EN BANC
G.R. No. 197146, December 06, 2016
HON. MICHAEL L. RAMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF CEBU CITY, METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD), REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, ARMANDO PAREDES; THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MCWD, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIR, ELIGIO A. PACANA; JOEL MARI S. YU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE MCWD BOARD; AND THE HONORABLE TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH DISTRICT, CEBU CITY, Petitioners, v. HON. GILBERT P. MOISES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18, CEBU CITY; AND HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
A law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution, like a presidential decree, is presumed to be valid and constitutional on the theory that it was carefully studied by the Legislative and Executive Departments prior to its enactment, and determined to be in accord with the Fundamental Law. However, the presumption of validity and constitutionality is overturned and the law should be struck down once it becomes inconsistent with the present Constitution and the later laws.
Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Decree, the following words and terms shall have the meanings herein set forth, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context. The definition of a word or term applies to any of its variants.In July 2002, Cebu Provincial Governor Pablo L. Garcia wrote to the MCWD to assert his authority and intention to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors.1 He stated in his letter that since 1996, the active water service connections in Cebu City had been below 75% of the total active water service connection of the MCWD; that no other city or municipality under the MCWD had reached the required percentage of 75%; and that, accordingly, he, as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, was the appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors pursuant to Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198.
(a) Act. This is the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists. (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The questioned provision, paragraph (b) of Section 3 of P.O. 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It expressly states in unequivocal terms the appointing authority in the water district's board of directors --- if more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of the city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located.Mayor Osmeña and Yu jointly moved for reconsideration,14 but the RTC denied their motion.15
It has not been belied by defendants that the active water service connections of Cebu City in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), at 61.28%, have gone below the required 75% required by law for the city mayor to have the authority to appoint members of the board of directors of the water district. Lacking such percentage requisite, the appointing power is now vested with the governor of the Province of Cebu. While it may be true that the governor had not participated in organizing MCWD and neither did the Province of Cebu invest in establishing waterworks in the component local governments, the law, however, does not impose any condition or restriction in transferring the power to the governor to appoint members of the board of directors when the percentage falls below 75%. Thus, there is no doubt that when any of the water district's participating city or municipality could not obtain 75% of the active water service connections, the governor shall appoint the members of the board of directors of the water district, whether it is a participant or not, in its organization.
As to the constitutionality of the questioned provision, the Court finds that Sec. 3 of P.O. 198 does not violate the Constitution or the Local Government Code. Vesting the authority in the governor to appoint a member of the board of directors of a water district is not intruding into the affairs of the highly urbanized cities and component cities which comprise the district, and neither is it a threat to their autonomy. It does not interfere with their powers and functions and neither can it be considered an exercise of the provincial government's supervisory powers. At most, it is simply giving the authority to appoint the head of the government unit (the governor) where all the members of the water district are geographically located, and only when none of these cities and municipalities has the required 75% of the active water service connections. Nevertheless, the issue is not whether the governor took any part in organizing the water district or has contributed to its formation, but that by law, she has been made the appointing authority even if she has no participation or involvement in the cooperative effort of the members of the water district. This may not be the most expedient and appropriate solution, but still, it is not illegal. As to why this is so is a question only our lawmakers could answer.
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality, one who attacks a statute, alleging constitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional, that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute, and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favour of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Notably, among the admissions found in the Answer for defendants Yu and MCWD states: "x x x with respect to the two (2) vacancies in the Board of MCWD and that joint appointment was made by the plaintiff and defendant Mayor Osmeña to Atty. Adelino Sitoy and Mr. Eligio Pacana." The Court surmises from this statement that as early as the previous appointments (of Mr. Pacana and Atty. Sitoy) defendants have already recognized the appointing authority of the governor for members of the MCWD board of directors, considering Cebu City's failure to reach the 75% benchmark on active water service connections.
In sum, the Court has not been able to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree No. 198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who seek to declare the law, or parts thereof unconstitutional, must clearly establish the basis therefore. Otherwise, the arguments fall short.
Based on the grounds raised by defendants to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3 of P.D. 198, the Court finds that defendants have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the questioned section constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favour of plaintiff and against defendants, finding the appointment of defendant Joel Mari S. Yu as member of the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) as illegal, null and void.13
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ABDICATED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY IN REFUSING TO DELVE ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.II.
