EN BANC
G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO MEMBER OF THE JBC, Petitioner, v. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, CHAIRED BY THE HON. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, CHIEF JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO CHAIRPERSON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO JR., J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability in the law.1
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.2
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With that, this Court examined the constitutional provision that states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC. Had it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. This Court further articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department as no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover, this Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that the ex officio members of the JBC consist of representatives from the three main branches of government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the executive, and a representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It can be deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC would negate the principle of equality among these three branches of the government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.3
As instructed by this Court,8 both Houses of Congress, through the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which acts as the People's Tribune in this case, and the JBC commented on the Petition.I.
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC TO CORRECT ITS UNWARRANTED DENIAL OF THE VOTES REGISTERED BY [HEREIN PETITIONER] DURING THE EN BANC DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER 2 AND 9, 2016 BECAUSE THE DECISION IN THE CHAVEZ CASE IS DEFECTIVE/FLAWED.II.
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO MANDATE THE JBC TO ACCEPT/COUNT SAID VOTES CAST BY [PETITIONER] BECAUSE THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS DEFECTIVE/FLAWED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.III.
THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF [REPRESENTATIVES] TO PARTICIPATE AND VOTE ON A [6-MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CREATES AN [INSTITUTIONAL] IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND INSTITUTES AN INHERENT AND CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JBC THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].IV.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY REQUIRES PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JBC PROCEEDINGS AND ALL APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].A. THE BICAMERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT WAS BELATEDLY DECIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, BUT MUST BE DEEMED AS INCORPORATED AND MODIFYING THE JBC STRUCTURE UNDER SECTION 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION, TO GIVE FULL MEANING TO THE INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS.
B. THERE WAS A CLEAR OVERSIGHT AND TECHNICAL OMISSION INVOLVING SECTIONS 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION THAT SHOULD BE RECTIFIED BY [THIS COURT].
C. THE FULL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN THE JBC IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH PARTICIPATING AND VOTING FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS, OTHERWISE THE JBC PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND [THE] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBERS IN THE JBC UPHOLDS THE CO-EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNCIL OF THE THREE MAIN BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.7
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.The legal standing of each member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,27 where this Court pronounced that:
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
x x x x
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (citation omitted). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof.Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized (citation omitted).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (citation omitted).
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (citation omitted).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (citation omitted). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (citation omitted).28 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The same is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus, time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.41
Endnotes:
1Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 132051, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 469.
2 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.
3 Id. at 597-606.
4Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496.
5Rollo, pp. 42 & 45.
6 Petition, id. at 9-10.
7 Id. at 11-12.
8 Per Resolutions dated January 17, 2017 (id. at 84-85) and February 14, 2017 (id. at 255-256).
9 Manifestation in lieu of Comment (to the Petition dated December 28, 2016), OSG, id. at 168-169.
10 Id. at 175.
11 Id. at 183.
12 Id. at 185.
13 Id. at 187.
14 Id. at 191, 194 & 198.
15 Id. at 199-202, 207 & 210.
16 Id. at 217 & 224.
17 Comment/Opposition (On the Petition dated 28 December 2016), JBC, id. at 262-268.
18 Id. at 269-271.
19 Id. at 271-273.
20 Id. at 273-280.
21 Id. at 280-282.
22 Supra note 6, at 83.
23Lu v. Lu YM, Sr., G.R. Nos. 153690, 157381 & 170889, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 254, 273.
24Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, et al., April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 283.
25Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 & 187910, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 360.
26 G.R. Nos. 160261-160263, et al., November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 136-137.
27 G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, et al., August 19, 994, 235 SCRA 506.
28 Id. at 519-520.
29 G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286.
30Yee v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 385, 394.
31 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1.
32 G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017.
33The Diocese of Bacohd v. Commission on Elections, supra note 31, at 45-50.
34Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135-209136, et al., July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1, 72.
35Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 289.
36Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 34, at 74-75.
37Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 182, 198.
38Partido ng Manggagawa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 671, 684.
39Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage, G.R. No. 157660, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 664, 671.
40Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 37.
41Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 285, 293-295.
42Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 545, 554.
43Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 4, at 507-514.
44 Id. at 515-518.
LEONEN, J.:
The 1935 Constitution similarly states:TITLE X
The Judicial Power
Article 80. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the Legislative and Executive Powers.
The promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, however, vested the chief executive with both executive and legislative powers. Vetting and appointing of members to the judiciary became the sole prerogative of the President:ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Hoping to unshackle the Republic from the abuses of power during Martial Law but at the same time wanting to insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, through Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, proposed the creation of an independent body that would vet potential appointees to the judiciary.4 This body would be represented by the different stakeholders of the legal sector and would have the mandate of preparing the list of potential judicial appointees to be submitted to the President. The proposal became what is now the Judicial and Bar Council. Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution now provides:ARTICLE X
The Judiciary
Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President.
Based on their understanding of the provision stating that one (1) of its ex officio members would be "a representative of Congress," both the House of Representatives and Senate sent representatives to the Council. Representative Rogaciano A. Mercado sat as ex officio member from December 10, 1987 to February 23, 1989 while Senator Wigberto E. Tañada sat as ex officio member from March 2, 1988 to May 21, 1990.5 In a previous case, however, this Court stated that membership in the Council would be altered only in 1994, stating that before then, the House of Representatives and the Senate would alternate its representation:ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
. . . .
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
[F]rom the moment of the creation of the JBC, [Congress] designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.The practice of giving each member of Congress one (1) full vote was questioned in 2012 in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.7
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.6
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.Upon Motion for Reconsideration, this Court, voting 10-3,9 reiterated that "[i]n the [Judicial and Bar Council], any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress."10
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized him and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that the representation would be on a rotation basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be he. In the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the meetings, and vice versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up with an agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It should be a communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished with copies of all notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.There was no showing of the presence of any resolution from any of the legislative chambers that authorized or ratified the practice.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of Senate President Drilon stating, among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed that Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31, 2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a letter. His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from the Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement. He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave.
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.12
The Judicial and Bar Council was directed to file its comment to the Petition. On February 6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)18 entering its appearance for "[t]he Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Senate and the House of Representatives"19 and "[acting] as the People's Tribune."20 On February 10, 2017, the Judicial and Bar Council Executive Chair21 and its regular members22 filed its Comment23 on behalf of the Council.
- The JBC's denial of petitioner Umali's vote as ex-officio member during the En Banc sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016, be reversed and set aside;
- The JBC be directed to count the votes of petitioner Umali as ex-officio member during the en bane sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016;
- The current six-month rotational representation of Congress by the Senate and the House of Representatives in the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and
- The JBC be directed to revert back to its prior representational arrangement where two representatives from Congress are recognized and allowed to vote, or the status quo ante, prior to the Chavez ruling, and in accordance with such specific guidelines that the Supreme Court will promulgate to ensure full and proper representation and voting by both members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, and thereafter to recognize, accept and count the votes cast by the petitioner Umali in all proceedings of the JBC.17
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.72Respondent contends that petitioner has no standing to file this case absent a resolution from the House of Representatives authorizing him to do so.73 It anchors its argument on Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez,74 where this Court stated:
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.75Respondent, however, failed to read the entirety of the quoted portion. In Philippine Constitutional Association, the procedural issue on standing was whether Senators could question a presidential veto on an appropriations bill despite the absence of a Senate resolution authorizing them to file the case. This Court, in addressing the issue, first acknowledged that previous decisions have required Senators to first submit a Senate resolution authorizing the filing of the case. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that members of Congress have standing to question any action that impairs the Congress' powers and privileges, regardless of whether there was a prior Congressional resolution:
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. . . . In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:Every member of Congress has standing to question acts which affect the powers, prerogatives, and privileges of Congress. In Pimentel v. Executive Secretary:77Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized . . .
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
. . . .
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises . . .
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution . . .
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress . . . In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted[:]This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.76 (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted.)
