SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-19-3916 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4710-P), June 17, 2019
ANONYMOUS, COMPLAINANT, v. JESSICA MAXILINDA A. IBARRETA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 36, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from the letter indorsement1 dated January 8, 2016 of Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon (Assistant Ombudsman Fangon) and the undated anonymous complaint2 charging respondent Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta (respondent), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Camarines Sur, Branch 36 (RTC) of: (a) acquiring ill-gotten wealth; and (b) engaging in lending business with high interest and devoting her official time in promoting her financial and propriety pursuit, respectively.
TO: ALL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY SUBJECT: PROHIBITION TO WORK AS INSURANCE AGENTVerily, Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988 has prohibited all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours. The prohibition is aimed at ensuring that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time service, for only then could any undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, and they would not ably meet the demand except by devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public.18 This is in line with Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, entitled the "Code of Conduct of Court Personnel," which reads:
In line with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, the Executive Department issued Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 authorizing heads of government offices to grant their employees permission to "engage directly in any private business, vocation and profession ... outside office hours."
However, in its En Bane resolution dated October 1, 1987, denying the request of Atty. Froilan L. Valdez of the Office of Associate Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, to be commissioned as a Notary Public, the Court expressed the view that the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department are not applicable to officials or employees of the courts considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature of their work which requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary. The same policy was adopted in Administrative Matter No. 88-6-002-SC, June 21, 1988, where the court denied the request of Ms. Esther C. Rabanal, Technical Assistant II, Leave Section, Office of the Administrative Services of this Court, to work as an insurance agent after office hours including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. Indeed, the entire time of Judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to insure efficient and speedy administration of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, all officials and employees of the Judiciary are hereby enjoined from being commissioned as insurance agents or from engaging in any such related activities, and, to immediately desist therefrom if presently engaged thereat. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
CANON IVAlthough many "moonlighting" activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held. In this case, respondent's act of engaging in a money lending business - an accusation which she failed to sufficiently rebut - while concurrently being a Sheriff of the RTC surely put the integrity of her office under so, much undeserved suspicion. She should have been more circumspect in her acts, knowing that sooner or later, it would be unavoidable that the impression that she had taken advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions would arise. Undoubtedly, her activities greatly diminished the reputation of her office and of the courts in the esteem of the public.19 As such, the OCA correctly found her administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.20
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
Section 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
"However, while this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy." "In several jurisprudential precedents, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the imposable penalty."23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Here, considering the fact that this is respondent's first offense in her thirty (30) years of service, and that she is performing a frontline function as a Sheriff, the Court finds it proper to impose on her a fine equivalent to her salary for one (1) month and one (1) day, pursuant to Section 47 (1) (b) and (2)24of the RRACCS. This imposition also finds support in Cabigao where the Court held:
While the recommended penalty of one-month suspension is reasonable, the same is not practical at this point, considering that his work would be left unattended by reason of his absence. Furthermore, he may use his suspension as another excuse to justify his inaction and inefficiency in other matters pending before his office. Instead of suspension, we impose a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, so that he can finally implement the subject writs and perform the other duties of his office.25As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. Court employees should act with more circumspection and to steer clear of any situation, which may cast the slightest suspicion on their conduct.26 Relatedly, '"[s]heriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the law, play an important role in the administration of justice. They are in the forefront of things, tasked as they are to serve judicial writs, execute all processes, and carry into effect the orders of the court.' As a front-line representative of the judicial system, sheriffs must always demonstrate integrity in their conduct for once they lose the people's trust, they also diminish the people's faith in the entire judiciary."27
Endnotes:
1Rollo, p. 7.
2 Id. at 9.
3 Id. at 1.
4 See Report (on the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Sheriff Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta) dated July 20, 2016; id. at 12-14.
5 See id. at 1-3.
6 See Report on the Alleged III-Gotten Wealth of Sheriff Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta dated January 23, 2017; id. at 32-33.
7 See id. at 12-14 and 32-33. See also id. at 2-4.
8 Id. at 1-6. Penned by OCA Legal Office Chief Wilhelmina D. Geronga and approved by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez.
9 See id. at 4-6.
10 Dated August 4, 2017. Id. at 37-39.
11 See id.
12 Id. at 42-49. Signed by Deputy Court Administrator and Office-in-Charge Raul Bautista Villanueva.
13 See A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC effective on June 1, 2004.
14Rollo, p. 49.
15 Id. at 1-6.
16 See id. at 42-45.
17 See id. at 47-49.
18Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Lopez and Montalvo, 744 Phil. 541, 553-554 (2014).
19 See id. at 554.
20 "[M]isconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct only. Most importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail." (Daplas v. Department of Finance, 808 Phil. 763, 772 [2017].)
21 Promulgated on November 8, 2011.
22 719 Phil. 475 (2013).
23 Id. at 484; citations omitted.
24 Section 47 (1) (b) and (2) of the RRACCS reads:
Section 47. Penalty of Fine. -The following are the guidelines for the penalty of fine:
1. Upon the request of the head of office or the concerned party and when supported by justifiable reason/s the disciplining authority may allow payment of fine in place of suspension if any of the following circumstances are present:
xxxx
b. When the respondent is actually discharging frontline functions or those directly dealing with the public and the personnel complement of the office is insufficient to perform such function;
xxxx
2. The payment of penalty of fine in lieu of suspension shall be available in Grave, Less Grave, and Light Offenses where the penalty imposed is for six (6) months or less at the ratio of one (1) day of suspension from the service to one (1) day fine; Provided, that in Grave Offenses where the penalty imposed is six (6) months and one (1) day suspension in view of the presence of mitigating circumstance[/s], the conversion shall only apply to the suspension of six (6) months. Nonetheless, the remaining one (1) day suspension is deemed included therein.
25Cabigao v. Nery, supra note 22, at 486, citing Mariñas v. Florendo, 598 Phil. 322, 331 (2009).
26 See id. at 483, citing Macinas v. Arimado, 508 Phil. 161, 165 (2005).
27 See id.; citations omitted.