G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
Quo warranto, as used in this case, will amount to a "removal" of an impeachable public officer. Thus, Article VIII, Section 5(1) should be read alongside Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution. The distinction relating to when offenses were committed is not relevant for purposes of the process for removal. Concededly, actions prior to the assumption of office may amount to a crime. However, it is only upon the end of the tenure of the impeachable officer or after her removal may she be held to account.RULE 66
Quo Warranto
Section 2. When Solicitor General or Public Prosecutor Must Commence Action. - The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.
Section 3. When Solicitor General or Public Prosecutor May Commence Action with Permission of Court. - The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
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Section 5. When An Individual May Commence Such An Action. - A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name.9
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:Then it proceeds to a narrow version of verbal legis or plain reading of Article XI, Section 2 to propose that there is possibly no other interpretation other than the removal of the President, Vice President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman by impeachment is merely permissive.
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.10
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.11 (Emphasis supplied)Fundamentally, when construing the meaning of the Constitution, it is not only the literal meaning of words and phrases that should be taken into consideration.
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit - ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.13David also underscored that jurisprudence over the text under consideration must also be taken into account, as judicial decisions that interpret law and the Constitution become part of our legal system.14
(1) The President;This list is exclusive. For all other public officers, the Constitution allows a process that may be provided by law-pot by impeachment.
(2) The Vice President;
(3) Members of the Supreme Court;
(4) Members of the Constitutional Commissions; and
(5) The Ombudsman.16
Section 16....This provision emphasizes the independence of Congress, which, under the provisions of our Constitution, impeaches and convicts the officers mentioned in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.
(3) Each House may determine the mles of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.18
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.Clearly, the power to remove an impeachable official, while involving the interpretation of the Constitution, is not assigned to the Judiciary. It is an exclusive function of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House acts as prosecutor while the Senate will act as the body to try the case; that is, to receive evidence and vote for conviction or acquittal.
(2) A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(6) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(7) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(8) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(9) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.19
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna's separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco [v. House of Representatives] ruling. Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:The numbers required from a collective body were clearly designed to ensure that the removal of the impeachable public officers requires a modicum of political will from the elected representatives in both Congressional chambers. This, again, was a process to shield the heads of the Constitutional departments, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman with an added layer of assurance against suits that could be maliciously filed by disgruntled parties, and therefore, diminish the independence and resolve of the impeachable officers.MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.21 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
(1) Culpable violation of the Constitution;Again, the list is exclusive. The process does not allow removal for any other crime or misdemeanor. It is not left wholly to the discretion of the members of Congress. The evidence must infer facts which amount to the offenses mentioned.
(2) Treason;
(3) Bribery;
(4) Graft and Corruption; and
(5) Betrayal of the Public Trust.23
Section 11. Limitations. - Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from o.ffice unless the same be commenced within one (I) year after the cause o.f such ouste1or the right of' the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question.25 (Emphasis supplied)It is in the public's best interest that questions regarding title to public office be resolved and laid to rest as soon as possible. This is the rationale behind the one (1)-year prescriptive period. Public service demands stability and consistency.
[I]n actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.29 (Emphasis supplied)Unabia also emphasized the importance of protecting public funds, hence, the government cannot compensate an unqualified officer:
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so.30The importance of protecting public funds and maintaining stability in the government is reiterated in Pinullar v. President of Senate31 and De la Cerna v. Osmeña.32
While the court exhorts the institution of the corresponding action for the redress of wrong or unlawful act committed either by a private person or an official of the Government, and discourages laches and inaction, such relief must be sought for within a reasonable period; otherwise any remedy to which he may be entitled would be denied him for his apparent loss of interest, or waiver, or even acquiescence on his part (Mesias vs. Jover, 97 Phil., 899; 51 Off. Gaz [12] 6171). The rationale of this doctrine is given when this Court said:In De la Cerna:"..., the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so ..."33
In his petition for mandamus, dated May 5, 1956, as well as in his amended petition, dated June 26, 1956, petitioner-appellant alleged that Administrative Case No. 22 of the municipal board of the City of Cebu was still pending investigation and awaiting judgment or decision. On the other hand, in their answer to his petition for mandamus, respondents therein equally alleged that in said Administrative Case No. 22, petitioner-appellant was found guilty of the charges and as a result the municipal board dismissed him from the service. For lack of evidence, we are unable to make a finding on this controverted point, not knowing which of the conflicting allegations should be accepted. However, it is a fact that appellant's position was duly abolished and that due to said abolitions, he was separated from the service on October 10, 1953, and as already stated, he filed this action for reinstatement and for the payment of back salaries, only on May 10, 1956, after a period of almost three years.An action for quo warranto should be promptly filed and persons who claim a right to the office occupied by a supposed usurper should do so within the provided period, lest they be deemed to have abandoned35 their right.
Following the doctrine laid down in the case of Unabia vs. City Mayor, supra, and other cases, where we held that "any person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office", we find no error in the two appealed orders, and, consequently, hereby affirm the same.34 (Citation omitted)
Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:However, Article 1108(4) refers to acquisitive and extinctive prescription as regards the acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general. Article 1108 can be found in Book III of the Civil Code which relates to the different modes of acquiring ownership.
