1. ALIENS; CITIZENSHIP; SIMILARITY OF CASE AT BAR TO ROA v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (23 PHIL., 316); GENERAL ADHERENCE TO LONG ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE. — The present case is similar to Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 315), in that the facts determinative of citizenship in both relate to events which had taken place before the advent of American sovereignty. We cannot reverse the doctrine in Roa v. Collector of Customs supra, if to convert Roa into an alien, after our final pronouncement in 1912 that he was a Filipino. If we depart from the rule there established notwithstanding the almost-exact analogy between the two cases, nothing short of legal anachronism would follow, and we should avoid this result.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The rule laid down in the Roa case had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of our Constitution; not only this court but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and administrative agencies of the Government had theretofore abided by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it. Withal, our decisions should not be, as to a given period of time upon the same or similar facts and under the same or similar circumstances, as fluctuating as to engender the phenomenon described by Mr. Justice Thompson, of the Supreme Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus. (Perkins v. Clements et als., 1 Pat. & H. [Va. ], 153.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABROGATION OF DOCTRINE OF ROA CASE AND ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLE OF "JUS SANGUINIS" IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. — When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to T. R. individually but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned in the treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter, going to China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here. This was the rule at the time of the adoption of our Constitution. With it, the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also aware of this rule, and in abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sangumis the predominating principle in the determinination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of T. R., were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

4. ID.; ID., ID.; ID.; GREATER POLITICAL, RECOGNITION FOR WOMEN. — Considering the fact that the mother of A. T. B., who is the father of the herein applicant, is a Filipina, and, under our Constitution, A. T. B. would have the option, upon reaching majority, to adopt Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution); considering the benign policy of giving greater political recognition to women, to the extent that in the United States marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not operate loss of her citizenship; and in view of Commonwealth Act No. o3, which is indicative of this political recognition, however partial, accorded to Filipino women; considering, further, the limited number of people who would be benefited by the application of the doctrine as qualified in Roa v. Collector of Customs; and the reason at the bottom of Commonwealth v. Baldello (G. R. No. 45375, April 12, 1939), and Yu Ching Po v. Gallofin (R. G. No. 46795, Oct. 6, 1939), we are of the opinion and so hold that the applicant, being a minor child of A. T. B. who was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen.

Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived at the port of Cebu on January 18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan Bangco. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been passed upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. 308), which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born in Manila on February 27, 1893. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by decision of February 23, 1939, up- held the conclusion of the lower court and declined to overrule the doctrine in Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315, in the following commendable language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But the appellant impugns the soundness of the doctrine laid down in the foregoing decisions and urges us to overrule them. We do not think it necessary to enter upon a discussion of the alleged misapplication of the law or erroneous conclusions reached in the cases referred to It is our understanding that the decisions criticized are conclusive and binding upon this Court and all other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as expressing the law on the subjects treated therein. The rule of stare decisis and "a becoming modesty" which demands of inferior courts ’conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation," compels us to respect and follow these decisions, while unreversed regardless of the divergencies of opinion that are said to exist about their correctness (The People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Petitioners, v. Jose O. Vera, Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mariano Cu Unjieng, Respondents, G. R. No. 45685, November 16 1937). This should be our norm of conduct at least where the decisions sought to be disregarded are not manifestly wrong, unjust or contrary to law, and where a departure therefrom might only result in ’going from one doubtful rule to another.’"

A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities: Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner) was born here in 1893, both before the advent of American sovereignty; (2) the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers, Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, both were minor residents of the Philippines; and (4) both, in their boyhood, went to China for the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines. The dissimilarities are: (1) Roa returned to the Islands after attaining the age of maturity, whereas Tan Bangco returned to this country when still a minor; and (2) the father of Roa was domiciled in the Philip- pines until the year 1895 when he went to China and never returned, dying therein 1900, whereas, in the present case the record is silent on this point. The similarities are very close and the dissimilarities are in favor of Alejandro Tan Bangco. The Solicitor-General does not dispute the analogy and evidently yields to the proposition that if the doctrine in the Roa case, which has been followed in many subsequent cases, principally in Vaño v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 480); United States v. Ong Tianse (29 Phil., 332); United States v. Ang 136 Phil., 858); United States v. Lim Bin (36 Phil., 927); Go Julian v. Government of the Philippines Islands (45 Phil., 290); Haw. v. Collector of Customs, (59 Phil., 612), is to be adhered to, then Alejandro Tan Bangco is a Filipino citizen, and consequently, the petitioner, who is his minor child, is also a Filipino.

It is urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that we resamine and reverse the doctrine laid down in Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, because the law, we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by this court in that case. A suggestion of this kind should be simpathetically received but for the fact that the principle of territoriality or jus soli adopted in Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, does not have to be set aside by this court for the reason that principle is no longer predominating in this jurisdiction after the taking effect is the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary principle of jus sanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar should be decided on an entirely different principle because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we are of the opinion that this cannot be done unless we give a retroactive effect to the Constitution. We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the authority of Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. As already observed, the present case is similar to Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, in that the facts determinative of citizenship in both relate to events which had taken place before the advent of American sovereignty. We cannot reverse the doctrine in Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, if to convert Roa into an alien, after our final pronouncement in 1912 that he was a Filipino. If we depart from the rule there established notwithstanding the almost-exact analogy between the two cases, nothing short of legal anachronism would follow, and we should avoid this result.

