1. CONTEMPT BY NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION; ELEMENTS OF; WHEN SUIT NOT PENDING. — The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal con tempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil., 668.) It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. (Nixon v. State, 207 Ind., 426; 193 N. E., 591; 97 A. L. R., 894.) What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF ONE COURT TO PUNISH CONTEMPTS COMMITTED AGAINST ANOTHER. — In the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — CRIMINAL NATURE OF CONTEMPT POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT EXERCISED ON PRESERVATIVE NOT VINDICATIVE PRINCIPLE. — It is suggested that "even if there had been no thing more pending before the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the reason that the publication scandalized the court. (13 C. J., p. 37, 45; o R. C. L., 513.)" The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the United States, "the weight of authority, how ever, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press." (Annotations, 68 L. R. A., 255.) Other considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is other wise after the case is ended." (In re Lozano and Quevedo, supra; In re Abistado, supra.) In at least two instances, this court has exercised the power to punish for contempt "on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle" (Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil., 778), "on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment." (In re Lozano and Quevedo, supra.) Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense (Lee Yick Hon. V8. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil., 548), and in considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged (State v. New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N. M., 102, 177 p. 751), and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of justice the doubt must be re solved in his favor, and he must be acquitted. (State v. Hazel tine, 82 Wash., 81, 143 p. 436.)

As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines v. Salvador Alarcon, Et Al., convicting the accused therein except one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Federico Manga has who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. The objectionable portion is inserted in the following petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the Court of First Instance of that province on September 29, 1937:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PETITION PARA QUE FEDERICO MAÑGAHAS SEA CASTIGADO POR DESACATO

"Comparece el fiscal provincial que suscribe y al Hon. Juzgado, como motivos de accion, respetuosamente alega:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

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