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives;
(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;
(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription.36 (Emphasis supplied)
And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State (Article 1108, Civil Code; Republic vs. Rodriguez, L-18967, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 53). The case law has also been:If we were to follow the majority's argument of altogether excusing the State from the limiting effects of time, then we would be encouraging and giving our imprimatur to indolence and mediocrity within government service. This must not be the case and we must always expect more from our public officers, especially the Solicitor General who holds the honor of representing the State."When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of limitation or limitation" (Government of the U.S. vs. Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, 49 Phil. 495, 500; Republic vs. Grijaldo, L-20240, December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 681 ).
"Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Impeachment is characterized as a sui generis proceeding that is both legal and political in nature. It is legal in the sense that like criminal cases, it requires basic evidentiary rules and due process.47 As in administrative proceedings, it results in the removal and disqualification of the official.48 It is political in the sense that it is used as "a constitutional measure designed to protect the State from official delinquencies and malfeasance, the punishment of the offender being merely incidental."49 While the proceeding itself is nonpmiisan, the powers to initiate impeachment and to conduct trial are exercised by Congress, a political body that may be susceptible to partisan influence.50 The sanction also carries with it "the stigmatization of the offender."51ARTICLE IX.-IMPEACHMENT
Section 1. The President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes.
In its current iteration, the provision in the Constitution reads:ARTICLE XI. ....
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles oflmpeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
[I]mpeachment is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a hundredton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to tire it, and a large mark to aim at.52Due to its complex nature, "impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office."53 Factors that must be examined and considered include "the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt."54 Proceedings stall legislative work, are costly to prosecute, and result in the divisiveness of the nation.55 Thus, impeachment is limited "only to the officials occupying the highest echelons of responsibility in our government."56
Impeachment was also reproduced m the succeeding Constitutions, with the 1975 Constitution providing:ARTICLE IX.-IMPEACHMENT
Section 1. The President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes.
Article XIII-Accountability of Public OfficersAnd the 1987 Constitution stating:
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Section 2. The President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis supplied)An exception is provided for in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.57 Rule 16 provides:
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the proclamation of the winner.To the majority, the existence of this rule does not preclude the availability of a petition for quo warranto to remove impeachable officers.58 This ignores that among the impeachable officers, the President and the Vice President are the only ones elected by the public. The rest are appointed officials.
On impeachment, Mr. Guingona stated that elective officials are difficult to impeach, particularly the President, as he may be a member of the ruling party in the Senate. He advanced the view of the 1971 Constitutional Revision Project by stating that impeachment cases should be heard by a nonpolitical and highly qualified judicial tribunal, citing instances to prove his point.59Another point to consider would be the vast difference in the qualifications required of each office. In order to be qualified to run as President or Vice President, the candidates must possess the following qualifications:
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.The Constitution does not provide any other qualifications. Thus, any person who fulfills these minimum requirements will be considered a candidate. Otherwise, former President Joseph E. Estrada, who was not a college graduate, and former President Corazon C. Aquino, who had no political experience,61 would not have even been allowed on the ballot.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.60
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.While the Commission on Appointments consists of members of Congress, it is considered to be a constitutional body independent of Congress. Pimentel v. Enrile75 explains:
The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.76All nominations or appointments submitted for approval to the Commission on Appointments must submit papers or documents containing a family background and curriculum vitae.77 In addition, the nommees or appointees must submit the following papers and documents:
a) Disclosure, under oath, of kinship with any appointive or elective official in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, occupying positions down to the directorship level, within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;A public hearing is conducted 30 days after the referral to the Commission.79 The Commission votes by viva voce unless a member requests that the votes should be nominal.80
b) Copies of Income Tax Returns for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years;
c) Verified statements of assets and liabilities for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years, including those of his spouse, if the nominee or appointee is in the government service; or verified statements of net worth for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years, if the nominee or appointee comes from the private sector;
d) Disclosure of business, financial, personal and professional connections and interest for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years, including those of his spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in his household;
e) Clearances under oath by the heads of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and such other concerned Agencies, as may be required by the nature of the position he is nominated or appointed to;
f) A medical certificate issued by a duly licensed physician containing information about the nominee or appointee's physical and mental conditions; and,
g) Statement, under oath, whether the nominee or appointee has any pending criminal or administrative case against him.78
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment. To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies, a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections, and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.88 (Citations omitted)This Court again reiterated this principle in In re: Gonzalez,89 a case filed by then Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales, requesting Justice Fernan to comment on the letter of Mr. Cuenco questioning the dismissal of his disbarment complaint against Justice Fernan. This Court stated:
It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.The same rule was applied in Jarque v. Desierto,91 a disbarment case against former Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,92 however, this Court clarified that when it stated "[p]recisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies"93 in Cuenco, it did not mean that a Deputy Ombudsman was an impeachable officer:
....
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court said:"The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over 'public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.' There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, pmiicularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
'Sec. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption.'
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that 'judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 465-466).' The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action 'in accordance with law' may not prosper."Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehaviour. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
Sec. 3 ...
