THIRD DIVISION
G.R.No. 186199, September 07, 2016
EDGARDO A. QUILO AND ADNALOY VILLAHERMOSA, Petitioners, v. TEODULA BAJAO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 17, Manila, dated 18 December 2008, which denied the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 due to failure to attach with the petition a certified true copy of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Decision3 and Orders4 in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 and for disregarding the three (3)-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe present case stemmed from an Ejectment Complaint5 filed by respondent Teodula Bajao (Bajao) against Eduardo B. Saclag, Jr., Zoilo J. Fulong, Sr., Elena Bertos,6 and Talia Saclag (hereinafter collectively referred to as "defendants") in the MeTC of Manila, Branch XIX, docketed as Civil Case No. 158273-CV, praying that the defendants vacate and demolish the subject property located at 2519 Granate Street, Sta. Ana, Manila. After trial, the MeTC ruled in favor of Bajao in a Decision dated 20 November 1998.
Aggrieved, the defendants elevated the case to the RTC-Branch 3 of Manila. On 13 September 1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC which has become final and executory due to defendants' failure to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), via a petition for review under Rule 41. The CA's Resolution denying defendants' appeal was issued on 26 November 1999. The defendants' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the CA's Resolution dated 13 March 2000.
When the defendants elevated the case to this Court, the petition was denied for failure to show a reversible error committed by the CA in a Resolution7 dated 14 June 2000. Pursuant thereto, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment8 declaring that the Resolution has become final and executory on 28 July 2000.
By virtue of the Entry of Judgment, Bajao filed a Motion for Execution on 8 August 2000. Seven (7) years thereafter, the Motion for Execution9 was acted upon by the RTC on 23 October 2007, ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court of origin or the MeTC.10 Finally, on 13 November 2007, the MeTC granted the Motion for Execution and issued a Writ of Execution on 28 November 2007.
On 27 February 2008, Edgardo Quilo and Adnaloy Villahermosa, petitioners herein, received a Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish Premises[11] from the MeTC, Branch XIX of Manila, directing them to vacate the property and remove their houses therein by virtue of the Writ of Execution. In opposition to the Writ, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Recall of the Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish Premises on 5 March 2008 based on the following grounds: (1) the Writ of Execution was issued beyond the lapse of the 5-year period within which to execute a judgment based on Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and (2) for issuing the Writ of Execution on them, who are not parties to the ejectment case. Petitioners argued that the property subject of the Writ of Execution, which is 2519 Granate St., Sta. Ana, Manila, is not the same property, they are occupying, which is 2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila.
On 26 June 2008, the MeTC denied the Motion to Quash. According to the MeTC, the Writ of Execution is binding on all persons claiming rights on the property including persons occupying the property, whether impleaded or not.12chanrobleslaw
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied in an Order dated 29 July 2008. The MeTC referred to the petitioners' Answer where the latter admitted the correctness of the description of the subject property, i.e., 2519 Granate St., Sta. Ana, Manila. To further prove that the property of petitioners and the property subject of litigation are one and the same, the Process Server who personally served the summons way back in 1998, attested that it was the same subject property. As a matter of fact, the same Process Server accompanied the Sheriff to serve the Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish Premises to the same subject property. Hence, there is no dispute as to where the subject property is situated. The change in the address from 2519 to 2518 occurred only after the case was filed with the MeTC. There being no issue in the identity of the subject property, the MeTC ordered the implementation of the Writ of Execution on petitioners. The dispositive portion of the Order dated 29 July 2008 reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied. The Sheriff of this Court is hereby directed to implement the Writ of Execution issued by this Court on November 28, 2007. The Court reiterates its Order to the Sheriff to effect the ejectment from the premises located at 2519 Granate Street, Sta. Ana, Manila and which is presently known as 2518 Granate Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila, of the defendants as well as all persons claiming rights under them, and such other persons who may be presently occupying the said premises, whether or not impleaded as parties in the present ejectment case. The plaintiff is directed to coordinate with the Sheriff of this Court for the immediate implementation of the Writ of Execution and in order to forestall further delay.On 29 August 2008, the Sheriff served petitioners a 2nd and Final Notice to Pay/Vacate and to Demolish Premises.
