FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197514, August 06, 2018
RAMON R. VILLARAMA, Petitioner, v. CRISANTOMAS D. GUNO, HON. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 223, CARMELITA YADAO GUNO AND PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1, assailing the November 15, 2010 Decision2 and June 29, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93271, which nullified the Regional Trial Court's (RTC's) order4 of denial of Crisantomas D. Guno's (Crisantomas) Special Appearance with Motion to Vacate Judgment5.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of September, 1997, a copy of summons together with complaint and annexes dated September 19, 1997, addressed to SPS. CRISANTOMAS GUNO AND CARMELITA GUNO at the 3rd Floor Quezon Hall, UP Diliman, Quezon City, issued by the Honorable Court in connection with the above-entitled case was caused to be served by substituted service (Section 7, Rule 14) to defendant Carmelita Guno considering that defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided for in Section 8, Rule 14 and that earnest efforts were exerted to serve summons personally to the defendants and service was effected by leaving a copy of summons at the defendant's office through Ms. Francesa V. Tadeo, a clerk at the defendant's office and a person with suitable age and discretion then working therein, who acknowledged receipt thereof only for defendant Carmelita Guno as evidenced by her signature located at the lower left portion of the original summons.On March 6, 1998, the process server issued an Officer's Return stating:
This is to further certify that summons to defendant Crisantomas D. Guno cannot be served considering that he does not reside nor hold office in the address provided in the complaint; hence, summons to defendant Crisantomas D. Guno is being returned UNSERVED.13
THIS IS TO CERTIFY UNDER OATH that on March 6, 1998 th (sic) undersigned personally went at 408 P. Bernarld Street, Ugong, Pasig City to serve copies of herein Alias Summons with complaint and annexes attached thereto issued by the Court on February 24, 1998 in the above-entitled case upon defendant Crisantomas Guno. The Alias Summons with complaint and annexes was served to the above-mentioned defendant thru SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, by leaving copy (sic) of the Alias Summons with complaint and annexes at the defendant's given address/residence with Ruby Guno Santiago (sister of defendant Crisantomas D. Guno), a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.On November 7, 1997, Carmelita filed her Answer with Counterclaim. Crisantomas, on the other hand, was declared in default for failure to file an answer.15
DULY SERVED THRU SUBSTITUTED SERVICE.14
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, judgment is hereby entered declaring the following:The said Decision was later appealed by both Carmelita and Prudential, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 87062.18
(1) The eighteen (18) promissory notes executed by the Defendant Sps. Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno dated February 21, 1983 as RESCINDED;
(2) The Deed of Sale of Real Property dated March 24, 1983 between Sps. Marcial and Rita V. Reyes and the Defendant Sps. Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno as likewise RESCINDED;
(3) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218121 registered under the name of the Sps. Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno;
(4) Directing the Defendants Sps. Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno to pay the plaintiff the following:(a) Liquidated damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency; and(5) The Complaint in Intervention filed by Prudential Bank is ordered DISMISSED;
(b) Attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;
(6) All counterclaims are DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.17
x x x. The general rule is that husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly inasmuch as both are co-administrators of the community property under the absolute (sic) system of absolute community of property, as well as the conjugal partnership property. Defendant spouse Carmelita Yadao was served by substituted service on September 19, 1997, wherein the summons was directed to both spouses. Since Carmelita's marriage to Crisantomas had not yet been annulled when the present action was instituted, the service to her was binding as to Crisantomas and the qualification of the receipt made by a competent person in the regular place of business of Carmelita that the summons was "received for Atty. Yadao-Guno only" had no effect.Crisantomas then questioned the said order before the CA which ruled in his favor in the assailed Decision. The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons on Crisantomas. It found that the return did not state that prompt and personal service on Crisantomas was rendered impossible and neither was it shown that efforts were made to find Crisantomas personally and that the said efforts failed. It further ruled that being in derogation of the usual method of service, strict compliance with the indispensable requirements for the substituted service of summons is mandated.22
x x x x
The Court notes that the first motion for extension of time to file answer/responsive pleading filed by defendant Carmelita Guno dated October 2, 1997 was furnished to Crisantomas Guno at the same address which reads: "c/o 3rd Floor, Quezon City Hall UP Diliman, Quezon City" in Carmelita's regular place of business, where she also was served alias summons. Soon after, in the second motion for extension of time to file answer/responsive pleading which she filed dated October 22, 1997, the same was furnished Crisantomas at the address: "c/o 408 P. Bernald Street Ugong, Pasig City." In the subsequent pleadings she filed through her counsel, she likewise copy furnished her husband at the second address.
