1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT No. 2581, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE BLUE SKY LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS; POWERS AND DUTIES OF INSULAR TREASURER UNDER BLUE SKY LAW; PURPOSE OF BLUE SKY LAW; MEANING OF "PUBLIC INTEREST" ’. — Appellants argue that, while Act NO. 2581 empowers the Insular Treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities, no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. We are of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of this Act", and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that n certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with, Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation "is in the public interest." In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2681 — to protect the public against "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitation’s", — we incline to hold that "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. As observed in the case of People V8. Fernandez and Trinidad (G. R. No. 45655, June 15, 1938), "siendo el objeto de la ley el evitar especulaciones ruinosas, es claro que el interes publico, es, y debe ser la razon en que el Tesorero Insular deba basar sus resoluciones." And the torm "public interest" is not without a settled meaning. "Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .’ (New York Central Securities Corporation v. U. S. A., 287 U. S., 12, 24, 25; 77 Law. ed., 138, 145,146.) (See also Schenchter Poultry Corporation v. U. S., 295 U. S., 495, 540; 79 Law. ed., 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini v. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711, 712.) In this connection, we cannot overlook the fact that Act No. 2581 allows an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer to the Secretary of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Insular Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maximum of delegatus non jotest delegare or delegate potestas non potestas delegare, attributed to Bracton (De Legibus et Consuetudinious Angli