THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (DECEASED) SURVIVED AND ASSUMED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: ELISEO PIEDAD (DECEASED)*, JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, AND LEE PIEDAD, Petitioners, v. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES AND MARIANO BOBILLES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict application of the statute of limitations or laches would result in manifest wrong or injustice.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Eliseo Piedad, Joel Piedad, Publio Piedad, Jr., Gloria Piedad, Lot Piedad, Abel Piedad, Ali Piedad, and Lee Piedad (the Heirs of Piedad) assailing the Resolutions dated December 10, 20122 and July 10, 20133 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176.
The facts as established by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:
Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 435-T and raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola).4
On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery.5 The fallo of this Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders a Decision in favor of herein plaintiff Simeon Piedad and against defendants Candelaria Linehan-Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles, by declaring the deed of sale in question (Exhibit "A" or "5") to be NULL and VOID for being a mere forgery, and ordering herein defendants, their heirs and/or assigns to vacate the house and surrender their possession of said house and all other real properties which are supposed to have been covered by the voided deed of sale (Exhibit "A" or "5") to the administrator of the estate of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas. Furthermore, herein defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff or his heirs the following: (1) P3,000.00 Moral Damages; (2) P2,000.00 Exemplary Damages; and (3) P800.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on September 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court ruling.7
SO ORDERED.6
WHEREFORE, let a writ of demolition issue against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles. The sheriff implementing the writ is ordered to allow the defendants 10 days to remove their improvements in the premises and for them to vacate. Should defendant still fail to do so within the period aforestated, the sheriff may proceed with the demolition of the improvements without any further order from this Court.On November 26, 2001, Judge Gaviola denied Candelaria's Motion for Reconsideration.11
SO ORDERED.10
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar O. Estrera and Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin of the RTC in Toledo City, Cebu, Branches 29 and 59, respectively, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and imposes upon them a FINE in the amount of twenty[-]one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000) each, with the stem warning that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Also, the Court finds Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING AN ORDER and imposes upon him a FINE in the additional amount of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000)[.]Civil Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City was eventually transferred to Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City.24
SO ORDERED.23
First, assailed in the instant petition are Orders denying petitioners' motion to enforce a writ of execution and writ of demolition in Civil Case No. 435-T.On July 10, 2013, the Court of Appeals31 denied the Heirs of Piedad's Motion for Reconsideration.
Second, the Orders assailed in this petition were not rendered in the exercise of the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. In fact, Civil Case No[.] 435-T is an original action for annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Under the Rules, appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
The appropriate course of action for the petitioner was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding judge who issued the assailed Orders dated May 15, 2012 and August 16, 2012.30
Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.Rule 3, Section 1653 then provides for the process of substitution of parties when the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:Thus, the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.61
....
(3) Upon a judgment.
....
Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
In the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12 years and 1 day had already elapsed when the instant motion was filed on November 2, 2010. There may be instances that execution may still pursue despite the lapse of ten years from finality of judgment but it should be a result of a well-justified action for revival of judgment, not a mere motion, as can be found in the cited Supreme Court Decision.64The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of Dino65 to support its denial of petitioners' motion, claiming that the case at bar is very similar66 with Bausa. However, a careful reading of Bausa shows that while it contains similarities with the case at bar, the factual circumstances and ruling in Bausa tend to support petitioners' motion for revival, not its denial.
Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the Decision, petitioners have yet to regain possession of what is legally their own. These circumstances clearly demonstrate that the failure to execute the judgment was due to respondents' refusal to follow the several writs ordering them to vacate the premises. It would be unfair for the Court to allow respondents to profit from their defiance of valid court orders.70Bausa likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would result with the strict adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it would be better for courts to rule under the principle of equity:
It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. It would be more in keeping with justice and equity to allow the revival of the judgment rendered by Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 639. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd situation where the rightful owner of a property would be ousted by a usurper on mere technicalities. Indeed, it would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of another action that would only unduly prolong respondents' unlawful retention of the premises which they had, through all devious means, unjustly withheld from petitioners all these years.71Just like in Bausa, it also cannot be said that petitioners slept on their rights. Petitioners filed a motion for execution well within the five (5)-year period prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. However, their efforts were thwarted by respondents' machinations and Judges Estrera's and Villarin's illegal acts of issuing restraining orders against a coequal court. Nonetheless, petitioners continued to persevere and filed several motions72 before Judge Villarin, which the judge proceeded to ignore. This Court recognized the illegality of the acts committed by Judges Estrera and Villarin when this Court held them administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and undue delay in rendering an order, imposing upon them a fine and a stem warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.73
It would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of a separate action that would only unduly prolong petitioner's unlawful retention of the premises which he has through all devious means unjustly withheld from respondents all these years.78This Court, in a long line of cases,79 has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage. The reason behind this exception was explained in Camacho v. Court of Appeals:80
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. This rule of construction is especially useful in the present case where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice.81This Court has also interrupted82 the tolling of the prescriptive period or deducted83 from the prescriptive period when the peculiar circumstances of the case or the dictates of equity called for it. This Court held in Lancita v. Magbanua:84
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.85It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and respondents was declared null and void for being a forgery, and that the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory as early as November 1, 1998. However, due to respondents' schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years to prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to an empty victory and petitioners' continued struggle for their rights.
