THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200170, June 03, 2019
MARILYN R. YANGSON, PETITIONER, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY BRO. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, FSC, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-specific may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the July 28, 2011 Decision2 and January 4, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117679.
Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson) was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School (Surigao National).4
On April 30, 2008, Yangson was personally served a Memorandum dated April 14, 2008 issued by then Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Officer-in-Charge Fidela Rosas (Rosas).5 In the Memorandum, Yangson was reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School (Toledo Memorial):
In the exigency of the service, you are hereby advise[d] of your reassignment from Surigao Norte National High School to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School effective May 5, 2008.Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum without first consulting her counsel.7
Please submit your clearance as to money and property accountability before reporting to your new station. Your First Day of Service must also be submitted to this Office for our reference and file.
It is expected that you do your best in the interest of the service. Please be guided accordingly.6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of appellant Marilyn Yangson, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. She is hereby directed to report immediately to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School, Sison, Surigao Del Norte.Yangson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the Department of Education Central Office in its October 13, 2008 Resolution. Thus, she elevated her claims to the Civil Service Commission.29
SO RESOLVED.28
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Marilyn R. Yangson is GRANTED. Accordingly, Resolution dated August 13, 2008 and Resolution dated October 13, 2008 issued by the Secretary, Department of Education, Pasig City, directing her to immediately report to Toledo S. Pantilo Sr. Memorial National High School, Sison, Surigao del Norte, are declared NULL AND VOID. The Schools Division Superintendent is directed to immediately reinstate Yangson in her original work station.36Thus, the Department of Education elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 101241 and 1000476 of the Civil Service Commission dated 15 June 2010 and 13 December 2010, respectively, are SET ASIDE.Yangson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its January 4, 2012 Resolution.49
SO ORDERED.48
SECTION 6. Consent for Transfer — Transportation Expenses. — Except for cause and as herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another.The text of the law is clear and unequivocal: Section 6 applies to transfers, not reassignments. Petitioner's movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial was a reassignment, not a transfer.
Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools or the Director of Vocational Education, as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made three months before any local or national election.
Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the Government if his transfer is finally approved. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .Transfer and reassignment are defined in Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 807,83 or the Civil Service Law:
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
. . . . (3) Transfer. — A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission. The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. (7) Reassignment. — An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
SECTION 24. Personnel Actions. — All appointments in the career service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations. A non-eligible shall not be appointed to any position in the civil service whenever there is a civil service eligible actually available for and ready to accept appointment.They are also defined in Sections 11 and 13(a) of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 1800692, otherwise known as the 2017 Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Human Resource Actions. The provisions state:
As used in this Decree, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
. . . . (c) Transfer. — A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefore. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission. The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. (g) Reassignment. — An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
SECTION 11. Nature of Appointment. — The nature of appointment shall be, as follows:Osea v. Malaya84 differentiates a reassignment from a new appointment, which is necessary in a transfer:. . . .SECTION 13. Other Human Resource Actions. — The following human resource actions which will not require the issuance of an appointment shall nevertheless require an Office Order issued by the appointing officer/authority:
c. Transfer — the movement of employee from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without gap in the service involving the issuance of an appointment.
The transfer may be from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency or from one department or agency to another: Provided, however, that any movement from the non-career service to the career service and vice versa shall not be considered as a transfer but reappointment.
. . . .
a. Reassignment — movement of an employee across the organizational structure within the same department or agency, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals,86 a secondary school principal, whose appointment was not station-specific, contested her reassignment to another school. She cited the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, arguing that her consent is necessary for the reassignment's validity. There, this Court differentiated transfer from reassignment and held that the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is not applicable:
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.85 (Citations omitted)
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Thus:Here, the Memorandum petitioner questions specifically stated that she was being reassigned:"The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain — even as public service dictates that a transfer be made — in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement in Ibañez vs. Commission on Elections:The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school. When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even without her consent.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)'That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debaite. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment. Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely assigned to a particular station."
In the exigency of the service, you are hereby advise(d) of your reassignment from [Surigao National] to [Toledo Memorial] effective May 5, 2008.88This was a simple reassignment. Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, then, does not apply.
1. Arguing that an appointment as principal in the Bureau of Public Schools and assignment to a particular school are inseparable, plaintiff maintains that her unconsented transfer to another school by virtue of an administrative directive amounts to a removal — prohibited by the Constitution and the Civil Service Act — which cannot be done unless for causes specified by law.Fernandez discusses several more cases where it was ruled that the right to security of tenure is not violated when a public officer or employee, whose appointment is not station-specific, is reassigned:
Plaintiffs confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads, thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education" without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice.