2. While we profess no "idolatrous reverence for precedents", (Philippine Trust Co. v. Mitchel, 59 Phil., 30), we should not overlook the fact that the rules laid down in the Roa case had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of our Constitution; not only this Court but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and administrative agencies of the Government had theretofore abided by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it. Withal, our decisions should not be, as to a given period of time, upon the same or similar facts and under the same or similar circumstances, as fluctuating as to engender the phenomenon described by Mr. Justice Thompson, of the Supreme Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus. (Perkins v. Clements et als. 1 Pat. & H. (Va.) 153.)

3. When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned in the treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter, going to China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here. This was the rule at the time of the adoption of our Constitution. With it, the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also aware of this rule, and in abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. This is apparent from the following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Delegate Aruego. — Mr. President, may I just have one question? May I ask Mr. Roxas if, under this proposition that you have, all children born in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution was included?

"Delegate Roxas. — No, sir: that is to say, if they are citizens in accordance with the present law, they will be citizens.

"Delegate Aruego. — But as I said they are citizens by judicial decisions.

"Delegate Roxas. — If they are citizens now by judicial decisions, they will be citizens.

"Delegate Aruego. — I should like to make it clear that we are voting on the proposition so that it will include all those born in the Philippines, regardless of their parentage, because I have heard some objections here to the incorporation in toto of the doctrine of jus soli. There are many who do not want to include, as citizens, children of Chinese parents, but they are included in the proposition we are voting upon . . .

"I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if that proposition would make Filipino citizens of children of Chinese parents born last year or this year.

"Delegate Roxas. — No, because by the laws of the Philippine Islands, they are not Filipino citizens now." (Record of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session of November 20, 1934.)

4. In the case of Commonwealth of the Philippines v. Gloria Baldello, G. R. No. 45375, promulgated April 12 1939, we held that a Filipino woman, abandoned by her husband who was a native of Mexico but who was neither a Mexican nor American citizen, retained her Filipino citizenship, and in arriving at this conclusion, we said that, "our opinion finds corroboration in the rule indicated in Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 315, 324-325), which is now a legal provision embodied in paragraph 7, Article I, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, to the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying a foreigner belonging to a nation the laws of which do not allow her to acquire the husbands nationality." It should be noted that in this Baldello case we relied however indirectly on Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, and cited Commonwealth Act No. o3, which Act is but a partial expression of the modern tendency in the United States to accord distinct personality to married woman by providing that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not operate loss of American citizenship. (Vide Act of Congress of September 22, 1922, 42 U. S. St. -at-L. p. 1022, ch. 411, sec. 3, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 9; Act of Congress of March, 1931, 46 U. S. St. -at-L. p. 1511, ch. 442, sec. 4.)

In Yu Ching Po v. Gallofin, G.R. No. 40795, promulgated on October o, 1939, we held that a person born ill the Philippines of a Filipino-mestizo father and a mestiza-Chinese mother, notwithstanding vagueness in point of paternity and maternity, because according to our decision, "no dicen si es hijo de padre filipino y de madre china, o si lo es de padre chino y de madre filipina", is a Filipino citizen, for the reason that under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, which was in force in that year, he was a Spanish subject, which nationality he conserved.

Our attention has been called to the case of Paz Chua v. Secretary of Labor, R. G. No. 46451, promulgated September 30, 1939, where we affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying the writ of habeas corpus and holding that the applicants therein were not entitled to enter and reside in the Philippines on the basis of Philippine citizenship. Perusal of our decision in that case will show that the factual and legal environment there was wholly different from that in the case at bar, as may be seen from the concluding paragraph of our decision in that case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Siendo Chua Uang de padres chinos y teniendo la misma nacionalidad que estos por ser entonces menor de edad, es indudable que cuando fue a China a la edad de 13 años, que debio haber sido en 1927, ella continuaba siendo cuidadana China (Articulo 2, parrafo 2, Capitulo II, de las Revised Nationality Laws of China, editada por FlournoyHudson, publicada por Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, citada en la pagina 9 del alegato del Procurador General). Cuando contrajo matrimonio cuatro años despues con Yao Tian, otro ciudadano de la Republica de China, ella, en el supuesto de que tenia nacionalidad distinta, siguio la de su esposo, a tenor del parrafo 1 de la citada compilacion de leyes de China. Chua Uang no puede invocar la nacionalidad filipina por solo hecho de haber nacido en el pais porque no le alcanzan las disposiciones del articulo 2 de la Ley Jones, Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del 29 de agosto de 1916, porque no era subdita española el 11 de abril de 1899."cralaw virtua1aw library

We have not failed to reflect on the far-reaching consequences of our decision in this case, but considering the fact that the mother of Alejandro Tan Bangco, who is the father of the herein applicant, is a Filipina, and, under our (Constitution, Alejandro Tan Bangco would have the option, upon reaching majority, to adopt Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution); considering the benign policy of giving greater political recognition to women, to the extent that in the United States marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not operate loss of her citizenship; and in view of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which is indicative of this political recognition, however partial, accorded to Filipino women; considering, further, the limited number of people who would be benefited by the application of the doctrine as qualified in Roa v. Collector of Customs; and the reason at the bottom of Commonwealth v. Gloria Baldello, and Yu Ching Po v. Jose Gallofin, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the applicant, being a minor child of Alejandro Tan Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.



VILLA-REAL, M, concurrente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Al cesar la guerra que hubo entre los Estados Unidos de America y España, estas dos naciones celebraron en 10 de diciembre de 1898 un tratado de paz, que se llamo "Tratado de saris," en cuyo articulo IX, parrafo 2.