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* Substituted by his heirs Remedios Veloso Cascon, Ronald C. Piedad, Janus C. Piedad and Ralph C. Piedad. See Rollo, p. 106.
1Rollo, pp. 37-43.
2 Id. at 59-60. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Pedro B. Corales of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3 Id. at 23-24. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Maria Luisa Quijano Padilla of the Special Former Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
4 Id. at 11.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 11-12.
8 Id. at 12.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 13.
13 Id. at 38.
14 Id. at 13.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 13-14.
18 Id. at 14.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 10-11.
22 Id. at 10-20. Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, 623 Phil. 178 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id. at 66.
25 Id. at 67.
26 Id. at 66-70.
27 Id. at 69.
28 Id. at 38.
29 Id. at 59-60.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 23-24.
32 Id. at 37-43.
33 Id. at 37.
34 Id. at 39.
35 Id. at 39-40.
36 Id. at 57.
37 Id. at 40.
38 Id. at 72.
39 Id. at 80-93.
40 Id. at 81-82.
41 Id. at 82-83.
42 Id. at 84-85.
43 Id. at 86-87.
44 Id. at 88-89.
45 Id. at 90.
46 Id. at 106-109.
47 Id. at 106.
48 Id. at 117.
49 Id. at 158-168.
50 Id. at 158-160.
51 Id. at 160-161.
52 Id. at 163.
53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 16 provides:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
54Rollo, pp. 88-89.
55 623 Phil. 178 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
56 Attys. Roberto R. Arendain, Randy M. Pareja and Patrina T. Soco of the Arendain Pareja and Soco Law Offices.
57Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, 623 Phil. 178, 184 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
58 Id. at 182-184.
59 Id. at 184.
60 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 19.
61Villeza v. German Management and Services, Inc., 641 Phil. 544, 550 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
62Rollo, p. 12.
63 Id. at 67.
64 Id. at 69.
65 585 Phil. 526 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].
66Rollo, p. 70.
67 585 Phil. 526, 534-535 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].
68 Id. at 535.
69 Id. at 534.
70 Id. at 535.
71 Id. at 535 citing Spouses Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 612, 627 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division] and David v. Ejercito, 163 Phil. 509 (1976) [Per J. Martin, First Division].
72Rollo, p. 14.
73 Id. at 19.
74 Id. at 69.
75 Id. at 59-60.
76 163 Phil. 509 (1976) [Per J. Martin, First Division].
77 Id. at 515.
78 Id.
79Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Serra, 713 Phil. 722, 726 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; Yau v. Silverio, 567 Phil. 493, 502-503 (2008) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division]; Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 736, 751-752 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 115, 123-124 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 108, 114-115 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
80 351 Phil. 108 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
81 Id. at 115.
82Republic v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 115, 123-124 [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 736, 751-752 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division]; Lancita v. Magbanua, 117 Phil. 39, 44 (1963) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].
83Villaruel v. Court of Appeals, 254 Phil. 305, 314-315 (1989) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division]; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 287 Phil. 656, 666 (1992) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda de Villaroya, 237 Phil. 280 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
84 117 Phil. 39 (1963) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].
85 Id. at 44-45.
86United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581, 591-592 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
87Republic v. Court of Appeals, 221 Phil. 685, 693 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division]; Philippine Veterans Bank v. Solid Homes, 607 Phil. 14, 26-27 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; Villeza v. German Management and Services, Inc., 641 Phil. 544, 551-552 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].