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that "to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution." Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the Senate.78 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)Here, petitioner, as a member of Congress and the Chair of the House Committee on Justice, alleges that the rotational representation arrangement adopted by respondent Judicial and Bar Council impairs the prerogative of Congress to have full representation within the Council. Petitioner need not have the required House resolution to file his Petition.
True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position.Gonzales v. Chavez83 further explains:
. . . .
As we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases pending before this Court:This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be advised of his position just as well.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of which the individual lawyers in said office are a part.The Office of the Solicitor General is not prohibited from taking a position adverse from that of the Judicial and Bar Council. Its representation would be on behalf of the Filipino people, instead of a particular government instrumentality.
. . . .
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to serve.84
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.Citing the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, respondent contends that the Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner should have first asked Congress to repudiate the rotational representation agreement.86
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)
This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to comply is considered a culpable violation of the Constitution. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:90Article VIII
Judicial Department
. . . .
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
[T]he usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4 (1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.91 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)Admittedly, petitioner's prayer to have his vote counted in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc Meetings has already become moot with the appointments of Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.92 Nevertheless:
Th[is] Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.93 (Citation omitted)An erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision would be considered a grave violation of the Constitution. Judicial appointments are likewise of paramount public interest. This case will also settle, once and for all, the issue on the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1).
The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.101Similarly, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:102
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.103 (Citations omitted)Whenever this Court renders its decisions, the intended effects of those decisions to future cases are taken into consideration. The changing membership of the bench likewise contributes to the evolution of this Court's stand on certain issues and cases. Ruling by precedent, thus, requires more than a mechanical application:
[T]he use of precedents is never mechanical.There is also a need to abandon decisions "when this Court discerns, after full deliberation, that a continuing error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent of a constitutional provision exists."105 Assuring the public of stability in the law and certainty of court actions is important. It is, however, more important for this Court to be right. Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to re-examine previous decisions to avoid continuing its error:
Some assumptions normally creep into the facts established for past cases. These assumptions may later on prove to be inaccurate or to be accurate only for a given historical period. Sometimes, the effects assumed by justices who decide past cases do not necessarily happen. Assumed effects are given primacy whenever the spirit or intent of the law is considered in the interpretation of a legal provision. Some aspect of the facts or the context of these facts would not have been fully considered. It is also possible that doctrines in other aspects of the law related to a precedent may have also evolved.
In such cases, the use of precedents will unduly burden the parties or produce absurd or unworkable outcomes. Precedents will not be useful to achieve the purposes for which the law would have been passed.104 (Citations omitted)
The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law . . . is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the court should be right. And particularly is it not wise to subordinate legal reason to case law and by so doing perpetuate error when it is brought to mind that the views now expressed conform in principle to the original decision and that since the first decision to the contrary was sent forth there has existed a respectable opinion of non-conformity in the court. Indeed, on at least one occasion has the court broken away from the revamped doctrine, while even in the last case in point the court was as evenly divided as it was possible to be and still reach a decision.106Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council was not a unanimous decision of this Court. Vigorous dissents accompanied not only the main decision but also the resolution on the motion for reconsideration. This Petition precisely assails Chavez's outcome and its effect on the diminished representation of Congress in the vetting process of judicial nominees. Rather than dismiss this case on the basis of stare decisis, it would be more prudent for this Court to revisit Chavez in order to settle the issue.
The Constitution considers both chambers as separate and distinct from each other. The manner of elections, terms of office, and organization of each chamber is provided for under separate provisions of the Constitution.ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of proceedings for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.Thus, there is no Member of Congress that can represent all of Congress. Congress is represented by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Constitution itself provides for only one (1) instance when both chambers must vote jointly:
No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not exist separate from the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from the Senate. By constitutional design, he or she cannot get instructions from the House of Representatives. If a Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate, then he or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate if the House of Representatives' instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives.
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the House of Representatives may carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as a whole.119
In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,120 this Court, however, ruled that Congress is only entitled to one (1) seat in the Judicial and Bar Council, pursuant to its interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 8(1) provides:ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
. . . .
