BRION, J. - DISSENTING OPINION -G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016 - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.; G.R. NOS. 221698-700 - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ, Respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.
G.R. NOS. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
" ... Several years ago a permanent resident of the United States came back to the Philippines and was elected to a local office. A protest was lodged against him on the ground of lack of residence. The evidence submitted was his green card, and it was irrefutable. The Supreme Court ruled that his permanent and exclusive residence was in the United States and not in the municipality where he had run and won. His election was annulled.
Where a former Filipino citizen repents his naturalization and decides to resume his old nationality, he must manifest a becoming contrition. He cannot simply abandon his adopted country and come back to this country as if he were bestowing a gift of himself upon the nation. It is not as easy as that. He is not a donor but a supplicant.
In a sense, he is an apostate. He has renounced Philippine citizenship by a knowing and affirmative act. When he pledged allegiance to the adopted country, he also flatly disavowed all allegiance to the Philippines. He cannot erase the infidelity by simply establishing his residences here and claiming the status he has lost.
The remorseful Filipino turned alien by his own choice cannot say that he sought naturalization in another country only for reasons of convenience. That pretext is itself a badge of bad faith and insincerity. It reflects on his moral character and suggests that he is not an honest person. By his own admission, he deceived his adopted country when he pretended under oath to embrace its way of life." [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
" .. .[t]he procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [Poe] is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the May 9, 2016 National Elections."2 [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
"The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of [Poe] should be denied due course or cancelled 'on the exclusive ground' that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.x x x x
x x x as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified 'is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.3
x x x The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by judgment of a competent court or tribunal."4
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification 'provided by law or the Constitution, ' neither can the [CoC] be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false material representations regarding his or her qualifications, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which falsity of representation can be found. The only exception that can be made conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions xx x [which] are equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined". 5
(1) the Comelec did not have the authority to rule on Poe's citizenship and residency qualifications as these qualifications have not yet been determined by the proper authority.
(2) since there is no such prior determination as to Poe's qualifications, there is no basis for a finding that Poe's representations are false;
(3) while a candidate's CoC may be cancelled without prior disqualification finding from the proper authority, the issues involving Poe's citizenship and residency do not involve self evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the falsity of representation could have been determined; and
(4) The COMELEC's determinations on Poe's citizenship and residency are acts of grave abuse of discretion because:
(a)Poe's natural-born citizenship is founded on the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution, domestically recognized presumptions, generally accepted principles of international law, and executive and legislative actions; and
(b) Poe's residency claims were backed up not only by jurisprudence, but more importantly by overwhelming evidence.
Case | Ponente , Division | Ruling: |
Aratea v. Comelec | Carpio, J. En banc | The Court affirmed the Comelec's determination that Lonzanida has served for three terms already and therefore misrepresented his eligibility to run for office; this, according to the Court, is a ground for cancelling Lonzanida's CoC under Section 78. |
Maquiling V. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 | Sereno, CJ, En banc | The Court reversed the Comelec's determination of the Arnado's qualification to run for office because of a recanted oath of allegiance, and thus cancelled his Coe and proclaimed Maquiling as the winner. The Court, in reviewing the Comelec's determination, did not dispute its capacity to determine Arnado's qualifications. |
Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 | Perez, J., En Banc | The Court affirmed the Comelec's evaluation and determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is not a Philippine citizen and a resident of the Philippines. It even upheld the Comelec's cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" and held that the Comelec can liberally construe its own rules of procedure for the speedy disposition of cases before it. |
Cerafica v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014 | Perez, J. En Banc Decision | The Court held that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia; in so doing, the Court quoted and reaffirmed its previous ruling in Luna v Comelec, thus: "If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code." |
Luna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007 (cited as reference to its affirmation in Cerafrica) | Carpio, J. En Banc | Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. xxx If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna's certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid. |
Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certifcate of Candidacy. -
A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed;
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,[21] and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.[23] It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake:
x x x x
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. [25] In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. xxx
B.1.a. Effect of the ponencia's misinterpretation of
Section 78 proceedings to the Court's certiorari
jurisdiction over the present case
If we were to follow the ponencia's limitation on the COMELEC's function to determine Poe's eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poe's citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.
In practical terms, the Court's ruling only assured Poe the chance to run; conceivably, if she wins, the Court, through the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, will then rule that the people have spoken and that they cannot be denied their voice after the elections. Based on the present circumstances, this is a scenario that cannot be entirely ruled out.
To reiterate, the ponencia declared that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine, even preliminarily, the eligibility of candidates prior to an election under a Section 78 proceeding, except for disqualifications already or previously acted upon by the proper authorities or where the facts are self-evident or of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the falsity of representation could readily be determined.
Since the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction "to rule and cannot even preliminarily determine questions of eligibility, then the issues involving the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in ruling on Poe's eligibilities cannot effectively be resolved except through a ruling that, given the lack of authority, it was grave abuse of discretion for COMELEC to rule as it did. And given the same lack of authority, the reversal of the cancellation of her CoC must follow as a consequence. Thus, her CoC effectively remains valid.
The consequence of ruling that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of a Section 78 proceeding is that any other subsequent discussions by this Court upholding Poe's eligibilities would be obiter dicta, or pronouncements that are not essential to the resolution of a case. With the COMELEC stripped of the jurisdiction to determine, even preliminarily, Poe's citizenship and residence, then its determinations are null and void, leading to the further conclusion that this Court no longer has any issue left to review and to decide upon as neither would it be necessary to determine Poe's eligibilities.
In other words, any pronouncements outside the COMELEC's limited jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELEC's opinion and would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if still necessary at that point.
B.1.b. Aruego's account of the deliberations,
as cited in the ponencia
Ironically, the ponencia's citation of Jose M. Aruego's recounting of the deliberations even reinforces my position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution's parentage provisions. Aruego allegedly said:During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.50
Aruego's account of the deliberations reinforces my position for the following reasons:
First, Aruego said that "this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation."
In saying this, Aruego also recounted that many, if not most, of the majority of those who voted against the inclusion of foundlings in the 1935 Constitution believed that the matter of their citizenship should be governed by statutory legislation because the cases of foundlings are too few to be included in the Constitution.
Thus, the principle of international law on foundlings is merely supportive of the primary reason that the matter should be governed by statute, or is a secondary reason to the majority's decision not to include foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.
Notably, both the text of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention and the account of its member Jose Aruego do not disclose that the intent behind the non-inclusion of foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution was because they are deemed already included.
What deliberations show is that a member of the Convention thought that it would be better for a statute to govern the citizenship of foundlings, which Aruego, in his subsequent retelling of what happened in the deliberations, described as the primary belief of the majority. At the very least, there was no clear agreement that foundlings were intended to be part of Article IV, Section 1.
The ponencia's ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who do not enjoy similar roots.
Another drastic change appears to be coming for no clear and convincing legal reason in the present case: Section 78 would now be emasculated despite established rulings by this very Court on what the COMELEC can undertake within its Section 78 jurisdiction.
A close reading of Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, also penned by J. Perez as above noted, will show that the issues the COMELEC decided there were practically the same issues in this cited case. Yet, the Court's majority in the present case holds that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on the issues of a candidate's citizenship and residence requirements in the course of a Section 78 proceeding, despite its previous affirmation of the same COMELEC power in Ongsiako-Reyes also in a Section 78 proceeding. Have established precedents been sacrificed to achieve desired results?