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.90
In cross-referencing Sec. which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally required to be members of the bar.94The principle applies to members of Constitutional Commissions that are also members of the Bar. In Duque, Jr. v. Brilliantes, Jr.,95 a disbarment case was filed against members of the Commission on Elections for the allegedly erroneous resolutions that they issued. This Court held:
This Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re First Indorsement from Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan, has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. At the time the present complaint was filed, respondents-commissioners were all lawyers. As impeachable officers who are at the same time the members of the Bar, respondents-commissioners must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before they may be held to answer administratively for their supposed erroneous resolutions and actions.96If an impeachable officer is required to be a member of the Bar, disbarment would make the impeachable officer unqualified for the position and would result in his or her removal from office. This Court prohibited what would be a clear circumvention of the Constitution.
And so, in the case now before this Court, the fact that the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals is no reason for this Court not to exercise its disciplinary power over her as a member of the bar. The provision of the second paragraph of Section 24 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended, that the justices of the Court of Appeals shall not be removed from office except on impeachment, is no reason for this Court to abdicate its duty, and give up its inherent power, to oversee and discipline all members of the bar, regardless of whether they are in the private practice of the profession, or they hold office in any of the three departments of our government, or they pursue any other calling. The power of this Court to disbar an unworthy member of the legal profession is distinct and apart from the power of any other authority to remove such member of the legal profession from his judicial position or from any other position that he holds in the government. Constitutional or statutory proceedings for removal from oflice are wholly distinct and separate from disciplinary proceedings involving members of a profession.Espejo-Ty, however, has ceased to become good law with the promulgation of Cuenco v. Fernan.101 In any case, Espejo-Ty was an unusual situation of disbarment against an impeachable officer who was under the disciplinary supervision of this Court. The charges against San Diego were eventually dismissed since this Court found no substantial evidence to support the allegations. Thus, there was no opportunity to discover whether San Diego's disbarment would have eventually led to her removal from the Court of Appeals, despite this Court stating that only Congress had the power to remove her.
It is, therefore, Our considered view that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide complaints for disbarment against a justice of the Court of Appeals. But while this Court may order the disbarment of a justice of the Court ofAppeals, it is Congress, and Congress alone, in the exercise of its power of impeachment, that can remove from office a justice of the Court of Appeals.100
True judicial accountability advances judicial independence and the paramount Rule of Law. "Accountability and independence are two sides of the same coin: accountability ensures that judges perform their constitutional role, and judicial independence protects judges from pressures that would pull them out of that role."102Lower court judges who have failed to meet the ethical standards imposed on the judiciary may face administrative103 and disciplinary sanction from this Court. They may be admonished, reprimanded, suspended, or even removed from service depending on the gravity of their offense. This Court is specifically empowered under Article VIII, Section 11 of the Constitution, to dismiss lower court judges "by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.The independence of the Supreme Court and of the Judiciary in general demands that the Members of this Court be removed from office only through the process of impeachment and no other.
....
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is impmiant because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.107
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.Another reason that he advanced for proposing permanency in tenure was to ensure that only the best suited would occupy judicial office. The judiciary should be shielded from the mediocre:
This independence of the judges is equally reqmsrte to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.111
It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the government can have no great option between fit character; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the subject.112
[T]he Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.The Constitution specifically vests courts with the ability to "settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" and, more importantly, to determine whether either of the other two (2) branches of the government gravely abused its discretion.117
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.116
A history of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The American people considered it necessary "that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government." It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.120 (Citations omitted)There are two (2) aspects of judicial independence, namely: decisional independence and institutional independence.
Judicial independence has both individual and institutional aspects. As for the independence of individual judges, there are at least two avenues for securing that independence: First, judges must be protected from the threat of reprisals, so that fear does not direct their decision making. Second, the method by which judges are selected, and the ethical principles imposed upon them, must be constructed so as to minimize the risk of corruption and outside influence. The first endeavor is to protect judicial independence from outside threat. The second is to ensure that judicial authority is not abused, and it is the core concern of the enterprise of judicial accountability.124Considering that the Judiciary is publicly perceived "as the authority of what is proper and just,"125 and taking into account its vital role in protecting fundamental freedoms, both decisional independence and institutional independence must be preserved.126 The Judiciary's independence becomes more critical in light of the expanding critical issues it may possibly face.127
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.133The selection and appointment process to the Judiciary is an appropriate measure by which judicial independence may be advanced.134
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.The previous Constitutions conferred the power to nominate and appoint members of the Judiciary to the Executive and Legislative branches.138
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long[-]held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office.137
A similar appointment scheme was adopted in the 1935 Constitution:TITLE X
OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Article 80. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Solicitor General shall be appointed by the National Assembly with the concurrence of the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of Government, and shall have absolute independence from the legislative and executive branches.
The 1973 Constitution granted the President the exclusive power to select and appoint members of the Judiciary:ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
At present, appointment to the Judiciary entails a two (2)-step process. The Judicial and Bar Council submits to the President a list containing at least three (3) nominees. The President then selects a candidate from the list and appoints such candidate to the vacancy.139ARTICLE X
The Judiciary
Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President.
[T]he intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.143 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)Aside from the goal of insulating the Judiciary from partisan politics, the Judicial and Bar Council was envisioned to guarantee that only those who are deserving and qualified may be considered for purposes of appointment. Applicants undergo a rigorous process of screening and selection based on the minimum standards required by the office or position to which they are applying and the criteria set by the Judicial and Bar Council.
