SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V. ASTUDILLO, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS - CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA. LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the review and nullification of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 17, 20161 and February 16, 20172 in CA-G.R. SP No. 08362, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde (Demonteverde) started her service in the government on July 1, 1963 with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) until her resignation on. February 15, 1967.3 She then transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) - Bacolod and served until December 31, 1986. On January 29, 1987, she transferred to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) where she served until June 29, 1995. All in all, Demonteverde served in the said government agencies for a total of 32 years, from 1963 to 1995.
On June 30, 1995, Demonteverde joined the Judiciary as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City until her retirement on February 22, 2011.
In a letter dated July 28, 1995, Demonteverde requested from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a refund of the retirement premiums she paid under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 11464 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6605 in excess of the retirement premiums that she should pay under R.A. No. 910, as amended, the law on retirement benefits for Judges and Justices applicable to her when she joined the Judiciary on June 30, 1995.
However, instead of issuing a refund only of the excess of the contributions paid, the GSIS, on August 23, 1995, refunded to Demonteverde the amount of P16,836.60 representing her retirement premiums, or her total personal share with interest, under R.A. No. 660.
On February 11,2011, Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court her retirement application under R.A. No. 910,6 as amended, for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on February 22, 2011.
On March 3, 2011, Demonteverde likewise filed an application with the GSIS for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 82917 covering her government service outside of the Judiciary from July 1, 1963 until June 29, 1995.
In a letter dated October 14, 2011, the manager of the GSIS Bacolod informed Demonteverde that the retirement laws covering her service in the government from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995 were P.D. No. 1146,8 R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The GSIS thus returned the application of Demonteverde so that she may choose from the modes of retirement enumerated.
On November 28, 2011, Demonteverde wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting a re-evaluation of her application for retirement under R.A. No. 8291.
Demonteverde's request was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims (COC) for evaluation, and on May 18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod informed her of the COC's issuance of Resolution No. 021-2012 denying her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291. Demonteverde then appealed the COC's Resolution to the GSIS Board of Trustees (GSIS BOT).
Given the issues raised in Demonteverde's case, the GSIS inquired with both the PAO and the Supreme Court as to whether Demonteverde received gratuity benefits and if her entire government service was covered in her retirement under R.A. No. 910, respectively.
In response to the inquiry, the PAO replied that Demonteverde did not apply for nor receive gratuity benefits from the said agency when she transferred to the Judiciary in 1995.9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), advised the GSIS that pursuant to R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, and its implementing guidelines, judges who have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the Judiciary or in any branch of the government, or both, and who retired compulsorily upon reaching the age of seventy (70) years, shall, upon retirement, be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance and other allowances which they were receiving on the date of their retirement.10
The OCA confirmed that:
3. Judge Demonteverde was able to meet the minimum fifteen (15) years government service required to be entitled to full pension benefits under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, and thus, her services rendered outside of the Judiciary is no longer needed in the determination/computation of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended.11The OCA likewise clarified that the monetary value of the accrued terminal leave benefits that Demonteverde earned in her government service prior to joining the Judiciary was already included by this Court in the payment of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910. The OCA added that this Court will request reimbursement from Demonteverde if the GSIS decides to grant retirement benefits.12
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Petitioner is allowed to retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her period of services outside the judiciary from 01 July 1963 to 29 June 1995. The payment of her benefits shall be reckoned from 22 February 2011, the date when her actual separation from service took place.On December 12, 2013, Demonteverde filed a Motion for Execution14 of the Decision of the GSIS BOT, stating therein that she received a notice of the October 14, 2013 Decision on November 11, 2013; that more than 15 days had elapsed since her receipt of the copy of the decision; and that the same had become final and executory and ripe for implementation.15 Said Motion for Execution was granted by the GSIS BOT on even date.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, the CA, in the assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution, reversed itself and reinstated Demonteverde's Petition. It agreed with Demonteverde that the case may be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds: where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy, and for certain special considerations, such as public welfare or public policy.21 Thus:
- Petitioner failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the preferred personal mode of filing the petition under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court was not availed of.
- Petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed October 10, 2013 Decision, December 12, 2013 Order and February 13, 2014 Resolution of the GSIS, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. While petitioner appended to the Petition copy of the assailed October 10, 2013 Decision and February 13, 2014 Resolution of the GSIS they were mere photocopies. The assailed December 12, 2013 Order of the Hearing Officer of the GSIS appears also to be a mere photocopy.
- Petitioner failed to properly verify the Petition in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC amending Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which now requires that a pleading must be verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. Petitioner did not to (sic) incorporate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping the phrase "or based on authentic records."
- Petitioner failed to attach copies of all pleadings and documents, which are necessary for a thorough understanding and resolution of the instant Petition, such as, but not limited to, following:
- Petitioner's July 28, 1995 letter to the GSIS requesting for a refund of her retirement premiums.
- Petitioner's February 11, 2011 and March 3, 2011 applications for claim of retirement benefits field (sic) with the GSIS, Baco1od Branch.
- The October 14, 2011 letter of the GSIS' Bacolod Branch Manager, Ms. Vilma Fuentes.
- Petitioner's November 28, 2011 letter to the GSIS requesting for a re-evaluation of her application for retirement benefits.
- Petitioner's Petition filed with the GSIS [C]ommittee on Claims.
- The GSIS Committee on Claims' Answer to petitioner's Petition.
- The March 26, 2013 letter of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO Chief Administrative Officer. (sic)
- The July 23, 2013 and September 17, 2013 letters of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.