THE JUDGMENT IS VOID ON ITS FACE BECAUSE OF CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS APPARENT BY A MERE READING OF THE DECREE.III.
THE JUDGMENT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.17
As to the constitutionality of the questioned provision, the Court finds that Sec. 3 of P.D. 198 does not violate the Constitution or the Local Government Code. Vesting the authority in the governor to appoint a member of the board of directors of a water district is not intruding into the affairs of the highly urbanized cities and component cities which comprise the district, and neither is it a threat to their autonomy. It does not interfere with their powers and functions and neither can it be considered an exercise of the provincial government's supervisory powers. At most, it is simply giving the authority to appoint the head oftbe government unit (the governor) where all the members of the water district are geographically located, and only when none of these cities and municipalities has the required 75% of the active water service connections. Nevertheless, the issue is not whether the governor took any part in organizing the water district or has contributed to its formation, but that by law, she has been made the appointing authority even if she has no participation or involvement in the cooperative effort of the members of the water district. This may not be the most expedient and appropriate solution, but still, it is not illegal. As to why this is so is a question only our lawmakers could answer.Nonetheless, the petitioners rightly contend that the RTC improperly regarded the matter about Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 as a political question; hence, not justiciable. It was not.
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging constitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible bases, that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
x x x x
In sum, the Court has not been able to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree No. 198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who seek to declare the law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional, must clearly establish the basis therefore. Otherwise, the arguments fall short.22
x x x The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en bane and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members...." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. (Emphasis supplied)The petitioners have averred the unconstitutionality or invalidity of Section3 (b) of P.D. No 198 based on the provision's arbitrariness in denying substantive due process and equal protection to the affected local government units (LGUs). Such issue, being justiciable, comes within the power of judicial review. As such, the RTC skirted its duty of judicial review by improperly relying on the political question doctrine. It should have instead adhered to the pronouncement in Estrada v. Desierto,26 to wit:
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Italics omitted)
The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the enactment on December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the Elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes) and antedated as well the effectivity of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1, 1992. At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component city of Cebu Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the Philippines based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which immediately meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu Province. In accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province, but the voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Later on, Cebu City, already an HUC, was further effectively rendered independent from Cebu Province pursuant to Section 29 of the 1991 Local Government Code, viz.:MALACAÑANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 198 May 25, 1973
DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY FAVORING LOCAL OPERATION AND CONTROL OF WATER SYSTEMS; AUTHORIZING THE FORMATION OF LOCAL WATER DISTRICTS AND PROVIDING FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF SUCH DISTRICTS; CHARTERING A NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION TO FACILITATE IMPROVEMENT OF LOCAL WATER UTILITIES; GRANTING SAID ADMINISTRATION SUCH POWERS AS ARE NECESSARY TO OPTIMIZE PUBLIC SERVICE FROM WATER UTILITY OPERATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, one of the pre-requisites to the orderly and well balanced growth of urban areas is an effective system of local utilities, the absence of which is recognized as a deterrent to economic growth, a hazard to public health and an irritant to the spirit and well-being of the citizenry;
WHEREAS, domestic water systems and sanitary sewers are two of the most basic and essential elements of local utility system, which, with a few exceptions, do not exist in provincial areas in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, existing domestic water utilities are not meeting the needs of the communities they serve; water quality is unsatisfactory; pressure is inadequate; and reliability of service is poor; in fact, many persons receive no piped water service whatsoever;
WHEREAS, conditions of service continue to worsen for two apparent reasons, namely: (1) that key element of existing systems are deteriorating faster than they are being maintained or replaced, and (2) that they are not being expanded at a rate sufficient to match population growth; and
WHEREAS, local water utilities should be locally-controlled and managed, as well as have support on the national level in the area of technical advisory services and financing;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in my by the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby decree, order and make as part of the law of the land the following measure:TITLE I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Title. - This Decree shall be known and referred to as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The creation, operation, maintenance and expansion of reliable and economically viable and sound water supply and wastewater disposal system for population centers of the Philippines is hereby declared to be an objective of national policy of high priority. For purpose of achieving said objective, the formulation and operation of independent, locally controlled public water districts is found and declared to be the most feasible and favored institutional structure. To this end, it is hereby declared to be in the national interest that said districts be formed and that local water supply and wastewater disposal systems be operated by and through such districts to the greatest extent practicable. To encourage the formulation of such local water districts and the transfer thereto to existing water supply and wastewater disposal facilities, this Decree provides the general act the authority for the formation thereof, on a local option basis. It is likewise declared appropriate, necessary and advisable that all funding requirements for such local water systems, other than those provided by local revenues, should be channeled through and administered by an institution on the national level, which institution shall be responsible for and have authority to promulgate and enforce certain rules and regulations to achieve national goals and the objective of providing public waterworks services to the greatest number at least cost, to effect system integration or joint investments and operations whenever economically warranted and to assure the maintenance of uniform standards, training of personnel and the adoption of sound operating and accounting procedures.
Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Decree, the following words and terms shall have the meanings herein set forth, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context. The definition of a word or term applies to any of its variants.
(a) Act. This Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the Board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Section 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. - The province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the province. (Emphasis supplied)Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and independent component cities pursuant to and in accordance with Section 2529 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a law enacted for the purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance with the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREAS, existing domestic water utilities are not meeting the needs of the communities they serve; water quality is unsatisfactory; pressure is inadequate; and reliability of service is poor; in fact, many persons receive no piped water service whatsoever;Verily, the decree was enacted to provide adequate, quality and reliable water and waste-water services to meet the needs of the local communities and their growing populations. The needs of the communities served were paramount. Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true objectives of the decree to still leave to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor had administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for 16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD. In comparison, the City of Cebu had 61.28%38 of the active service water connections; Mandaue, another HUC, 16%; and Lapu Lapu City, another HUC, 6.8%. There is no denying that the MCWD has been primarily serving the needs of Cebu City. Although it is impermissible to inquire into why the decree set 75% as the marker for determining the proper appointing authority, the provision has meanwhile become unfair for ignoring the needs and circumstances of Cebu City as the LGU accounting for the majority of the active water service connections, and whose constituency stood to be the most affected by the decisions made by the MCWD's Board of Directors. Indeed, the classification has truly ceased to be germane or related to the main objective for the enactment of P.D. No. 198 in 1973.
WHEREAS, conditions of service continue to worsen for two apparent reasons, namely: (1) that key element of existing systems are deteriorating faster than they are being maintained or replaced, and (2) that they are not being expanded at a rate sufficient to match population growth; and
WHEREAS, local water utilities should be locally-controlled and managed, as well as have support on the national level in the area of technical advisory services and financing; (bold emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, p. 151.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 152.
6 Id. at 99-100.
7 Id. at 96.
8 Id. at 152.
9 Id. at 85-95.
10 Id. at 102-128.
11 Id. at 164-188.
12 Id. at 73-80.
13 Id. at 78-80.
14 Id. at 189-221.
15 Id. at 81-84.
16 Id. at 3-72.
17 Id. at 22.
18 Id. at 96.
19David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171397, May 3, 3006, 489 SCRA 160, 214-215.
20Rollo, pp. 22-41.
21Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 44, 51-52; Ynot v. intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659, 665-666.
22 Supra note 13, at 79-80.
23Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452, 459.
24Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, No. L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360.
25cralawred Id.
26 Supra note 24.
27 Id. at 41-59.
28 Sec. 3. Cities. - x x x x
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component Cities in accordance with the standards established in the Local Government Code as provided for in Article XI, Sec. 4 (1) of the Constitution, any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located.
x x x x
29 Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. -
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.
x x x x
30 The pertinent provisions of Article X on this are:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
31Rollo, pp. 272-304.
32 G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 400, 436.
33Rollo, pp. 109-110.
34 Id. at 59-64.
35Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association, G.R. No. 111953, December 12, 1997 283 SCRA 31, 39-40.
36 See ABAKADA GURO Partylist v. Hon. Ermita, G.R. No. 169056, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1.
37 G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 278, 289.
38Rollo, pp. 97-101.