But the worst impact yet on the Constitution is the discovery that this Court can play around even with the express wordings of the Constitution. While this may already be known to those in the legal profession, the reality becomes glaring and may be a new discovery for the general public because of the recent EDCA case; the present case and ruling may very well be considered another instance of judicial tinkering with the express terms of the Constitution.B.1.c. Burden of Proof.
A contested issue that surfaced early on in these cases is the question: who carries the burden of proving that the petitioner is a natural-born Philippine citizen?
Lest we be distracted by the substance of this question, let me clarify at the outset that the cases before us are petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 (in relation to Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. In these types of petitions, the petitioner challenges the rulings/s made by the respondent pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. Thus, it is the petitioner who carries the burden of showing that the respondent, the COMELEC in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion.
Of course, in making the challenged ruling, the COMELEC had a wider view and had to consider the parties' respective situations at the outset. The present private respondents were the petitioners who sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC and who thereby procedurally carried the burden of proving the claim that Poe falsely represented her citizenship and residency qualifications in her CoC.
I would refer to this as the procedural aspect of the burden of proof issue. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) - from the perspective of procedure - carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material representations; she claimed in her CoC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen when she is not; she also claimed that she has resided in the Philippines for ten years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, when she had not. The original petitioners had to prove what they claimed to be false representations.
Thus viewed, the main issue in the case below was the false material representation, which essentially rested on the premises of citizenship and residence - is Poe a natural-born citizen as she claimed and had she observed the requisite qualifying period of residence?
The original petitioners undertook the task on the citizenship issue by alleging that Poe is a foundling; as such, her parents are unknown, so that she is not a Philippine citizen under the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
Poe responded by admitting that indeed she is a foundling, but claimed that the burden is on the original petitioners to prove that she is in fact a foreigner through proof that her parents are foreigners.
Since Poe indeed could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen.
The same process was repeated with respect to the residency issue, after which, the COMELEC ruled that Poe committed false representations as, indeed, she is not a natural-born Philippine citizen and had not resided in the country, both as required by the Constitution.
These were the processes and developments at the COMELEC level, based on which the present Court majority now say that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for not observing the rules on the burden of proof on the citizenship and the residency issues.
Separately from the strictly procedural aspects of the cancellation of CoC proceedings, it must be considered that the petitioner, by filing a CoC, actively represents that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the office she is running for.
When this representation is questioned, particularly through proof of being a foundling as in the present case, the burden should rest on the present petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born Philippine citizen, a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately prior to the election, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a registered voter. This is the opportunity that the COMELEC gave Poe to the fullest, and I see no question of grave abuse of discretion on this basis.
From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are.51 By conferring citizenship on a person, the State obligates itself to grant and protect the person's rights. In this light and as discussed more fully below, the list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive.
Thus, this Court has held that any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.52In other words, citizenship cannot be presumed; the person who claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a Filipino.53 It is only upon proper proof that a claimant can be entitled to the rights granted by the State.54
This was the Court's ruling in Paa v. Chan55 where this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
The Court further explained that the exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen. A person, otherwise disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy the right or privilege of a Philippine citizen by representing himself to be one.56
Based on these considerations, the Court majority's ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus, the Court majority's positions on where and how the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioner's own burden of proof in the present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail.
PART C
MY ORIGINAL "SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION"
TO THE ponencia OF
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. [Article VII, 1987 Constitution, emphasis and underscoring supplied]
(a) what is the status of a foundling under the 1935 Constitution given that this is the governing law when Poe was found in September of 1968.
(a) was she qualified to apply under RA No. 9225 given that the law specifically applies only to former natural-born citizens;
(b) even granting arguendo that she can be considered natural-born, did she - under RA 9225 - reacquire her natural-born status or is she now a naturalized citizen in light of the constitutional definition of who is a natural-born citizen?
DATE | Particular's (with legal significance) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 3, 1968 | The date Poe was found; her parentage as well as the exact date and actual place of birth are unknown. Poe claims that she was born on this date when Edgardo Militar found her at the Jaro Iloilo Cathedral.57 • Legal significance: Our Constitution requires a President to be a natural-born citizen. Poe admitted that she is a foundling (i.e., one born of unknown parents)58and later claimed that she is a natural-born citizen.59 • She made her representation on the basis of a claimed presumption of Filipino citizenship (apparently stemming from the circumstances under which she was found [on September 3,1968 in Jaro Iloilo])60and on the basis of international law which allegedly gave her natural-born citizenship status. • Poe never formally claimed that she is presumed a Filipino citizen under Philippine adoption laws, although adoption was mentioned in passing in her Memorandum.61 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 6, 1968 | Emiliano reported Poe as a foundling with the Office I of the Civil Registrar (OCR) in Jaro, Iloilo for registration.62 • Legal significance: official record that Poe is a foundling. No legal question has been raised about this document. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
November 27, 1968 | The OCR issued the foundling certificate under the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."63 • The Original Certificate of Live Birth dated November 27, 1968 contains the notation· 'foundling" and now appears to have erasures, to reflect apparently the subsequent adoption of Poe by Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1973 | When Poe was five years old, Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe filed a petition for Poe's I adoption.64 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 13, 1974 | The Court approved the Spouses Poe's petition for adoption. Poe's name was changed to "Mary Grace Sonora Poe.65 • Legal Significance: She officially assumed the status of a legitimate child by adoption of the Spouses Poe, but the adoption did not affect her citizenship status; under P.D. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), the adopted child does not follow the citizenship of the adopting parents.66 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In 2006 | • Significantly, no question arose regarding Poe's legal capacity to be adopted as the law likewise does not bar the adoption of an alien.67 • Jesusa Sonora Poe registered Poe's birth and secured a birth certificate from the National Statistics Office on May 4, 2006. The certificate did not reflect that she was a foundling who had been adopted by the spouses Poe.68 The changes were in accordance with Adm. Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the Implementing Rules on the Civil Registry Law, and P.D. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) which specifically allows the confidential treatment of the adoption. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 13, 1986 | The Comelec issued a voter's identification card to Poe for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila 69 • Legal Significance: The records of the case do not disclose the documents Poe used to support her voter registration, but she must have surely claimed to be a Filipino citizen; otherwise, the voter's ID would not have been issued.70 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
April 4, 1988 | Poe Obtained her Philippine Passport No. F92728771 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She renewed her passport on April 5, 1993 (Passport i No. L881511) and on May 19, 1998 (Passport No. I DD155616).72 • Legal Significance: She could have been granted a passport only if she had applied as, and claimed that she is a Filipino citizen.73 Filipino citizenship is expressly stated on the faces of the passports .74 • The exercise of the rights of a Filipino citizen does not ripen to nor can it be the basis for claim of Filipino citizenship.75 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 29, 1991 | Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an American citizen of Filipino extraction) in the Philippines on July 27, 1991.76 • Legal Significance: Her US. residency status did not affect the Philippine citizenship status reflected in her passport and voter's ID, but affected her Philippine residency status as soon as she applied for and was granted US. residency status. Specifically, she abandoned the Philippine domicile that she had from the time she was found.77 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 18, 2001 | Poe became a naturalized United States (US.) citizen.78 • Legal significance: Poe lost whatever claim she had to Philippine citizenship through "express renunciation of the citizenship.79 U.S. citizenship confirmed her abandonment of the Philippine citizenship whose rights she had been exercising, as well as her Philippine residence.80 • Note that in her oath to the U.S., she "absolutely and entirely renounce[d] and abjure[d] all allegiance and fidelity ... to any state ... of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen." (This was the "infidelity" that the Return of the Renegade quotation, above, referred to.) • She turned her back on the Philippines under these terms. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 19, 2001 | Poe obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793, expiring on December 18, 2011.81 • Legal Significance: Part of her right as a U.S. citizen. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 18, 2001 to July 18, 2006 | Various travels of Poe to the Philippines before she applied for Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225. She used her U.S. Passport and entered the Philippines through Philippine Balikbayan visas.82