- The Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping and in the Affidavit of Service did not contain the province or city where the notary public was commissioned, the office address of the notary public, in violation of Section 2(c) and (d), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.20
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:GSIS BOT moved for reconsideration and filed an Opposition to the Petition, but the CA, in its February 16, 2017 Resolution, denied the said motion for reconsideration and directed the GSIS BOT to file its comment to Demonteverde's petition.
1. GRANT the Motion for Extension to file Comment and the Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment filed by respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
2. ADMIT the Comment and Opposition (To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 19, 2014) filed by the GSIS.
3. GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and SET ASIDE the June 19, 2014 Resolution.
4. REINSTATE the instant petition and DIRECT respondents to FILE their COMMENT (not a Motion to Dismiss) to the petition within TEN (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of Comment within which to file a Reply, if petitioner so desires.
SO ORDERED.22
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated February 17, 2016 reinstating Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus; and Resolution dated February 16, 2017 denying GSIS BOT's Motion for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016 Resolution.I.
THE ASSAILED GSIS BOT DECISION IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL.II.
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT AN ALTERNATE REMEDY FOR LOST APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 AND THE TWO ACTIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.III.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN FORMER JUDGE DEMONTEVERDE'S PETITION DO NOT AFFECT PUBLIC POLICY.IV.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS TAINTED WITH MANY PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES WHICH ARE FATAL TO THE PETITION.23
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits of exceptions. This Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly: (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of rules.29
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution, initially dismissed Demonteverde's special civil action for certiorari, reasoning that Demonteverde had the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Citing the case of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,31 the CA thus said:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.The CA even categorically ruled that the present circumstances in Demonteverde's case did not warrant the application of the exceptions to the general rule provided by Rule 43,32 thereafter proceeding to identify the aforementioned procedural defects in the petition.
In the case of Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, court will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to the realities of the situation."Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public of against public good.34 It is the principle under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted for the good of the community.35
Applying the above-cited jurisprudence in Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalia Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., and upon perusal of the arguments contained in the instant Motion for Reconsideration, there is basis to reconsider the dismissal of the instant Petition. The Court agrees with petitioner, that the instant case may be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds: where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy and for certain special considerations as public welfare or public policy. In this case, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed GSIS decision maybe [sic] dispensed with on the same cited grounds of public welfare and the advancement of public policy and in addition, in the broader interests of justice.33
Petitioner's mode of appeal via Rule 65 of the Rules was guided by the pronouncements of the court in the case of Page-Tenorio vs. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004. Her motion for partial reconsideration and withdrawal of motion for execution dated 2 January 2014 was denied by respondents on a dubious technical ground of having been filed out of time, without resolving on the merits the reckoning period that were never taken up during the proceedings, thus denying her due process. Petitioner was never given a chance to be heard on the matter.39While the CA gave credence to this claim and granted Demonteverde's motion, this Court cannot sustain the CA's resolution.
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years x x x he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was receiving at the time of his/her retirement x x xConsidering the express wordings of R.A. No. 910, which include service "in any other branch of the Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge, Demonteverde's years of service as in the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO were already correctly credited by the OCA as part of her government service when it granted her retirement application for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on February 22, 2011.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Pablito A. Perez concurring; rollo, pp. 27-32.
2Rollo, pp. 34-36A.
3Id. at 39.
4 "Amending, Expanding, Increasing and Integrating the Social Security and Insurance Benefits of Government Employees and Facilitating the Payment Thereof Under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as Amended, and for Other Purposes."
5 "An Act to Amend Commonweallth Act Numbered One Hundred and Eighty-Six Entitled 'An Act to Create and Establish a Government Service Insurance System, to Provide for its Administration, and to Appropriate the Necessary Funds Therefor,' and to Provide Retirement Insurance for Other Purposes."
6 "An Act to Provide for the Retirement of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, for the Enforcement of the Provisions Hereof by the Government Service Insurance System, and to Repeal Commonwealth Act Number Five Hundred and Thirty-Six."
7 "An Act Amending Presidential Decree 1146 as Amended, Expanding and increasing the Coverage and Benefits of the Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms Therein and for Other Purposes."
8 "Amending, Expanding, Increasing and Integrating the Social Security and Insurance Benefitflsif Government Employees and Facilitating the Payment Thereof Under Commonwealth Act No. I86, as Amended, and for Other Purposes."
9Rollo, p. 45.
10Id.
11Id.
12Id. at 45-46.
13Id. at 262.
14Id. at 103.
15Id. at 231.
16Id. at 106-116.
17Id. at 118-119.
18Id. at 127-141.
19 Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Jhosep Y. Lopez concurring; id. at 143-147.
20Id. at 144-146.
21Id. at 31.
22Id. at 31-32.
23Id. at 9-16.
24Beluso v. COMELEC, et al., 635 Phil. 436, 442-443 (2010).
25Id. at 443.
26China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corporation, 642 Phil. 308, 323 (2010).
27Id. at 323-324.
28 G.R. No. 197358. April 5, 2017.
29China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corporation, supra note 26, at 322, citing Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, et al., 575 Phil. 384, 403 (2008).
30 594 Phil. 451, 459-460 (2008).
31 479 Phil. 768, 782 (2004).
32Rollo, p. 144.
33 Id. at 31. (Citations omitted)
34Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., 724 Phil. 198, 207 (2014), citing Avon Cosmetics, Incorporated v. Luna, 540 Phil. 389, 404 (2006).
35Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated, G.R. No. 183789, August 24, 2011, citing Ollendorff v. Abrahamson, 38 Phil. 585, 590-591 (1918).
36Rollo, p. 132.
37Id. at 179-189.
38Id. at 184.
39 Emphasis ours.
40Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, 700 Phil. 749, 759 (2012).
41Id.
42Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, 478 Phil. 573, 591 (2004).
43Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, 467 Phil. 62, 90 (2004).
44Id.
45Id.