FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017
ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES, AND JUSTO TORRES, JR., Petitioners, v. ANTONIA F. ARUEGO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rules 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the September 12, 2011 Resolution2 and March 26, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 which dismissed petitioners' Roberto A. Torres, Immaculada Torres-Alanon, Agustin Torres and Justo Torres, Jr. (petitioners) Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and denied their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 7, 1983, Antonia F. Aruego (Antonia) and Evelyn F. Aruego (Evelyn), represented by their mother and guardian ad litem Luz M. Fabian, filed a Complaint4 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for "Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights" against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and guardian ad litem Justo M. Torres, Jr. (collectively defendants). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-16093.
In their Complaint, Antonia and Evelyn alleged that they are the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego (Aruego) who had and maintained an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, their mother, up to the demise of Aruego on March 30, 1982.
Alleging further that they are in continuous possession of the status of children of the deceased Aruego and not being aware of any intestate proceeding having been filed in court for the settlement of the estate of Aruego, they have thus filed this complex action for compulsory acknowledgment and participation in said inheritance. In paragraph 10 of their Complaint, they enumerated the following properties left by the deceased Aruego, so far as known to them:
10. The deceased Jose M. Aruego left, among other things, so far as known to the plaintiffs, the following properties:In their Answer,6 defendants denied the allegations of the Complaint and set forth affirmative defenses to dispute the claim of Antonia and Evelyn that they are the illegitimate children of the deceased Aruego.(a) Undivided one-third (1/3) share to a parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 30770 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, Metro Manila, with an area of 797 square meters, more or less.(b) Undivided one-half (1/2) share to the parcels of land covered by:T.C.T. No. 48618 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 68,365 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 18683 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 23,131 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 21319 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 12,956 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 21317 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 7,776 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 21315 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 34,889 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 2 i 315 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 6,083 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 127154 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 757 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 9598 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 1,167 square meters, more or less.T.C.T. No. 1060 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 44,602 square meters, more or less.(c) Undivided one-half share of whatever rights, interests and participation the deceased Jose M. Aruego has on the University Stock Supply, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.5
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration9 but it was denied by the lower court in its Order10 dated January 14, 1983. They filed a Notice of Appeal11 on February 12, 1993 but it was denied due course by the lower court in its Order12 dated February 26, 1993 on the ground that it was filed out of time.
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that, the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:1. Real [Estate] Properties covered by TCT No. 48680, exh "K";4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
2. TCT No. 18683, exh "K-1";
3. TCT No. 12150, exh "K-2";
4. TCT No. 21316, exh "K-3";
5. TCT No. 21311, exh "K-4";
6. TCT No. 21318, exh "K-5";
7. TCT No. 127154, exh "K-6";
8. TCT No. 9598, exh "K-7";
9. TCT No. 1060, exh "K-8";
10. TCT No. 30730, exh "K-9";
11. share in the University Book Store.
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego's share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to pay plaintiff (Antonia Aruego) counsel the Sum of P10,000.00 as Arty's, fee.
8. Cost against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.8
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The court orders:Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but it was denied by the court a quo.35SO ORDERED.33
- The Defendants to submit, within 30 days from notice of this order, an accounting of all the fruits, rents, profits, and income from the properties belonging to the estate of Jose M. Aruego from the time of his death until the actual division thereof among his heirs;
- Each [party] to nominate three (3) competent and disinterested persons and submit, within 15 days from notice of this Order, the names of said persons from which this court shall choose three (3) commissioners who will be tasked to perform the following:
a) To make an updated project of partition specifying the metes and bounds of the particular portion of the property assigned to plaintiff; and, b) Upon approval by the court of the project of partition, to effect the same and deliver to plaintiff her share thereon.
Petitioners' ArgumentsI
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONSIDERING THAT:
- THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO.
- B. IN LIGHT OF HEIRS OF JUAN D. FRANCISCO v. MUNOZ-PALMA, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND NO COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WARRANTS A REVIEW AND/OR MODIFICATION OF THE [15] JUNE 1992 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THAT:
- THE [15] JUNE [1992] DECISION (OF THE COURT A QUO) IS NOT CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTIES COMPRISING TFIE ESTATE OF MR. JOSE M. ARGUEGO, SR. AS THE SAME IS NOT AN ISSUE IN RESPONDENT-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS.
- THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS.
- EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ISSUE REGARDING THE PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE ESTATE OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR. HAS ATTAINED FINALITY, THE SAME MAY STILL BE MODIFIED AS THE TERMS TFIEREOF ARE PATENTLY UNCLEAR AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARE OF MS. SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARGUEGO, AS WELL AS THE SHARES OF THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS AND/OR THIRD PARTIES THAT EXIST PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR.41
It may be well to remember, that the fact that the decision in the case has long become final and executory, and that the order in dispute was issued merely in execution thereof, does not necessarily imply the non-existence of an appeal therefrom. For while it is true that, as a general rule, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable, it also recognized that the rule is subject to two exceptions, viz., (1) when the order of execution varies or tends to vary the tenor of the judgment, and (2) when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough that there remains room for interpretation thereof by the trial court.45Petitioners assert that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo "are obviously unclear as it admits of different interpretations"46 which, in fact, account for the remaining conflict between the parties herein. Respondent believes that the "1/2 portion" should be taken from the "whole estate," contrary to their interpretation that the "1/2 portion" refers to "1/2 of the share of each legitimate descendant of Aruego."47 Acting on her erroneous belief, she had, in fact, caused the subdivision of the property covered by TCT No. 30730, now the subject of the pending annulment case before the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36300.
