THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206331, June 04, 2018
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (DARMPC), Petitioner, v. CARMENCITA DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY MARY CATHERINE M. DIAZ; EMMA CABIGTING; AND NINA T. SAMANIEGO1, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
A liberal construction of the rules of procedure, including the period within which a petition for review must be filed, requires justifiable reasons or at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 11, 2012 Decision3 and September 12, 2012 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118549. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the April 30, 2009 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-1407- 2003/NLRC LAC No. 043647-05.5 It found that Carmencita Diaz (Diaz), Emma Cabigting (Cabigting), and Nina T. Samaniego (Samaniego) were illegally dismissed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (the Cooperative).6
Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego worked for the Cooperative as Accounting Clerk, Loan Officer and Verifier, and Lending Supervisor, respectively.7
On October 24, 2003, the Cooperative's accountant discovered that duplicate original receipts showing the members' cash payments of share capital contributions were missing and unrecovered. Cabigting explained that she found that the entries in the members' index cards were written by Cashier Lorelie C. Matel (Matel) and Loan Officer Roslyn G. Sengson (Sengson). Matel admitted that she manipulated the index card entries to misappropriate funds. Matel and Sengson later confessed that there was nothing left from the misappropriated funds and that they had already destroyed the missing receipts.8
On October 26, 2003, Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego learned that Matel and Sengson allegedly claimed that they were all in a conspiracy in the anomalous transactions. The next day, Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were forced to admit their participation despite their denial and claims that the official receipts showed that payments were received only by Matel or Sengson.9
Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were placed under a 30-day preventive suspension on October 29, 2003. After the period lapsed, they tried to return to work but were told that the Cooperative had already terminated their employment.10
On December 9, 2003, Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Cooperative before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.11
The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint on January 31, 2005 and found that Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were mere members, and not employees of the Cooperative. Moreover, assuming that they were employees, their dismissal from service was justified due to their failure to fully account for the missing funds and explain the anomalous transactions.12
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's findings and found that Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were employees of the Cooperative. Nonetheless, the Cooperative ruled to dismiss them based on just cause under Article 282, paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Labor Code. But since the Cooperative failed to observe the requirements of due process in terminating their employment, they were given P10,000.00 each in nominal damages.13 Both parties' motions for reconsideration were denied.14
Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the April 30, 2009 Decision and October 28,2010 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission.15
On May 11, 2012, the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari, finding that Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of this Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated April 30, 2009 of the public respondent NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-1407-2003/NLRC LAC No. 043647-05 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Private respondent cooperative is hereby ordered to:First, it upheld the National Labor Relations Commission's finding that Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were employees of the Cooperative.171. pay petitioners their backwages, including 13th month pay, unpaid vacation and sick leaves and the monetary equivalent of other benefits, computed from the time their compensation was withheld from them on December 1, 2003 up to the finality of this decision;All other claims are denied for lack of merit.
2. pay petitioners their separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of engagement up to the finality of this decision; and
3. pay petitioners' attorney's fees at 10% of the total monetary award to be recovered.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Arbiter Branch of origin for the proper computation of the backwages, 13th month pay, unpaid vacation and sick leaves and the monetary equivalent of other benefits, and separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.16
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition. (Emphasis supplied)Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it, within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party's loss of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory right, must "be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law."55 Failure to file one's appeal within the reglementary period is fatal to a party's cause, "precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case."56
The petitioner is further reminded that any "resort to a liberal application or suspension of the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice." It cannot be otherwise for him, for, as the Court aptly put it in Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation:Evidently, no reasonable attempt has been made by petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing within the reglementary period. Atty. Tamaca's excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court of Appeals September 12, 2012 Resolution and his electoral activities do not deserve any consideration from this Court.Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid d' etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing them to be ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was impermissible. Such rules, often derided as merely technical, are to be relaxed only in the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal construction in exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them.63 (Citations omitted)
The Court's pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of casts. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (Emphasis supplied)In Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission:66
Well-settled is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal.No court, not even this Court, may thereafter modify, alter, or let alone reverse a final and immutable judgment.68 The only exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to the parties, and void judgments.69 Even when there are facts or circumstances that would render the execution of a final judgment unjust and inequitable, it must be shown that they arose after the finality as to warrant a court's modification or alteration.70 As respondents point out,71 "all litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear."72
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was received by private respondent's counsel on April 26, 1991, making the last day for perfecting the appeal May 6, 1991. The decision became final and executory upon failure of petitioner to appeal within the ten-day period. Private respondent, therefore, as the prevailing party, is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the final and executory judgment in his favor.
This Court has held that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case whether or not said decision is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain, which cannot be corrected by certiorari.67 (Citations omitted)
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of
Court |
Endnotes:
1 Spelled "Samanego" in the Petition for Review.
2Rollo, pp. 7-18.
3 Id. at 20-33. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Rodil V. Zalameda of the Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 46-48. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Rodil V. Zalameda of the Former Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 32.
6 Id. at 29-30.
7 Id. at 21.
8 Id. at 21-22.
9 Id. at 22.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 22-23.
14 Id. at 24.
15 Id. at 21.
16 Id. at 32-33.
17 Id. at 25.
18 Id. at 26.
19 Id. at 26-27.
20 Id. at 28.
21 Id. at 28-29.
22 Id. at 29-30.
23 Id. at 30.
24 Id. at 30-31.
25 Id. at 31-32.
26 Id. at 34-44.
27 Id. at 46-47.
28 Id. at 3-6.
29 Id. at 7-18.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id. at 12-14.
34 Id. at 13-14.
35 Id. at 15.
36 Id. at 50.
37 Id. at 57-73.
38 Id. at 57-58.
39 Id. at 58.
40 Id. at 58-59.
41 Id. at 59-65.
42 Id. at 67-70.
43 Id. at 75-81.
44 Id. at 76.
45 Id. at 80-A.
46 Id. at 76.
47 Id. at 82-86.
48 Id. at 82.
49 Id. at 82-83.
50 Id. at 83-84.
51 Id. at 88-88-A.
52 Id. at 89-91.
53 Id. at 92.
54 Id. at 89.
55Rigor v. Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 852, 858 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
56Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 282 Phil. 555, 561 (1992) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division]; Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Mapagu, G.R. No. 196084, February 15, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/february2017/196084.pdf> [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
57Rollo, p. 7.
58 Id. at 8.
59 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 4 states:
Section 4. Contents of petition. - The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
60Rollo, pp. 75-81.
61 Id. at 82-83.
62 741 Phil. 394 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
63 Id. at 408-410.
64Filipinas (Pre-Fabricated Bldg.) Systems "Filsystems" Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 463 Phil. 813, 821 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
65Ampo v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 750, 755 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
66 340 Phil. 36 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
67 Id. at 38.
68Dy Chiao v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 192491, August 17, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/august2016/192491.pdf> 7 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
69Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 491 Phil. 81, 91-92 (2005) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division].
70Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association v. Hon. Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, 343 Phil. 910, 914 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
71Rollo, pp. 65-67.
72Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 158, 165 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
73Rollo, p. 15.