THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199151-56, July 25, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, LT. GEN. LEOPOLDO S. ACOT, B/GEN. ILDEFONSO N. DULINAYAN, LT. COL. SANTIAGO B. RAMIREZ, LT. COL. CESAR M. CARINO, MAJ. PROCESO T. SABADO, MAJ. PACQUITO L. CUENCA, 1LT. MARCELINO M. MORALES, M/SGT. ATULFO D. TAMPOLINO, REMEDIOS "REMY" DIAZ, JOSE GADIN, JR., GLENN ORQUIOLA, HERMINIGILDA LLAVE, GLORIA BAYONA AND RAMON BAYONA JR., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated September 16, 2011 and October 15, 2010 by public respondent Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and to reinstate the six (6) Informations for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" filed against all private respondents.
The assailed Resolution dated October 15, 2010 granted the motions to quash or dismiss filed by private respondents Lt. Gen. Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), B/Gen. Ildefenso N. Dulinayan (Dulinayan), Lt. Col. Santiago B. Ramirez (Ramirez), Lt. Col. Cesar M. Cariño (Cariño), Maj. Proceso T. Sabado (Sabado), Maj. Pacquito L. Cuenca (Cuenca), 1Lt. Marcelino M. Morales (Morales), M/Sgt. Atulfo D. Tampolino (Tampolino) and Remedios Diaz (Diaz). The assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2011 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the October 15, 2010 Resolution and granted the motions to quash filed by respondents Jose Gadin, Jr. (Gadin), Glenn Orquiola (Orquiola), Herminigilda Llave (Llave), Gloria Bayona and Ramon Bayona, Jr.2chanrobleslaw
The motions to quash or dismiss filed by private respondents were premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their constitutional rights to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of the cases.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySometime on December 28, 1994, a letter-complaint was filed by one Carmelita U. Ramirez before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO) alleging, among others, that private respondents conspired and defrauded the government in the amount of Eighty-Nine Million Pesos (P89M) through ghost deliveries.3 The complaint prompted the MOLEO to immediately conduct a fact-finding investigation. It discovered that a similar fact-finding body within the Philippine Air Force, more particularly the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG), found that based on the audit of the AFP's Program and Evaluation and Management Analysis Division (PEMRAD), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership OJ6, there were ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and materials at the 5th Fighter Wing Basa Air Base amounting to P24,430,029.00 and unaccounted supplies and materials worth P42,592,257.61.4chanrobleslaw
On February 22, 1995, the records and report of the OTIG were subsequently forwarded to the MOLEO, after which, MOLEO commenced conducting the preliminary investigation against private respondents.5 The last counter-affidavit was filed on March 11, 1996.6chanrobleslaw
On April 12, 1996, MOLEO Investigator Rudiger G. Falcis prepared a Resolution recommending that all private respondents be indicted for six counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and six counts of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents (Article 217, in relation to Articles 171 and 172, of the Revised Penal Code).7 Then Director Orlando C. Casimiro of the Criminal and Administrative Investigation Bureau concurred in the findings, and the same was recommended for approval by B/Gen Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret), Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.8chanrobleslaw
On July 10, 1996, Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo Mendoza issued a Memorandum recommending the filing of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and the dismissal of the charges for Malversation of Public Funds.9 This Memorandum was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro.10chanrobleslaw
On January 12, 1998, Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo issued a Memorandum recommending the dropping of charges against private respondents Acot and Dulinayan on the ground that the supplies involved were among those that had undergone the regular and proper procedure. This recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on March 2, 1998.11 On even date, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto also approved the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 with the following note - "with the modifications as to the respondents as recommended by SP Tamayo and as to the scope as recommended by the OSP."12chanrobleslaw
On January 12, 1999, the case was subjected to another re-evaluation by the MOLEO.13chanrobleslaw
In 2003, upon the assumption of then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcel o, the case underwent another thorough review upon the recommendation of the MOLEO.14chanrobleslaw
On April 27, 2005, MOLEO, received the records of the case for the preparation of the Informations to be filed with the court.15chanrobleslaw
On July 7, 2005, MOLEO, through its investigation team, issued a Memorandum recommending for another thorough review of the case arguing against the dismissal of the charges against private respondents Acot and Dulinayan.16 The Memorandum was recommended for approval by then Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro.17chanrobleslaw
On September 19, 2005, then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo referred the case to the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) for a thorough review of the case.18chanrobleslaw
On June 25, 2007, a Review Memorandum was prepared by Assistant Special Prosecutor Terence S. Fernando and was recommended for approval by Assistant Ombudsman Dina Joy Tenala containing the opinion of the OLA that "the April 12, 1996 Resolution did not become final and executory and that the doctrine relied upon for the dismissal of the case against Acot and Dulinayan is not applicable and that probable cause exists based on evidence."19chanrobleslaw
On October 23, 2008, then Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro approved the said Review Memorandum.20chanrobleslaw
On October 6, 2009, six Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan docketed as SB-09-CRM-0184 to 189 charging private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
The arraignment was set on November 20, 2009. On November 9, 2009, respondent Dulinayan filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion to Defer Arraignment. On December 1, 2009, respondent Acot filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment. On February 8, 2010, a Motion to Quash/Dismiss and for Deferment of Arraignment was filed by respondents Ramirez, Cariño, Sabado, Cuenca and Morales wherein they adopted the motions of respondents Dulinayan and Acot.21 On February 19, 2010, a Motion to Quash was filed by respondent Tampolino.22chanrobleslaw
In their separate motions to quash, respondents Dulinayan, Acot, Ramirez, Cariño, Sabado, Cuenca and Morales argued, among others, that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated when it took the Office of the Ombudsman almost fifteen (15) years to file their case before the court.