a) by declaring that the June 15, 1992 Decision is erroneous at least with respect to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego;Respondent's Arguments
b) by declaring that the terms thereof, with respect to the estate of xxx Aruego, are unclear and ambiguous;
c) by allowing the parties to present evidence to determine the properties and/or property interests of Aruego which are to be properly included in his estate; and
d) to issue an Order annulling and setting aside the assailed Resolutions of the CA.51
Asking this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to enable a party, in this instance the Petitioners, to present evidence after a decision has long-attained finality is no different from praying that an already executory decision be reviewed. More certainly, such strat[e]gem cannot be allowed as it will contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments. Instructive on this point is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Milan, viz[.]:Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the CA ruled in its second assailed Resolution dated March 26, 2012, viz.:A judgment becomes 'final and executory' by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has became final.True, the doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of exceptions such as the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench. Hence, there is no ground to justify the modification of the Respondent RTC's June 15, 1992 Decision.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. xxx
xxx Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. xxx
To stress, the Court finds, after a thorough review of the records, no compelling circumstance extant in this case that would warrant a departure from the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Most certainly, We cannot issue a writ so as to allow the Petitioners to present evidence as the same should have been raised by them during trial. xxx56 (Emphasis in the original)
At the risk of being repetitious, it bears reiterating, therefore, that this Court cannot and will not issue a writ of certiorari to enable the Petitioners to present evidence in a case where a decision has been rendered as far back as June 15, 1992, for doing so will contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments.57We affirm the assailed Resolutions of the CA.
Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.58 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.59In arguing that the assailed Resolutions erroneously applied the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the exceptions thereto, petitioners relied heavily on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Muñoz-Palma.60 Petitioners insist that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo are not clear enough, as there remains room for interpretation thereof, hence, the judgment may still be appealed even when the same has already attained finality.
9. To the best knowledge of the plaintiffs, no intestate proceeding has been filed in court for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, thus this complex action for compulsory acknowledgement and participation in said inheritance.72On the other hand, in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, respondent enumerated the properties left by Aruego, so far as known to her.73
It has been consistently held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling.75 In Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,76 the Court said: "it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for."
- The share and participation of the plaintiffs in the estate of their deceased father be determined, and the defendants ordered to deliver such share unto the plaintiffs.74
Endnotes:
** Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2484 dated September 14, 2017.
1Rollo, pp. 18-77.
2 Id. 78-82; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita O. Tolentino and Rodil V. Zalameda.
3 Id. 83-84.
4 Id. at 91-97.
5 Id. at 93-94.
6 Id. at 98-104.
7 Id. at 112-118; penned by Presiding Judge Modesto C. Juanson.
8 Id. at 118.
9 Id. at. 119-131.
10 Id. at 132; penned by Judge Senecio O. Ortile.
11 Id. at 133.
12 Records, Vol. I, p. 312.
13Rollo, pp. 134-158.
14 Records, Vol. I, pp. 326-329.
15 See March 13, 1996 Decision in G.R. No. 112193; id. at 330-338 at 333.
16Rollo, pp. 169-206.
17 Records, Vol. I, pp. 330-338.
18 Records, Vol. II, pp. 447-448.
19Rollo, pp. 217-220.
20 Id. at 220-223.
21 Id. at 224-227.
22 Id. at 234-245.
23 Id. at 231-232.
24 Id. at 230.
25 Id. at 233.
26 Records, Vol. II, pp. 518-522
27Rollo, pp. 254-256.
28 Id. at 256
29 Id. at 257-273.
30 Id. at 274-284.
31 Id. at 285-293.
32 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1030-1033.
33 Id. at 1032-1033.
34Rollo, pp. 296-301.
35 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1067-1068.
36Rollo, pp. 314-370.
37 Id. at 78-82.
38 Id. at 82.
39 Id. at 83-84.
40 Id. at 18-77.
41 Id. at 48-49.
42 147 Phil. 721 (1971).
43Rollo, p. 50.
44 Supra note 42 at 727-728.
45Rollo, p. 50.
46 Id. at 51.
47 Id.
48 Supra note 42.
49 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1067-1068.
50Rollo, p. 58.
51 Id. at 66.
52 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1030-1033.
53 Records, Vol. II, pp. 518-522.
54Rollo, p. 380.
55 Id. at 381.
56 Id. at 79-81.
57 Id. at 84.
58Spouses Genato v. Viola, 625 Phil. 514, 528-529 (2010); Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 558 Phil. 683, 703 (2007).
59 Id.
60 Supra note 42.
61 Id.
62 87 Phil. 166 (1950).
63 Id. at 169.
64 Records, Vol. III, p. 1031.
65Rollo, p. 81.
66 Records, Vol. I, p. 112 and its dorsal page.
67 Id. at 180-185.
68Butiong v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 227, 252-253.
69Sapad v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 478, 483 (2000).
70 656 Phil. 337, 340 (2011).
71Rollo, pp. 91-97.
72 Id. at 93.
73 Id. at 93-94; see par. 10 quoted, supra note 5.
74 Id. at 96.
75Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 304 (1999).
76 481 Phil. 520, 539 (2004).
77Espiritu v.Court of First Instance of Cavite, 248 Phil. 623, 629 (1988).
78 Records, Vol., I, p. 94 - dorsal page.
79Budget Investment & Financing, Inc. v. Mangoma, 237 Phil. 613, 621 (1987).
80Teh v. Teh Tan, 650 Phil, 130, 142 (2010).
81 Per Special Order No. 2483 dated September 14, 2017.