SO ORDERED."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch (sic) 17 committed serious reversible error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioners for allegedly failing to attached (sic) certified true copy of the Decision rendered by the [MeTC] Branch XIX Manila (sic) dated November 20, 1998 and for allegedly failing to comply with the three day notice rule in violation of Sec. 4 (sic) Rule 15 of the rules of the court.II
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila Branch (sic) XIX committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners (sic) motion to quash writ of execution and recall of the notice to pay/vacate and demolish premises.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.-As borne by the records, petitioners failed to attach certified true copies of the MeTC Orders dated 26 June 2008 and 29 July 2008 and MeTC Decision dated 20 November 1998 with their petition for certiorari. It was only when they filed a motion for reconsideration when the petitioners submitted certified true copies of the assailed Orders dated 26 June 2008 and 29 July 2008 on 2 October 2008.xxxxThe petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in Dr. Reyes v. CA,20 that:
xxxxIndeed, the Writ of Execution, which is supposedly what is being questioned, is based on, and cannot alter the decision in the case. Hence, a true or plain copy of the Decision remains a required submission.
The phrase is the equivalent of "ruling, order or decision appealed from" in Rule 32, §2 of the 1964 Rules made applicable to appeals from decisions of the then Courts of First Instance to the Court of Appeals by R.A. No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 5433. Since petitioner was not appealing from the decision of the MeTC in her favor, she was not required to attach a certified true copy - but only a true or plain copy - of the aforesaid decision of the MeTC. The reason is that inclusion of the decision is part of the requirement to attach to the petition for review "other material portion of the record as would support the allegations of the petition." xxx
Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme CourtTherefore, the decision ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property pursuant to the ejectment proceedings must be immediately executed. Especially so without any substantial defense to oppose the ejectment order, the petitioners should yield possession to respondent. Hence, petitioners' ploy that would obliterate the objective of summary ejectment proceedings must fail. The order to vacate is immediately executory.
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.As the Decision became final and executory on 28 July 2000, Bajao has five (5) years or until 28 July 2005 within which to move for its execution. Indeed, Bajao, in compliance with Rule 39, timely moved for the execution of the Decision when he filed a Motion for Execution on 8 August 2000. However, as mandated by Section 6, Rule 39, if the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.27 In the case at bar, the Decision, despite the timely motion to execute the same, was not implemented by the court. The failure to implement the Decision impelled Bajao to again file another motion to execute. However, Bajao's course of action to execute the Decision is not in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39; Bajao merely filed a motion. As already stated, the correct remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. Actions for revival of judgment are governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:Clearly, the proper remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment, which Bajao did not avail of. A cursory application of the aforesaid rules would dictate that this Court must rule in favor of the petitioners and grant the petition on the ground of failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 39. However, the circumstances of the present case are replete with peculiarities which impel this Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction. This case, has after all, been raised to this Court for the second time, and there is nothing more imperative than for the Court to finally settle all controversies and dispose of a protracted and long dragging case.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryxxxx
(3) Upon a judgment.
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryArt. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
Endnotes:
* On Wellness Leave.
1Rollo, pp. 2-30.
2 Id. at 32; penned by Presiding Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., in Spl. Civil Case No. 08-119920.
3 Id. at 84-87, MeTC records, pp. 48-51, dated 20 November 1998; penned by Judge Ricardo R. Rosario in Civil Case No. 158273-CV.
4 Id. at 5 I & 55, MeTC records, pp. 425-426, dated 26 June 2008; rollo, pp. 52-54, MeTC records, pp. 455-457, dated 29 July 2008; both penned by Presiding Judged Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin in Civil Case No. 158273-CV.
5 MeTC records, pp. 2-5.
6 Respondent Elena Bertos is stated as Alena Bertol in other parts of the records.
7 MeTC records, p. 298.
8 Id. at 297.
9 Id. at 306-307, dated 7 August 2000.
10 Id. at 302; RTC Order dated 23 October 2007.
11Rollo, p. 80, dated 12 February 2008.
12 Rollo, pp. 46.
13 47. Id. at 54.
14 Supra note 2.
15Rollo, pp. 12-13.
16Section 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may be dismissed motn proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary(a) Failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period;17Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., v. People, 72 I Phil. 760, 770 (2013).
(b) Lack of merit in the petition;
(c) Failure to pay the requisite docket fee and other lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs;
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition;
(e) Failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause;
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal; and
(g) The fact that the case is not appealable to the Supreme Court.
18Danez, Jr., v. Judge Concepcion, et al., 693 Phil. 399, 412 (2012).
19Ag v. Judge Mejia, 555 Phil. 348, 354-355 (2007).
20 456 Phil. 520, 533 (2003).
21Gutierrez v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, 488 Phil. 110, 121 (2004).
22Sta. Ana v. Hon. Suñga, 153 Phil. 320, 33 I (1973).
23 Id. at 332
24 Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 469, 480-481 (1999).
25cralawred Rollo, p. 49.
26Pajnyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 578 (2004).
27 Rubio v. Alabata, G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 554, 559-560.
28 Id. at 561.
29 Id.
30 Id.