In the Comment or Opposition filed by the petitioner, it stated that the respondents failed to invoke their right which must also be weighed with the right of the State to prosecute citing the case of Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan.23 It further stated that the State should not be bound by the negligent act of its officers, and the laxity in the filing of the case is prejudicial to the State because it stands to lose Eighty-Nine Million Pesos (P89M).
In his Reply, respondent Dulinayan countered that the cited cases of Corpuz and Valencia24 have different factual antecedents. In the said cases, the delay was only one year and there was contributory negligence on the part of the accused. He reiterated that it took more than seven (7) years before the MOLEO requested a review of the Resolution of the Ombudsman and another four (4) years before the Informations were filed. He did not have the opportunity to invoke his right before the Ombudsman because he was not informed of the existence of the cases considering that he was able to secure clearance therefrom. His constitutional rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights take precedence over the rights of the State.
In his Reply, respondent Acot asserted that there was a power play within the Office of the Ombudsman considering that despite prior dismissal of the case against him, it was still subjected to review seven years later and a contrary recommendation was issued after four (4) more years. He claimed that the internal politics in the instant case was akin to the case of People v. Tatad.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
In its Supplemental Comment/Opposition, the petitioner averred that considering the huge amount involved in the case, it had to be reviewed meticulously and scrupulously such that the resolution underwent a hierarchy of review which called for a painstaking and fastidious study of the records of the case.
On October 15, 2010, public respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motions to quash on the ground that the aforesaid private respondents' right to speedy disposition of their cases was unduly violated, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A careful reading of the April 12, 1996 Resolution of the Ombudsman and the Memoranda issued reveals that this initial Resolution was the one which resulted from [the] painstaking study of the documents gathered vis-a-vis the counter-affidavits of the respondents. Noteworthy is the fact that the prosecution did not offer any other explanation as to the delay of the review of the Resolution except that the case had to be reviewed meticulously and scrupulously, that the Resolution underwent a hierarchy of review and calls for painstaking and fastidious study of the records of the case. Upon review by OLA, no new documents were studied but there was merely a revisit of the cited case. Such would not require a "painstaking study or grueling review" as claimed by the Prosecution. Thus, the length of time it took to conduct its review is undoubtedly more than what was called for.On October 15, 2010, respondent Gadin filed a Motion to Quash Information and Defer Arraignment.27 On October 28, 2010, respondents Orquiola and Llave filed a Motion to Dismiss on the same grounds raised by the other respondents.28 On November 7, 2010, respondents Gloria Bayona and Ramon Bayona, Jr. jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss.29chanrobleslaw
Though the Prosecution points out that accused failed to seasonably assert their right, it must be emphasized that the prosecution has not espoused a justifiable reason for the delay in the review of the April 12, 1996 Resolution. We reiterate that the review of the said Resolution did not involve any new computations nor any other ocular inspections. It was merely a revisit and an evaluation of records already at hand and of the cited Arias case and the reasons espoused for the dismissal of the cases against Dulinayan and Acot. Neither new findings nor major changes were reflected in the said Resolution.