39 See De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Corporation, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
SEC. 45. Exemption from Taxes. A district shall (1) be exempt from paying income taxes, and (2) shall be exempt from the payment of (a) all National Government, local government and municipal taxes and fees, including any franchise, filing, recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and fees, charges or costs involved in any court of administrative proceeding in which it may be a party and (b) all duties or imposts on imported machinery, equipment and materials required for its operations.Moreover, the LGU joining a local water district does not surrender any of its powers under the Constitution or the Local Government Code to another LGU vested with the power to appoint the members of the Board of the local water district since Presidential Decree No. 198 expressly provides that a district once formed shall not be under the jurisdiction of any political subdivision.
Sec. 17. Performance of District Powers. - All powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board: Provided, however, That any executive, administrative or ministerial power shall be delegated and redelegated by the board to officers or agents designated for such purpose by the board.Hence, the power to appoint the members of the Board of Directors of the local water districts, which is vested upon the LGU determined in accordance with the formula or rule prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 198, does not impair the autonomy of the other LGUs included in the District.
SEC. 6. Formation of District. - This Act is the source of authorization and power to form and maintain a district. Once formed, a district is subject to the provisions of this Act and not under the jurisdiction of any political subdivision. To form a district, the legislative body of any city, municipality or province shall enact a resolution containing the following:Secondly, the majority opinion indulged itself in constitutionally objectionable judicial legislation by effectively amending Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198, which provides:
(a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name of the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said system, followed by the words "Water District."
(b) A description of the boundary of the district. In the case of a city or municipality, such boundary may include all lands within the city or municipality. A district may include one or more municipalities, cities or provinces, or portions thereof.
(c) A statement of intent to transfer any and all waterworks and/or sewerage facilities owned by such city, municipality or province to such district pursuant to a contract authorized by Section 31(b) of this Title.
(d) A statement identifying the purpose for which the district is formed, which shall include those purposes outlined in Section 5 above.
(e) The names of the initial directors of the district with the date of expiration of term of office for each.
(f) A statement that the district may only be dissolved on the grounds and under the conditions set forth in Section 44 of this Title.
(g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as set forth in Section 36 of this Title.
Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district beyond that specifically provided for in this Act.
If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be adopted in each city, municipality and province.
SEC. 3. Definitions. - x x x.The majority opinion criticized the 75% threshold prescribed by Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 to vest an LGU with the power to appoint the members of the Board of Directors of the local water district, and in doing so, framed it within the supposed violation of the due process clause and equal protection of the laws.
x x x x
(b) Appointing authority. - The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total acting water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists.
BRION, J.:
In his letter, Gov. Pablo pointed out that since 1996, MCWD's active waterworks connections in Cebu City had gone below Sec 3 (b)'s 75% threshold, and that no other city or municipality under MCWD had reached the same threshold.3 Hence, he (Gov. Pablo) and not the Mayor of Cebu City has the power to appoint members to the MCWD board.x x x x
(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. x x x (emphasis and omissions supplied)
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:Unquestionably, this Court has the original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari against final judgments resolving the constitutionality or validity of laws, including presidential decrees. However, this Court's certiorari jurisdiction is not exclusive.x x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (omissions and emphases supplied)
x x x x
Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:Thus, this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction) is not exclusive. Its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the CA and, in proper cases, with the RTCs.25cralawred
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x x
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.Thus, to determine whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court must go beyond the present petition, and determine whether the RTC resolved the constitutional issues framed by the parties before it.
As I discussed at the beginning of this dissent, the RTC resolved the first issue.
a) Who has the authority to appoint the members of the Board of Directors of the [MCWD] under [PD 198]; b) The constitutionality of Section 3(b) of PD 198; and c) Whether or not the Province of Cebu is a participant in the operation, management and organization of MCWD.44
As to the constitutionality of the questioned provision, the Court finds that Section 3, of PD 198 does not violate the Constitution or the Local Government Code. Vesting the authority in the governor to appoint a member of the board of directors of a water district is not intruding into the affairs of the Highly Urbanized Cities and component cities which comprise the district and neither is it a threat to their autonomy. It does not interfere with their powers and functions and neither can it be considered an exercise of the provincial government's supervisory powers. At most it is simply giving the authority to appoint to the head of the government unit (the governor) where all the members of the water district are geographically located, and only when none of these cities and municipalities has the required 75% of the active water connections. Nevertheless, the issue is not whether the governor took part in organizing the water district or has contributed to its formation, but that by law, she has been made the appointing authority even if she has no participation or involvement in the cooperative effort of the members of the water district. This may not be the most expedient and appropriate solution, but still, it is not illegal. As to why this is so is a question only our lawmakers could answer. (emphasis supplied).While the presiding judge had devoted only one paragraph to address the second and third issues, he emphasized three observations: first, Section 3(b) is not an intrusion into Cebu City's autonomy; second, the issue is not whether the governor participated in organizing the water district, but whether the law granted him the power to appoint the LWD's board of directors; and third, granting the power appoint to the governor may not be the most appropriate solution but it is not illegal.
