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.26 On 28 November 2011, they filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to set aside the decision of the OP.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Therefore, Director Turalba could not be faulted for his act of furnishing a copy thereof to respondent Casimiro who was the subject of the investigation which the complainants sought to be conducted. On the other hand, respondent Casimiro cannot be blamed for issuing the Memorandum dated January 18, 2010 directing complainants to explain their action, in view of the latter's insinuation that it was by his fault that the preliminary investigation of OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218 had been prolonged.25cralawred
As correctly raised by respondent Casimiro, the delay, if any, was necessitated by the layers of preliminary investigation and multiple reviews conducted by the concerned authorities in the Office of the Ombudsman over a period of time under different leaderships starting from Ombudsman Desierto, to Ombudsman Marcelo and thereafter, to Ombudsman Gutierrez. It must be emphasized that for his part, respondent Casimiro concurred with the findings of his subordinates, Almazan and Falcis, who conducted the preliminary investigation against Acot and company, and who issued the 12 April 1996 Resolution recommending the filing of appropriate criminal Informations against the latter. This, in turn, was recommended for approval by Casaclang, respondent Casimiro's immediate superior, to Ombudsman Desierto.In a Resolution dated 23 May 2013,28 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration29 filed by petitioners on 21 December 2012. Thereafter, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was timely filed on 19 June 2013.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
From the foregoing factual antecedents, it becomes evident that upon review of the 12 April 1996 Resolution, the charges against Acot and Dulinayan were approved for dismissal by Ombudsman Desierto, and not for the filing of Information as recommended and concurred with by Almazan and Falcis, and respondent Casimiro, respectively. Thus, respondent Casimiro cannot be faulted in the delay, if any, in filing the appropriate criminal Informations against Acot and Dulinayan considering that Ombudsman Desierto overruled the recommendations and concurrence by the Investigators and Casimiro as to the finding of probable cause against the said military officials. Simply put, there was nothing to be filed before the Sandiganbayan against Acot and Dulinayan after the approval and modification of the 12 April 1996 Resolution as the charges against them were approved for dismissal.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS NOT VIOLATED BY RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION;
B. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD AS AGAINST RESPONDENT CASIMIRO FOR THE DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218 (SB-09-CRM-0184-0189), AND AGAINST RESPONDENTS CASIMIRO AND TURALBA FOR VIOLATION OF OFFICE ORDER NO. 05-18, OFFICE ORDER NO. 05-13, VIOLATION OF SEC. 35 OF R.A. 6770 AND SEC. 3 (K) OF R.A. 3019;
C. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE COMPLAINANT WAS BY REASON OF THE "DELAY" IN FILING THEIR COMMENT IN SB-09-CRM-0184-0189, TO THE MOTION TO QUASH SEPARATELY FILED BY ACCUSED ACOT AND DULINAYAN;
D. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, BUT CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS PREVIOUS RULINGS;
E. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13;
F. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON VARIOUS ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS, SUCH AS:1. WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN C.A. G.R. 114210 ENTITLED JENNIFER AGUSTIN-SE ET AL. VS. INTERNAL AFFAIRS BOARD ET AL.;
2. TO RULE ON THE ISSUE THAT RESPONDENT [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT] ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE COMPLAINANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY REASON OF THE DELAY IN FILING THEIR COMMENT IN SB-09- CRM-0184-0189;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE RESPONDENT [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT] IS CORRECT THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO THE UNDUE INJURY CAUSE [SIC] TO THE PEOPLE AND TO PETITIONERS.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight - all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryMoreover, it is well-settled that as a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts.36 Thus, absent the recognized exceptions to this general rule, this Court will not review the findings of fact of the lower courts.37 In this case, petitioners failed to show that the exceptions to justify a review of the appreciation of facts by the Court of Appeals are present.
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryMoreover, as the report of the ODESLA is merely recommendatory in nature, its absence does not negate the validity of the decision of the OP. There is nothing in EO No. 13 which states that the lack of recommendation of the ODESLA renders the OP's decision in an administrative case void. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process.Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.x x x x
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 7. Conditions for Protected Disclosure. -The 5 January 2010 Memorandum does not meet the conditions set forth in Section 7; and thus, it does not qualify as a protected disclosure under the rules. The Memorandum fails to meet the first requirement as the disclosure, while made voluntarily and in writing, was not executed under oath. Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, there is also no indication that the document was to be treated as confidential. If indeed they had intended that the Memorandum be considered of a confidential nature, they should have indicated it clearly, such as by putting the word "confidential" on the face of the document. This they failed to do; and thus, the Memorandum was treated as a regular office memorandum.
Whistleblowers shall be entitled to the benefits under these Rules, provided that all the following requisites concur:
(a) The disclosure is made voluntarily, in writing and under oath;
(b) The disclosure pertains to a matter not yet the subject of a complaint already filed with, or investigated by the IAB or by any other concerned office; unless, the disclosures are necessary for the effective and successful prosecutions, or essential for the acquisitions of material evidence not yet in its possession;
(c) The whistleblower assists and participates in proceedings commenced in connection with the subject matter of the disclosure; and
(d) The information given by the whistleblower contains sufficient particulars and, as much as possible, supported by other material evidence.