Thus, the length of seven (7) years of review is obviously vexatious and oppressive. Likewise, the length of fifteen (15) years to hold the Preliminary Investigation is too long a time to conduct it, considering the circumstances of the case. As to the claim of the Prosecution that the accused failed to assert its rights, we quote the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cervantes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryThe Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan (220 SCRA 55, 64) alleging that as in Alvizo the petitioner herein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter."We must highlight the fact that there is no contributory act on the part of the accused that resulted in the delay of the Preliminary Investigation.
We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, and after considering that the right of the aecused-movants to the speedy disposition of their cases and the right of the State to punish people who violated its penal laws should be balanced, this Court resolves to grant the Motions of accused. The prosecution has utterly failed to justify the inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation of these cases.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." Therefore, the judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in Rule 45 is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.33chanrobleslaw
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. x x xThus, the instant petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in seeking to annul the Resolutions of public respondent Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which granted the motions to quash or dismiss filed by private respondents which were premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their rights to speedy disposition of their cases.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.The constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.36 In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.37 This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.38chanrobleslaw
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is the Court's observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryA defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.61chanrobleslawPetitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.As pointed out by respondent Gadin in his Comment, the delay of fifteen (15) years in the filing of the Informations impair his ability to adequately defend himself for the reason that the witnesses who could testify on the processes and procedures in the PAF Finance Service Units at the time the alleged offenses were committed may no longer be. found or available.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x x
Endnotes:
1Rollo, p. 2.
2Rollo, p. 64.
3 Petition, rollo, p. 7; Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 75; Resolution, rollo, p. 55.
4 Petition, rollo, pp.7-8; Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 75.
5Ibid; Resolution, rollo, p. 55.
6 Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 75; Resolution, rollo, p. 55.
7Rollo, p. 8; Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 76; Resolution, rollo, p. 55.
8 Petition, rollo, p. 8; Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 76.
9Rollo, pp. 8 and 76, respectively; Resolution, rollo, p. 56.
10 Resolution, rollo, p. 56.
11Rollo, pp. 8 and 56; approved January 16, 1998 according to Dulinayan, rollo, p.76-77.
12Rollo, p. 56 and 77.
13Id. at 9.
14Id.
15Id.
16Rollo, p. 56
17 Comment to Petition, rollo, p. 77.
18Rollo, p. 9.
19 Resolution, rollo, p. 56.
20Id.
21Rollo, p. 48.
22Id. at 42.
23 484 Phil. 899 (2004).
24 510 Phil. 70 (2005).
25cralawred Rollo, pp. 8-9.
26Id. at 59-60.
27Id. at 33.
28Id. at 12.
29Id. at 12 and 34.
30Id. at 62.
31 490 Phil. 105 (2005).
32Villareal v. Aliga, 724 Phil. 47, 60 (2014), citing People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 524 Phil. 496, 522 (2006).
33Id.
34People v. Judge Laguio, 547 Phil. 296, 311 (2007); People v. Uy, 508 Phil. 637, 649 (2005).
35 643 Phil. 462, 469 (2010). (Citations omitted)
36Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator, G.R. No. 105029-32, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 722, 765.
37Capt. Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP-Manila, et al., 628 Phil. 628, 639 (2010).
38Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001), citing Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 587 (1998); Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, 399 Phil. 674, 682 (2000).
39Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413, 447 (1999); Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 304 Phil. 604, 613 (2000).
40Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 55, 63; Dansal v. Fernandez, 383 Phil. 897, 906 (2000); Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38.
41 Petition, rollo, p. 8.
42Id. at 9.
43Id.
44 335 Phil. 766, 770 (1997).
45 242 Phil. 563 (1988).
46Supra note 44.
47 366 Phil. 568, 576-577 (1999).
48 Consolidated Reply, p. 8.
49 Comment of Jose R. Gadin, Jr., id. at 67.
50Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 714 Phil. 55, 62-63 (2013).
51Enriquez, et al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 569 Phil. 309, 316 (2008).
52Coscolluela, v. Sandiganbayan et al., supra note 50, at 63.
53PCGG et al. v. Disierto, 563 Phil. 517, 525 (2007).
54Rollo, p. 81.
55Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 50, at 67.
56Rollo, p. 17.
57Id. at 67.
58Id. at 36.
59 366 Phil. 602, 609 (1999).
60Supra note 50.
61Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 50, at 63-64. (Citations omitted)
62Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 23, at 917.
63Mari v. Gonzales, 673 Phil. 46, 55 (2011).
64Id. at 917-919. (Citations omitted)
65 1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 12.
66Capt. Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP-Mcmila, et al., supra note 37, at 640, citing Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., p. 295.
67Matias v. Judge Plan, Jr., 355 Phil. 274, 282 (1998).