• Legal Significance: During this period, Poe - an American citizen - was a visitor who had abjured all allegiance and fidelity to the Philippines; she was not a Filipino citizen or a legal resident of the country. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 7, 2006 | She took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines.83 • Legal Significance: The start of the process of reacquiring Filipino· citizenship by an alien under RA No. 9225. The process assumes that the applicant was a NATURAL-BORN Philippine citizenship before she lost this citizenship. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July l0, 2006 | Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) applications for: (a) reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225; and (b) derivative citizenship for her three minor children.84 • Legal Significance: RA No. 9225 is available only to former natural-horn Filipino citizens.85 Thus, the validity of her RA No. 9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship depended on the validity of her natural-born citizenship claim. • She falsely represented under oath in her RA No. 9225 application that she was a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was the daughter of Ronald and Susan Poe, thereby also concealing that she had been a foundling who was adopted by the Spouses Poe, not their natural-born child. As an adopted child, she could not have been a natural-born citizen who followed the citizenship of the Spouses Poe under the rule of jus sanguinis. • This false material representation became the basis for her subsequent claim to be a natural-born citizen, notably in her MTRCB appointment, her election to the Senate and her present candidacy for President. The COMELEC 's ruling on Poe 's CoC for President is now the subject of the present petitions. • Despite the privilege under the adoption laws and rules86 to keep the fact of adoption confidential, she still had the duty to disclose her foundling status under RA No. 9225 because this is material information that the law mandatorily requires to be made under oath as a condition for the application of the law.87 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 18, 2006 | The BID approved Poe's application for Philippine citizenship and the applications for derivative citizenship for her three children.88 • Legal Significance: The approval of Poe's RA No. 9225 application, on its face, entitled her to claim dual citizenship status - Philippine and American.89 • To quote the BID Order approving Poe's application - "the petitioner was a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to Filipino parents ...." This Order immeasurably facilitated Poe's subsequent claim to natural-born status. • The present case is not the medium to question validity of the BID approval, but still lays open the question of whether Poe committed false material representations in the application process - a question of fact that the COMELEC ruled upon, 90 i.e., that she falsely represented that she had been a natural-born citizen. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 31, 2006 | The BID issued to Poe her Identification Certificate No. 06-1091891 pursuant to RA No. 9225 in relation with Administrative Order No.91, series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
August 31, 2006 | Poe registered again as voter in Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.92 • Legal Significance: Under RA No. 9225, a dual citizen can vote but cannot be voted upon to elective position unless a renunciation of the other citizenship is made.93 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 31, 2006 | Poe obtained Philippine Passport No. XX473199.94 • Legal Significance: The passport was issued after the approval of Poe's RA No. 9225 citizenship and was therefore on the strength of the approval made. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 18, 2006 - October 13, 2009 (The date of the | Poe travelled abroad using her U.S. passport; the BID stamped the entry "RC" and/or "IC No. 06- 10918" for her travels to and from the Philippines on these dates:95
• Legal Significance: The BID allowed Poe to enter and leave the country as "RC." Atty. Poblador mentioned that "RC" means "resident citizen" to claim the marking as evidence of continuing res id ency. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 6, 2010 | Poe was appointed Chair of the MTRCB.96 • Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR CB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born citizen.97 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 20, 2010 | Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and citizenship to comply with RA No. 9225's requirements.98 • Legal Significance: Her renunciation of US. Citizenship complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 and would have made her a "pure" Filipino citizen if she had validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under this law.99 • A seldom noticed aspect of this renunciation is that Poe only renounced her U.S. citizenship because it was required by her appointment and subsequent assumption to office at the MTRCB. 100 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 21, 2010 | Poe took her Oath of Office for the position of MTRCB Chairperson.101 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 26, 2010 | Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of the MTRCB Chairperson.102 • Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR CB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born Filipino Citizenship.103 U.S. government actions on the renunciation of U.S. citizenship that Poe made. The U.S. immigration noted in Poe's passport that she repatriated herself on this date.104 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 12, 2011 | Poe executed the Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of U.S. Nationality at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.105 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 9, 2011 | She also executed a Statement of Voluntary Relinquishment of U.S. Citizenship.106 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
February 3, 2012 | The U.S. Vice Consul signed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the U.S.107 The U.S. Department of State approved the Certificate of Loss of U.S. Nationality.108 • Legal significance: Confirmatory renunciation, before U.S. authorities, of her previous renunciation under RA No. 9225. Up until these series of acts, Poe was a dual citizen. • Legally, this was the conclusive evidence that she had abandoned her U.S. domicile, as a traveler carrying a purely Philippine passport, she could no longer travel at will to and from the U.S.. nor reside in that country. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 2, 2012 | Poe filed her CoC for Senator for the May 13, , 2013 Elections; she stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.109 • Legal Significance: This is another case involving the material representation of being a · natural-born Filipino, having been born to Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. • She was elected Senator without any question about her citizenship being raised. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
November 18, 2015 | The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) (voting 5 to 4) issued its Decision110 dismissing the Quo Warranto petition of Rizalito David which was based on the claim that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. • Legal Significance - The SET ruling does not bind nor bar the COMELEC from ruling on the cancellation of CoC petitions because these tribunals are different, the cause of actions before them are different, and the parties are likewise different. • Significantly, the dissents at the SET were wholly based on legal considerations - on the Constitution, on international law, and Philippine statutes. The SET majority ruling relied more on political considerations. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 15, 2015 | Poe filed her CoC111for PRESIDENT for the May 9, 2016 Elections; she signed the statement under oath that she is a NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN. • Legal Significance: This is the citizenship issue in the present case which posed to the Comelec 2 sub-issues: First . Is Poe a natural-born Filipino citizen After considering her foundling status, her Acquisition of U.S. citizenship and the consequent loss of her claimed natural-born Philippine citizenship, and her alleged reacquisition under RA No. 9225? Second . Since she claimed she was a natural-born citizen, did she commit false material representations in her CoC and in the official documents supporting her claim? If she did, should this false material representation lead to the cancellation of her CoC? Given the succession of falsities that Poe made on her natural-born status, may the COMELEC be faulted with GAD for ruling as it did? • Ironically, she claims in the present CoC cancellation case that the grant by the Philippines of her right to vote, her passport, and her appointment to the MTRCB should be· considered evidence of government recognitions of her natural-born Philippine citizen status.112 She thus wants her very own misdeeds to be the evidence of her natural-born status. • The previous false claims open the question: could they count as evidence of natural-born status if they have all been rooted on documents that were based on misrepresentations? • More importantly, could her election or appointment to public office have worked to automatically grant or restore her Philippine citizenship? • While the fact of adoption is confidential information in the Amended Certificate of Live Birth (but must appear in the Registry of Birth), the grant of confidentiality is not an absolute shield against the disclosure of being a foundling nor a defense against false representation. While in RA No. 9225, the natural-born requirement is a statutory one that arguably stands at the same level and footing as the confidential privilege on the law on adoption, in the present case, the natural-born requirement is a constitutional one that stands on a very much higher plane than the confidentiality privilege. In the latter case, national interest is already plainly involved in electing the highest official of the land. • Note, too, that in Frivaldo v. COMELEC,113 the Court ruled that the election of a former Filipino to office does not automatically restore Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. "The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.114 |
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Underscoring supplied)
First, what is the scope and extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding?
