EN BANC
G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA MARL C. BUENVIAJE, LANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND ALTREA I. GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS;
ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN; JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO, KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C. VARONA, RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;
APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA, NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED CITIZENS, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS;
G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHENM. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J. JR., J.:
On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662,1 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support.3 The Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).4
(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law; (2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society; (3) to train persons for leadership; (4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal institutions; (2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and Issues; (3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future; (4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self improvement; (5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and (6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms.
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation to faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational institutions recognized by the Government.Bar Matter No. 979-B
SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation status.
SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall x x x require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it cautioned that the law's objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed.7
x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.6
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity and competence.In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note and draft amendments to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This, notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and maintain quality among law schools.
x x x x
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x
x x x x
2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
x x x x
SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x
(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions herein enumerated;
(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic freedom and pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;
(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude examination;
(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;
(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may establish as part of the curriculum; and
(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)
x x x x
Number | Title/Subject |
LEBMO No. 2 | Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program |
LEBMO No. 3-2016 | Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the Accreditation of Law Schools to Offer and Operate Refresher Courses |
LEBMO No. 4-2016 | Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016 |
LEBMO No. 5-2016 | Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic Law Courses |
LEBMO No. 6-2016 | Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools |
LEBMO No. 7-2016 | Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission Test for Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All Law Schools in the Country |
LEBMO No. 8-2016 | Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing Increases in Tuition and Other School Fees, and, Introduction of New Fees by Higher, Education Institutions for the Law Program |
LEBMO No. 9-2017 | Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of Honorary Doctor of Laws Degrees |
LEBMO No. 10-2017 | Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School Calendar |
LEBMO No. 11-2017 | Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016, on PhiLSAT |
LEBMO No. 12-2018 | LEB Service/Transaction Fees |
LEBMO No. 13-2018 | Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes |
LEBMO No. 14-2018 | Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects |
LEBMO No. 15-2018 | Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law Courses in use by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law |
LEBMO No. 16-2018 | Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools |
LEBMO No. 17-2018 | Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools |
LEBMO No. 18-2018 | Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools |
LEBMO No. 19-2018 | Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor |
LEBMO No. 20-2019 | Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of Examinees Who Rated Below the Cut-off/Passing Score but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law School Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019 |
Number | Title/Subject |
LEBMC No. 1 | New Regulatory Issuances |
LEBMC No. 2 | Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees |
LEBMC No. 3 | Submission of Law School Information Report |
LEBMC No. 4 | Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form |
LEBMC No. 5 | Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018 |
LEBMC No. 6 | Applications for LEB Certification Numbers |
LEBMC No. 7 | Application of Transitory Provision Under [LEBMO] No. 7 Series of 2017 and [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of Freshmen Law Students in Basic Law Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018 |
LEBMC No. 8 | Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial Requirements Under [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016 for Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-2018 |
LEBMC No. 9 | Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law Week |
LEBMC No. 10 | September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes |
LEBMC No. 11 | Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2016-2017 |
LEBMC No. 12 | Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2017-2018 |
LEBMC No. 13 | Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of Law Librarians on April 4-6, 2018 |
LEBMC No. 14 | CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016 |
LEBMC No. 15 | Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019 |
LEBMC No. 16 | Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016 |
LEBMC No. 17 | Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019 |
LEBMC No. 18 | PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the Academic Year 2018-2019 |
LEBMC No. 19 | Guidelines for the Limited Conditional Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of the Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who Have Not Taken the PhiLSAT |
LEBMC No. 20 | Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019 |
LEBMC No. 21 | Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law Schools to be Qualified to Conditionally Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-2019 |
LEBMC No. 22 | Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018 PhiLSAT |
LEBMC No. 23 | Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools from Applicants for Admission |
LEBMC No. 24 | Observance of the Philippine National Law Week |
LEBMC No. 25 | Competition Law |
LEBMC No. 26 | Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law Deans, Faculty Members and Law Graduates with the 2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate Student Program |
LEBMC No. 27 | Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional [Enrollment] for Incoming Freshmen/1st Year Law Students |
LEBMC No. 28 | April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program |
LEBMC No. 29 | Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit Application |
LEBMC No. 30 | Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020 |
LEBMC No. 31 | Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020 |
LEBMC No. 40 | Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled Freshmen Law Students in AY 2019-2020 |
Number | Title/Subject |
Resolution No. 16 | Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small Students Population |
Resolution No.7, Series of 2010 | Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New Law Schools |
Resolution No. 8, Series of 2010 | Administrative Sanctions |
Resolution No. 2011-21 | A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to the Provisions of LEBMO No. 1 in regard to Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem |
Resolution No. 2012-02 | A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special, Orders for Graduates of the Basic Law Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing them with a Per Law School Certification Approved by the Legal Education Board |
Resolution No. 2013-01 | Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors |
Resolution No. 2014-02 | Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance Schedule and the Exemption from the Ll.M. Requirement |
Resolution No. 2015-08 | Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools |
Order | Annual Law Publication Requirements |
Chairman Memorandum | Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject |
(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. The PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of the LEB;14Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074 examinees passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way of consideration.
