G.R. No. 227523, August 29, 2018 - AMALIA S. MENEZ* (IN BEHALF OF THE LATE JONATHAN E. MENEZ), Petitioner, v. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, NAFTOTRADE SHIPPING AND COMMERCIAL S.A., AND MOILEN ALOYSIUS VILLEGAS, Respondents.

Petitioner Amalia S. Menez (petitioner), on behalf of her deceased husband Jonathan E. Menez (Jonathan), filed a petition for review on certiorari¹ (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision² dated April 29, 2016 and Resolution³ dated October 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119694. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Decision⁴ that petitioner was not entitled to death benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, and attorney's fees.

Facts

The CA's findings of facts are as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner is the surviving spouse of deceased seafarer, Jonathan, with whom she has three (3) children.

On February 20, 2009, Jonathan was hired by Status Maritime Corporation (private respondent), a local manning agency engaged in the recruitment and/or deployment of Filipino seafarers for its foreign principal, Naftotrade Shipping and Commercial S.A., as second engineer of M/V Naftocement with a basic monthly salary of US$1,000.00, for a period of six (6) months. Jonathan passed the pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and had been declared fit for sea service.

On February 25, 2009, Jonathan was deployed and embarked on the M/V Naftocement II, a vessel carrying cement. As 2^nd engineer, Jonathan was in charge of the main engine piston, generator engine piston, hydraulic oil jack and cleats, sea water ballast pump, fire and G.S. Pump, F.W. Pump, and cleaning the air sides of the main engine and cooler of sea water with chemicals. Jonathan was exposed to undue pressure a[n]d strain as he was required to be on call twenty-four (24) hours a day to monitor the condition of the vessel's engine. Such pressure and strain was (sic) aggravated by being away from his family for months on end. Due to long hours of duty in the engine room, Jonathan felt dizzy and nauseous; however, he just ignored it, thinking that it was only due to fatigue. Jonathan also experienced redness of his eyes and purple patches on his skin, but he did not mind it as it was not painful. He also suffered bleeding gums, prolonged nosebleed and severe urinary and gastrointestinal hemorrhage, but these were not entered in the ship's logbook despite the knowledge of the ship master.

On September 11, 2009, Jonathan disembarked from M/V Naftocement II and arrived in the Philippines on September 12, 2009. Thinking that his illness was not serious, Jonathan immediately went to his hometown in Bacolod City. He did not submit to a post-employment medical examination in anticipation of another deployment with private respondents.

Upon Jonathan's arrival, petitioner was shocked at Jonathan's hemorrhage. Jonathan rested to recover his strength, but his health deteriorated. Days after, Jonathan noticed traces of blood in his urine which prompted petitioner to bring him to Dr. Brian Antonio T. Togle (Dr. Togle), an internist-nephrologist. Jonathan was referred to MP Analysis and Laboratory Inc. in Bacolod City, where he was subjected to laboratory examinations and ultrasound of the lower abdomen. The medical result interpreted by Dr. Manuel M. Arboleda showed that Jonathan had "Borde[r]line Prostatic Size (23gms). Symmetrical Small Cystic Dilatation of the Ejaculatory Duct. Tiny Right Renal Cortical Cyst. Negative for Urinary Tract Stone or Obstruction". Dr. Togle prescribed sodium bicarbonate grX/tab, 2 tabs 3x a day after meals for one week.

On October 29, 2009, Jonathan was admitted at The Doctors' Hospital, Inc., Bacolod City for gum bleeding and redness of the eye. He underwent hematology examination, roentgenoscopy and chest PA. The examinations revealed that Jonathan had acute myelogenous leukemia and was recommended for bone marrow aspiration. Jonathan was discharged from the hospital on the same day. He went home to recuperate while taking his medicines.