To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges an justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre nd, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.146 (Citation omitted)In Villanueva, the Judicial and Bar Council's policy of equiring firstlevel courts to have five (5) years of service as judges before thy may qualify as applicants to second-level courts was challenged for being urtconstitutional. In dismissing the petition, this Court described the rigorous screening and selection procedure adopted by the Judicial and Bar Council s necessary to ensure that only the best suited applicants are considered fo appointment. The assailed policy required by the Judicial and Bar Council was declared constitutional. It was a reasonable requirement that would demonstrate an applicant's competence:
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows:Ethical standards imposed on members of the Judiciary strengthen and promote judicial independence both in its individual and institutional aspects.Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.147
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years['] experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the bench. (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
Conversations with family members and other individuals regarding pending cases are deemed highly improper.150 Associating with lawyers of litigants, though not wrong per se, may raise suspicion as to a judge's independence and integrity. Members of the Judiciary are enjoined from fraternizing with lawyers and litigants as such action may awaken the public's suspicion that a judge's personal relations would affect judicial conduct. For instance, a judge's act of having lunch with a lawyer who has a pending case before him was considered a ground for administrative sanction.151CANON 1
Independence
Section 2. In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
....
Section 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Section 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
The heart of judicial independence, it must be understood, is judicial individualism. The judiciary, after all, is not a disembodied abstraction. It is composed of individual men and women who work primarily on their own. This is true of trial courts, and no less in higher reaches. The Supreme Court, Justice Powell commented, is "perhaps one of the last citadels of jealously preserved individualism. For the most part, we function as nine small, independent law firms." The mental processes of the judges, then, are those of individuals and not of cogs in a vast machine.154The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary guards the Judiciary not only against possible influence and interference from litigants, parties, and personal affiliations, but also from influence that may possibly be exerted by judicial colleagues. Thus, Canon 1, Section 1 requires judges "to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently."
For the law to progress it must occasionally adopt views that were previously in disfavor, and the intellectual foundations are often laid by the opinions of dissenting judges. A dissent, said Hughes, "is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day."155Kaufman warns against the often overlooked but seemingly apparent peer pressure among and between members of a court:
I have spoken of infonnal peer pressure as the most etiective means of ridding the bench of its disabled members. But it is clear that the effectiveness of such pressure-as well as its fairness and the sound discretion as to when it should be applied-does not depend on a formal mechanism pitting judge against judge. It is based, rather on the prevalence within the judiciary of an atmosphere of good faith and collegiality. This sense of judicial community, itself so vital to the proper functioning of our courts, would be gravely endangered if judges were compelled to accept the formal power to discipline their colleagues, thus bypassing impeachment.156Allowing a judicial mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and practice of collegiality that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. Such a mechanism for exacting accountability threatens and effectively erodes the principle of independence that the Constitution has protected. It may even stifle free speech.
Sometimes, of course, ideological disagreements combine with personal incompatibilities to disrupt the working relationship. These rifts are unfortunate but tolerable. The other judges muffle the f1ames, and the consequences are rarely more severe than a few heated dissents and a mild increase in the number of cases heard en banc. But add a judicial mechanism for investigating judges and the problem would be magnified. A judge might see across the table not merely a working partner but a potential adversary. The dialogue would continue, of course. In most cases no change would be detectable. But there would be an inevitable loss of frankness if each participant/eared that candor might one day build a case against him.The Supreme Court is a collegial body. As the final arbiter of the interpretation of laws and the Constitution, it will accommodate all points of view. Every legal provision given, the state of facts suggested by judicial notice or the evidence should be independently interpreted and evaluated by every member of the Court. Deliberations should be arrived at rationally within all possible points of view considered. Dissents shape the majority opinion and jurisprudence is enriched for so long as each member is kept independent of the others.
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A judge who feels threatened by the perception that other judges are looking over his shoulder, not to decide whether to reverse him but to consider the possibility fdiscipline, will perform his work with a timidity and awkwardness damaging to the decision process. Judicial independence, like free expression, is most crucial and most vulnerable in periods of intolerance, when the only hope of protection lies in clear rules setting for the bright lines that cannot be traversed. The press and the judiciary are two very different institutions, but they share one significant characteristic: both contribute to our democracy not because they are responsible to any branch of government, but precisely because, except in the most extreme cases, they are not accountable at all and so are able to check the irresponsibility of those in power. Even in the most robust of health, the judiciary lives vulnerably. It must have "breathing space." We must shelter it against the dangers of a fatal chill.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.The responsibility of ensuring that Members of the Supreme Court, as well as members of all the other courts exercising judicial functions, meet the qualifications required under the law falls upon the Judicial and Bar Council.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges oflower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council159 explains that the Judicial and Bar Council was created to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of political pressure and partisan activities.160 The Judicial and Bar Council is a separate constitutional organ with the same autonomy as the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Angara v. The Electoral Commission161 emphasizes that the Electoral Commission is "a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution."162 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is intended to be "complete and unimpaired."163
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 1. Evidence of Integrity - The council shall take every possible step to verify the applicants records and of reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the council may require.Petitioner is mistaken in its assertion that respondent's non-submission of her complete Statements of Assets and Liabilities is fatal to her application as Chief Justice. JBC-009 shows that the determination of integrity is so much more nuanced than merely submitting documents like Statements of Assets and Liabilities or clearances from government agencies.
