SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABENIR BRUSOLA Y BARAGWA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
There is never any justification for a husband to hit his wife with a maso (mallet).
This resolves the appeal1 of the Court of Appeals' July 17, 2013 Decision,2 affirming the February 4, 2010 Decision3 of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, which found Abenir Brusola (Abenir) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.4
In the Information dated July 14, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia Brusola (Delia), as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of July 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the husband of complainant DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO, now deceased, with intent to kill and with the use of ball hammer (maso), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit his said wife, DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO with the said ball hammer on her head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law.5
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Abenir Brusola y Baragwa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the children of the deceased, Delia Brusola y Ramilo, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.13
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated February 4, 2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206, in Criminal Case No. 06-650, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.19
Article 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.24 (Citations omitted)
It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. Thus, the trial court's evaluation shall be binding on the appellate court unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. There is no reason to deviate from the rule.
The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the credibility of either witness. What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise moment that appellant struck his wife with a maso is absolutely insignificant and unsubstantial to merit consideration . . . Inconsistencies that refer only to minor details do not weaken the credibility of witnesses but are rather signs that the witnesses were not rehearsed.
What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal occurrence and the identity of the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and forthright manner how she saw appellant hit her mother with a maso on the head and her testimony is supported by the physical evidence of the injury sustained by the victim. While Abigail and Kristofer did not actually see appellant in the act of hitting their mother, nevertheless, they saw appellant holding the murder weapon and their mother fallen on the floor with a bloodied head immediately after the criminal act was committed . . .
The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne and her siblings had lost their mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison, leaving them virtual orphans. Assuming that appellant had previously disapproved of Joanne's early marriage, such would not have been a sufficient motive for her to wrongly accuse her own father of a heinous crime . . .25 (Citations omitted)
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — . . .
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
. . . .
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
. . . .
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.28 (Citation omitted)
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree — prision mayor — and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.31 (Citations omitted)
Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
- When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
- When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
- When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
- When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
- When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
- When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
- When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
- When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.
- When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
- Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
- Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
Endnotes:
1 The appeal was filed under RULES OF COURT, Rule 124, sec. 13(c).
2Rollo, pp. 2-11. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04419, was penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang and concurred in by Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Franchito N. Diamante of the Fifteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 CA rollo, pp. 15-27. The Decision, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-650, was penned by Judge Patria A. Manalastas-De Leon of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City.
4 Id. at 26-27.
5 Id. at 15.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 16-20.
8Rollo, p. 4.
9 Id. at 4-5.
10 Id. at 5-6.
11 Id. at 6.
12 CA rollo, pp. 15-27.
13 Id. at 26-27.
14 Id. at 34-45.
15 Id. at 41.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 43.
18Rollo, pp. 2-11.
19 Id. at 11.
20 Id. at 1.
21 Id. at 17.
22 Id. at 20-22, OSG Manifestation submitted on May 22, 2014; rollo, pp. 23-25, PAO Manifestation submitted on May 30, 2014.
23 CA rollo, p. 24.
24 Id. at 24-25.
25Rollo, pp. 8-9.
26See People v. Arnante, 439 Phil. 754 (2002) [Per J. Vitug, First Division], People v. Joyno, 364 Phil. 305 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
27 674 Phil. 150 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
28 Id. at 166.
29 464 Phil. 680 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
30 CA rollo, pp. 76-77, Brief for the Accused-appellant.
31People v. Genosa, 464 Phil. 680, 746-747 (2004)[Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
32People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].