On November 4, 2009, Jonathan was admitted to the Bacolod Our Lady of Mercy Specialty Hospital, Bacolod City, for the same complaint of epigast[r]ic pain and there, he was diagnosed with: (a) uncal herniation 2 to the parenchymal hemorrhages, right frontal and temporal cortical areas; (b) upper GI bleed; and (c) acute myelogenous leukemia. On November 11, 2009, Jonathan died from his illness at the Bacolod Our Lady of Mercy Specialty Hospital, Bacolod City.

On April 14, 2010, petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter, for nonpayment of death benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00; US$7,000.00 each for the three (3) minor children (or a total of US$21,000.00); medical reimbursement; US$1,000.00 burial expenses; P500,000.00 moral damages; P500,000.00 exemplary damages; P500,000.00 compensatory damages; and 10% of the recoverable amounts as and for attorney's fees.

Mandatory conferences were held before the Labor Arbiter[,] but no settlement was reached by the parties, who were then required to submit their respective pleadings and supporting evidence. On September 10, 2010, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Status Maritime Corporation, and/or the foreign principal/employer Naftotrade Shipping & Commercial S.A., and/or to pay, jointly and severally complainant Amalia S. Menez, widow of deceased seafarer Jonathan E. Menez, for and on behalf of their minor children, the Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$72,000.00) representing death benefits and allowance, and burial allowance, and One Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Seventy Six Pesos (P147,076.00) representing reimbursement of medical expenses, plus ten percent (10%) thereof as and for attorney's fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC arguing that: (1) the deceased seafarer died after the effectivity of his employment contract with private respondents; (2) the illness which caused the seafarer's demise was not proven to be work-related; (3) the seafarer's illness, acute myelogenous leukemia, was undetected during his pre-employment medical examination; (4) cancer is judicially ruled to be not a work-related disease; and (5) the seafarer failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment medical examinations.

On December 30, 2010, the NLRC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on March 29, 2011.⁵

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA assailing the NLRC decision. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the NLRC and ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence compliance with Section 20(A) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (2000 POEA-SEC) when petitioner failed to show proof that her husband's death was work-related.⁶

Further, the CA ruled that Jonathan failed to submit himself to post-employment medical examination as soon as he arrived in the Philippines, or within three (3) days therefrom in violation of Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.⁷

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

Whether Jonathan's death is compensable under the 2000 POEA-SEC.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

Petitioner argues that Jonathan's death due to acute myelogenous leukemia is compensable because it is work-related,⁸ and that Jonathan's death occurred during the term of his employment as his symptoms manifested during the term of his employment.⁹ These are factual issues that are generally not reviewable in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As the Court ruled in Madridejos v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc.¹⁰:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As a rule, we only examine questions of law in a Rule 45 petition. Thus, "we do not reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the [National Labor Relations Commission], an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field." Similarly, we do not replace our "own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are usually "conclusive on this Court."¹¹

Here, the Court finds that the CA was correct in affirming the factual findings of the NLRC that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that he should appear before the company-designated doctor. Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC states:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
   
   For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
   
   If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphasis supplied)
   

Although this rule is not absolute,¹² petitioner failed to provide a reason for Jonathan's failure to report within three (3) days from repatriation. If Jonathan, as petitioner claims, was already experiencing bleeding gums, prolonged nosebleed and severe urinary and gastrointestinal hemorrhage even before his repatriation, then it was imperative that he reported this to his employer as soon as he arrived in the Philippines and have himself checked by the company-designated physician. As the Court held in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag¹³: "To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims."¹⁴

Even if the Court were to excuse Jonathan's failure to comply with the reporting requirement, petitioner failed to prove that Jonathan's death was work-related and compensable.

As the Court ruled in Yap v. Rover Maritime Services Corp.,¹⁵ "x x x in order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer to be entitled to death compensation from the employer, it must be proven that the death of the seafarer (1) is work-related; and (2) occurred during the term of his contract."¹⁶

Here, petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence the causal connection between Jonathan's death and the nature of his work. The ruling in Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas,¹⁷ (Klaveness) where the Court denied the claim for death benefits because of the failure to prove by substantial evidence that the deceased's work increased the risks of acquiring bladder cancer, applies here:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The deceased allegedly suffered bouts of painful urination while on-board petitioner's vessel. The pain would however subside upon the taking of pain relievers. Nevertheless, in the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot conclude that the pain was due to cancer. After all, painful urination is non specific to cancer and may be linked to other conditions. Moreover, there was no indication that petitioner was made aware of such painful spells while the deceased was on-board.

