THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206316, March 20, 2019
PANASONIC MANUFACTURING PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (FORMERLY MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC PHILIPPINES CORP.), PETITIONER, v. JOHN PECKSON, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, A., JR., J.:
Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated December 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118641, and its Resolution3 dated March 15, 2013, which set aside the Decisions dated May 11, 20104 and September 30, 20105 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA), which dismissed respondent John V. Peckson's (Peckson) complaint for lack of merit.
The facts are aptly summarized by the CA. Peckson was formerly employed as a Sales Supervisor for the Battery Department of petitioner Panasonic Manufacturing Philippines Corporation (Panasonic). The legal controversy started when, in a letter dated September 16, 2003, Peckson expressed his intention to resign effective on October 30, 2003.6 The contents of said letter read, thus:
TO: PERSONNEL DEPARTMENTIn a subsequent letter dated September 25, 2003, Peckson informed Panasonic that he wished to change the effectivity of his resignation instead to October 15, 2003:8
FROM: JOHN PECKSON
RE: RESIGNATION
DATE: SEPTEMBER 16, 2003
I am tendering my resignation effective October 30, 2003. I would like to thank this company for giving me the opportunity to work here.
I would like to thank also the few people who tried to support me namely Mr. Tiongson and some of my friends in NBP.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.)
JOHN PECKSON7
TO: PERSONNEL DEPARTMENTOn April 11, 2005, Peckson filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with the NLRC, with claims for payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement with full backwages, non-payment of 13th month pay and other benefits, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Panasonic and Jose De Jesus (De Jesus) in the latter's personal capacity as Manager of Peckson's former Battery Sales Department. In the complaint, Peckson alleged that he was forced to resign by De Jesus after the latter accused him of falsifying De Jesus' signature in an "Authority to Travel" form dated August 20, 2003.10 In an effort to disprove De Jesus' accusations, Peckson had proceeded to the Philippine National Police (PNP) to have the controversial "Authority to Travel" form examined, and also submitted several other documents signed by De Jesus as a way to compare the signatures and prove that it was De Jesus who had indeed signed the form.
FROM: JOHN PECKSON
RE: RESIGNATION
DATE: SEPTEMBER 25, 2003
I would like to change the date of my resignation from MEPCO to October 15, 2003, my earlier resignation letter stated October 30, 2003. I am doing this so that I could attend to some personal matters. Again, I would like to thank MEPCO for all the support it has given and also the people who became my friends in the company.
Good luck to the battery business and I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) JOHN PECKSON9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by [Peckson] is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.On April 25, 2007, Peckson filed an appeal with the NLRC, which was however dismissed for being filed out of time. In dismissing the appeal for being filed beyond the ten-day prescriptive period, the NLRC reasoned that while Peckson alleged that he received a copy of the LA's decision only on April 18, 2007, the records showed the mail bearing the decision was served at Peckson's given address on January 4, 2007, but the same was not delivered since the addressee moved out.18
SO ORDERED.17
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.Proceedings in the CA
SO ORDERED.21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Decisions dated May 11, 2010 and September 30, 2010, respectively, both rendered by the [NLRC] in NLRC CA No. 052522-07, NLRC Case No. RAB-IV 04-20622-05-RI are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, private respondents [Panasonic] and [De Jesus] are solidarily liable to pay [Peckson] the following: (a) full backwages reckoned from October 15, 2003 up to April 11, 2005 based on a salary of Php 21,345.00 a month, including 13th month pay and other benefits; (b) the additional sum equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one whole year, from August 1, 2002 to April 11, 2005, as separation pay; (c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages; (d) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and (e) Attorney's Fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.Panasonic's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.26 Hence, this Petition.