Endnotes:
1 Executive Summary of COA 2014 Report on MCWD. http://www.coa.gov.ph/phocadownloadpap/userupload/annual_audit_report/GOCCs/2014/COA-Regional-Office/Region-VII/MetropolitanCebuWD-R7_ES2014.pdf, last accessed December 6, 2016.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2Rollo, p. 151.
3 Page 3 of the Ponencia.
4Id.
5Id. This was the Second Action for Declaratory Relief filed. The first was filed by MCWD after it received Governor Pablo Garcia's letter. The case was dismissed without pronouncement on Section 3(b)'s constitutionality.
6Rollo, p. 152.
7 On February 22, 2008; id. at 96.
8Id. at 153.
9Id. at 74.
10Id. at 79.
11Id.
12Id. at 189.
13Id. at 6.
14Id. at 26.
15Id. at 65.
16Id.
17 Page 8 of the Ponencia.
18Id. at 10.
19Id. at 9.
20Id. at 12.
21Id. at 17.
22Id.
23Id. at 17-18.
24 An Act Expanding The Jurisdiction Of The Court Of Appeals, Amending For The Purpose Section Nine Of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, As Amended, Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act Of 1980.
25cralawred Cruz v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 170404, September 28, 2011, 554 SCRA 50, citing Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil 28, 34 (2002).
26Id., Cruz v. Gingoyon.
27Id.
28Id.
29 SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.x x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
30Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579, 593. According to Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), lis motais "means [a] dispute that has begun and later forms the basis of a lawsuit."
31 This Court's power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari" final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving the constitutionality of statutes means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by the lower courts. See Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659, 660.
32 Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 and 170510-11, June 1, 2011, sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
33Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 129.
34Id.
35Id.
36People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 438, 452-453.
37Supra note 31.
38 The petitioners argued in the court below that [MCWD] is a government corporation, whose existence emanates from the patrimony of local governments, particularly Cebu City's Osmeña Waterworks, which maintains and services the majority of water consumers within the district. They are paid only through an annual in-lieu shares with restrictions; thus the exercise of the authority of appointment to the governing body of MCWD is not a political power but a proprietary right. Rollo p. 122.
39Id. at 184.
40Id.
41Id.
42Id. at 121.
43Id. at 73-80.
44Id. at 74.
45Id. at 189.
46 As such, the political question doctrine was improperly relied upon by the RTC to skirt the duty of judicial review. Page 10 of the Ponencia.
47Id. at 8.
48 Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
49 Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Bill of Rights, 2002 ed., p. 227.
50Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
51White Light Corporation v. the City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416.
52Id. at 419.
53Id.; See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRlNCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).
54Supra note 49.
55Galicto v. Aquino, III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 172.
56Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, 531 SCRA 583, citing Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil 744 (2003).
57Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 893 (2003).
58LAMP v. Secretary of DBM, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 375, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
59Rollo, p. 54.
60Id. at 11.
61Id. at 73.
62https://www.cebucity.gov.ph/index.php/home-new/cebu-city-charter, last accessed December 6, 2016.
63 Republic Act No. 3857.
64Id., Section 31(30) To provide for the establishment and maintenance and regulate the use of public drains, sewers, latrines, and cesspools; to regulate the construction and use of private sewers, drains, cesspools, water closets and privies; to provide for the establishment and maintenance of waterworks, for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of the city, and for the purification of the source of water supply and places through which the same passes, and to regulate the consumption and use of the water; to fix and provide for the collection of rents therefore, and to regulate the construction, repair, and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs. Any and all waterworks systems, including the Osmeña Waterworks System, provided for or undertaken by the city government shall exclusively belong to it, such that the city shall have the exclusive control, direction and supervision over the same, and all laws and executive orders and circulars issued by the Office of the President making reference to the ownership, possession, control and operation of waterworks and sewers shall not be applicable to the City of Cebu.