Second, given the scope and extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding, did it gravely abuse its discretion in its interpretation and application of the law and jurisprudence to the evidence presented before it?
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
x x x the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.218
(i) an inquiry into the standards for eligibility (which are found in the law and in jurisprudence);
(ii) the application of these standards to the candidate; and
(iii) the representations he or she made as well as the facts surrounding these representations.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision. [italics supplied]
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. [italics supplied]
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one 's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. [emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. [italics and underscoring supplied]
Section 4. Contents and Form of Certificate of Candidacy. - The COC shall be under oath and shall state:
a. office aspired for;xxxx
g. citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized;xxxx
k. legal residence, giving the exact address and the number of years residing in the Philippines x x x;x x x x
n. that the aspirant is eligible for said office;x x x x
t. that the facts stated in the certificate are true and correct to the best of' the aspirant's knowledge;x x x x
The COC shall be sworn to before a Notary Public or any official authorized to administer oath. COMELEC employees are not authorized to administer oath, even in their capacities as notary public. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is predominantly political, six Senators and three Justices of the Supreme Court. The Philippine Constitution did not strictly demand a strictly legal viewpoint in deciding disqualification cases against Senators. Had the intention been different, the Constitution should have made the Supreme Court also sit as the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The fact that six Senators, elected by the whole country, form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal would suggest that the judgment of the whole Filipino nation must be taken into consideration. [Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Finally, it is important for the public to understand that the main decision of the SET and my separate opinion are limited to the issues raised before it. This does not cover other issues raised in the Commission on Elections in connection with the Respondent's candidacy as President or issues raised in the public fora.
The Supreme Court | COMELEC |
Republic Act No. 1793 (1957): Sec. l. There shall be an independent residential Electoral Tribunal to be composed of eleven members which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines x x x x | Commonwealth Act No. 607 ( 1940), Sec. 2: The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. It shall decide save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections x x x |
1935 Constitution (as amended m 1940), Art. X, Sec. 2: The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. Xxx | |
Batas Pambansa Big. 884 (1985), Sec. 1: There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, to be composed of the nine members which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and the VicePresident of the Philippines.xx x | 1973 Constitution, Art. XII-C, Sec. 2: The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions: 1. Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. xxxx 3. Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of votes. |
1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4: x x x x The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. | 1987 Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2: The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and Regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. x x x x (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote , all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. |
1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 7: x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the Aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt o r a copy thereof. | 1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. I: The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. |
Executive Order 292 ( 1987), Book V, Title I, Subtitle C, Chapter 1, Sec. 2: Powers and functions. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, and shall: (20) Have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motuproprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant. Notwithstanding the pendency of any pre-proclamation controversy, the Commission may, motuproprio or upon filing of a verified petition and after due notice and hearing, oder the proclamation of other winning candidates whose election will not be affected by the outcome of the controversy. |
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.244 [emphases and italics supplied]
III.A.1. Article IV, Section 1ofthe1935 Constitution does not, on its face, include foundlings in listing the "citizens of the Philippines."
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality of the place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law, footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281; Garcia's Quizzer on Private International Law, p. 270) which in this case, is the Philippines. Consequently, Eddy Howard may be regarded as a citizen of the Philippines for passport purposes only if he desires to be a full-fledged Filipino, he may apply for naturalization under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535. [emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied]
However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality of the place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law, footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281) which in this case, is the Philippines. Consequently, Anthony Satan Hale may be regarded as a citizen of the Philippines, and entitled to a passport as such.
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked.253
Español | English |
SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda, Senor Presidente. Propongo que despues def inciso 2 se inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos natura!es de un padre extranjero y de una madre filipina no reconocidos por aquel, x x x x EL PRES/DENTE: La Mesa desea pedir una aclara. cion def proponente de la enmienda. ;,Se refiere Su Senoria a hijos naturales o a toda clase de hijos ilegitimos? SR. RAFOLS: A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. Tambien se incluye a los hijos naturales de padres conocidos, y los hijos naturales o ilegitimos de padres desconocidos. SR. MONTINOLA: Para una aclaracion. Alli se dice "de padres desconocidos. "Los Codigos actuates considera como filipino, es decir, me re__fzero al Codigo espanol que considera como espano!es a todos los hijos da padrea desconcidos nacidos en terrilorio espanol, porque la presuncion es que el hijo de padres desconocidos es hijo de un espanol, y de igual manera se podra aplicar eso en Filipinas, de que un hijo de padre desconocido y nacido en Filipinas se considerara que es filipino. de modo que no hay necesidad . .. SR. RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque estamos relatando las condiciones de los que van a ser filipinos. SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la interpretacion de la ley ahora, de manera de que no hay necesidad de la enmienda. SR. RAFOLS: La enmienda debe leerse de esta manera: "Los hijos naturales o ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y de una madre filipina, no reconocidos par aquel, o los hijos de padres desconocidos. " x x x x SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter to the hands of the Legislature? (original in English) SR. ROXAS: Senor Presidente, mi opinion hum ii de es que estos son casos muy insignificantes y contados, para que la Constitucion necesite referirse a ellos. Por las /eyes internacionales se reconoce el principio de que los hijos o las personas nacidas en un pais y de padres desconocidos son ciudadanos de esa nacion, y no es necesario incluir en la Constitucion una disposicion taxativa sobre el particular. x x x x EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a votacion dicha enmienda. Los que esten conformes con la misma, que digan Si. (Una minoria: Si.) Los que no lo esten, que digan No. (Una mayoria: No.) Queda rechazada la enmienda. | MR. RAFOLS: For an amendment, Mr. Chairman. I propose that after the paragraph 2, the following be inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized that" x x x x THE PRESIDENT: The Board wishes to request a clarification to the proponent of the amendment. Does His Honor· refer to natural children or any kind of illegitimate children. MR. RAFOLS: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes the natural children of unknown parentage, and natural or illegitimate children of unknown parentage. MR. Montinola: for clarification. They are called "of unknown parents." The Codes actually consider them Filipino, that is, I mean the Spanish Code considers all children of unknown parents born m Spanish territory as Spaniards because the presumption is that the child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard; this treatment can likewise be applied in the Philippines so that a child of unknown father born in the Philippines is Filipino, so there is no need ... MR. RAFOLS: There is a need, because we are relating those conditions to those who are going to be Filipinos. MR. Montinola: But that's the lay interpretation of law now, so there is no need for the amendment.