Section 2. Background Check - The Council may order a discrete background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the means thereof
Section 3. Testimonies of Parties - The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on ground of his moral fitness and its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to be cross-examine the opposite and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case the Council may either direct a discrete investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
Section 5. Disqualification - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:Section 6. Other instances of disqualification - Incumbent judges, officials or personnel of the Judiciary who are facing administrative complaints under informal preliminary investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator may likewise be disqualified from being nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges are serious or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant for nomination.
- Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
- Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
- Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in administrative case where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000.00, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
For purposes of this Section and of the preceding Section 5 in so far as pending regular administrative cases are concerned, the Secretary of the Council shall, from time to time, furnish the Office of the Court of Administrator the name of an applicant upon receipt of the application/recommendation and completion of the required papers; and within ten days from the receipt thereof the Court Administrator shall report in writing to the Council whether or not the applicant if facing a regular administrative case or an IPI case and the status thereof. In regard to the IPI case, The Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the complaint and the comment of the respondent.
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional dffices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.This finds its implementation in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Application or recommendation letterOn June 24, 2010, with Chief Justice Renato C. Corona's appointment as Chief Justice, the Judicial and Bar Council put out an announcement173 for applications or recommendations for the vacant position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. New applicants or recommendees were directed to submit the following documents:
Personal Data Sheet (JBC Form 1 downloadable from the JBC Website ...)
Proof of Filipino Citizenship
ID Picture (2x2)
Cert. of Good Standing or latest Official Receipt from the IBP National Treasurer
ITR for the past two (2) years
2010 Clearances from NBI, Ombudsman, IBP, Office of the Bar Confidant and employer
Transcript of School Records
2010 Police Clearance from place of residence
Certificate of Admission to the Bar (with Bar Rating)
Six (6) copies of the following:The January 20, 2010 and June 24, 2010 announcements for vacancies in the Supreme Court, the first of which pertained to the position of Chief Justice, did not require the applicants and recommendees to submit their Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Despite the constitutional requirement that a member of the Judiciary should be of "proven competence, integrity, probity and independence," the Judicial and Bar Council, until recently, has not consistently required the submission of Statements of Assets and Liabilities for applicants to the Judiciary.
Application or Recommendation Letter
Notarized Personal Data Sheet (JBC Form 1 downloadable from the JBC website ... with recent ID Picture (2x2)
Transcript of School Records
Certificate of Admission to the Bar (with Bar Rating)
One (1) copy of the following:
ITR for the past two (2) years
2010 Clearances from NBI, Ombudsman, IBP, Office of the Bar Confidant and employer
Proofs of age and Filipino citizenship
2010 Police Clearance from place of residence
Results of Medical examination and sworn medical certificate with impressions on such results
Cert. of Good Standing or latest Official Receipt from the IBP National Treasurer
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant's good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant's reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person's character."177This Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho178 stressed that the failure to disclose assets or the misdeclaration of assets in a Statement of Assets and Liabilities does not automatically translate to dishonesty. Rather, what the Statement of Assets and Liabilities law aims to guard against are accumulated wealth of public servants that are grossly disproportionate to their income or other sources of income, and which cannot be properly accounted for or explained:
In this case, the discrepancies in the statement of Racho's assets are not the results ofmere carelessness. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence pointing to a conclusion that Racho is guilty of dishonesty because of his unmistakable intent to cover up the true source of his questioned bank deposits.It is within the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council to decide that the mere failure to file a Statement of Assets and Liabilities or misdeclaration or omission of assets in a Statement of Assets and Liabilities, without any evidence of disproportionate or unexplained wealth, cannot be said to be reflective of one's lack of integrity. I find no transgression of the Constitution when the Judicial and Bar Council does so.
It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employee's income or other sources of income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty because when a public officer takes an oath or office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit.179
This aspect of the power of the Court - its power of supervision - is particularly relevant in this case since the JBC was created "under the supervision of the Supreme Court," with the "principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary." In the same manner that the Court cannot dictate on the lower courts on how they should decide cases except through the appeal and review process provided by the Rules of Court, so also cannot the Court intervene in the JBC 's authority to discharge its principal function. In this sense, the JBC is fully independent as shown by A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC or Resolution Strengthening the Role and Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and Establishing the Offices Therein. In both cases, however and unless otherwise defined by the Court (as in A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC), the Court can supervise by ensuring the legality and correctness of these entities' exercise of their powers as to means and manner, and inferpretingfor them the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations affecting the means and manner of the exercise of their powers as the Supreme Court is the final authority on the interpretation of these instruments....190 (Emphasis supplied)The dissent in Jardeleza v. Sereno191 then stressed that this Court should observe restraint in reviewing the Judicial and Bar Council's vetting process so as not to unnecessarily interfere with the nomination and appointment of its own Members:
By constitutional design, this court should wisely resist temptations to participate, directly or indirectly, in the nomination and appointment process of any of its members. In reality, nomination to this court carries with it the political and personal pressures from the supporters of strong contenders. This court is wisely shaded from these stresses. We know that the quality of the rule of law is reduced when any member of this court succumbs to pressure.The Concurring Opinion in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council193 and Separate Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aquino194 emphasized that while this Com1has the power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, such power must only be exercised in cases when the Council commits grave abuse of discretion.
