SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 225075, June 19, 2019
ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE INCORPORATED*/ERNESTO CUNANAN, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated March 29, 2016 and Resolution3 dated May 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 141852. The CA denied the petition for certiorari assailing the Decision4 dated April 30, 2015 and Resolution5 dated June 22, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 03-000666-15, which reversed the Labor Arbiter's (LA) Decision6 dated January 27, 2015 finding that petitioner Arnulfo M. Fernandez (petitioner) was illegally dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the complainant to have been illegally dismissed by the respondents as a regular employee. Conformably, respondent Kalookan Slaughter House and its owner, respondent Ernesto N. Cunanan, are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the complainant backwages computed from [the] time of dismissal until finality of this Decision and separation pay, which equivalent (sic) to one (1) month salary per year of service, counted from time of engagement until finality of this Decision.The LA found that the requisites of an employer-employee relationship were established as follows: petitioner was hired by Kalookan Slaughterhouse through Tablit and petitioner was paid his daily wage for his butchering services.18 Further, Kalookan Slaughterhouse had authority to discipline petitioner as regards his work activities through Kalookan Slaughterhouse's personnel named Noelberto De Guzman (De Guzman).19 Kalookan Slaughterhouse also exercised control over the conduct of petitioner in the performance of his work and implemented policies regulating his rendition of services. In fact, De Guzman admitted to the strict policies imposed by Kalookan Slaughterhouse such as the requirement of I.D.s, uniforms, and even where butchering knives are inserted. According to De Guzman, petitioner violated all of these.20 The policies implemented showed that petitioner could not render butchering services following his own ways and means. The LA also found that petitioner presented his I.D. issued by Kalookan Slaughterhouse, which proved that he was an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.21
As of this date, complainant's backwages and separation pay are tentatively computed at P84,500.00 and P260,000.00, respectively.
Respondents Kalookan Slaughter House and Ernesto N. Cunanan are further ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the complainant the following:All other claims are denied.
Service Incentive Leave Pay - p 7,500.00 13th Month Pay - 39,000.00 Night Shift Differential - 1,462.50 Attorney's Fees - 39,246.25
SO ORDERED.17
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing considerations, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the above-entitled case for lack of employer-employee relationship.The NLRC ruled that although there was a semblance of employer-employee relationship as the work of a butcher is necessary and desirable in the usual trade and business of a slaughterhouse, the facts and circumstances in this case showed that there was no employer-employee relationship.26 The NLRC ruled that it was normal and usual practice in slaughterhouses to engage the services of butchers on a contractual or per piece basis.27 Petitioner was an independent contractor and not an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse because there was no regular payroll showing his name and the legal deductions made from his salary. There were also no pay slips, and the money he received from Tablit showed that he was an independent butcher and not an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.28] The NLRC found that the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Tablit tends to show that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Kalookan Slaughterhouse.29 The NLRC also ruled that petitioner failed to prove any dismissal as he was only barred from entering the premises for his failure to follow the slaughterhouse's policies,30 but nonetheless ruled that there was just cause to dismiss petitioner as he was found sleeping on duty.31
SO ORDERED.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.The CA ruled that petitioner's claim of the existence of an employer employee relationship is not supported by substantial evidence as he failed to submit salary vouchers, pay slips, daily work schedule and even a certificate of withholding tax on compensation income.33 The CA found that the gate passes and log sheets that petitioner submitted were not sufficient as the gate passes specifically state that they do not qualify the holder as an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse and the log sheets were only for services from September 24 and 28, 2012.34
SO ORDERED.32
I
WHETHER THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS AN EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS.II
WHETHER THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS AN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.36
As a rule, "[i]n appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the task of the Court is generally to review only errors of law since it is not a trier of facts, a rule which definitely applies to labor cases." As the Court ruled in Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. v. Conag: "But while the NLRC and the LA are imbued with expertise and authority to resolve factual issues, the Court has in exceptional cases delved into them where there is insufficient evidence to support their findings, or too much is deduced from the bare facts submitted by the parties, or the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting findings x x x."38Petitioner was an employee of
(a) | log sheets for three days in September 2012 where it was shown that he reported for work;39 |
(b) | three gate passes and one identification card all of which state that he was abutcher;40 and |
(c) | a trip ticket showing that on December 30, 2007, petitioner was part of a group who went to Bataan. The trip ticket had a notation that petitioner was a captain of the trip and the truck with Plate Number CJH 377 was driven by a certain Peter.41 |
(a) | Sinumpaang Salaysay42 of Tablit alleging that he has been an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse for more or less 20 years, he was given authority by Cunanan to hire people as hog butchers when the need arose but he himself would be responsible for paying them, and that one of those hog butchers was petitioner, he did not exercise control over the means and methods of the butchers and he only monitored if they finished their work, and that Kalookan Slaughterhouse strictly implemented the "No ID, No Entry" Policy, "No Uniform, No Entry" Policy, "No Gate Pass, No Entry" Policy, and that those under the influence of alcohol were prohibited from entering the premises; |