65 PD 198 "whereas" clauses of the law explain the need to establish local water districts.
66 Section 2, Title I, Presidential Decree No. 198.
67 WHEREAS, local water utilities should be locally-controlled and managed, as well as have support on the national level in the area of technical advisory services and financing; Presidential Decree No. 198.
68 Section 49, PD 198, as amended by Section 21, PD 768.
69 The PD originally reads: "For purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered a quasi-public corporation x x x." However, in the 1991 case of Davao City Water District et al. vs. CSC et al., the Supreme Court ruled that LWUs are government-owned and -controlled corporations.
70 Section 6, PD 198.
71 Executive Summary of COA 2014 Report on MCWD http://www.coa.gov.ph/phocadownloadpap/userupload/annual_audit_report/GOCCs/2014/COA-RegionalOffice/Region-VII/MetropolitanCebuWD-R7_ES2014.pdf, last accessed December 6, 2016.
71https://www.cebucity.gov.ph/index.php/home-new/cebu-city-charter, last accessed December 6, 2016.
72 Executive Summary of COA 2014 Report on MCWD. http://www.coa.gov.ph/phocadownloadpap/userupload/annual_audit_report/GOCCs/2014/COA-Regional-Office/Region-VII/MetropolitanCebuWD-R7_ES2014.pdf, last accessed December 6, 2016.
73Rollo, p. 129.
74Id. at 11 and 134-141.
75Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Supra note 55.
76 See pp. 15-16, Ponencia.
77 Bernas, Joaquin, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a commentary. 2009 ed., p. 139, citing II Schwartz, The Right of the Person, 487-8 (1968).
78 Bernas, Joaquin, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a commentary. 2009 ed., p. 139.
79People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 83, 90 (1951).
80 Page 17 of the Ponencia.
81Id.
82 See Section 2, Title I, PD 198.
83 WHEREAS, existing domestic water utilities are not meeting the needs of the communities they serve; water quality is unsatisfactory; pressure is inadequate; and reliability of service is poor; in fact, many r,ersons receive no piped water service whatsoever;
84 By filing the appropriate resolutions to, and after hearing conducted by, the LWUA; See Sections 42 and 43 of the PD 198, as amended by PD 768.
85 Section 31 of PD 198.
86Id., Section 26.
87Id., Section 25, as amended by Section 4, PD 1479.
88 Section 17, of PD 198.
89 Section 6, PD 198 states that "Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district beyond that specifically provided for in this Act."
90 Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
91Id., Sections 450 and 442, respectively.
92 Section 1, Article IV of the Freedom Constitution states that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, implementing rules and regulations, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Proclamation shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the President or the regular legislative body to be established under a New Constitution."
93 Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution states that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."
94Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 466, citing R.E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 97 (4th ed., 1998), pp. 269-270.
95 Section B, 1(2); C, 1(2); D, 1(2), Article IX, Constitution.
96 Section 9, Article VIII, Constitution.
97Id.
98 Page 15 of the Ponencia.
99 Section 468. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the province, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants x x x and shall:100 Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.x x x x
(4) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and, in addition to said services and facilities, shall:x x x x
(ii) Subject to applicable laws, facilitate or provide for the establishment and maintenance of waterworks system or district waterworks for supplying water to inhabitants of component cities and municipalities; x x x (omission and emphasis supplied)
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants x x x and shall:101 Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -x x x x
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:x x x x
(vii) Subject to existing laws, establish and provide for the maintenance, repai and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for th inhabitants and to purify the source of the water supply; x x x.
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants x x x and shall: x x x x (5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall: x x x x (vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants; x x x. (omission and emphasis supplied)
102Rollo, p. 65.
103Id. at 47.
104Id.