The separation of powers inherent in our Constitution is a rational check against abuse and the monopolization of all legal powers. We should not nullify any act of any constitutional organ unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The breach of a constitutional provision should be clearly shown and the necessity for the declaration of nullity should be compelling. Any doubt should trigger judicial restraint, not intervention. Doubts should be resolved in deference to the wisdom and prerogative of co-equal constitutional organs.192
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.The Separate Opinion in Aguinaldo, in particular, states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This Court exercises the powers of supervision only through judicial review over the Judicial and Bar Council and only when there is grave abuse of discretion.Nonetheless, the independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council as a constitutional body does not remove it from the Court's jurisdiction when its assailed acts involve grave abuse of discretion.
Nothing in the Constitution diminishes the fully independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council. It is a separate constitutional organ with the same autonomy as the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Angara v. Electoral Commission emphasizes that the Electoral Commission is "a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution." The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is intended to be "complete and unimpaired." The rules it promulgates cannot be subject to the review and approval of the legislature because doing so would render ineffective the grant of power to the Electoral Commission[.]195 (Citations omitted)
Judicial review is the mechanism provided by the Constitution to settle actual controversies and to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The expanded power of judicial review gives the court the authority to strike down acts of all government instrumentalities that are contrary to the Constitution. Angara v. Electoral Commission points out that judicial review is not an assertion of the superiority of the judiciary over other departments, rather, it is the judiciary's promotion of the superiority of the Constitution:In order to come within the scope of judicial review, the Constitution requires not merely abuse of discretion but grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional transgression must be nothing less than "arbitrary, capricious and whimsical."197 The extent of this Court's review of the nomination and appointment process must not be given such an expansive interpretation that it not only undermines the independence of the Judicial and Bar Council, but even undermines the President's constitutional power of appointment.The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.196
Dear Atty. Gombio,Strangely, the letter was not addressed to her colleagues. Neither were they given the courtesy of being furnished copies of her letter.
On the matter of my leave, please take note that due to the demands of the Senate trial where I intend to fully set out my defenses to the baseless charges, I will take an indefinite leave, until I shall have completed my preparation for the Senate trial, a portion of which will be charged against my wellness leave under A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC (Re: Wellness Program of all Justices for 2018), originally from March 12 to 23, 2018, to March 1 to 15, 2018. I will be submitting the requisite forms to the Clerk of Court.
Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)
Dear Colleagues:Her follow-up letter highlighted the inaccuracies over what was agreed upon during the February 27, 2018 En Banc session. Her camp's propensity to spin facts into a story that would closely hew to their narrative of respondent as the righteous and steadfast defender of the Judiciary should have been kept in check. There is a difference between sober advocacy and reckless media spin.
On the matter of my leave, I would respectfully need to advance my wellness leave to March 1 to 15, 2018 (originally March 12 to 26, 2018), to avail of the exemption from raffle under Section 6(c), Rule 7 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, I shall take an indefinite vacation leave (of at least 15 days) to prepare for my Senate defense and to be exempt for raffle. Please note that under said rule:
(c) Members who are on wellness leave or who are on vacation or sick leave, for at least fifteen (15) continuous calendar days, shall be exempt from raffle....
Thank you.
I have been requested to read this Press Statement by thirteen (13) Justices of the Supreme Court.The Court's statement reveals what really happened during the En Banc session and confirms that contrary to her team's pronouncements to the media that it was her choice to go on leave, respondent was in truth asked by her peers to go on an indefinite leave. There was no reason for the En Banc to reveal such a delicate and sensitive matter which occurred within its chambers, but respondent's inaccurate statement meant that the En Banc had no choice but to correct her in order to preserve the Court's integrity.
After extended deliberations last Tuesday February 27, 2018, thirteen (13) of the Justices present arrived at a consensus that the Chief Justice should take an indefinite leave. Several reasons were mentioned by the various justices. After consulting with the two most senior justices, the Chief Justice herself announced that she was taking an indefinite leave, with the amendment that she start the leave on Thursday, March 1, 2018. The Chief Justice did not request the rescheduling of her wellness leave.
The Court En Banc regrets the confusion that the announcements and media releases of the spokespersons of the Chief Justice have caused, which seriously damaged the integrity of the Judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular. In the ordinary course of events, the Court expected the Chief Justice to cause the announcement only of what was really agreed upon without any modification or embellishment. This matter shall be dealt with in a separate proceeding.
In view of the foregoing, the Court En Banc considers Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno to be on an indefinite leave starting March 1, 2018. Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio shall be the Acting Chief Justice.
The Clerk of Court and the Office of the Court Administrator will be informed and ordered to inform all courts and offices accordingly.
The Chief Justice understands the sense of the thirteen (13) justices that they expected me, in the normal course of events, to cause the announcement of my indefinite leave. I had agreed to go on an indefinite leave, but I am also bound by the appropriate administrative rules. The rules do not contain any provision on "indefinite leave." I had to qualify my leave according to the provisions of Rule 7, Section 6(c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court which reads "(c) Members who are on wellness leave or who are on vacation or sick leave, for at least fifteen (15) continuous calendar days shall be exempt from raffle. x x x" and the Resolution dated January 23, 2018 (A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC) on the matter of my approved wellness leave. I requested yesterday in writing the rescheduling of my wellness leave in view of my restudy of the rules. It is unfortunate that my plan of making use of any already approved wellness leave in relation to an indefinite leave was inaccurately conveyed for which I apologize.This explanation does not inspire belief. It was obviously meant to harmonize her first and second letters and lessen the impact of the inaccuracies.