Section 1. OMB officials and employees shall not disclose any confidential information acquired by them in the course of their employment in the Office. Pursuant to Section 7(c) of Republic Act 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, they shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public either: (1) to further their private interest or give undue advantage to anyone; or (2) to prejudice the public interest, x x x.To reiterate, the 5 January 2010 Memorandum was bereft of any confidential character - it was not a protected disclosure nor did it contain any confidential or classified information as provided under the law. As such, Turalba could not have violated any rules on confidentiality when he provided Casimiro with a copy of the said Memorandum.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).In turn, malicious prosecution has been defined as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this jurisdiction, the term malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.Based on the foregoing, we see that the elements of malicious prosecution are wanting in this case. Based on the Complaint filed by Casimiro before the IAB, there had been probable cause for him to initiate the charges against petitioners. It is of record that petitioners had indeed filed several motions for extension of time, and that instead of filing the necessary Comment, they had submitted the 5 January 2010 Memorandum. This could have constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service or gross neglect of duty. Moreover, when they were asked by Casimiro to explain their actions, they did not respond, but merely submitted another Memorandum, addressed to Villa-Ignacio, which were considered actions that evinced resistance to authority.49 In fact, the IAB found petitioners guilty of Simple Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and were reprimanded for their conduct.50 Thus, the gravamen of malicious prosecution - the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless - was absent on the part of Casimiro.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice - an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As correctly pointed out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is not binding on its other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions that form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, at the time petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before this Court.Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the subject matter in CA-G.R. No. 114210 is different from the issues involved in this case. While this petition involves the administrative complaint filed by petitioners against Casimiro in relation to the alleged failure of Casimiro to file the Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others, the petition involved in CA-G.R. No. 114210 is the administrative complaint filed by petitioners which relates to the delay incurred by petitioners in filing the necessary pleadings before the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in not taking judicial notice of CA-G.R. No. 114210.
Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not giving due deference to the said Decision of its co-division, and its actuation cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.54 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 45-65. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.
3 Id. at 66-67. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.
4 Id. at 481-496. Signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
5 Id. at 149-166.
6 Id. at 67-169.
7 Id. at 170-171.
8 Id. at 207-208.
9 Id. at 178-179.
10 Id. at 180-194.
11 Id. at 128-142, 144-148.
12 Id. at 195.
13 Id. at 197-198.
14 Id. at 209-219.
15 Id. at 220-222.
16 Id. at 227-234.
17 Id. at 242-244.
18 Id. at 246-250.
19 Id. at 257-264.
20 Id. at 97-127.
21 The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
22Rollo, pp. 97-127.
23 Id. at 481-496.
24 Id. at 493-494.
25 Id. at 495.
26 Id. at 497-498.
27 Id. at 58-59. Emphasis in the original.
28 Id. at 66-67.
29 Id. at 68-96.
30 Id. at 12-13.
31 See Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas v. Limbaco, 670 Phil. 274 (2011).
32 See Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631 (2010).
33Rollo, pp. 12-13.
34 See Office of the Ombudsman v. De Villa, G.R. No. 208341, 17 June 2015.
35Angeles v. Pascual, 673 Phil. 499, 505 (2011).
36Angeles v. Pascual, 673 Phil. 499 (2011).
37 In Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 200, 208 (2005), this Court, citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, recognized the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
38Hon. Flores v. Atty. Montemayor, 666 Phil. 393 (2011).
39 Series of 2010, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary."
40 691 Phil. 624 (2012).
41 Id. at 639-642.
42 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
43 Section II (a), Office Order No. 05-18, 24 January 2005.
44 Section II (b), Office Order No. 05-18, 24 January 2005.
45 "Retaliatory Action" pertains to negative or obstructive responses or reactions to a disclosure of misconduct or wrongdoing taken against the whistleblower and/or those officials and employees supporting him, or any of the whistleblower's relatives within the fourth civil degree either by consanguinity or affinity. It includes, but is not limited to, civil, administrative or criminal proceedings commenced or pursued against the whistle blower and/or those officials and employees supporting him, or any of the whistleblower's relatives within the fourth civil degree either by consanguinity or affinity, such as forcing or attempting to force any of them to resign, to retire and/or transfer; negative performance appraisals; fault-finding; undue criticism; alientation; blacklisting; and such other similar acts.
46 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
47 Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or48Magbanua v. Junsay, 544 Phil. 349, 364-365 (2007).
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
49Rollo, p. 412.
50 Id. at 413.
51Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009).
52Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, 673 Phil. 12 (2011).
53Quasha Ancheta Peña Nolasco Law Office v. CA, 622 Phil. 738 (2009)
54 Id. at 748-749.