(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law;15
(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree; expecting to graduate with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a graduate from foreign higher education institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit as to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT;16
(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator;17
(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in testing centers;18
(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination;19
(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB;20
(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed shall be issued a Certificate of Grade;21
(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of the study;22
(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two years from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic law course;23
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional requirements for admission;24
(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and enrolled, and their PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades received by every first year student;25
(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less than 80% or 2.5) for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is removed;26
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and the law schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall submit a justification for the admission and the required report;27 and
(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively sanctioned as prescribed in Section 3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to P10,000.00.30
2. Conditions - x x xThe conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory provision provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).
a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;
b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her conditional admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester;
c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-off score, his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in the exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked shall not be entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the school fees paid; and
e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit for Conditional Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the foregoing conditions.31
I. Procedural Issues:II. Substantive Issues:
- Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and
- Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.
- Jurisdiction over legal education;
- Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;
- Reasonable supervision and regulation
- Institutional academic freedom
- Right to education
- LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of law; and
- LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court] declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing - the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial review to determine which between the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction over an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation; board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas,68 to question the contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized statute.Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand should be stayed when there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should instead be respected.It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. x x xx x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
x x x x
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest common to all members of the public. x x x
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he ii1 injured by its operation. x x x
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x
Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. x x x
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. x x x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, t ere was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a facial challenge against the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:
This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
x x x x
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied by the antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
x x x xFacial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction; the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)81
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.1(a). Scope of Judicial Review
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."93 (Emphasis supplied)The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance.94
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.161 (Internal citations omitted)
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability' arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.177
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former - conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x xThe 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the complementary roles played by the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State supervision and regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.197
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit liberty of administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of the constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction.207 (Emphasis supplied)3. Reasonable exercise
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987 Constitution added the word "reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 4[1] to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State exercises over education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found in the 1973 Constitution providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a broader scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the guarantee of academic freedom only to universities of higher learning established by the State.214
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v. Dames II,220 it was held that academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman v. National University,222 which affirmed the student's right to due process.
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." Also: To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher - recognized and effectively guaranteed by society - to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.224
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x (Emphasis supplied)Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court upheld the university's academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate to the university the outright dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness,229 or grave abuse of discretion230 on the part of the schools, or overriding public welfare231 can therefore justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure."
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such quality education accessible.
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why, towards this end, the State shall:Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society; (2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age; (3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged; (4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and (5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education.236 x x x (Emphasis supplied)And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that education should be accessible to all, regardless of social and economic differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing the limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should still be afforded and provided availability to those who are poor and. deserving. That is why when we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the State to provide it to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized as an important function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be provided by the State. The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to acquire a decent standard of living, and that, therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the right to life, the right to liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of law.237 (Emphasis supplied)The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate means.
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present as the Constitution provides that these elements should be protected and promoted in all educational institutions.
(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x; (2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology ([e.g.] access to a "distance learning" programme); [and] (3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education: whereas primary education shall be available "free to all", States parties are required to progressively introduce free secondary and higher education[.]240
SEC. 5. x x xThere is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic requirements used to assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with the institutions themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.
x x x x
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
x x x xLikewise, in Calawag:247
2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. (Emphases supplied)
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman and members of the committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-done. The committee report to my mind, Madam President, is excellent and I hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to page 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree with this statement, but when we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman that it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason of misconduct or that his stay in the school is considered by the administration of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to education under this situation?Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to be admitted to educational institutions.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute. As a matter of fact, Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at the end of the provision, it say, "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject to certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and this is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of discrimination. We have accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are schools that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be exclusively for girls. And there are schools that may refuse admission to girls because they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to accept a student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the welfare of the other students. What I mean is that there could be reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam President.
MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education.
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of educational institutions to admit students upon certain conditions such as ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a respectable school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on the students.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.
There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case of [Lesser] v. Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had an average of less than 85 percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University where refusal to retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a major subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue studying in this school of theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court had approved:
a) Legal education m the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
x x x x
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.2492. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x xThis power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
x x x x
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar, which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
x x x x
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.]
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x xThis power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
x x x x
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
x x x x
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
x x x x
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB] may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x (Emphases supplied)
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.
x x x x
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and require apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the Integrated . Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662] risks a declaration of constitutional infirmity.253 (Underscoring supplied)4. Section 7(e) on minimum standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT issuances
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x xPetitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs to the Court pursuant to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law; Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.
x x x x
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor.256Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period. (Emphases supplied)
Senator Tolentino: x x xThis matter was amplified in second reading:
I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years in private schools and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many students in the law school are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not provide for some mechanism of choosing people who should take up the law course.
As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a lawyer, who can afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these students - I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not be taking up law but some other course because, simply, they do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become lawyers.
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our principles of democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should be able or who should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the student is in high school to somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the penchant for the legal profession is not one of those subjects specifically measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or less, talented for an academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be designed to really test the aptitude of those who would like to enter the law school. x x x
Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the aptitude of these children, and they waste money and time in making these children take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My real concern is whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who should be allowed to take up law, and not everybody would be allowed to take up law. x x x
x x x x
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I think one cannot just categorically deny a student - especially if he is bright - entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by what I had previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x x258 (Emphases supplied)
Senator Angara: x x xThe lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to administer an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.260 This presumption has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.
Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to law school. I think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the board may very well decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a proposed law entrance examination.
"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x
x x x x
d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude;263 it entails unreasonable examination and travel expenses and burdensome documentary requirements;264 applying for PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient;265 it is redundant to existing law school entrance exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific study.267
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements - i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school - for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional; schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only those qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education, in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)
We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because of the need to meet the goal of promoting public health and safety.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)
x x x xWithout doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted to any· law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.
7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.
x x x x
9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.
x x x x
11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:x x x x
- A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;
- Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality of the applicant; and
- Personal interview of the applicant.
15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of 2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction. (Emphases supplied)
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note - x x x - that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."2. Other LEB issuances on law admission
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification
SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x
x x x x
Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution or school following a different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for admission to law school.
SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board shall apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's degree and must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.
SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without prejudice to other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree in juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-membership in the Philippine Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)
x x x xThese provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its admission policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not, as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.
SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course required for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school. Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after having informed the Board.278
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and must, within a period of five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards
SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science[.] x x x
x x x xPART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUMArticle I
Faculty Qualifications
SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a L1.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.
SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his appointment as dean.
SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws.280 (Emphases supplied)
x x x xAnd under LEBMO No. 2:x x x x
- Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master of Laws. It is the responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.
- The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master of laws degree:
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.
2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20% 2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40% 2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60% 2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%- Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
3.1. Supreme Court; 3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals; 3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General 3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws; 3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges; 3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure; 3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law, Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects; 3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers; 3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective bureaus are implementing; 3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach International Law or related subjects; 3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation of their deans; and 3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided they teach the subjects of their expertise.- The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year 2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status; 4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non compliant with these rules in succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out status; 4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non compliant with these rules in succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of the school year.- If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall be restored. (Emphases supplied)
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is operated below quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating a law program.This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools), as follows:
x x x x
2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law school and its facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x
x x x x
SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);
b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the substandard law school under Permit Status.
x x x xTo be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A. No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and 7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.
B) For Members of the Law Faculty
SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law schools required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No. 2014-02, the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate units of all courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.
SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum [sic], the President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to the LEB separate certification of the total teaching assignments/load for the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the prescribed matrix form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her highest academic law degree, qualification for , exemption from the Ll.M. requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty members. Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular semester not later than 45 days from the start of the semester.
x x x x
SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty members required to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases supplied)
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis supplied)This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its [rule]-making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and effect of law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
x x x x
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cam1ot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
x x x x
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
x x x x
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that -Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and the Teclmical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators. (Internal citations omitted)
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the LEB period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans and professors, including the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's right to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate schools of law around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While one or two programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach out to graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that most deans and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system of any graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors.283
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, thus:
a) A full-time faculty member is one:
1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1; 2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school; 3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and 4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time professor as enumerated in the preceding number.
SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified, in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with these rules.
SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)
SEC. 412. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit status for just causes including but not limited to:In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the Board;
b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;
d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors;
e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements and advertisements;
f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the students and inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and
h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in the rules and regulations of the Commission on Higher Education.284 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x xFurther, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be included in the law school's apprenticeship program, as follows:
b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school. (2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to the Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation. (3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and in order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval. (4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school enrolled in it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes
SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.
x x x x
c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by the Dean or a member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents 2) Interviewing clients 3) Courtroom observation and participation 4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations 5) Legal counseling 6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners 7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the employer-entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation.Article IV
Grading System
SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall devise its own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the students are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the following are observed:
x x x x
(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated number of apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the apprenticeship program.285 (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* Also referred to as "Jocelyn L. Daño" in some parts of the rollo.
1 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
2See In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, September 4, 2001 (Resolution).
3 Republic Act No. 7662, Sec. 4.
4 Id. at Sec. 5.
5In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 1.
11Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.
12 LEBMO No. 7-2016, supra, par. 2.
13 Id. at par. 10.
14 Id. at par. 1.
15 Id. at par. 2.
16 Id. at par. 3.
17 Id. at par. 4.
18 Id. at par. 5.
19 Id. at par. 6.
20 Id. at par. 7.
21 Id. at par. 8.
22 Id. at par. 9.
23 Id. at par. 10.
24 Id. at par. 11.
25 Id. at par. 12.
26 Id. at par. 13.
27 Id. at par. 14.
28 Sec. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school); b) Phase-out of the law program; and c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the substandard law school under Permit Status.
29 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program.
30 LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 15.
31 LEBMO No. 11-2017, par. 2.
32Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, pp. 6-22.
33 Id. at 8-11.
34 Id. at 38-59.
35 Id. at 289-320.
36Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, pp. 3-39.
37Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. III, pp. 1309-1311.
38 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following power:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemental by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
39 Sec. 8. x x x
(5) The [Judicial and Bar] Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
40 Republic Act No. 7622, Sec. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
x x x x
(c) [T]o set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without enroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning[.] (Emphasis supplied)
41 Sec. 7. (e) [T]o prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.] (Emphasis supplied)
42 Sec. 7. (h) [T]o adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] (Emphases supplied)
43 Sec. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
x x x x
(2) [T]o increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
44 Sec. 7. (g) [T]o establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.] (Emphasis supplied)
45 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, arid require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education. (Emphasis supplied)
46Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, p. 29.
47 Id. at 86-87.
48 236 Phil. 768 (1987).
49 716 Phil. 208 (2013).
50Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra.
51 In support, petitioners-in-intervention attached to their Partial Compliance and Motion, certifications issued by St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., St. Mary's College of Tagum, Inc. College of Law, and Western Leyte College School of Law tending to show a decrease in the number of enrollees from academic year 2017 to 2018 to academic year 2018 to 2019. They also attached a Summary of Enrollment (of 44 out of the 126 law schools) furnished by the Philippine Association of Law Schools which tend to show that 37 out of the 44 law schools experienced a decrease in enrollment. (Rollo [G.R. No. 242954], Vol. III, pp. 1463-1477).
52 Art. VIII, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
53 Art. X, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. The Batasang Pambansa shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section five hereof.
54 Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
55See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910 (2003).
56 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1, provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
57 Id. at Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
58Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 136 (2016).
59 Id. at 139.
60Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 294 (2016).
61 732 Phil. 1, 121 (2014).
62 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
63Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014), citing Holy Spirit Homewoners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, 529 Phil. 573, 587 (2006).
64Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, supra.
65 Supra note 55, at 891-892.
66 757 Phil. 534, 544 (2015).
67 G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 350.
68 G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018.
69Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009). See also Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936), where the Court held that the Court's duty under the Constitution is "to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them."
70Garcia v. Executive Secretary, id., citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 55, at 892.
71Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 471 (2010).
72Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc., (AMCOW), v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 58, at 140.
73Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).
74De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at Visayas, G.R. Nos. 185320 and 185348, April 19, 2017, 823 SCRA 550, 571-572.
75ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 266 (2008).
76De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 686-687 (2010), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/1/> and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/102/> (visited May 31, 2019).
77 97 Phil. 806, 809-811 (1955).
78 718 Phil. 294, 305-306 (2013).
79 391 Phil. 84, 106-108 (2000).
80 Supra note 61.
81 Id. at 124-126.
82 721 Phil. 416, 520 (2013).
83Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 11.
84 Id. at 15.
85 Id. at 17.
86Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 3, pp. 1370-1371.
87 Id. at 1375-1380.
88 Id. at 1381.
89 Id. at 1382.
90Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 304.
91Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 22.
92BAYAN v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000) and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 695-696 (1995).
93The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018.
94Private Hospitals, Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018.
95See Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 634 (2000).
96Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012).
97 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), supra note 38.
98 Sec. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, [E]nglish, [S]panish, history and economics.
99 Sec. 16. Failing candidates to take review course. - Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show to the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourthyear review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
100Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 18.
101 Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses [Bachelor of Laws] in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
102 Sec. 1. Conditions for student practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
103 Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
104 Sec. 3. Privileged communications. - The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
105 Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. - The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
106 Supra note 91.
107 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)
(visited April 1, 2019).
108 Cortes, Irene R. (1994), ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Law Center.
109 The implementation of this Act created a heavy shortage of teachers so the Philippine Commission authorized the Secretary of Public Instruction to bring to the Philippines 600 teachers from the United States known as the "Thomasites."
110 Philippine College of Arts and Trade, now known as the Technological University of the Philippines.
111 Philippine Normal School, now known as the Philippine Normal University.
112 Act No. 74, Sec. 18.
113 University of the Philippines College of Law law.upd.edu.ph/about-the-college (visited April 1, 2019).
114 ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 108.
115 Id.
116 AN ACT MAKING THE INSPECTION AND RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES OBLIGATORY FOR THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, March 10, 1917.
117 Act No. 2706, Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act, a private school or college shall be any private institution for teaching managed by private individuals or corporations, which is not subject to the authority and regulations of the Bureau of Education, and which offers courses of primary, intermediate, or secondary instruction, or superior courses in technical, professional, or special schools, for which diplomas are to be granted or degrees conferred.
118 Id. at Sec. 6. The Secretary of Public Instruction shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools and colleges granting the degrees of bachelor of arts, bachelor of science, or any other academic degrees. He shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental, phannaceutical, engineering, and agricultural schools or colleges and other special schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character.
119 Cited in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, supra note 77, at 812.
120 Id.
121 CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 5, provides:
Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters for specially gifted citizens.
122 Enacted on June 8, 1940.
123 Approved on June 14, 1947. Repealed by Republic Act No. 8047 or the BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT ACT.
124 Republic Act No. 139, Sec. 1. Sec. one of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and fifty-seven, as amended by Acts Numbered Thirty-one hundred and eighty-five, Thirty-four hundred and two, and Thirty-seven hundred and seventy-two, is further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. A board is hereby created which shall be known as the Board on Textbooks and shall have charge of the selection and approval of textbooks to be used in the public schools. The textbooks selected and approved shall be used for a period of at least six years from the date of their adoption.
The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the Government shall be submitted to the Board which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the Government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the Government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
Decisions of the Board on Textbooks shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Instruction upon the recommendation of the National Council of Education.
125 Executive Order No. 94 (1947).
126 Magsalin, M. Jr. (2003), The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, Arellano Law and Policy Review, 4(1), 38 56 (visited May 31, 2019).
127 Id. at 39.
128 Republic Act No. 1124, AN ACT CREATING A BOARD OF NATIONAL EDUCATION CHARGED WITH THE DUTY OF FORMULATING GENERAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND DIRECTING THE EDUCATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE NATION, June 16, 1954. Later on amended by Republic Act No. 4372 on June 19, 1965.
129 Presidential Decree No. 1 (1972).
130 Under Proclamation No. 1081 (1972).
131 Under Presidential Decree No. 1397 (1978).
132 CONSTITUTION (1973) Art. XV, Sec. 8(1), provides:133 Approved on September 11, 1982.
- All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to goals of national development.
134 Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Part III, Chapter 3, Sec. 27, provides:
Sec. 27. Recognition of Schools. - The educational operations of schools shall be subject to their prior authorization of the government, and shall be affected by recognition. In the case of government operated schools, whether local, regional, or national, recognition of educational programs and/or operations shall be deemed granted simultaneously with establishment.
