EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ], July 26, 2016
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner, v. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ]
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JOSE ROBERTO F. PO, Petitioner, v. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This is a consolidation of the Administrative Complaints which the then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Pag-IBIG Fund/Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), represented by Atty. Jose Roberto F. Po, filed against Hon. Rolando G. Mislang, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 167.
The following are the factual and procedural antecedents of the case:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn October 29, 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted in view of the HDMF's Complaint Affidavit against Delfin S. Lee and other officers of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) for the crime of syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage under Presidential Decree No. 1689, in relation to Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, through the fraudulent take-out of housing loans for fake borrowers. Allegedly, these borrowers had actually no intention to apply for housing loans but were merely paid by Globe Asiatique agents to sign blank loan documents. Said loan documents were then submitted to the HDMF for processing. Because of this fraudulent scheme, the HDMF suffered damages in the amount of about P6.5 Billion. The DOJ then formed a panel of prosecutors to investigate the complaint, which was docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10J-00319 (1st DOJ case). Subsequently, or on November 15, 2010, Lee, together with Globe Asiatique, filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against the HDMF before the Makati RTC.
On December 10, 2010, the NBI Anti-Graft Division recommended that Lee, among others, be charged with the crime of syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage. Thus, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors that would handle the preliminary investigation of the complaint, which was docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10L-00363 (2nd DOJ case). On January 27, 2011, Lee filed a Petition seeking the suspension of the proceedings in the 2nd DOJ case pending the outcome of the Makati civil case, because there were issues in the civil case which purportedly constituted a prejudicial question to the 2nd DOJ case. However, the DOJ panel issued an Omnibus Order dated February 21, 2011 which, among others, denied said petition for lack of common issues and parties. In denying Lee's prayer for suspension, the panel of prosecutors explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At first glance, it may appear that the issues in Civil Case No. 10-1120 are related to the issues in NPS No. XVI-INV-10L-00363, however, a cursory reading of the pertinent records of the two cases will reveal that, in the first, the main issue is the right of GA to replace its buyers pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Funding Commitment Agreement (FCA), and Collection Servicing Agreement (CSA) it entered into with HDMF while, in the second, the matter to be resolved is whether or not respondents are liable for the crime of syndicated estafa. Moreover, there is no commonality of parties in the two cases, therefore, whatever would be the decision of the court in the aforementioned civil case will certainly not affect the resolution of the herein criminal complaint. And this is true since, as shown in the complaint in Civil Case No. 10-1120, the case is not about the sale of the properties to Evelyn B. Niebres, Ronald Gabriel Perez San Nicolas, and Catherine Bacani, rather, the action was filed by GA to compel HDMF to honor the provisions of the MOA, FCA and CSA entered into by the parties and/or compel HDMF to accept the replacement buyers/borrowers as offered by GA.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryLee moved for a partial reconsideration of the abovementioned Omnibus Order but the same was denied. The DOJ panel of prosecutors likewise directed him to file his counter-affidavit. On July 28, 2011, after filing his counter-affidavit, Lee filed a Petition for Injunction (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order or TRO) against the DOJ, which was raffled to the sala of Judge Mislang. Again, Lee sought to suspend the preliminary investigation being conducted by the DOJ in the 2nd DOJ case, and subsequently, to likewise prevent the filing of the Information in the 1st DOJ case. On August 5, 2011, Lee's counsel inquired if the DOJ's counsel would be willing to enter into a stipulation with regard to the existence of the 2nd DOJ case and the Makati civil case. After the counsel of the DOJ had acceded to said request, the parties, with the permission of Judge Mislang, then agreed to submit for resolution the petition for injunction upon submission of their respective memoranda within fifteen (15) days, since there were no longer factual matters that needed to be threshed out in a full-blown trial. However, on August 12, 2011, after Lee had submitted his memorandum the day before, he filed an unverified Urgent Motion for the ex-parte resolution of his application for the issuance of a TRO. Thereafter, without waiting for the DOJ's memorandum, Judge Mislang issued Orders dated August 16, 2011 and August 26, 2011, granting Lee's petition. Thus, the HDMF and the DOJ filed separate complaints, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ and OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ, respectively, against Judge Mislang, alleging that the latter acted in patent disregard of the rules on injunctive relief and prejudicial question, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure, and manifested partiality and gross misconduct in issuing the assailed Orders.
After a thorough and judicious study of the attendant factual and legal milieu, this Court has come to the conclusion that no prejudicial question exists that would justify the issuance by public respondent Judge of the writ of preliminary injunction as both cases before the DOJ can proceed independently of that with the Makati RTC.Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.6 Such, however, is not the case with Judge Mislang. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.7 A judge is presumed to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions.8chanrobleslaw
This Court agrees with petitioner's contention that no prejudicial question exists with respect to the first DOJ case. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. As it was shown that the recommendation by the NBI for DOJ to investigate Lee and other officials of the GA for estafa was filed ahead of the civil case which Lee filed against HDMF before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the doctrine of prejudicial question is untenable in the first DOJ case.
Moreover, it did not escape this Court's attention that when Lee moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the DOJ, in the first DOJ case, ... he did not file a petition for suspension of criminal action by reason of prejudicial question before the panel of DOJ prosecutors, in violation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court... The rule is clear that in filing a petition for suspension of criminal action based upon a pendency of a prejudicial action in a civil action, the same should be made before the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. If an information had already been filed before the court for trial, the petition to suspend should be filed before the court where the information was filed.
Considering that no information has yet been filed against Lee and the action that was brought before the court a quo was one for injunction and damages, the public respondent Judge gravely erred when he took cognizance of Lee's prematurely filed petition and granted his prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Nevertheless, even if the civil case was filed ahead of the first DOJ case, the doctrine of prejudicial question is still inapplicable.
x x x
... (I)njunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and protected for the protection of society. It is only in extreme cases that injunction will lie to stop criminal prosecution. Public respondent Judge anchored his issuance of the writ on the existence of a prejudicial question. However, this Court finds that the facts and issues in the Makati civil case are not determinative of Lee's guilt or innocence in the cases filed before the DOJ. Verily public respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from filing an information of estafa against Lee in the first DOJ case and from proceeding with the preliminary investigation in the second DOJ case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order issued by public respondent Judge dated September 5, 2011 in Civil Case No. 73115-PSG for Injunction is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted for lack of basis both in fact and in law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Endnotes:
1Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369), p. 8.
2 Evaluation and recommendation submitted by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia, dated October 8, 2013.
3Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
4Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
5Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372), pp. 140-141. (Emphasis in the original)
6Peralta v. Judge Omelio, 720 Phil. 60, 86 (2013).
7 Id.
8Caguioa v. Judge Laviña, 398 Phil. 845, 848 (2000).
9 Re: Complaint Against Justice John Elvi S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 418, 438 (2007).
10 522 Phil. 390 (2006).
11Romero v. Judge Mislang, February 6, 2008, First Division Resolution.
12Patawaran v. Judge Mislang, August 12, 2015, Third Division Resolution.
13Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr., 398 Phil. 60, 70 (2000), citing Bureau of Customs v. Ogario, 385 Phil. 928 (2000), further citing Jao v. CA, 319 Phil. 105 (1995).
14 Section 8 of Rule 140 on the Discipline of Judges and Justices, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges, with the following imposable penalties:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;15Supra note 6.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
16Samson v. Judge Caballero, 612 Phil. 737, 752 (2009).