Respondents were unable to adduce evidence that the deceased's work exposed him to the chemicals suspected to increase the risks of acquiring bladder cancer. Neither were they able to prove that his bladder cancer was acquired during his employment. As we earlier noted, one's predisposition to develop cancer is affected not only by one's work, but also by many factors outside of one's working environment. In the absence of substantial evidence, the deceased's working conditions cannot be assumed to have increased the risk of contracting bladder cancer.¹⁸ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The CA therefore correctly held that absent any medical report or any relevant document showing that Jonathan contracted the illness during the term of his employment, such claim is just a mere allegation, thus:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, Jonathan was repatriated on September 11, 2009 due to completion of contract; he died on November 11, 2009 or two (2) months after his repatriation. Moreover, there is no proof that the illness which was the cause of death, was work-related.

x x x x

Petitioner claims that Jonathan was exposed to undue pressure and strain as he was required to be on call twenty-four (24) hours a day to monitor the condition of the vessel's engine; the pressure and strain was (sic) aggravated by being away from his family for months; that due to long hours of duty in the engine room, Jonathan experienced dizziness and nausea, however, he ignored it, thinking that it was only due to fatigue; that Jonathan also experienced redness of the eyes and purple patches on the skin, but he did not mind it as it was not painful; that Jonathan had suffered bleeding gums, prolonged nosebleed and severe urinary and gastrointestinal hemorrhage. No complaint, medical report or such relevant document was presented regarding the illness contracted by Jonathan on-board M/V Naftocement. Without any record of illness during his voyage, it is difficult to state that Jonathan had acquired or developed acute myelogenous leukemia during his employment.

In view of the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the allegation is essentially self-serving and devoid of any evidentiary weight.

The Labor Arbiter failed to establish a factual basis for the award, merely concluding that since Jonathan passed the PEME, and he was diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia a month after his repatriation, dying from such illness two (2) [months] from repatriation, the cause of the illness is work-related. The conclusion does not lend itself to the facts of the case; it is non-sequitur.¹⁹ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, the death of Jonathan occurred two (2) months after the expiration of his contract, thus, there was a failure to comply with the requirement that the death should have occurred during the term of the contract. As the Court held in Klaveness, "x x x in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract."²⁰ The only exception to this rule is when the death occurs after the employee's medical repatriation,²¹ which is absent in this case as Jonathan was repatriated because of the expiration of his contract.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2016 and Resolution dated October 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119694 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,^*JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

---

^* Also spelled as Meñez in some parts of the rollo.

^* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.

¹ Rollo, pp. 28-53.

² Id. at 55-67. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.

³ Id. at 69-70.

⁴ Id. at 217-231. Decision dated December 30, 2010 of the NLRC First Division in NLRC LAC No. OFW(M)-10-000876-10, penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and concurred in by Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go.

⁵ Id. at 56-59.

⁶ See id. at 60-62.

⁷ Id. at 63.

⁸ See id. at 35-36.

⁹ See id. at 39.

¹⁰ G.R. No. 204262, June 7, 2017, 826 SCRA 452.

¹¹ Id. at 472.

¹² See Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag, 678 Phil. 938, 948 (2011).

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Id. at 949.

¹⁵ 741 Phil. 222 (2014).

¹⁶ Id. at 233.

¹⁷ 566 Phil. 579 (2008).

¹⁸ Id. at 589.

¹⁹ Rollo, pp. 61-63.

²⁰ Supra note 17, at 585-586.

²¹ See Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 745 Phil. 252, 266 & 269 (2014).