I have not resigned and I will not resign. This indefinite leave is not a resignation. I will devote my time to the preparation of my Senate defense and work on the cases in my docket.
Canon 13 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.Disappointments arising from losing one's motions and pleadings are understandable. Criticism of the Court that decides will always be forthcoming. But for a party to do everything in her power to undermine the Court for fear of an adverse result may breach not only judicial courtesy but also our professional responsibilities as a lawyer.
Endnotes:
1 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
3 CONST., art XI, sec. 3 provides:
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a tiworable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
4 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 provide:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower cowis as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges oflower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges oflower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency perfonning quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
5 468 Phil. 421, 461-462 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
6 RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, sec. 1.
7 RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, sec. 5.
8 RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, sec. 3.
9 RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, secs. 2, 3, and 5.
10 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(1).
11 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
12 G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 435 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
13 Id. at 478-479.
14 G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 435 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
15 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1
16 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
17Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
18 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (3).
19 CONST., art. XI, secs. 3(1) to (8).
20 658 Phil. 322 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
21 Id. at 400-401 citing J. Azcuna, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
22See also the Separate Opinion of Justice Azcuna in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
23 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
24Villegas v. De La Cruz, 122 Phil. 1102 (1965) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; Cristobal v. Melchor, 168 Phil. 328 (1977) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, First Division].
25 RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, sec. 11.
26 122 Phil. 1102 (1965) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
27 Id. at 1105.
28 99 Phil. 253 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
29 Id. at 257.
30 Id. at 257-258.
31 104 Phil. 131 (1958) [Per J. Felix, En Banc].
32 105 Phil. 774 (1959) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].
33 104 Phil. 131, 135 (1958) [Per J. Felix, En Banc].
34 105 Phil. 774, 776 (1959) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc).
35Castro v. Del Rosario, 125 Phil. 611 (1967) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
36 CIVIL CODE, art. 1108.
37 Civil Service Commission v. Javier. 570 Phil. 89 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc] citing Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 433 Phil. 620 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
38Republic of the Philippines v. Animas, 155 Phil. 470 (1974) [Per J. Esguerra, First Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 698 (1989) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil 606 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]; Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]; East Asia Traders Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 477 Phil 848 (2004) (Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Second Division); Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 529 Phil. 192 (2006) [Per J. Puno, Second Division); Heirs of Parasac v. Republic of the Philippines, 523 Phil 164 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, 542 Phil. 86 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division); Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic of the Philippines, 567 Phil. 427 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division]; Yu Chang v. Republic, 659 Phil 176 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
39 253 Phil. 698 (1989) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division].
40 Id. at 713.
41See J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
42 Id. citing Michael Nelson, ed., THE PRESIDENCY A To Z, WASHINGTON D.C. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (1998).
43 Id.
44 Id. citing Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1 (November 1989).
45 Id. citing Michael Nelson, ed., THE PRESIDENCY A TO Z, WASHINGTON D.C. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (1998).
46 Id. citing Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1 (November 1989).
47See J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
48 Id. citing Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 2 (Winter 1999).
49 J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 957 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
50 Id. citing UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project, Manila (1970).
51 Id. citing Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 2 (Winter 1999).
52 Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered on November 1, 1978, New York, 1002.
53See Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, 75 Phil. 380 (2014) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC (2010).
58Majority opinion, pp. 48-50.
59 1986 Constitutional Deliberations, Journal No. 40, Vol. I, July 26, 1986.
60 CONST., art. VII, secs. 2 and 3.
61 Veronica Palumbarit, Past PHL presidents: Many were lawyers, one a housewife, another a mechanic, GMA NEWS ONLINE, December 17, 2015 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/specialreports/548156/past-phl-presidents-many-werelawyers-one-a-housewife-another-a-mechanic/story/> (last accessed May 7, 2018).
62See CONST., art. VIII, sec. 9 and art. XI, sec. 9.
63 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 1, sec. 1.
64 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 1, sec. 8.
65 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 3, rule 4, and rule 5.
66 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 1, sec. 1.
67 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 4, sec. 2.
68 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 5, sec. 2.
69 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 6.
70 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 7, sec. 1.
71 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 2, sec. 2.
72 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 8, sec. 1.
73 The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 8, sec. 2.
74 CONST., art. IX (B), sec. 1 (2); art. IX (C), sec. 1 (2); and art. IX (D), sec. 1 (2).
75 509 Phil. 567 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
76 Id. at 574.
77 2007 Rules of the Commission on Appointments, ch. IV, sec. 16.
78 2007 Rules of the Commission on Appointments, ch. V, sec. 24.
79 2007 Rules of the Commission on Appointments, ch. IV, sec. 16.
80 2007 Rules of the Commission on Appointments, ch. IV, sec. 23.
81 CONST., art. IX (C), sec. 2.
82 CONST., art. IX (C), sec. 2(4).
83 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1).
84 CONST., an. XI, sec. 8.
85 CONST., art. IX (C), sec. 1 (1).
86 CONST., art. IX (D), sec. 1.
87 241 Phil. 816 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
88 Id. at 828.
89 243 Phil. 167 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
90 Id. at 169-173, citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 213 Phil. 288 (1984) [Per J. Relova, En Banc].