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safely requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
A verba legis interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution leads to an ambiguity and disregards the bicameral nature of Congress. Chavez presumes that one (1) member of Congress can vote on behalf of the entire Congress.ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
. . . .
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.Civil Liberties Union also instructs us that constitutional interpretation should depend on the understanding of the people adopting it, rather than how the framers interpreted it:
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.122 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer[s'] understanding thereof.123 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)Resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission to discern the framers' intent must always be with the understanding of its context and its contemporary consequences.124 Records show that Article VIII, Section 8(1) was approved by the Constitutional Commission on July 19, 1986.125 On July 21, 1986, the Commission voted to amend the proposal of a unicameral "National Assembly" to a bicameral "Congress."126
Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the thinking of this group is, that all the provisions that were being drafted up to that time assumed a unicameral government.127On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened to introduce amendments to the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14 only.128 The entire Article on the Legislature, meanwhile, was approved on October 9, 1986.129 By October 15, 1986, the Constitution was presented to the President of the Constitutional Commission, Cecilia Muñoz Palma.130
From the promulgation of the Constitution, Congress already recognized that "a representative of Congress" can only mean one (1) representative from each chamber. This interpretation was so prevalent that from 2001, each member from the Senate and the House of Representatives was given one (1) full vote.132 This is the representation of Congress contemplated in the Constitution.
Ex Officio Members Representing the Senate, Congress: WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA 2 March 1988 to 21 May 1990 +RAUL S. ROCO 30 September 1992 to 3 March 1993 ALBERTO G. ROMULO 14 April 1993 to 1 August 1995 +MARCELO B. FERNAN 2 August 1995 to 31 December 1996 +RAUL S. ROCO 1 January 1997 to 30 July 1998 +RENATO L. CAYETANO 31 July 1998 to 31 January 2000 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. 1 February 2000 to 29 November 2000 +MIRIAM D. SANTIAGO 10 January 2001 to 14 February 2001 +RENATO L. CAYETANO 16 May 2001 to 28 August 2001 FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 29 August 2001 to August 2004 23 August 2004 to 30 June 2007 6 August 2007 to 23 November 2008 FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO 24 November 2008 to 30 June 2013 AQUILINO MARTIN DL. PIMENTEL III 23 July 2013 to 31 December 2013 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015 LEILA M. DE LIMA 26 July 2016 to 19 September 2016 RICHARD J. GORDON 19 September 2016 to date Ex Officio Members Representing the House of Representatives, Congress: +ROGACIANO M. MERCADO 10 December 1987 to 23 February 1989 ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 31 July 1989 to 12 August 1992 PABLO P. GARCIA 26 August 1992 to 8 March 1995 ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 28 June 1995 to 30 June 1998 ALFREDO E. ABUEG 31 July 1998 to 29 November 2000 +HENRY P. LANOT 14 December 2000 to 30 June 2001 ALLAN PETER S.CAYETANO 8 August 2001 to 3 March 2003 MARCELINO C. LIBANAN 4 March 2003 to 8 August 2003 SIMEON A. DATUMANONG 9 August 2004 to 30 June 2007 MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. 8 August 2007 to 30 June 2010 NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. 29 July 2010 to 30 June 2013 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2014 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2015 REYNALDO V. UMALI 3 August 2016 to date
[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized him and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that representation would be on a rotation basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be [him]. In the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the meetings, and vice versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up with an agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It should be a communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished with copies of all notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.There is no office or officer in Congress that can represent both chambers. Representative Tupas recognized this difficulty and cautioned the Council that it should never presume that one (1) chamber can speak for the entire Congress. He proved this point when he told the Council that he was unaware of any letter sent by the Senate President.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of the Senate President Drilon stating, among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed that Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31, 2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a letter. His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from the Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement. He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave.
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.134 (Emphasis supplied)
Chavez deprives Congress its opportunity to fully represent its constituencies, whether at the national or at the local level.