105Section 10. Nominations. - On or before October 1 of each even-numbered year, the secretary of the district shall conduct each known organization, association, or institution being represented by the director whose term will expire on December 31 and solicit nominations from these organizations to fill the position for the ensuring term. One nomination may be submitted in writing by each such organization to the secretary of the district on or before November 1 of such year: This list of nominees shall be transmitted by the Secretary of the district to the office of the appointing authority on or before November 15 of such year and he shall make his appointment from the list submitted on or before December 15. In the event the appointing authority fails to make his appointments on or before December 15, selection shall be made from said list of nominees by majority vote of the seated directors of the district constituting a quorum. x x x. (emphasis and omission supplied)
LEONEN, J.:
Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Decree, the following words and terms shall have the meanings herein set forth, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context. The definition of a word or term applies to any of its variants.The controversy started when in 2002, after consistent exercise by the Cebu City Mayor of the power to appoint MCWD directors from 1974 to 2002, the Governor of the Province of Cebu decided to assert her power of appointment. The Governor claims that the provision gives her the power to appoint directors of MCWD whenever none of the cities or municipalities covered by MCWD holds seventy-five percent (75%) of its total active water service connections.(a) Act - This Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists.
You will instruct the commission to proceed to the city of Manila, where they will make their principal office, and to communicate with the military governor of the Philippine Islands, whom you will at the same time direct to render to them every assistance within his power in the performance of their duties. Without hampering them by too specific instructions, they should in general be enjoined, after making themselves familiar with the conditions and needs of the country, to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments, in which the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observations of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty.Local government autonomy had been impliedly adopted as State policy as early as 1935 when our Constitution defined the kind of power that the President may exercise over executive departments and local governments. Article VII, Section 11(1) of the 1935 Constitution provided that the President exercised control over executive departments. However, the President's power over local governments was limited to general supervision:
The next subject in order of importance should be the organization of government in the larger administrative divisions corresponding to counties, departments, or provinces, in which the common interests of many or several municipalities falling within the same tribal lines, or the same natural geographical limits, may best be subserved by a common administration. Whenever the commission is of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands is such that the central administration may safely be transferred from military to civil control, they will report that conclusion to you, with their recommendations as to the form of central government to be established for the purpose of taking over the control.3 (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 11. (1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."Control" has been consistently defined in our jurisprudence as the power to "alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."4 On the other hand, "supervision" has been defined as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties."5
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.7Thus, when the 1935 Constitution limited the President's power over local government units to supervision, he or she had been proscribed from interfering or taking an active part in the affairs of local government units. The State, at that time, had already recognized local autonomy as a means to more effectively determine and address local concerns.
SEC. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.A similar provision can be found among the State policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy oflocal governments.Both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution devoted a whole Article to local governments as a means to institutionalize the principle of local autonomy.8
SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.Aside from the power to create their own revenues, the present Constitution gave local governments entitlement to shares in the national taxes and in proceeds of the utilization of their wealth and resources.12 Local government um.ts were a1so guaranteed sectora1 representation.13
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their comronent units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.15In other words, the present Constitution reiterated that not even the President may determine and dictate how local government units' duties shall be performed.
SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.Further, the Local Government Code provides that local government units "shall endeavor to be self-reliant"18 and shall be responsible for providing the basic services needed by its constituents. Thus:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.Among the basic services that municipalities and cities must provide their constituents are infrastructure facilities such as water supply systems. Thus:
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein[.]
SECTION 17. Basic Services and FacilitiesPresidential Decree No. 198 allows provinces to interfere with this duty of municipalities and cities when it empowered the governor to appoint MWCD directors in case none of the cities and municipalities covered by MCWD reached the 75% requirement.
.... (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: (2) For a municipality: .... (viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for pubEc elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities; .... (4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province[.] (Emphasis supplied)
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On tne other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.33The presumption of constitutionality accorded to laws passed by the Congress also recognizes the meticulousness imposed by our Constitution on the process by which the legislative department should promulgate laws. Each law passed by the legislative department undergoes three readings.34 In between those readings, public hearings may be conducted wherein the representatives from the public and private sectors, members of the academe, and experts in the field related to the proposed law may participate. The law may also undergo discussions and debates. Opinions by the representatives from the public, private, and academic communities and the differences that emerge from the discussions and debates will result to several amendments of the proposed law before its actual passage.35 After its passage by the Congress, the law shall be submitted to the President for approval.36
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.37 (Emphasis supplied)In Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan:38
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:In Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), et al. vs. The Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.:40"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted."39 (Emphasis supplied)
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held that:These principles were inoperative when President Ferdinand Marcos issued presidential decrees. Presidential decrees were laws promulgated by President Ferdinand Marcos in arrogation of the Congress' legislative powers, under his martial law powers.42 The issuance of presidential decrees at that time was an exercise by the executive of his legislative powers.43Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it."41 (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 3 provides:
Section 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles:
(a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities[.]