SO ORDERED.25
Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the; circumstances.To note, the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he, in fact, intended to terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.38
On the other hand, "[r]esignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether lie or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."37 (Citation omitted)
While Peckson later on ticked a box in the form stating "Personality conflict with manager" as one of the factors influencing his decision to leave Panasonic in page 2 of the Exit Interview Form,43 he did not expound on the same. In fact, he ticked several other boxes, such as "Dissatisfied with pay and compensation scheme," "Desire for more responsibilities/higher status," as well as even reiterating his reason to "Consider working for another FMCG company."44
Q: Why are you leaving the Company? (Ask employee to fill up form B and probe on reasons cited. Draw out critical incidents, comments or suggestions.) Please rank reason(s) in order of priority. A: To work for another FMCG company. Q: What did you like most/least about working in this Company? (Draw out comments about job management, peers, compensation, advancement, etc.) A: A very structured/layered organization. Human Resource Dept. was very supportive of me.42
In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting. She also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action against respondents. The affidavit of waiver and the settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo on August 6, 2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. An affidavit of waiver duly acknowledged before a notary public is a public document which cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is absolutely essential. The Agreement likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of these officials sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In this case, no such evidence was presented. Besides, "[T]he Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import." Absent any extant and clear proof of the alleged coercion and threats Iladan allegedly received from respondents that led her to terminate her employment relations with respondents, it can be concluded that Iladan resigned voluntarily.48 (Citations omitted)As Peckson failed to present any relevant evidence aside from his own self-serving declarations, the Court cannot countenance his claims especially considering the legal dictum that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.49 In the absence of such, the Court must rely on the actual proof presented as evidence, i.e., the resignation letters of Peckson showing his voluntary separation from the company, and not the mere allegations of fraud and deception that have characterized Peckson's grievances as the latter tried to explain his apparent involuntary resignation.
Based on the pleadings, this Court finds nothing to support Aparecio's allegation that fraud was employed on her to resign. Fraud exists only when, through insidious words or machinations, the other party is induced to act and without which, the latter would not have agreed to. This Court has held that the circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it, each assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways. Fraud and misrepresentation are, therefore, never presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and not mere preponderance of evidence. Hence, this Court does not sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances which, at most, create only suspicion; otherwise, it would be indulging in speculations and surmises.51In summation, Peckson failed to show any substantial evidence that he was treated unfairly and, thus, he was forced to resign. As supposed proof, Peckson only produced his affidavits and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report. He failed to show any tangible acts of harassment, insults, and any abuse that would warrant a possible finding of constructive dismissal. Even Peckson's belated filing of a complaint highlight the lack of merit to his accusations, especially as he was unable to give any valid reason why he hesitated in filing the same.
Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also, though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period, its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a mere afterthought. Taken together, these circumstances are substantial proof that petitioners resignation was voluntary.While the rights of the workers, as with all human rights, must be protected, the law does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.54 The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor,55 especially when the antecedent facts indicate the lack of malfeasance on the part of the management. In this case, Peckson was not able to overcome his burden to prove that his resignation was involuntary. Nor was he able to properly assail with his own evidence Panasonic's proof that he left of his own accord. Thus, the CA erred in deviating from the findings of both the LA and the NLRC, findings, which, upon our own independent review, show without a shadow of the doubt the voluntariness of Peckson's actions and separation from work.
Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the argument that it is the employer who bears the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive dismissal.53 (Emphasis Ours)
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* Designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 3-33.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; id. at 35-50.
3 Id. at 53-55.
4 Rendered by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco; id. at 288-289.
5 Id. at 304-307.
6 Id. at 36-37.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 37.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 37.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 38.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 207.
16 Id. at 205-208.
17 Id. at 208.
18 Id. at 39.
19 Id. at 307.
20 Id. at 304-307.
21 Id. at 307.
22 Id. at 35-50.
23 Id. at 41.
24 Id. at 43.
25 Id. at 49.
26 CA Resolution dated March 15, 2013, id. at 53-55.
27 Id. at 4.
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id. at 24.
30 Id. at 507.
31 Id. at 510.
32 Id. at 508.
33 Id. at 510.
34South East International Rattan, Inc., et al. v. Coming, 729 Phil. 298, 305 (2014).
35Vicente v. CA (Former 17th Division), 557 Phil. 777, 784 (2007).
36 701 Phil. 612 (2013).
37 Id. at 638-639.
38Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc., et al. v. Siason, 765 Phil. 399, 407 (2015).
39ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales, 769 Phil. 498, 511 (2015).
40 678 Phil. 793 (2011).
41 807 Phil. 747 (2017).
42Rollo, p. 71.
43 Id. at 72.
44 Id.
45Auza, Jr., et al. v. MOL Philippines, Inc., et al., 699 Phil. 62, 83-84 (2012).
46 Id.
47 776 Phil. 591 (2016).
48 Id. at 600-601.
49Portuguez v. GSIS Family Bank, 546 Phil. 140, 156-157 (2007).
50 559 Phil. 80 (2007).
51 Id. at 92.
52 557 Phil. 777 (2007).
53 Id. at 786-787.
54Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation v. Alcon, et al., 746 Phil. 172, 179 (2014).
55 Id.