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specific station. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain—even as public service dictates that a transfer be made—in a particular station.90 (Citations omitted)
In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et al., the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:Here, it has been established that petitioner's appointment is not station-specific. While she is entitled to her right to security of tenure, she cannot assert her right to stay at Surigao National. Her appointment papers are not specific to the school, which means she may be assigned to any station as may be necessary for public exigency. Because she holds no vested right to remain as Principal III of Surigao National, her security of tenure was not violated."Petitioners were appointed as Mediator-Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were not, however, appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from one organizational unit to another of the same agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order."In Quisumbing v. Gumban, the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:"After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station."Again, in Ibañez v. Commission on Elections, the Court had before it petitioners' appointments as "Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city, municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as such. The Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as the exigencies of the service required," and that they had no right to complain against any change in assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a particular station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete such appointment:. . . And the respective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually conferred — not in that of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers.". . . .
Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred by the President of the University of the Philippines to the Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as an illegal and unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:. . . .
The clue to such transfers may be found in the 'nature of the appointment.' Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects so substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus, one who is appointed 'principal in the Bureau of Public Schools' and is designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot be objected to.
. . . .
To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of 'Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines.' He is not merely a dean 'in the university.' His appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station."91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
SECTION 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .Fernandez discusses that reassignments by virtue of this provision are neither deemed as removals without lawful cause nor seen as violations of the right to security of tenure:
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
. . . .
(7) Reassignment. — An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. (Emphasis supplied)
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners . . . had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such reassignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.98In Department of Education, Culture and Sports, this Court affirmed the reshuffling of principals in the exigencies of service:
It should be here emphasized that Azurin's letter of August 12, 1982, clearly stated that Navarro's reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was explicitly mentioned that her reassignment is a recognition of her capabilities as administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that she should look at her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the Quezon City public high schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to MEC Circular No. 26, Series of 1972. This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education that principals, district supervisors, academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school administrative officers and superintendents are to be transferred upon completion of five (5) years of service in one station. Such policy was based on the experience that when school officials have stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for them to become stale and unchallenged by new situations and conditions, and that some administrative problems accumulate for a good number of years.Similarly, here, we cannot conclude as a matter of established fact that petitioner was reassigned by whim, fancy, or spite, as she would like this Court to believe. It is presumed that reassignments are "regular and made in the interest of public service."100 The party questioning its regularity or asserting bad faith carries the burden to prove his or her allegations.101 In Andrade v. Court of Appeals:102
In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been assigned as principal of Carlos Albert High School for more than ten (10) years. She was ripe for reassignment. That she was a model principal was precisely one of the reasons for recommending her for reassignment so that her management and expertise could be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the presumption of good faith that Azurin enjoys, We believe that her recommendation for Navarro's reassignment — for the latter to share the benefits of her expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that a relatively long stay in one's station tends towards over-fraternization with associates which could be injurious to the service — has a substantial factual basis that meets the requirements of the exigencies of the service.99 (Citations omitted)
Entrenched is the rule that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. In the case at bar, we find that there was no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of a wrong," or "breach of a known duty," or "some motive or interest or ill will" that can be attributed to the private respondent. It appeared that efforts to accommodate petitioner were made as she was offered to handle two (2) non-teaching jobs, that is, to handle Developmental Reading lessons and be an assistant Librarian, pending her re-assignment or transfer to another work station, but she refused. The same would not have been proposed if the intention of private respondent were to cause undue hardship on the petitioner. Good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case at bar, the burden of proving alleged bad faith therefore was with petitioner but she failed to discharge such onus probandi. Without a clear and persuasive evidence of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of private respondent stands.103
Very truly yours, (SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 9-31.
2 Id. at 32-44. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 45-46. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the Former First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 32.
5 Id. at 32-33.
6 Id. at 47.
7 Id. at 33.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 54.
10 Id. at 33 and 54-55.
11 Id. at 56-58.
12 Id. at 56-57.
13 Id. at 57.
14 Id. at 33-34 and 57-58.
15 Id. at 34.
16 Id. at 64-66. The Resolution was penned by Regional Director Jesusita L. Arteche, CESO, of the Department of Education CARAGA Regional Office.
