FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198237, October 08, 2018
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, v. LAND INVESTORS AND DEVELOPERS CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TIJAM, J.:
Through this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) seeks to annul the Decision2 dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93752 which reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated April 14, 2009 and June 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.
In its assailed Decision, the CA found BPI liable to its depositor, respondent Land Investors and Development Corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.
1. Signature cards (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B" and "B-1") with petitioner that show the names and specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of respondent;Respondent's exhibits were all admitted by the court a quo.12
2. Respondent's Board Resolution (Exhibit "C") showing the authority of the signatories in "any two" capacity;
3. Counterchecks taken from the bank's checkbook which allowed Dela Peña to make encashments on the basis of Dela Peña's lone signature (Exhibits "D" to "D-2" and "E") and checks that bear the lone signature of Dela Peña (Exhibit "F" to "F-6");
4. Withdrawal slips bearing Dela Peña's lone signature (Exhibits "G" to "G-1"); withdrawal slips bearing Dela Pena's lone signature and in some cases, together with the forged signature of Fariñas (Exhibits "H" to "H-28"); checks bearing the signatures of Dela Peña with the forged signatures of Fariñas (Exhibits "I" to "I-80"); and
5. Sample signatures of Fariñas (Exhibits "Q" to "Q-17"); NBI Comparison Charts showing the sample and questioned signatures of Fariñas (Exhibits "S" to "S-12" and "T" to "T-17"); and the NBI Report with the conclusion that the questioned and standard/sample signatures of Fariñas were not written by one and the same person (Exhibit "R").11
"In a nutshell, the grievance of [respondent] against BPI is that the latter, through the 'deliberate malfeasance' or 'gross negligence' of its 'Pamplona Branch personnel,' conspired with the herein defendant [Dela Peña] in defrauding the former the total sum of Three Million Six Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Ninety[-]Five Pesos and One Centavo (P3,652,095.01).Resultantly, the RTC disposed:
Necessarily, the herein [respondent] should prove by strong and convincing evidence that the defendant [BPI] colluded with Mr. Dela Peña and that BPI failed to exercise the diligence higher than that of a good father of a family in dealing with [respondent's] account with it.
The testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence of the herein [respondent] are so barren when it comes to its allegation of connivance between BPI and Mr. Dela Peña. This Court has perused the record apropos over and over again but it could not find any proof of conspiracy between Mr. Dela Peña and BPI adduced by [respondent]. It would seem that [respondent] may have forgotten about this particular allegation of it against BPI. Hence, on this score alone, the demurrer to evidence extant of BPI has no merit.
Withal, the evidence presented by the [respondent] herein is also very inadequate to establish gross negligence on the part of defendant [BPI].14
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the instant "Demurrer to Evidence" of the herein defendant [BPI] is hereby GRANTED.Respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it appealed to the CA.
Congruently with Section 1, Rule 33 of the Revised Rules of Court, the case extant is hereby DISMISSED apropos herein defendant [BPI] on the ground that upon the facts and the law the. [respondent] herein has shown no right to relief.
Vis-a-vis herein defendant [Dela Peña], who was declared in default by the Court via its fiat on 30 November 2004, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the herein [respondent] the following sums, to wit:
1. Three Million Six Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Ninety[-]Five Pesos and One Centavo (P3,652,095.01), plus legal interest counted from the date of each unauthorized withdrawal until the entire amount is fully paid as and for actual damages;
2. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as and by way of moral damages;
3. Two Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]200,000.00) as and by way of exemplary damages;
4. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and
5. The costs of suit.
Serve copies of this Resolution to the plaintiff herein and herein defendant bank and to their respective counsel of record, including the defaulted defendant at his given address on record.
SO ORDERED.15
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 61 dated 14 April 2009 and 26 June 2009, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.BPI's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the CA in its Resolution21 dated August 12, 2011.
Defendant-appellee BPI and defendant [Dela Peña], who was declared in default, are solidarily liable to [respondent]. Defendant appellee and defendant [Dela Peña] are ORDERED to pay (1) actual damages in the amount of P3,652,095.01 plus 12% legal interest from the date of each unauthorized withdrawal until the entire amount is fully paid and (2) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees in favor of [respondent].
SO ORDERED.20
[T]he doctrine that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being conclusive in nature, are binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence. x x x.28 (Citation omitted)As such, "only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest bias in the Appellate Court's reading of the evidence will justify this Court's intervention by way of assuming a function usually within the former's exclusive province."29 The instant petition demonstrates no such exceptional circumstance.
(a) the document is an ancient one under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) the document is not being offered as genuine.30 (Citations omitted)To begin with, the Court notes that the trial court had admitted all of respondent's exhibits to which BPI raised no further objections. The admissibility of respondent's pieces of evidence should no longer be further litigated. It also appears that BPI admitted and stipulated on the genuineness and due execution of the questioned checks and withdrawal slips during the preliminary conference and further admitted that these checks and withdrawal slips were obtained from the microfilm copies of BPI. It was further alleged and admitted that these very same checks and withdrawal slips were honored by BPI.31 Thus, the foregoing judicial admissions dispense with the ordinarily required proof that the checks and withdrawal slips were authentic.
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:Nacar also instructs that the new rate is to be applied prospectively, or from July 1, 2013. Applying the foregoing guidelines to the instant case, the amount of P3,652,095.01 shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from September 16, 2002, or the date when judicial demand was made, until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until satisfaction thereof.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
- When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
- When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.39 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Endnotes:
* On official travel.
** Designated Acting Working Chairperson per Special Order No. 2605 daterl September 28, 2018.
*** Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated June 20, 2018 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1Rollo, pp. 7-25.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan, concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Franchito N. Diamante; id. at 30-48.
3 Id. at 8-9.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 9 and 55.
7 Id. at 55-56.
8 Id. at 32.
9 Id. at 32-33.
10 Id. at 56-57.
11 Id. at 58-59.
12 Id. at 33.
13 Id. at 9-10.
14 Id. at 61.
15 Id. at 10-11.
16 Id. at 35-36.
17 Id. at 38.
18 Id. at 40-41.
19 Id. at 43.
20 Id. at 47-48.
21 Id. at 50-51.
22 507 Phil. 287 (2005).
23Pascual v. Burgos, et al., 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016).
24Rep. Of the Phils. v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership, 728 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2014).
25 As those enumerated by this Court in DBP v. Traders Royal Bank, et al., 642 Phil. 547, 556-557 (2010):
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
26Uniland Resources v. DBP, 277 Phil. 839, 844 (1991).
27 776 Phil. 167 (2016).
28 Id. at 188.
29 Id.
30Patula v. People, 685 Phil. 376, 397-398 (2012).
31Rollo, p. 76-78.
32 Id. at 40.
33Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. v. Capistrano, 681 Phil. 462, 475 (2012).
34 Article 1933 of the Civil Code provides, in part:
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
x x x x
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
x x x x
35 Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
36 Section 1, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
37 Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
38 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
39 Id. at 281-283.
40 Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
x x x x
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.