x x x x MR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter to the hands of the Legislature? MR. ROXAS: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these are very insignificant and rare cases for the Constitution to refer to them. Under international law the principle that children or people born in a country and of unknown parents are citizens of that nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include in the Constitution an exhaustive provision on the matter. x x x x THE PRESIDENT: The Chair places the amendment to a vote. Those who agree with the amendment, say Yes. (A minority: Yes.) Those who do not, say No. (the majority: No.) The amendment is rejected. |
(1) | another member of the 1934 Constitutional Convention provided for a different reason for not including foundlings in the enumeration of citizens under Article IV, i.e., that the· matter should be left to the discretion of the legislature; |
(2) | Mr. Roxas' statement could in fact reasonably be construed to be in support as well of this alternative reason; what is certain is that Mr. Roxas did not support the Rafols proposal; |
(3) | Mr. Roxas's view is only one view that was not supported by any of the members of the Constitutional Convention, and cannot be considered to have been representative of the views of the other 201 delegates, 102 of whom were also lawyers like Mr. Roxas and might be presumed to know the basics of statutory construction; |
(4) | references to international law by members of the Constitutional Convention cannot, without its corresponding text in the Constitution, be considered as appended to or included in the Constitution; |
(5) | Poe's position is based on an interpretation of a lone observation made in the course of the constitutional debate; it is not even an interpretation of a constitutional provision; |
(6) | the deemed inclusion would have rendered paragraph 3 of Section 1 absurdly unfair as foundlings would be considered Filipino citizens while those born of Filipina mothers and foreign fathers would have to undertake an election; and lastly, |
(7) | the sovereign Filipino people could not be considered to have known and ratified the observation of one member of the Constitutional Convention, especially when the provisions which supposedly reflect this observation do not indicate even a hint of this intent. |
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. [Emphasis supplied]
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. [emphasis supplied]
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. [emphasis and italics supplied]
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. [Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Article 15.
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
III.A.6(a). Generally accepted principles of
international law.
It is not for International Law, but for Municipal Law to determine who is, and who is not considered a subject.284
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a) [emphases supplied]
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) a bona fide intention to remain there; and
(3) a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile.
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. [emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)
Unless a change of domicile is validly effected, one
with reacquired Filipino citizenship acquires the right to reside in the
country, hut must have a change of domicile,· otherwise,
he is a Filipino physically in the Philippines hut is
domiciled elsewhere.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 [28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.306 [underscoring supplied]
In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.307 [underscoring supplied]
"[Ty's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under [RA] No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence /domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.308
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.309
Endnotes:
1 Philippine Daily Inquirer,' Return of the Renegade" Mar. 4, 1995.
2 See p. 16, par. I of the ponencia.
3 Seep. 20, last paragraph of the ponencia.
4 See p. 21, par. I of the ponencia.
5 See p. 21, par. 2 of the ponencia.
6 See p. 4 of J. Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.
7 See p. 22, par. I of the ponencia.
8 See p. 2 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
9 See p. 10 of J. Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.
10 See p. 22, par. 2 of the ponencia.
11 Seep. 22, par. 2 of the ponencia.
12 Seep. 22, par. 3 of the ponencia.
13 See p. 22-23 of the ponencia
14 See p. 24-28 of the ponencia.
15 See p. 24, par. I of the ponencia.
16 See p. 26, par. I of the ponencia.
17 See pp. 27-28 par. 2 of the ponencia.
18 See p.25 of the first circulated version of J. Jardeleza's Opinion.
19 See p. 28, pars. I and 2 of the ponencia.
20 Seep. 66 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
21 See p. I and p.66 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
22 See page 68 of the originally circulated opinion.
23 See pp. 28-29 of the ponencia.
24 See pp. 29- 30 of the ponencia
25 See pp. 30-32 of the ponencia
26 See pp. 33, pars. 2 and 3 of the ponencia.cralawred
27 See pp. 34-36 of the ponencia
28 See p. 35, par. 2 of the ponencia.
29 See pp. 36-39 of the ponencia.
30 See p. 39. Par. 2 of the ponencia.
31 See discussions on pp. 38-39 of the ponencia on these points.
32 See p. 86 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
33 See discussions on pp. 84 to 87 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
34 See pp. 39-40 of the ponencia.
35 See discussion on pp. 41-44 of the ponencia on these points.
36 See discussion on pp. 41-44 of the ponencia on these points.
37 See pp. 17-18 of the ponencia.
38 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
39 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.cralawred
40 See p. 19 of the ponencia.
41 See p. 20 of the ponencia.
42 See pp. 20 - 21 of the ponencia.
43 Ibid.
44 G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
45 595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).
46Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 543 - 544.
47 G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007.
48Cerajica v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
49 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.
50 See p. 26 of the ponencia, citing I Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 209 (1949).
51 Alexander Marie Stuyt, The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals to Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction (2013), p. 101.
52 Gov. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451 (2009).
53 Ibid.
54 J. Bernas SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 1st edition (1987), p. 500, citing Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
55Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815 (1967).
56 Ibid.
57 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "l" (both of Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "l" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
58 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 10, 12 (pars. 12 and 13), 109-120 (subsection 8.3), 112 (par. 148), and 120 (par. 156); and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 6, 7, 15 (par. 17), 79-89 (subsection 8.3), 84 (pars. 122 and 122.l), and 87 (par. 125).
59 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 9, 10, 94 (subsection 8), 97-109 (subsection 8.2), 109-120 (subsection 8.3), 153 (par. 202), 156 (par. 204.8), and 157 (par. 205); and petition in· G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 5, 24 (par. 47), 55-59 (subsection 8 and 8.1 ), 69-76, 79-89, and 141-146 (subsection B.11).
60 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 104-108 (pars. 136-138); and petition in G.R. No. 221698- 700, pp. 72-76 (pars. 106-108).
61 See Paragraph 4.23.8 of Poe's Memorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration, both in the Tatad case, Annexes "N" and "U" of G.R. No. 221698-700.
Paragraph 4.23.8 stated:
ii. Official acts in recognition of Respondent's [Poe's] Philippine citizenship
4.23.8. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan Court issued a Decision granting the Spouses Poe's petition to adopt Respondent. Article 15 of the Civil Code states that "(l)aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Respondent does not argue, and has never argued, that her adoption by the Poe spouses conferred citizenship on her. However, the adoption affirms that Respondent was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court could not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to "family rights and duties" and to "status" of persons), if it did not in the first place, consider Respondent to be a Filipino who would be "bound" by such laws.
Page 24 of Poe's Motion for Reconsideration, on the other hand, read:
30.6. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan Court issued a Decision granting the Spouses Poe's petition to adopt Respondent. Respondent does not argue that her citizenship is derived from her Filipino adoptive parents; rather it is her position that the adoption affirms that she was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court could not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to "family rights and duties" and to "status" of persons), if it did not in the first place, consider Respondent to be a Filipino who would be "bound" by such laws.
62 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "l" (both of Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "1" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
63 Foundling Certificate (LCR 4175), Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "1" (both of Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibit "I" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
64 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, par. 19.
65 MTC Decision, Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "2" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "2-A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
66 Art. 39(1) of PD 603.
67 See Articles 337 and 339 of the Civil Code and Section 2, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. - the governing laws and rules on adoption at the time Grace Poe was adopted by the spouses Poe. Articles 337 and 339 provides who may be adopted; impliedly, they allow adoption of aliens, save those aliens whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. Section of Rule 99, on the other hand, enumerates the contents of a petition for adoption; the petition does not require allegation that the child is a Philippine citizen.