Assuming arguendo that service of summons to the husband must be separate from service to the wife, the records of the case show that service was properly made to defendant Crisantomas since the Court could find no possible explanation as to why defendant Carmelita will use an address where her husband could not be found nor deliberately lie about the residence of her husband, assuming that they were, at that time summons was supposed to be served, already de facto separated. To bolster the conclusion that Crisantomas truly resided in the abovementioned address, a certain Cris Santiago received an order of the court in behalf of Crisantomas at 408 P. Bernald Street, Ugong, (sic) sister named Ruby Guno Santiago at the same address on March 6, 1998. Quite obviously, defendant Crisantomas is estopped from claiming the contrary, and that his affidavit stating that he never resided or lived at 408 P. Bernald Street, Ugong, Pasig City was done as a mere afterthought to escape the liability imposed by the Court in the decision dated May 9, 2005. Thus, the said affidavit and the motion to vacate judgment filed by Crisantomas should not be given credence by this Court.21
The courts' jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one's right to due process.25Here, as borne by the records, the alias summons was served upon Crisantomas and Carmelita at the 3rd Floor Quezon Hall, UP Diliman, Quezon City. The same was received albeit with the caveat that it was received only in so far as Carmelita was concerned. Carmelita then proceeded to participate in the proceedings and filed her answer where she raised that an earlier case involving the same documents, except for the amended trust agreement, had already been passed upon by the RTC, CA and SC in the case entitled "Spouses Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno vs. Prudential Bank and Trust Co.". Carmelita fully participated in the proceedings of the instant case until the rendition of judgment on May 9, 2005.
I, CRISANTOMAS GUNO, Filipino, of legal age, single, residing at Unit No. 9, Goldmine Townhomes, Melissa Drive, Xavierville I, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, subscribing under oath, hereby depose and state that:Apart from his denial, there was no additional evidence adduced in support of his claim that he was never served a copy of the summons, the decision of the case or the proceedings of the case. He actually never stated in his affidavit that he and Carmelita were separated in fact - this was merely stated in his motion as a footnote27 and that their marriage was eventually annulled. Curiously, however, no dates or evidence were ever supplied as to the exact date when they were separated in fact or when their eventual annulment took place. "It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence."28
1. I have never resided and/or lived at No. 408 P. Bernald Street., (sic), Ugong, Pasig City;
2. I was never served a copy of the summons in respect to the case entitled Ramon Villarama vs. Sps. Crisantomas D. Guno et al pending before QC RTC Br. 223, docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-97-31700;
3. I never received a copy of the summons in respect to the above-mentioned case from the personnel of said court or from any person for that matter;
4. From the inception of said case until a decision was rendered, I was never notified of the proceedings of the said case;
5. In fact, I was not even furnished a copy of the Decision rendered in the said case;
6. I execute this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for whatever legal purpose the same may serve;26
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.38As the deed of sale and promissory notes were entered into during the course of their marriage, the obligations thereunder are subsumed under their conjugal partnership. Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121 [2 and 3] of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership:
x x x A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or regular business place. He need not know where a resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice.41 (Emphasis Ours)Indeed, given the peculiar circumstances of this case, to rule otherwise would serve nothing but to delay a case that has already been in litigation since the 1990's. Villarama would be constrained to file anew a case for rescission against Crisantomas who is in no better position than Carmelita, who had already thoroughly threshed out their interests in the proceedings below.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018.
** Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated April 25, 2018 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
*** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2560-F dated August 8, 2018 vice Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.
1Rollo, pp. 11-32.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Mario Y. Lopez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier. Id. at 37-47.
3 Id. at 48-50.
4 Id. at 51-54.
5 Id. at 76-87.
6 Id. at 15, 37-38.
7 Id. at 38.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 38-39.
11 Id. at 39, 150-155.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 99.
14 Id. at 100.
15 Id. at 40.
16 Id. at 55-75.
17 Id. at 74-75.
18 Id. at 224.
19 Id. at 76-87.
20 Id. at 51-54.
21 Id. at 52-54.
22 Id. at 46.
23 Id. at 231-234.
24 530 Phil. 454 (2006).
25 Id. at 462.
26Rollo, p. 88.
27 Id. at 77; See footnote 1: "The other defendant in the above-captioned case, Carmelita Yadao-Guno, was the previous spouse of herein GUNO. They have been seprated in fact even before the inception of the instant case. Their marriage was eventually annulled."
28GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., et al., 721 Phil. 740, 753-754 (2013).
29Rollo, p. 89.
30 Id. at 150.
31 Id. at 42.
32 Id. at 128-132.
33 Id. at 130.
34Perkin Elmer Singapore PTE Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp., 556 Phil. 822, 839 (2007).
35 Civil Code, Article 118.
36 Id., Article 160; See also Family Code, Article 116.
37 538 Phil. 319 (2006).
38 Id. at 334-335.
39 See Biaco v. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45 (2007).
40 577 Phil. 383 (2008).
41 Id. at 395.