(b) | Photographs of petitioner sleeping in the premises of Kalookan Slaughterhouse;43 |
(c) | Photographs of policies implemented by Kalookan Slaughterhouse as listed by Tablit;44 and, |
(d) | Sinumpaang Salaysay45 of De Guzman where he alleged that he is a caretaker of Kalookan Slaughterhouse and he knew of petitioner as one of the butchers hired by Tablit; he would often reprimand petitioner for failing to follow Kalookan Slaughterhouse's policies such as when petitioner failed to wear his ID, wear his uniform, and properly store his knives used for butchering. Petitioner would also sometimes come to work with dirty clothes, and there was one time he caught petitioner sleeping. He also alleged that petitioner is Tablit's employee, and that he would only see petitioner when there were many hogs to, be butchered, thus petitioner would not report for work every day. |
Petitioners' defense that they merely contracted the services of respondents through Malibiran fails to persuade us. The facts of this case show that respondents have been under the employ of MCI as early as 1991. They were hired not to perform a specific job or undertaking. Instead, they were employed as all-around laborers doing varied and intermittent jobs, such as those of drivers, sweepers, gardeners, and even undertakers or tagalibing, until they were arbitrarily terminated by MCI in 2004. Their wages were paid directly by MCI, as evidenced by the latter's payroll summary, belying its self-serving and unsupported contention that it paid directly to Malibiran for respondents' services. Respondents had identification cards or gate passes issued not by Malibiran, but by MCI, and were required to wear uniforms bearing MCI's emblem or logo when they reported for work.Here, the totality of petitioner's evidence and the admissions of Kalookan Slaughterhouse convinces the Court that petitioner was indeed an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse. Petitioner was able to present an LD., gate passes, log sheets, and a trip ticket. Kalookan Slaughterhouse even admitted through De Guzman that uniforms were given to all personnel, including petitioner.
It is common practice for companies to provide identification cards to individuals not only as a security measure, but more importantly to identify the bearers thereof as bona fide employees of the firm or institution that issued them. The provision of company-issued identification cards and uniforms to respondents, aside from their inclusion in MCI's summary payroll, indubitably constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support only one conclusion: that respondents were indeed employees of MCI.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the CA, petitioners failed to show that it was Malibiran who exercised control over the means and methods of the work assigned to respondents. Interestingly, Malibiran's affidavit is silent on the aspect of control over respondents' means and methods of work. Rather than categorically stating that she was the one who directly employed respondents to render work for MCI, Malibiran merely implies that, like respondents, she was just a co-worker. Malibiran's statement that the work for MCI was merely in the nature of accommodation to help respondents earn a living, in effect, impliedly admits the fact that she did not have the capacity to engage in the independent job-contracting business, and that, therefore, she was not respondents' employer.48
x x x Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In the first place, it never raised this defense in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the nature of respondents' employment, i.e., whether they are seasonal employees, contractors, or worked under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner alleged that some of the respondents are coconut filers and copra hookers or sakadors; some are seasonal employees who worked as scoopers or lugiteros; some are contractors; and some worked under the pakyaw system. In support of these allegations, petitioner even presented the company's payroll, which will allegedly prove its allegations.
By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted that respondents worked for it, albeit in different capacities. Such allegations are negative pregnants - denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied, and amounts to an acknowledgement that respondents were indeed employed by petitioner.52
x x x By their silence, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the same. Section 11 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which supplements the NLRC Rules, provides that an allegation not specifically denied is deemed admitted. x x x59Having been illegally· dismissed, the LA was correct m awarding backwages and separation pay.
Endnotes:
* Also appears as "Kalookan Slaughterhouse"and "Kalookan Slaughter House, Inc." in some parts of the records.
1Rollo, pp. 1 1-30.
2 Id. at 194-208. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Nina G. Antonia-Valenzuela concurring.
3 Id. at 221.
4 Id. at 121-131. Penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., with Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez concurring.
5 Id. at 162-163.
6 Id. at 97-105. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jose Antonio C. Ferrer.
7Id. at 76, and 195.
8 Id. at 195-196.
9 Id. at 195, 196.
10 Id. at 196.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 55 and 196.
13 Id. at 196.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 104-105.
18 Id. at 101.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 102.
22 Id. at 100-101.
23 Id.at 103.
24 Id. at 103-104.
25 Id. at 130.
26 Id. at 127.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 128.
29 Id. at 129.
30 Id. at 129-130.
31 Id. at 129.
32 Id. at 208.
33 Id. at 203.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 204.
36 Id. at 18.
37 G.R. No. 231111, October 17, 2018.
38 Id. at 5; citations omitted.
39Rollo, pp. 64-66.
40 Id. at 89.
41 Id. at 90.
42 Id. at 79.
43 Id. at 80.
44 Id.at 81-82.
45 Id. at 83-84.
46David v. Macasio, 738 Phil. 293, 307 (2014).
47 620 Phil. 737 (2009).
48 Id. at 742-743; citations omitted.
49Rollo, p. 203.
50 See Domasig v. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 Phil. 518, 524 (1996).
51 539 Phil. 305 (2006).
52 Id. at 311; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
53Rollo, p. 55.
54 Id. at 71.
55 See id. at I 03.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 130.
58 Id. at 203-207.
59Masonic Contractor, Inc. v. Madjos, supra note 47, at 744; citations omitted.
60Rollo, p. 104.
61 ART. 306. [291] Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
62Rollo, p. 257.
63See Divine Word College of Laoag v. Mina, 784 Phil. 546, 559 (2016).