68 See NSO Birth Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "10" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "10" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
69 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, par. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "3" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "3" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
70 See Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution. It reads:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. [Emphasis supplied]
71 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 13; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, 17. Annex "Mseries'', Exhibit "4" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "4" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
72 Annex "M-series", Exhibits "4-A" and "4-B" (ofTatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "4-A" and "4-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
73 Section 5 of RA No. 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) pertinently states:
SECTION 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. - No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements:
a) A duly accomplished application form and photographs of such number, size and style as may be prescribed by the Department;
x x x x
g) If the applicant is an adopted person, the duly certified copy of court order of adoption, together with the original and amended birth certificates duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General shall be presented: Provided, That in case the adopted person is an infant or a minor or the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents, an authority from the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be required: Provided, further, That the adopting foreign parents shall also submit a certificate from their embassy or consulate that they are qualified to adopt such infant or minor child xx x. [emphases supplied]
74 Section 3(d) of RA No. 8239 states: "x x x (d) Passport means a document issued by the Philippine Government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and protection.
See Poe's Philippine passport issued on May 19, 1998, October 2009, and March 18, 2014; and her Diplomatic passport issued on December 19, 2013, Annex "M-series" in GR Nos. G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series in GR No. 221697.
75 Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815, 824 (1967).
76 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18.
77 See Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861, 872-873 (2002); Romualdez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 328-329 (1995), citing Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Ouray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034, 1042 (1975); Caraballo v. Republic, 114 Phil. 991 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-798 (1976).
78 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18.
79 " I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; .that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. "
Source: The Immigration and Nationality Act of the U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization (last accessed on February 15, 2016).
80 See the Immigration and Nationality Act of the U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization (last accessed on February 7, 2016).
81 Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
82 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
83 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 24. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "19" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "13" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
84 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 25. Annex "Mseries", Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "14" and "15" to "15-B" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
85 See Section 3 of RA No. 9225. It pertinently reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
x x x x
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. [Emphases supplied]
86 Art. 38 of PD 603.
87 M.C. No. Aff-04-01, Secs. 2-5 and 8.
88 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
89 The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEAL TH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".
See also Section 2 of RA 9225. It states:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
See also excerpts of Congress deliberations on RA 9225 in AASJS v. Hon. Datumanong, 51 Phil. 110, 116-117 (2007).
90 See December 23, 2015 Comelec en banc resolution in the Elamparo case, Annex "B" of G.R. No. 221697; and December 23, 2015 Comelec en banc resolution in the Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez cases, Annex "B" ofG.R. No. 221698-700.
91See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26. Poe's Identification Card was signed by signed by Commission Alipio Fernandez: Annex "M-series", Exhibit "23" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "17'' (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "23" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
92 See also the Identification Certificates of her children: Annex "M-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23- C" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "17-A" to "17-C" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23-C" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
93 RA No. 9225, Sec. 5(1) and (2).
94 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26. Annex "I-series", Exhibit "25" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697; and Annex "M-series", Exhibit "25" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700.
95 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series"', Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
96 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "19" (of Contrera/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "26" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
97 See Sections 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5, 1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:
Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral character and standing in the community xx xx. [emphasis supplied]
98 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 22; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "27" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "21" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
99 See Japzon v. Comelec, 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
100 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21, par. 49; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 26-27, par. 54.
Under Sec. 5(3) of RA No. 9225, "[t]hose appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath." 'Emphases and underscoring supplied]
101 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "29" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "!- series", Exhibit "29" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
102 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "20" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibit "26-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
103 See Sections 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5, 1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:
Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral character and standing in the community xx x. [emphasis supplied]
104 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
105 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 24; petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 30. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "30" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "22" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "30" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
106 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "30-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "23" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "30-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
107 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "31" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 2216971.
108 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "31" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
109 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "32" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "32" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
See also Come lee en banc December 11, 2015 resolution in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15- 007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), pp. 43 and 47, Annexes "A" and "Bin G.R. No. 221698- 700.
110 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "43" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "43" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
111 See petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 62-63 and 70-72. Annex "C" both in G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-700.
112 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 102-104; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 69-72.
113 255 Phil. 934 (1989).
114 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 255 Phil. 934 (1989).
115 US citizenship acquires requires a prior period of permanent residence in that country.
116 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate (LCR 4175), Annex "M-series", Exhibit "I" (both of Tatad and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "I" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
117 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 14, and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, par. 19.
118 MTC Decision, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "2" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "2-A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
See also OCR Certification of receipt of MTC Decision, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "2-B" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
119 See Tolentino, A. (1960). Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.I, pp. 651-652, in relation top. 624.
120 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, par. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "3" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "3" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
121 See Article V, Section I of the Constitution.
122 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 17.
123 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 15, 17.
124 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034, 1042 (1975); Caraballo v. Republic, 114 Phil. 991, 995 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-798 (1976).
125 Ibid.
126 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18.
127 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14, par. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 17, par. 24.
128 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18.
129 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 17.
130 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18.
131 See Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
132 Romualdez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 328-329 (1995), citing Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651-652 (1928); Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034 (1975); Caraballo v. Republic, 114 Phil. 991, 995 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-798 (I 976).
133 See US Immigration and Nationality Act. htt.ps://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenshipthrough-naturalization (last accessed on February 7, 2016).
134 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 20.
135 Jurisprudence tells us that absence from one's residence to pursue study or profession someplace else does not amount to abandonment of that residence (Supra note 7). Analogously, it can be argued that resignation from one's employment does not ipso facto translate to abandonment of residence (in cases where the place of employment is the same as the place of residence).
136 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 18-19. See also Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
137 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 19.
138 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 19.
139 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 19-20.
140 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. See Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
141 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" and "7-A" to "7-F" (of Tatad case), and Exhibits "3" and "3-A" to "3-F" (of Contreras and Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" and "7-A" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
142 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 20.
143 Oral Arguments, January 19, 2016.
144 See Coquilla v. Comelec, 434 Phil. 861, 875 (2002).
"Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (I) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only." [emphasis supplied]
145 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "6-series" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "2-series" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-series" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
146 See Romualdez v. RTC. G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415-416.
147 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 20.
148 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 21. See also Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Tatad case) and Exhibits "3" to ''3-F" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case), in G.R. No. 221697.
149 See Section 9(f) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, Executive Orders No. 423 (signed in June 1997) and Executive Order No. 285 (signed in September 4, 2000).
In 2011, the Bureau of Immigration records show that the Philippines had more than 26,000 foreign students enrolled in various Philippine schools; more than 7,000 of these are college enrollees while the rest were either in elementary and high school or taking short-term language courses (see http://globalnation.inguirer.net/978 l/philippines-has-26k-foreign-students last accessed on February 12, 2016).
See also The International Mobility of Students in Asia and the Pacific, published in 2013 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/ Documents/international-student-mobility-asia-pacific-education-2013-en.pdf (last accessed on February 12, 2016); and Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning Overseas Filipinos http://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/ handbook/Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning Overseas Filipinos-chapterlV.pdf (last accessed on February 15, 2016).
150 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "8" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "4" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "8" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
151 Romualdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415-416.
152 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "II" and "12" in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "5" and "6" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
153 Section 5 of RA No. 4726 reads:
Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid ifthe concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.
See also Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 558 Phil. 683, 698-699 (2008).
154 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 2. Annex"!- series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697; Annex "M-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (ofT atad case), Exhibits "2-series", "9" and "9-A" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700.
155 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23.
156 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "16" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "10" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "16" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
157 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "13 and 14" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "7" and "8" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "13'' and "14" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
158 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "17" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "II" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
159 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "17" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "I I" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
160 "AN ACT TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, PRESCRIBE THE PROCEDURES FOR REGISTERING ENTERPRISES DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES", enacted on March 28, 1996.