91 A.C. No. 4509, December 5, 1995, as cited in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 63 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
92 493 Phil. 63 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
93 Id. at 82.
94 Id.
95 A.C. No. 9912, September 21, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/september2016/9912.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]
96Duque Jr. v. Brillantes, Jr., A.C. No. 9912, September 21, 2016 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
97Majority opinion, p. 116. The majority opinion's argument appears to be that while impeachable officers can only be removed by impeachment, an officer who is unqualified to be an impeachable officer may be removed through other means.
98 150-A Phil. 757 (1972) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
99 Republic Act No. 296 (1948), ch. III, sec. 24 provides:
Section 24. The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals shall not be removed from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Article IX of the Constitution.
100Espejo-Ty v. San Diego, 150-A Phil. 757, 779 (1972) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
101 241 Phil. 816 ( 1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
102 Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. (2008).
103 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6 provides:
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
104 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
105In re: Gonzales, 243 Phil. 167, 172 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
106 243 Phil. 167 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
107 Id. at 170-172.
108 Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered, on November 1, 1978, New York.
109 Id.
110 The Federalist Papers No. 78, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp> (last visited May 9, 2018).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 182 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
114See Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 233 Phil. 313 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
115 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
116 Id. at 157-158.
117 CONST., art. VIII. sec. 1.
118 Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. (2008).
119 41 Phil. 322 (1921) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
120 Id. at 329-330.
121Re: COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by SC Justices, 692 Phil. 147, 156 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
122 Id. at 157.
123 Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. (2008).
124 Id.
125Francia v. Abdon, 739 Phil. 299, 313 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
126Re: COA Opinion on Computation ojAppraised Value of Properties Purchased by SC Justices, 692 Phil. 147, 156 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc] citing In re: Macasaet, 583 Phil. 391 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., En Banc].
127 Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered on November 1, 1978, New York.
128 1973 CONST., art. X, sec. 5(5) provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
...
5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
1935 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 13 provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
129Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549 (20 I 0) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division] citing In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954) [Per J. Diokno, Second Division].
130 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 3 provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
131 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
132 293 Phil. 503 (1993) [Per J. Nocon, En Banc].
133 Id. at 506.
134 Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicia/Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. (2008).
135 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8(5) provides:
Section 8. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
136 G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833.pdf> [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
137 Id. at 7-8.
138 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/228628.pdf> [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
139 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 9 provides:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
140 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/228628.pdf> 2 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
141De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 697 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
142 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
143 Id.
144 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(3).
145 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/213181.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] citing I RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, JOURNAL No. 29 (Monday, July 14, 1986).
146 G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833.pdf> 8-9 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc] citing Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (20 14) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
147 Id. at 9-10.
148 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC (2004).
149Fidel v. Caraos, 442 Phil. 236, 242 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
150See Re: Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. 586 Phil. 321 (2008) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
151See Pertierra v. Lerma, 457 Phil. 796 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
152See Castillo v. Calanog, 276 Phil. 70 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Dela Cruz v. Bersamira, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567, July 24, 2000 [Per J. Ynares Santiago, First Division]; Sison-Barias v. Rubia, 736 Phil. 81 (2014) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
153 Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered on November 1, 1978, New York.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Petition. p. 2.
159 691 Phil 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
160 Id. at 188.
161 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
162 Id. at 175.
163 Id.
164Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 548 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
165 Id. at 549.
166 Id. at 556.
167 CONST. art. VIII, sec. 7(3).
168 CONST., art. 11, sec. 17 provides:
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the am1ed forces with general or fiag rank. the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
169Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division] summarized the contents of Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713 as:
"[T]hat it is the duty of public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The sworn statement is embodied in a proforma document with specific blanks to be filled out with the necessary data or information. Insofar as the details for real properties are concerned, the information required to be disclosed are limited to the following: 1) kind, 2) location, 3) year acquired, 4) mode of acquisition, 5) assessed value, 6) current fair market value, and 7) acquisition cost."
170 Republic Act No. 3019, sec. 7 provides:
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and tile with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before rhe end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.
171 Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, Annex 21, p. 15.
172 Published in Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. A14.
173 Published in Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B4.
174 Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, Annex 21, pp. 15-16.
175Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
176 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
177 Id.
178 656 Phil. 148 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
179 Id. at 164.
180 CONST. art. VIII, sec. 8(1).
181 CONST. art VIII, sec. 8(5).
182 CONST. art VIII, sec. 8(1).
183 A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC, Sec. 4(a). A Resolution Strengthening the Role and Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and Establishing the Offices Therein.
184 CONST. art VIII, sec. 8(3).
185 CONST. art VIII, sec. 8(4).
186Drilon v. Lim, 305 Phil. 146 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
187 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302 (November 29, 2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
188 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
189 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
190 Justice Brion, Separate Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 736 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
191 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
192 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]
193 757 Phil. 534 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
194 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
195 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302_leonen.pdf> 3-4.
196 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc] and CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
197See Ganaden, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G .R. Nos. 170500 and 170510-11, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 117 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division] and Ysidoro v. Hon. De Castro, G .R. Nos. 171513 and 190963, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 1 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
198 G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
199 G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231671.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].
200 G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/227757.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
201 G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/august2017/225442.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
202 725 Phil. 380 (2014) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
203 G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/july2016/212426.pdf> [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].