2 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy.
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
3 Full text of "Instructions of the President to the Philippine commission, April 7, 1900.."
https://archive.org/stream/instructionspre00mckigoog/instructionspre00mckigoog_djvu.txt (Last visited November 15, 2016).
4The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, 482 Phil. 331, 355 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Mondano v. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. See also Taule v. Secretary Santos, 277 Phil. 584, 598 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
5The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, 482 Phil. 331, 355 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Mondano v. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 143, 147 (1955) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. See also Taule v. Secretary Santos, 277 Phil. 584, 598 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc], Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84, 98-100 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], and Drilon v. Lim, 235 Phil. 135, 140-141 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
6 235 Phil. 135 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
7 Id. at 142.
8 CONST. (1973), art. XI and CONST., art. X.
9 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 2 provides:
ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
....
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
10 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 4(1) provides:
ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
....
SEC. 4(1). Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined by standards established in the local government code, shall be independent of the province.
11 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 5 provides:
ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
....
SEC. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
12 CONST., art. X, secs. 6 and 7.
13 CONST., art. X, sec. 9.
14 CONST., art. X, sec. 15.
15 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.
16 CONST., art. X, sec. 12 provides:
ARTICLE X. Local Government
....
SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
17 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 5(c) provides:
SECTION 5. Rules of rnterpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
....
(c) The general welfare provision in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
18 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 17(a).
19 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 17(3)(vii) provides:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.....20See also San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (273 Phil. 271, 279 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]), where the Court upheld the primacy of interpretations favouring local autonomy over interpretations favouring centralized power of the national government.
(3) For a Province:
....
(vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities[.]
21 Pres. Decree No. 198 (1973), secs. 17, 18, 23, and 24 provide:
SEC. 17. Performance of District Powers. - All powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board: Provided, however, That any executive, administrative or ministerial power shall be delegated and redelegated by the board to officers or agents designated for such purpose by the board.
SEC. 18. Functions Limited to Policy Making. - The function of the board shall be to establish policy. The Board shall not engage in the detailed management of the district.
....
SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. (As amended by Pres. Decree No. 768 (1975), sec. 9 and Rep. Act No. 9286 (2003), sec. 2)
SEC. 24. Duties. - The duties of the General Manager and other officers shall be determined and specified from time to time by the board. The general manager, who shall not be a director, shall have full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation of water district facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of the district: Provided, That the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the board. (As amended by Pres. Decree No. 768 (1975), sec. 9)
22Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
23 CONST., art. VII, sec. 1.
24 CONST., art. VII, sec. 17.
25cralawred CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
26 CONST., art. VI, sec. 1.
27 CONST., art. VI, secs. 1, 2, 4, 5(1), and 7 provide:
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
....
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next follcwing their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
....
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length oftime shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
28Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 558 Phil. 338, 353 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing Atitiw v. Zamora, 508 Phil. 321, 342 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
29 J. Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 732 (2003) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
30 Id. at 734.
31Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
32 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
33 Id. at 156-157.
34 CONST., art. VI, sec. 26 provides:
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity .If its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
35Legislative Process: How a bill becomes a law, House of Representatives http://congress.gov.ph/legisinfo/?l=process (Last visited November 15, 2016).
36 CONST., art. VI, sec. 27 provides:
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
37Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158-159 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
38 479 Phil. 265 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
39 Id. at 284-285, citing Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, 281 Phil. 572, 579-580 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
40 686 Phil. 357 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
41 Id. at 372-373, citing Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 197 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc] and ABAKADA GURO Party List (formerly AASJS), et al. v. Han. Purisima, et al., 584 Phil. 246, 267-268 (2008) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].
42See also Presidential Decrees, Official Gazette http://www.gov.ph/section/executiveissuances/presidential-decrees-executive-issuances/ (Last visited November 15, 2016).
43See Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
44 1976 Amendments http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/1973-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-2/ (Last visited November 15, 2016).
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, while the sector shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the Members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitutions.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister), if he so desires, may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land. (Emphasis supplied)