Court/Tribunal Number of Appointees Supreme Court 1 Court of Appeals 0 Legal Education Board 1 Sandiganbayan 1 Court of Tax Appeals 1 Ombudsman 0 Lower Courts 38
The shortlist dated December 9, 2016 for the vacancy of Associate Justice Brion contained the following names:140
1. REYES, Jose Jr. C. -7 votes 2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D. -5 votes 3. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. -5 votes 4. MARTIRES, Samuel R. -5 votes 5. REYES, Andres Jr. B. -4 votes
As demonstrated, no tie-breaker was needed in the preparation of the shortlist. Insisting that the composition of the Council should be an odd number is unnecessary. The Council will still be able to discharge its functions regardless of whether it is composed of seven (7) or eight (8) members.
1. CARANDANG, Rosmari D. -6 votes 2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D. -5 votes 3. REYES, Jose, Jr. C. -5 votes 4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. -4 votes 5. LAZARO-JAVIER, Amy C. -4 votes 6. TIJAM, Noel G. -4 votes 7. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S. -4 votes
[S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction . . . , or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.141 (Citations omitted)Respondent Judicial and Bar Council was merely implementing a prior decision of this Court when it refused to count petitioner's votes. A relevant portion of the Chavez's, fallo states:
The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.142The method of reconstitution was left to the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council, in recognition of its status as an independent constitutional body. The Council, in turn, implemented Chavez by requiring that Congress provide it with only one (1) representative. In the July 23, 2013 En Banc Meeting, Representative Tupas relayed the instructions of the House of Representatives. Then Senate President Drilon sent the instructions of the Senate through a letter to the Chief Justice. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives did not offer any other type of representation that may have been agreed upon. The Council, therefore, was merely complying with the directive in Chavez. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:143
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.144These events, however, highlight the inevitable difficulty in implementing Chavez's interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1). There is no one (1) office in Congress that could provide the Council with one (1) representative. The Council has no authority to order Congress to jointly convene for the determination of its sole representative. Thus, the Council would only be able to implement what is practicable, that is, whatever arrangement the Congressional representatives may have agreed upon. Considering that the Congressional representatives have not yet manifested to the Council that it was considering another type of arrangement, the Council could not have been faulted for refusing to count petitioner's votes at a time when Senate was representing Congress in the Council.
Section 3. Petition for Mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.Mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot be issued to compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay:147
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.148 (Citations omitted)The difference between a discretionary act and a ministerial act is settled:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.149 (Citation omitted)The determination of the qualifications and fitness of judicial applicants is discretionary on the part of the Judicial and Bar Council.150 A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the council to withdraw a list originally submitted and to add other nominees that have not previously qualified.151
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.153 (Citation omitted)The Judicial and Bar Council has the ministerial duty to count the votes of all its members. Petitioner, as the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, should be considered a regular ex officio member of the Council, and his votes in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc Meetings should have been counted. This relief, however, has already become moot in light of the recent appointments to this Court. In future deliberations, however, the Judicial and Bar Council should have the ministerial duty to separately count the votes of both Congressional representatives in the Council.
Endnotes:
1 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
2 Id.
3 709 Phil. 478 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
4See I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL No. 29, dated July 14, 1986.
5JBC Officials, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials (Last accessed March 6, 2017).
6 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 189 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] citing List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council and Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001. Curiously, the List found in Judicial and Bar Council's website shows that since 1988, Congress has sent two (2) representatives to the Council.
7 691 Phil. 173, 189 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
8 Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Sereno, JJ., no part, nominees to the C.J. position. Brion J., no part, on leave. Abad, J., dissented. Del Castillo, J., joined the dissent of J. Abad.
9 C.J. Sereno had no part as chair of JBC. Associate Justice Velasco had no part due to participation in Judicial and Bar Council. Associate Justice Brion had no part. Associate Justices Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe concurred. Associate Justice Abad, Del Castillo and Leonen dissented.
10Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 494 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
11Rollo, p. 45.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 260, Comment.
14 Id. at 6. Representative Umali is the current chair of the House Committee on Justice.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Id. at 3-40.
17 Id. at 33.
18 Id. at 160-241.
19 Id. at 160.
20 Id.
21 Retired Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez.
22 Jose V. Mejia, Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa, and Toribio E. Ilao, Jr.
23Rollo, pp. 257-290.