Section l 0 of RA No. 7042, as amended by R.A. 8179, states:
SEC. l 0. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. - Any natural born citizen who has Jost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. [emphasis supplied]
161 Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by Jaw. [emphasis supplied]
162 See Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279; ponencia, pp. 45-47.
163 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 24. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "19" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "13" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
164 See Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-006 or the "2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004.
165 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "14" and "IS" to "15-B" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
166 See Section 3 of RA 9225. It pertinently reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
x x x x
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied]
167 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
168 The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".
See also Section 2 of RA 9225. It states:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
See also excerpts of Congress deliberations on RA 9225 in AASJS v. Hon. Datumanong, 51 Phil. II0, 116-117 (2007).
169 See the cases of Japzon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331; and Caballero v. Comelec. G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
170 R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. See Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267.
171 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "23" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "17'' (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit ''23" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
172 See Annex "M-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23-C" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "17-A" to "17-C" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23- C" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
173 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "24" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "18" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "24" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
174 See Article V, Section I of the Constitution.
175 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.
176 Under Section 3 of R.A. 6768, as amended, a balikbayan, who is a foreign passport holder, is . entitled to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year, with the exception of restricted nationals.
177 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
178 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
179 Grace Poe's Identification Certificate Number.
180 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "25" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "25" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
181 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "19" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "26" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
182 See Sections 2, 3, and 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5, 1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:
Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be appointed by the President of t:ie Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (I) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. xxx
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral character and standing in the community x x x
Section 3 of PD No. 1986, on the other hand, enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the MTRCB Board, while Section 5 enumerates the powers of the Chairman of the Board who shall likewise act as the Chief Executive Officer of the Board.
183 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 22; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "27" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "21" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
184 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21, par. 49; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 26-27, par. 54.
185 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "29" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "(- series", Exhibit "29" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
186 See Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "26-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "20" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "26-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
187 See Sections 2, 3, and 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5, 1985.
Section 2 pertinently provides:
Section 2. Composition; Qualifications, Benefits - The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (2 I) years of age, and of good moral character and standing in the community x x x
Section 3 of PD 1986, on the other hand, enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the MTRCB Board, while Section 5 enumerates the powers of the Chairman of the Board .who shall likewise act as the Chief Executive Officer of the Board.
188 See Comelec en banc December 11, 2015 resolution in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), pp. 43 and 47, Annexes "A" and "Bin G.R. No. 221698-700. See also petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 168.
189 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "33" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I- series", Exhibit "33" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
190 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "34" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex"!- series", Exhibit "34" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
191 See petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 62-63 and 70-72. Annex "C" both in G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-700.
192 Sections 78 and 52, in relation with Sections 74 and 63 of the Omnibus Election Code.
193 See Article IX-C, Section 2 in relation with Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section I provides in no categorical terms:
SECTION I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [emphases supplied]
194 See Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003).
195 63 Phil. 139, 158-59 (1936).
196Beluso v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456; Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157707, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 156, 163; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 158780-82, October 12, 2004, 440 SCRA 206, 212.
197Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 386.
198 Justice Puno 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil: 586, 740 (2003) citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
199 Justice Puna 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
200Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338 (2007).
201 Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitutiun of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, (2003), pp. 136-137.
202 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, l 8 (1939).
203 Bernas, id. note 1, at 137.
204 See J. Leonardo-De Castro, Concu1Ting Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. I 79267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 435.
205 J. Panganiban, Dissenting Opinion. Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, 392.
206 Bernas, S.J. The l 987 Constitution of the Rep11blic of the Philippines: A Commentary, (2009), p. 139.
207 J. Carpio-Morales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 699 SCRA 352, 435.
Examples of these so-called "quasi-suspect" classifications are those based on gender, legitimacy under certain circumstances, legal residency with regard to availment of free public education, civil service employment preference for armed forces veterans who are state residents upon entry to military service, and the right to practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been qualified and licensed.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 J. Leonardo-De Castro, Concurring Opimon in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 435. Emphasis supplied.
212 J. Brion, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014.
213 Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237.
214 Article II, Section 1 states that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
Following the definition of the concept of "state" provided under Article I of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the elements of a state: people, territory, sovereignty, and government.
Bernas defines "people" as "a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining continued existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law." On the other hand, he defines "sovereignty" as "the competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political, technical and financial capabilities to do so." (See Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, (2009), pp. 40 and 54, respectively).
Cruz, citing Malcolm, defines it as "a people bound together by common attractions and repulsions into a living organism possessed of a common pulse, common intelligence and inspiration, and destined apparently to have a common history and a common fate." While he defines "sovereignty" as "the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that state is governed." (Cruz, Constitutional Law, (2007), pp. 16 and 26, respectively).
215 J. Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 699 SCRA 352, 435.
216People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
217 G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 45.
218Bedol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. 179830, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 554, 570-71.
219 Salcedo II v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447; Lluz and Adeloesa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456.
220 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.
221 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 326.
222 706 Phil. 534 (2013).
223 Id. at 551.
224 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 392-400.
225 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
226 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.
227 See Civil Code, Art. 8. See also Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 704-705; Cabigon v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 168030, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 149, 156-157; Hacienda Bino/Hortencia Starke, Inc., G.R. No. 150478, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 300, 309.
228 See Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Phlippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 760; Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa, G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011, 641 SCRA 572, 581. See also Pasiona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165471, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 137.
229 See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 473 (2009). See also Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367; Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-23446, December 20. 1971, 42 SCRA 561, 565; Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 877-878.
230 Palaran v. Republic, 4 Phil. 79 (1962).
231 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
232 G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267.
233 581 Phil. 657 (2008).
234 An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same (21 June 1957).
235 Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168 (1966).
236 1973 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2.
237 An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes (1985) .
238 B.P. 883, Sec. I.
239Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277; Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
240 Art. VI, Sec. 17.
241 G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
242 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
243 318 Phil. 329 ( 1995).
244 595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).
245Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003); Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173 (2012).
246 193 5 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1:
"Section I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
247 Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 649.
248 This is also the prevailing rule under Section 1 (2), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
249Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 73 Phil. 307 (1941 ); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952); Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil 421 (2004).
250 A. Scalia and B. Gamer. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012 ed.), p. 93.
251 CA No. 473.
252 115 Phil. 657 (1962).
253People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657, 668-69 (1962).
254 See Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. 460 Phil. 830, 887 (2003).
255 CONSTITUTION, Article Vil, Section 21.
256 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil: 386, 399 (2003).
257 M. Magallona. "The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and Approaches in Philippine Practice" 85 Philippine Law Journal 1, 2 (2010).
258 See: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 212-213 (2000).
259 Ibid.
260 Signed by the Philippines on May 23, 1969 and ratified on November 15, 1972. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, March 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 512. Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20l155/volume-1155-1-18232-English.pdf
261 Id. at 339.
262 Section 5, (2)(a), Article VIII provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
x x x x
263 See: I. Cortes and R. Lotilla. "Nationality and International Law From the Philippine Perspective" 60(1) Philippine Law Journal I, 1-2 (1990); and, M. Magallona. "The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and Approaches in Philippine Practice" 85 Philippine law Journal I, 2-3 (2010).
264 CONSTITUTION, Article Vlll, Section 4('2) on the power of the Supreme Court to nullify a treaty on the ground of unconstitutionality. See also: M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 6-7.