17 Id. at 64-65.
18 Id. at 65.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 34-35 and 75-82. The Resolution was recommended by Undersecretary Atty. Franklin C. Suñga and approved by Secretary Jesli A. Lapus of the Department of Education.
21 Id. at 77.
22 Id. at 80-81.
23 Id. at 78.
24 Id. at 79-80.
25 Id. at 80.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Id. at 82.
29 Id. at 35.
30 Id. at 91-97. The Resolution was signed by Commissioners Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza and Cesar D. Buenaflor and Chairman Francisco T. Duque III, and attested by Director IV Dolores B. Bonifacio of the Civil Service Commission.
31 Id. at 39-40.
32 Id. at 95.
33 Id. The Civil Service Commission based its finding on the master list of schools of the CARAGA Region.
34 Id. at 96.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 97. The Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was penned by Civil Service Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza, signed by Chairman Francisco T. Duque III, and Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor, and attested by Director IV of the Civil Service Commission Secretariat and Liason Office Dolores B. Bonifacio, of the Civil Service Commission.
37 Id. at 36.
38 Id. at 32-44.
39 Id. at 43.
40 Id. at 40 citing The Superintendent of City Schools for Manila v. Azarcon, 568 Phil. 273 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 40-41.
44 Id. at 42.
45 Id. at 41.
46 312 Phil. 235 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
47Rollo, p. 42.
48 Id. at 43.
49 Id. at 46.
50 Id. at 9-28.
51 Id. at 18.
52 Id. at 16.
53 Id. at 19.
54 Id. at 22.
55 Id. at 24.
56 Id. at 23-24.
57 Id. at 23.
58 Id. at 24.
59 Id. at 25.
60 Id. at 19.
61 Id. at 25.
62 Id. at 184-211.
63 Id. at 195.
64 Id. at 198.
65 Id. at 195.
66 Id. at 200.
67 Id. at 201.
68 Id. at 200.
69 Id. at 201.
70 Id. at 205.
71 Id. at 205-206. These factual issues allegedly include: (1) whether Yangson's movement was a transfer; (2) whether the notice is necessary to enable her appeal; (3) whether her reassignment is for an indefinite period; (4) whether there is a valid reason for her reassignment; (5) whether it amounts to a diminution in her rank and status; (6) whether she was appointed solely to Surigao National; and (7) whether her reassignment was warranted considering her excellent performance at Surigao National.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 207.
74 Id. at 266-270.
75 Id. at 266.
76 Id. at 24.
77 CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13(1). 2017 Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Human Resource Actions (Revised 2018).
78Rollo, p. 198.
79 Id. at 56.
80 Id. at 80.
81 Id. at 41.
82Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, 558 Phil. 235, 254 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
83 Presidential Decree No. 807 (1975), sec. 24, Civil Service Decree of the Philippines or Civil Service Law of 1975.
84 425 Phil. 920 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
85 Id. at 926.
86 262 Phil. 608 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
87 Id. at 614-615.
88Rollo, p. 33.
89 136 Phil. 315 (1969) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].
90 Id. at 321-322.
91 312 Phil. 235, 254-258 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
92Rollo, pp. 75 and 91.
93 Id. In accordance with the 1st Indorsement dated April 2, 2008 signed by Dr. Isabelita M. Borres, CESO IV, Assistant Regional Director and Officer-in-Charge, Department of Education CARAGA.
94 Id. at 212.
95 Id. at 212-229.
96 Id. at 33.
97Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, 312 Phil. 235 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
98 312 Phil. 235, 251 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
99 262 Phil. 608, 616 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
100Nieves v. Blanco, 688 Phil. 282, 292 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc] citing CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13(a)(3).
101Andrade v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 30, 43 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr. Second Division].
102 423 Phil. 30 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr. Second Division].
103 Id. at 43.
104Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 649, 667 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division], citing Rule VII, Section 11 of the Civil Service Commission Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, and Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, 304 Phil. 713 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
105Coseteng v. Perez, G.R. No. 185938, September 6, 2017, 838 SCRA 680-681 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division] and CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13(a)(3).
106 CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13(a)(3).
107 CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13(a)(3).
108 Id.
109Rollo p. 23.
110 136 Phil. 315, 325-327 (1969) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].
111Rollo, pp. 19 and 25-26.
112Nieves v. Blanco, 688 Phil. 282, 290 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]. CSC Resolution No. 1800692 (2018), sec. 13 (a), par. 1-2.
113Rollo, p. 33.
114 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 1.