EN BANC
G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017
JOSEPH C. DIMAPILIS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 with urgent prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Ante Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the Resolutions dated April 11, 20162 and August 31, 20163 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-436 (BRGY) (MP), which cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) filed by petitioner Joseph C. Dimapilis (petitioner) for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Pulung Maragul, Angeles City (Brgy. Pulung Maragul) for the October 28, 2013 Barangay Elections (2013 Barangay Elections), annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes as the duly-elected official for the said post.
I. | Petitioner's perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility. |
II. | The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office. |
Even without a petition under either x x x Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.56
III. | Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013 Barangay Elections cannot operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct. |
Second. The next question is whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC [(see supra note 31)], in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to Section 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 x x x could not be given retroactive effect. x x x.64
x x x x (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
IV. | With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a candidate in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes are to be considered stray votes. |
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
x x x x
x x x The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.74 (Emphasis supplied)
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.77
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 8-30.
2 Id. at 34-45. Issued by Presiding Commissioner Al A. Parreño and Commissioners Arthur D. Lim and Sheriff M. Abas.
3 Id. at 46-54. Issued by Chairman J. Andres D. Bautista and Commissioners Christian Robert S. Lim, Al A. Parreño, Luie Tito F. Guia, Arthur D. Lim, Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, and Sheriff M. Abas.
4 Id. at 103.
5 See Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Punong Barangay and Kagawad, Sangguniang Barangay; id. at 181. See also id. at 34 and 64.
6 Dated October 25, 2013. Id. at 90-102.
7 Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position.x x x x(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case[.]
8 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991" (October 10, 1991).
[9 See rollo, p. 96.
10 Pursuant to Section 10, Rule III of Administrative Order No. (AO) 07, otherwise known as the "RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN," approved on April 10, 1990, as amended by AO 17-03, entitled "AMENDMENT OF RULE III ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 07," approved on September 15, 2003, which pertinently provides:
Section 10. Penalties. — (a) For administrative charges under Executive Order No. 292 or such other executive orders, laws or rules under which the respondent is charged, the penalties provided thereat shall be imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman; (b) in administrative proceedings conducted under these Rules, the Office of the Ombudsman may impose the penalty of reprimand, suspension without pay for a minimum period of one (1) month up to a maximum period of one (1) year, demotion, dismissal from the service, or a fine equivalent to his salary for one (1) month up to one (1) year, or from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both, at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charge.
The penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
11Rollo, pp. 104-131. Approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez.
12 Id. at 132-156. Approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Mark E. Jalandoni.
13 See id. at 91-92.
14 Not attached to the rollo.
15Rollo, pp. 157-179.
16 Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
17Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (December 3, 1985).
18 See rollo, pp. 160-165.
19 Approved on February 15, 1993.
20 See rollo, pp. 166-167.
21 See id. at 184-187. Penned by Judge Philbert I. Iturralde.
22 See id. at 159, 168, and 186.
23 Id. at 36.
24 Not attached to the rollo.
25 See rollo, pp. 36 and 38.
26 Id. at 34-45.
27 Id. at 45.
28 Id. at 38.
29 Id. at 40.
30 Id. at 40-41.
31 G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
32 G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.
33 See rollo, pp. 42-44.
34 Id. at 44.
35 See Verified Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2016; id. at 55-73.
36 Id. at 58-59.
37 Id. at 75-80. Penned by Associate Justice (now Member of the Court) Jose Catral Mendoza with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.
38 See Second Division Minute Resolution dated August 2, 2010 in G.R. No. 192325 entitled "OMB v. Josefa [Joseph] C. Dimapilis, et al.," id. at 83.
39 See id. 60-61.
40 Id. at 85-88. Penned by Presiding Judge Eda P. Dizon-Era.
41 See id. at 62-64.
42 See id. at 64-67.
43 See id. at 46-54.
44 See id. at 50-52.
45 Id. at 53.
46 Bellosillo, Marquez and Mapili, Effective Litigation & Adjudication of Election Contests, 2012 Ed., p. 47.
47 See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza in Talaga v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 786, 890 (2012), citing Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. I, 8th Ed., p. 1002.
48 Id. See also Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 776.
49 See Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016.
50 See Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of the REVISED RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, promulgated on November 18, 2011.
51 See Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 601, 622-623 (2012).
52 Id. at 634. See also Aratea v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 700, 738 (2012).
53 Id. at 634-635.
54 711 Phil. 414 (2013).
55 Id. at 425-426.
56 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 51, at 632.
57 See rollo, pp. 17-20.
58Carpio Morales, supra note 32.
59 Id. at 558.
60 324 Phil. 813 (1996).
61 See discussion in Aguinaldo v. Santos, supra note 31, at 771-772.
62 See Reyes, supra note 60; at 826.
63 Id. at 827.
64 Id. at 826-827.
65 Pursuant to Section 10, Rule III of AO 07, as amended by AO 17-03.
66 See Jalosjos, supra note 54.
67 In Lingating v. COMELEC, November 13, 2002 (440 Phil. 308 [2002]); Aguinaldo v. Santos, supra note 31; and Lizares v. Hechanova (123 Phil. 916 [1966]), the public officials therein were administratively charged for the acts they committed during their previous term and were initially adjudged to be liable; however, during the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or appeal, the public officials were re-elected into the same office, which, thus, rendered moot and academic the pending charges against them. Cf Reyes v. COMELEC, March 7, 1996 (supra note 60) wherein the Court ruled that the condonation doctrine was inapplicable to Reyes, considering that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Ruling dated February 6, 1995 became final before the Court could finally resolve the case. See also Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009), pp.49-57.
68Aratea v. COMELEC, supra note 52, at 739.
69 See Section 9, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT TO RULES 23, 24, AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PURPOSES OF THE 13 MAY 2013 NATIONAL, LOCAL AND ARMM ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS," promulgated on September 25, 2012.
70Maquiling v. COMELEC, 709 Phil. 408,447 (2013).
71 See Hayudini v. COMELEC, 733 Phil. 822, 845-846 (2014).
72Aratea v. COMELEC, supra note 52, at 740.
73 Supra note 70, at 447-448.
74 Id. at 448.
75 Consonant with the Court's ruling in Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC (supra note 51, at 635) and Aratea v. COMELEC (supra note 52, at 740).
76 712 Phil. 177 (2013).
77 Id. at 190-191.