24 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
25Rollo, pp. 15-16.
26 Id. at 16.
27 Id. at 16-17.
28 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8 (1) provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
29Rollo, pp. 17-18.
30 Id. at 18.
31 Id. at 19. Under its current arrangement, the House of Representatives represents Congress in the JBC from January to June while Senate represents Congress from July to December. Justice Bienvenido Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while Justice Mendoza retires on August 13, 2017. Justice Velasco, Jr. retires on August 18, 2018 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro retires on October 8, 2018. Justice Del Castillo retires on July 29, 2019, Justice Jardeleza retires on September 26, 2019, Justice Bersamin retires on October 18, 2019 and Justice Carpio retires on October 26, 2019. Two justices will retire in the first half of 2019: Justice Martires retires on January 2, 2019 and Justice Tijam retires on January 5, 2019.
32 Justice Peralta retires on March 27, 2022 while Justice Perlas-Bernabe retires on May 14, 2022.
33Rollo, p. 20.
34 Id. at 23.
35 Id. at 24.
36 Id. at 27-28.
37 Id. at 29-30.
38 Id. at 30.
39 Id. at 15.
40 Id. at 16.
41 691 Phil. 173, 494 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
42Rollo, pp. 160-245. The Manifestation was verified by Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and Speaker of the House Pantaleon D. Alvarez.
43 Id. at 425-432. The Counter-Manifestation attached a letter from Senator Richard Gordon, the current Chair of the Senate Committee on Justice and Senate representative to the Judicial and Bar Council, signifying his assent to the Petition filed by Rep. Umali. This Court likewise noted a Letter (rollo, pp. 426-427) from Secretary of Justice Vitaliano N. Aguirre II stating that while he previously signified his assent to the filing of the Judicial and Bar Council's Comment, he found after further evaluation that "the arguments of the representative of Mindoro in his petition to be impressed with merit."
44 Id. at 168.
45 Id. at 169.
46 Id. at 175.
47 Id. at 185.
48 Id. at 186-187.
49 Id. at 190-194.
50 Id. at 194-198.
51 Id. at 200.
52 Id. at 201.
53 Id. at 207-209.
54 Id. at 209-211.
55 Id. at 217-220.
56 Id. at 224-225.
57 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
58Rollo, pp. 227-237.
59 Id. at 262-263.
60 Id. at 264-265.
61 Id. at 268-269.
62 Id. at 265.
63 Id. at 266-267.
64 Id. at 267.
65 Id. at 269-271.
66 Id. at 271-273.
67 Id. at 273-275.
68 Id. at 276.
69 Id. at 277-280.
70 Id. at 280-281.
71 Id. at 282-284.
72David v. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755-756 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc] citing Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1991, p. 941, RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 2, and Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
73Rollo, pp. 269-271.
74 305 Phil. 546 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
75 Id. at 562-536. See also rollo, pp. 269-270.
76Philconsa v. Enriquez, 305 Phil. 563, 562-564 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc] citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 269 Phil. 472 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc]; United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 (1976); Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 (1977); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (1973); and Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (1976).
77 501 Phil. 303 (2005) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
78 Id. at 312-313 citing Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307 (2000) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
79Rollo, p. 160.
80 1987 ADM. CODE, Book IV, Title III, chapter 12, sec. 35.
81 352 Phil. 424 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
82 Id. at 431-432 citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478; Section 35, Chapter 12 of the Administrative Code of 1987; Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 267 Phil. 476 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]; and Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 307 Phil. 592 (1994) [Per C.J. Narvasa, Second Division].
83 282 Phil. 858 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
84 Id. at 889-891.
85Rollo, p. 265.
86 Id. at 266-267.
87 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
88 Id. at 331.
89 Id. at 330.
90 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
91 Id. at 692 citing Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20 (1963) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
92 Associate Justice Martires was appointed on March 2, 2017 vice Associate Justice Perez while Associate Justice Tijam was appointed on March 8, 2017 vice Associate Justice Brion. Judicial and Bar Council, See Newly-appointed Judges/Justices, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, http://jbc.iudiciary.gov.ph/index.php/announcements/newly-appointed (Lase accessed July 25, 2017).
93Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, 582 Phil. 492 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division] and Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 559 Phil. 622 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
94 Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while Associate Justice Mendoza retires on August 13, 2017.
95Rollo, pp. 271-273.
96 Id. at 273-275.
97Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 395 Phil. 169, 177 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] citing R.S. Vasan, Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers, p. 227.
98 Id.
99See Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 677 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
100Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249, 257 (1947) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
101 Id.
102 632 Phil. 657 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
103 Id. at 686 citing Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 171 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division] and Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Harvard University Press, p. 4 (1982).
104 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 536 Phil. 1, 281 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], Separate Opinion of Justice Imperial in In the matter of the Involuntary Insolvency of Rafael Fernandez, 59 Phil. 30, 41 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], and Lazatin v. Desierto, 606 Phil. 271 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
105 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing Urbano v. Chavez, 262 Phil. 374, 385 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
106In the matter of the Involuntary Insolvency of Rafael Fernandez, 59 Phil. 30 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
107 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] and 709 Phil. 478 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
108 CONST., art. VI, sec. 2.
109 CONST., art. VI, sec. 5 (1).
110 CONST., art. VI, sec. 5 (2).
111 CONST., art. VI, sec. 4.
112 CONST., art. VI, sec. 7.
113 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16.
114 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (1).
115 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (4), par. (1).
116 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (4), par. (2).
117 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (3).
118 The House of Representatives is located in Quezon City while the Senate is located in Pasay City.
119 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 503-504 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
120 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
121 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
122 Id. at 162.
123 Id. at 169-170.
124 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 501 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
125 I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL No. 34, dated July 19, 1986.
126 I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL NO. 35, dated July 21, 1986, which reads in part With 22 Members voting for a unicameral system and 23 Members voting for bicameralism, the Body approved the proposal for a bicameral legislature.
127 II Constitutional Commission Record 434, dated 30, 1986.
128 II Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 102, dated October 7 and 8,1987.
129 III Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 103 dated October 9, 1986.
130 V Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 109 dated October 15, 1986.
131List of Former and Incumbent JBC Chairpersons, Ex Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries, Consultants and Officers (from 1987 to date), JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials (Last accessed July 25, 2017).
132See Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
133See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 506 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
134Rollo, p. 259.
135See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 507 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
136Rollo, p. 224.
137Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 491 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
138See the following constitutional provisions:
Article VI
. . . .
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law[.]
. . . .
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be[.]
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
. . . .
Article VIII
. . . .
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members . . .
Article IX
. . . .
B. The Civil Service Commission
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners . . .
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners . . .
D. Commission on Audit
Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners
. . . .
Article XI
. . . .
Section 11. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Article XIII
. . . .
Section 17 . . .
(2) The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.
139Shortlist of Nominees dated December 2, 2016, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Perez_12-2-16.pdf (Last accessed July 25, 2017).
140Shortlist of Nominees dated December 9, 2016, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Brion_12-9-16.pdf (Last accessed July 25, 2017).
141Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278, 280 (1941) [Per J. Moran, First Division] citing Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480 (1939) [Per J. Moran, En Banc] and Tavera-Lima, Inc. vs. Nable, 61 Phil. 340 (1939) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
142Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 209 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
143 632 Phil. 657 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
144 Id. at 686 citing Caltex (Phil), Inc. v. Palomar, 124 Phil. 763 (1966) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
145 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
146 Id. at 40.
147 595 Phil. 305 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].
148 Id. at 326 citing Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997) [Per J. Melo, Third Division]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004); Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912) [Per J. Johnson, First Division].
149De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 706-707 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc] citing Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 664 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].
150See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council, 741 Phil. 460, 641 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
151 Id.
152 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
153 Id. at 706 citing Nery v. Gamolo, 446 Phil. 76 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], Musni v. Morales, 373 Phil. 703 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
154 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] and 709 Phil. 478 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].