SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205745, March 08, 2017
CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, AND BREGIDO MALACAT, JR., Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Pride, when unchecked, can waste our youth and cause the forfeiture of all meaning in life, even in the most inconsequential things: in this case, a basketball game.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45,2 praying that the assailed May 31, 2012 Decision3 and January 14, 2013 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27951 be reversed and set aside, and that petitioners be acquitted of the offense of which they are charged.
The Court of Appeals' assailed Decision affirmed the April 24, 2003 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 37, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals' assailed January 14, 2013 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and Bregido Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with frustrated murder, as follows:
That on December 17, 1995, at about 6:00 [o]'clock in the morning at Zone 3, San Simon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault[,] box and struck one Rolando O. Bahian with a stone and hitting the latter's head and several parts of his body, thereby inflicting injuries[,] to wit: "Depressed Fracture, Open frontal bone, left, and advised for surgery,["] thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said offended party which prevented his death.6Upon arraignment, all three accused, now petitioners, pleaded not guilty.7 Trial then ensued.8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Br[e]gido Malacat, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder committed against Rolando Bahian, and they conspired in committing the crime, and, accordingly, each of the said accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium as the minimum term to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal medium as the maximum term.On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court's conclusions. It affirmed the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court, but replaced the award of actual damages to temperate damages amounting to P25,000. The Court of Appeals also deleted the award for loss of earning capacity, there being no proof in support of it. It also awarded P20,000 as civil indemnity. The dispositive portion of its assailed May 31, 2012 Decision51 read:
Moreover, all the three accused are sentenced and ordered (1) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and severally the sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos (P57,000.00) by way of reimbursement for the expenses he incurred for medicines; (2) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and severally the sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) for the income that Rolando Bahian could have earned for two (2) years as a farmer; (3) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and severally the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) by way of moral damages; and (4) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.50
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated April 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37 of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 96-266 is hereby AFFIRMED as to the penalty imposed with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages.Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition,53 where they insist on their version of events. They emphasize several factual details and maintain that they did not initiate an assault on Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained the injury on his forehead through his own fault; thus, they could not be held liable for acting with intent to kill Bahian.
All three (3) accused-appellants, CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALIS[I] and BREGIDO MALACAT, JR., are ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando Bahian the following amounts:
1. Php20,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. Php30,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;Specifically concerning criminal cases, this Court has stated that "in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."60
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.59
As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, it is true that the prosecution has sought to extenuate the weight of Bahian's admission by having him explain that he only lied to Dr. Mata because otherwise, "he would not have been admitted to the hospital and his injury would have not been operated on."74 However, even this extenuating explanation does not completely diminish the significance of his admission.
Q - And on February of 1995, your forehead was operated on by a certain Dr. John Mata, is that correct? A - Yes. Q - And you told Dr. Mata that the wound on your forehead was caused by you hitting the edge of the concrete pavement, is that correct? A - Yes, I told him a lie so that I could be treated. Q - But nobody in the German Doctors told you that you would not be operated if that was caused by a stone or in a fight? A - He asked me the reason why I got this injury? Q - And then? A - Then I told him the reason how I got this injury. Q - That you hit the edge of the concrete pavement? A - Yes. Q - And that was the first time you talked to him before the operation? A - Yes. Q - The first time you talked to him, you lied to him? A - Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be operated.73 (Citations omitted)
There is no showing that petitioners knew that complainant told his doctor that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete pavement. They came to know of it only when they heard him admit it on cross-examination. And yet, that's exactly what they have always been asserting right from the very start, even during the preliminary investigation, or long before they heard him say it on the witness stand.Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an iron bar, respectively.
It is too much of a coincidence that petitioners and the complainant should say exactly the same thing, that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete pavement - unless it is true.76
Danzon, a defense witness whom the prosecution never bothered to cross-examine, stated:
Q - They were armed or not? A - Who? Q - The three of them? A - I could see or identify if they were armed. Q - Nobody brought a bolo? A - When I arrived there, I did not see anybody holding a bolo. Q - Nobody brought a steel pipe? A - I have not seen. Q - You did not see anybody holding a gun? Q - No.78 (Citation omitted)
Two (2) other defense witnesses - Rosemarie and Delfin - were noted to have made the same observations.80
Q - Tell us what was that unusual incident all about? A - What I could say is that: I heard noise outside and because I was watching them, I saw Kag. Abalde holding a gun pointing upward and I saw Rolando Banian already wounded on his face.79 (Citation omitted)
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne, not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events, they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.81 (Citations omitted)
Endnotes:
* Designated as Fifth Member per S.O. No. 2416-U dated January 4, 2017.
1Rollo, pp. 4-23.
2 1997 Rules of Court
3Rollo, pp. 100-116. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Pedro B. Corales of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
4 Id. at 125-129. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
5 Id. at 24-42. The Decision was penned by Judge Jose L. Escobido of Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City.
6Rollo, p. 24.
7 Id. at 102.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 102-103.
12 Id. at 103.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 104.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id. at 105.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 106.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 24-42.
50 Id. at 41-42.
51 Id. at 100-116.
52 Id. at 115.
53 Id. at 4-23.
54 Id. at 145-149.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 149.
57 Id. at 161-163.
58 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
59Marasigan y De Guzman v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016 5-6 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., 665 Phil. 784, 789-790 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].
60People of the Philippines v. Esteban, G.R. No. 200290, June 9, 2014 6 [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
61Rollo, p. 103.
62 Id. at 6.
63 Id. at 105.
64 Id. at 13 and 17.
65 Id. at 103.
66 Id. at 13.
67People v. Sacabin, 156 Phil. 707, 713 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, Second Division].
68People v. Vasquez, 345 Phil. 380, 395 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division], citing People v. Uycoque, 316 Phil. 930, 942 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
69 345 Phil. 380 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].
70 Id. at 395.
71Rollo, p. 14.
72 Id. at 9.
73 Id. at 8-10.
74 Id. at 109.
75 Id. at 10.
76 Id. at 10.
77 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 12-13.
79 Id. at 12.
80 Id.
81Macayan, Jr. y Malana v. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015 7-8 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing CONST., art. III, sec. 1; CONST., art. III, sec. 14 (2); People of the Philippines v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]; and Basilio v. People of the Philippines, 591 Phil. 508, 521-522 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
82Rollo, p. 103.