265 M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 4, citing Ichong v. Hernandez, 10I Phil. 1156 (1957).
266 See: M. Dellinger. "Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The Deprivation of Democratic Rights by Nation States Not Recognizing Dual Citizenship" 20 Journal of Transnational law & Policy41, 61 (2010-2011).
267 See: M. Bussuyt. "Guide to the"Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" Martinus Nijhojf Publishers (1987).
268 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Available from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html
269 See: Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note I 04, at 577.
270 See: J. von Bemstorff. "The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Tum to Rights in International Law" 19(5) European Journal of International Law 903, 913-914 (2008).
271 See: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. I, 50-51 (2008) and Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra Note 104 at 577.
272 J Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, 735 SCRA 208, 209; citing E. Posner and J. L Goldsmith, "A Theory of Customary International Law" ( 1998). See also Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600-605 (2009).
273 See CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2.
274 See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque Ill, 561 Phil. 386, 399 (2003).
275 See: M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 2-3.
276Razon v. Tagitis, supra note I 19, at 601.
277 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b). Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p I =4&p2=2
278 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra note 115, at 199.
279 Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. b76, 687 (2009).
280 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2 in relation to CIVIL CODE, Article 8.
281 See: K. Hailbronner. "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law," EUDO Citizenship Observatory, (2006). Available at http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/chapter1 Hailbronner.pdf
282 See: P. Weiss. "Nationality and Statelessness in International Law" Sijthojf & Noordhojf International Publishers B. V., (1979).
283 Ibid
284 I. Oppenheim, International Law 643 (8th ed. 1955).
285Metropolitan Bank Corporation v. Tobias, supra note 63, at 188-189.
286 CIVIL CODE, Title VIII, Chapter I.
287 Id., Article 255
288 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
289 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
290 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
291 See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995).
292 Thus, for purposes of determining venue for filing personal actions, we look to the actual address of the person or the place where he inhabits, and noted that a person can have more than one residence. We said this in light of the purpose behind fixing the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions, which is to provide rules meant to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other of the courts of justice.
293Limbona v. Comelec, 578 Phil. 364 (2008).
294 619 Phil. 226 (2009). See also Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
295 See Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larazzabal v. Commission on Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167 (2009).
296 See Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167 (2009) and Jalosjos v. Comelec, 686 Phil. 563 (2012).
297 See: Sections 4, 5, 6 & 8 of R.A. No. 9189
298 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
299 301 J02 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
300 Entitled "An Act To Provide For The Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship By Naturalization, And To Repeal Acts Numbered Twenty-Nine Hundred And Twenty-Seven And Thirty-Four Hundred and Forty-Eight", enacted on June 17, 1939.
CA No. 63, as worded, provides that the procedure for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization shall be in accordance with the procedure for naturalization under Act No. 2927 (or The Naturalization Law, enacted on March 26, 1920), as amended. CA No. 473, however, repealed Act No. 2927 and 3448, amending 2927.
301 Entitled "An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization", enacted on June 16, 1950.
302 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS. Approved on October 23, 1995.Prior to RA No. 8171, repatriation was governed by Presidential Decree No. 725, enacted on June 5, 1975. Paragraph 5 of PD No. 725 provides that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. "Note that the repatriation procedure under PD No. 725 is similar to the repatriation procedure under Section 4 of CA No. 63.
303 See Section 3 of RA 9225. It pertinently reads:Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
x x x x
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied]
304 CA No. 473 provides the following exceptions: (1) the qualifications and special qualifications prescribed under CA No. 473 shall not be required; and (2) the applicant be, among others, at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization. Per Section 3 of CA No. 63:"The applicant must also: have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; and subscribe to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject."
Section 7 of CA No. 473. It states in full:Sec. 7. Petition for citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of die Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and, is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
See Section 9 of CA No. 473. It reads:Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. - Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of-the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department of the interior, the Bureau of Justice, the provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and die justice of the peace of the municipality wherein the petitioner resides.
See also Sections 1and2 of RA No. 530 amending Sections 9 and 10 of CA No. 473. They read:SECTION I. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General on his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has (I) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
SEC. 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting citizenship shall be registered and the oath provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled to all the privileges of a Filipino citizen.
And Section 4 of CA No. 4 73 which states:
Sec. 4. Who are disqualified - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
305 G.R. No. L-22041, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 147.
306 434 Phil. 861, 873-875 (2002).
307 434 Phil. 861, 873 (2002).
308 596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009).
309 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
310 Sec. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. - Citizenship may be reacquired: (1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven; (2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status; and (3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
311 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 28-29. See Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
312 R.A. 6768, as amended by R.A. 9174, Section 2(a).
313 Id. at Section 3(c).This visa is issued under the government's "Balikbayan" program instituted under the administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. in addition to the one-year visa-free stay, the program also provides for a kabuhayan shopping privilege allowing tax-exempt purchase of livelihood tools and providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country. The program also intends to showcase competitive and outstanding Filipino-made products.
The program also provides tax-exempt maximum purchases in the amount of USO I ,500, or the equivalent in Philippine and other currency, at Philippine Government-operated duty free shops, and exemption from Travel Tax, provided that their stay in the Philippines is one year or less. If their stay in the Philippines exceeds one year, Travel tax will apply to them.
314Coquilla v. Comelec, 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
315 Bureau of Immigration, Visa Inquiry - Temporary Visitor's Visa. Available at http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inQuiry/temporary-visitor-s-visa.
316 Ibid.
317 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
318 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 21. See also Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Tatad case) and Exhibits "3" to "3-F" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case), in G.R. No. 221697.
319 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 22. Annex "Mseries", Exhibits "11" and "12" in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "5" and "6" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
320 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 24. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "18" (of Tatad case); Exhibit "12" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "18" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
321 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "13 and 14" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "7" and "8" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "13" and "14" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
322 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "17'' (of Tatad case), Exhibit "11" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
323 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "6-series" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "2-series" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-series" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697. See also petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698- 700, p. 20. Also, see petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 2. Annex "I-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697; Annex "M-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "2- series", "9" and "9-A" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700.
324 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "16" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "JO" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "16" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
325 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "8" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "4" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibit "8" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
326 "An Act to Define Condominium, Establish Requirements For Its Creation, And Govern Its Incidents'', enacted on June 18, 1966.
Section 5 of RA No. 4 726 reads:
Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens. or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.
See also Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 588 Phil. 23 (2008).
327 "An Act Amending Section Four And Section Sixteen of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Six, Otherwise Known As The Condominium Act'', approved on February 23, 1995.
328 "AN ACT TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, PRESCRIBE THE PROCEDURES FOR REGISTERING ENTERPRISES !JOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES", enacted on March 28, 1996.
329 See Section 10 of RA No. 7042, as amended by R.A. 8179.
330 See Section 9(t) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, Executive Orders No. 423 (signed in June 1997) and Executive Order No. 285 (signed in September 4, 2000).
331 See Sections 25 and 28(8) of the NIRC.
332 See Comelec's en banc's December 23, 2015 resolution in SPA Nos. 15-002(DC), 15-007(DC) and 15-139(DC), Annex "B" of GR Nos. 221698-700 (Tatad case).
333 In her Memorandum, Poe admitted to owning two (2) houses in the U.S. up to this day, one purchased in 1992 and the other in 2008. She, however, claims to no longer reside in them. Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279.
334 See page 19 of the Comelec en banc 's December 23, 2015 resolution in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) (Elamparo case), Annex "B" of G.R. No. 221697.