THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,2 dated 22 September 2010, and Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the Omnibus Order,4 dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant No. 01-118.
Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize the following:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118 For: Violation of R.A. 8799 -versus-(The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art. 315, RPC) AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant NBI [Special Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO, that there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have in their possession/control located in [an] office premises located at 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as shown in the application for search warrant the following documents, articles and items, to wit:
Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC.
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the premises above-described and forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents, articles and items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of the warrant.
This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this date.11
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.142. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
- Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;
- List of brokers and 201 files;
- Sales agreements;
- Official receipts;
- Credit advise;
- Fax messages;
- Clients message slips;
- Company brochures;
- Letterheads; and
- Envelopes.
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be used in any proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.
SO ORDERED.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this petition.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily included in the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers without the requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific acts of defrauding another by falsely pretending to possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker similarly constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section 28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element common to both offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the "one specific offense rule."20ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING THAT:I.
READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.II.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN WHICH SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID NOT INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE "SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.25
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two points which must be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.27 Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; orIn Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez,31 the Court further ruled:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted-to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.30
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33x x x x
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued. x x x32
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that [t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Cornia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention thaUhe search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied)Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered throughout their numerous companies call prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares of stocks in a certain company likewise based abroad. Once the client is convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or she is advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the money supposedly intended for the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the account of the company which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same is immediately withdrawn and brought to the treasury department of the particular company. The money is then counted and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming clients (those with small accounts and who already threatened the company with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is ever made to buy the shares of stocks.46Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of various rules and regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.54In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder, albeit for six (6) counts.
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November 2007, citing 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 2 and People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 895 (1998).
2Rollo, pp. 47-63; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, concurring.
3 Id. at 64-65.
4 Id. at 123-132; penned by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.
5 Id. at 69-70.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 78-82.
8 Id. at 72-77.
9 Records (Vol. 1), pp. 74-167.
10 Id. at 72-73.
11Rollo, p. 87.
12 Id. at 88.
13 Id. at 89.
14 Id. at 90-106.
15 Id. at 107-120.
16 Id. at 121-122.
17 Id. at 132.
18 Id. at 62-63.
19 Id. at 21-22.
20 Id. at 23-32.
21 Id. at 33-40.
22 Id. at 235-257.
23 Id. at 247-250.
24 Id. at 274-299.
25Nala v. Judge Barroso, Jr., 455 Phil. 999, 1007 (2003).
26 126 Phil. 738 (1967).
27 Id. at 747.
28Tambasen v. People, 316 Phil. 237, 243-244 (1995).
29Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447, 457 (2012).
30 Supra note 26 at 747-748.
31 728 Phil. 391 (2014).
32 Id. at 412-413 and 420.
33Rollo, p. 87.
34 Section 24, R.A. No. 8799.
35 Section 27, R.A. No. 8799.
36 Section 28.1, R.A. No. 8799.
37 Section 32, R.A. No. 8799.
38 Section 41, R.A. No. 8799.
39 Section 49, R.A. No. 8799.
40 239 Phil. 468 (1987).
41 Id. at 472.
42 295 Phil. 198 (1993).
43 Id. at 214.
44 259 Phil. 541 (1989).
45 Id. at 554.
46Rollo, pp. 69-70.
47 Records (Vol. IV), pp. 793-807.
48 357 Phil. 377 (1998).
49 Id. at 392.
50Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 382 (2008).
51 Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code (Book Two), 17th Edition, p. 776 (2008).
52 329 Phil. 875 ( 1996).
53 747 Phil. 503 (2014).
54Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, supra note 52 at 928.
55Hon Ne Chan, et ai. v. Honda Motor Co.. Ltd. and Honda Phil., Inc., 565 Phil. 545, 557 (2007).
56 148 Phil. 794 (1971 ).
57 Id. at 811.
58 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.