SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KING REX A. AMBATANG, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
In an Information dated November 28, 2002, accused-appellant King Rex Ambatang (Ambatang) was charged with the murder1 of 60-year-old Ely Vidal (Vidal), as follows:
That, on or about the 17th day of October, 2002, in the Municipality of Taguig City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a knife, a deadly weapon, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and stab ELY VIDAL y PELEJO, hitting the latter in different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him fatal injuries which caused his instantaneous death, the said killing having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength which qualify such killing to murder, aggravated by the circumstances of insult and disregard of the respect due the offended party due to his age and nighttime.According to the prosecution, on October 17, 2002, at around 10:30 p.m., Jennifer Vidal Mateo3 (Jennifer) was at the kitchen of their house in Taguig with her cousins when she heard a barrage of stones hurled at their house.4 She peeked out of the window and saw Ambatang standing outside with a certain "Loui."5 Melody Vidal Navarro (Melody) immediately called barangay tanods, who then immediately went to Ambatang's house, just across the Vidals' house.6 While Ambatang's mother, Nicepura Ambatang, was speaking to a tanod, another tanod, Romeo Acaba (Acaba), saw Ambatang sharpening a knife in their kitchen.7 Suddenly, Ambatang was nowhere to be found and appeared to have sneaked past the tanods before running towards the Vidals' house.8 Later, Ambatang was on top of Vidal and was stabbing him repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Ambatang ran away but was apprehended by the tanods.9 The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Pasig Provincial Hospital.10 Post-mortem findings issued by Dr. Rolando C. Victoria stated that the cause of death was stab wounds to the chest.11
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
WHEREFORE, accused King Rex A. Ambatang is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the effects thereof as provided by law. He is further ordered to pay the victim's heirs Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php29,000.00 as actual damages; Php50,000.00 by way of moral damages; Php30,000.00 as temperate or moderate damages and to pay the costs, at the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid.On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed July 31, 2012 Decision,24 upheld Ambatang's conviction. However, it modified the Regional Trial Court Decision to include an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and deleted the award of P30,000.00 as temperate damages, there having already been an award of actual damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.23
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case No. 124748-H, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant King Rex Ambatang is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Ely Vidal P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P29,000.00, as actual damages, and P30,000.00, as exemplary damages. The award of P30,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED.Ambatang then filed his Notice of Appeal.26
SO ORDERED.25
Accused-appellant also offered alibi as a defense. He asserts that he was at home when the stabbing incident happened. We reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. Thus:In addition, accused-appellant attributed ill motive on the part of prosecution witness Carmelita. However, as the Court of Appeals explained, accused-appellant's conviction was not based on the testimony of Carmelita, but on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Jennifer and Acaba, "whose credibility was never assailed by accused-appellant."34It is well settled that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their denials and alibis.True, accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by Gina Canapi and Nicepura Ambatang. However, an alibi, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to fabricate and concoct. Thus, in People v. Albalate, the Supreme Court in rejecting accused's alibi explained:The alibi proffered by the appellant must be rejected. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly noted that appellant failed to make any mention about this alleged alibi when he was placed on the witness stand. It was only when defense witness Florentina Escleto (Escleto) testified that this alibi cropped up. At any rate, the same deserves no consideration at all. Escleto claimed to be a friend of the appellant. It is settled jurisprudence that an alibi "becomes less plausible when it is corroborated by relatives and friends who may not be impartial witnesses".Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused-appellant's presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold water.
In fine, the age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. We thoroughly review the records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic notes and we find no cogent reason to overturn the probative value given by the trial court on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, we sustain the guilty verdict against herein accused-appellant.33
[W]e have time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.37Regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed discrepancies on how accused-appellant left his residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times they saw him stab Vidal, what ultimately matters is that they witnessed how accused-appellant stabbed Vidal.
Accused employed treachery when he attacked the victim. This is shown by the suddenness of the attack against the unarmed victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter's part and opportunity to defend himself. Accused was a tall, young man with a sturdy physique. Armed with a sharp bladed weapon, he attacked and repeatedly stabbed the victim who was at that time sixty years old and inferior in size and built compared to him.39Thus, this Court resolves to dismiss accused-appellant's appeal for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged Decision to warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Endnotes:
** Designated additional member per Raffle dated March 29, 2017.
1 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248 provides:
Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:2Rollo, pp. 2-3
- With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
- In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
- By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
- On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity.
- With evident premeditation.
- With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
3 Erroneously referred to as "Jennifer Mendoza" in the CA decision
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 3-4.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 CA rollo, p. 39.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id. at 4-5.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 5.
22 CA rollo, pp. 36-41. The decision was penned by Judge Leili Cruz Suarez of Branch 163, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
23 Id. at 41.
24Rollo, pp. 2-14. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals Manila.
25 Id. at 13.
26 Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 1.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 18.
30 Id. at 19.
31 Id. at 34-40.
32People v. De Jesus, 695 Phil. 114, 122 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division] citing People v. Jubail, 472 Phil. 527, 546 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
33Rollo, pp. 8-10, citing People v. Bracamonte, 327 Phil. 160 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division]; People v. Tomas, 658 Phil. 653 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division]; People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; People v. Albalate, 623 Phil. 437 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]; People v. Delim, 559 Phil. 771 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division]; See People v. Bracamonte, 327 Phil. 160 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division]; and People v. Del Rosario, 657 Phil. 637 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]
34 Id. at 7.
35 Id. at 36-37.
36 442 Phil. 245 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
37 Id. at 255, citing People v. Givera, 402 Phil. 547, 566 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
38Rollo, p. 37.
39 CA rollo, pp. 40-41.
40 G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].