In all other cases the rules and regulations governing recognition shall be prescribed and enforced by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports defining therein who are qualified to apply, providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the grant of recognition and for its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related matters.
135 Id. at Part IV, Chapter 1, Sec. 54. Declaration of Policy. - The administration of the education system and, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the supervision and regulation of educational institutions are hereby vested in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, without prejudice to the provisions of the charter of any state college and university.
136 Id. at Chapter 2, Sec. 59. Declaration of Policy. - Higher education will be granted towards the provision of better quality education, the development of middle and high-level manpower, and the intensification of research and extension services. The main thrust of higher education is to achieve equity, efficiency, and high quality in the institutions of higher learning both public and private, so that together they will provide a complete set of program offerings that meet both national and regional development needs.
137 Id. at Sec. 65. Bureau of Higher Education. - The Bureau of Higher Education shall perform the following functions:138 The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, supra note 126.
- Develop, formulate and evaluate programs, projects and educational standards for a higher education;
- Provide staff assistance to the Board of Higher Education in its policy formulation and advisory functions;
- Provide technical assistance to encourage institutional development programs and projects;
- Compile, analyze and evaluate data on higher education; and
- Perform other functions provided for by law.
139 Reorganization of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for other purposes, Executive Order No. 117 (1987), Sec. 27, provides:
Sec. 27. Change of Nomenclatures. - In the event of the adoption of a new Constitution which provides for a presidential form of government, the Ministry shall be called Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the titles Minister, Deputy Minister, and Assistant Minister shall be changed to Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary, respectively.
140 Id. at Sec. 4. Mandate. - The Ministry shall be primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education at all levels, supervise all education institutions, both public and private, and provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development.
141 Book IV, Title VI, Chapter 1, Sec. 1.
142 Id. at Chapter 4, Sec. 10.
143 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(1). The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
144 Approved on March 30, 1989.
145 Art. III. Organization and Administration.
x x x x
Sec. 2. The administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by its own policies. The provisions under this Article shall only be suppletory in character.
146 AN ACT CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION or THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1994.
147 Art. VIII, Sec. 13, provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
148 105 Phil. 173 (1959).
149 Id. at 176.
150 112 Phil. 884 (1961).
151 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017, 837 SCRA 160.
152 Art. X, Sec. 5(5), provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
153Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra.
154Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 548 (2010).
155 Id. at 549.
156Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, supra note 148, at 176.
157In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 546 (1954).
158People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).
159 Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, 613 Phil. 1, 23 (2009), citing Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 248 Phil. 542, 555 (1988).
160In Re: Cunanan, supra, at 545.
161Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 242-243 (1991).
162 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932).
163 Id.
164See Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 4, pp. 1657-1677.
165 Republic Act No. 8557 or AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADE Y, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
166 Id. at Sec. 3. The PHILJA shall serve as a training school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts. For this purpose, it shall provide and implement a curriculum for judicial education and shall conduct seminars, workshops and other training programs designed to upgrade their legal knowledge, moral fitness, probity, efficiency, and capability. It shall perform such other functions and duties as may be necessary in carrying out its mandate.
167 Id.
168 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art.VIII, Sec. 6.
169 As amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated May 20, 1968 and February 13, 1992.
170In Re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948).
171 Id.
172 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 9. Examination; subjects. - Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing).
x x x x
Sec. 11. Annual examination. - Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place manually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
x x x x
Sec. 14. Passing average. - In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent in all subjects, without falling below 50 percent in any subject. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 percent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 percent; Mercantile Law, 15 percent; Criminal Law, 10 percent; Political and International Law, 15 percent; Taxation, 10 percent; Remedial Law, 20 percent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 percent.
173 Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. - An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Sec. 18. Certificate. - The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
174 Sec. 19. Attorney's roll. - The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
175 Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
176Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010.
177In Re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A be Actually Supervised During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997 https://www.lawphil.net/courts/bm/bm_730_1997.html (visited September 3, 2019).
178Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 427 (1968).
179 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (visited May 31, 2019).
180 7 Cush. 53, 85 (1851) (visited May 31, 2019).
181Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 178, citing United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94 (1910).
182 Id., citing United States v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915).
183 Id., citing United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915).
184 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
185Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 398 (1988).
186Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 986 (2000).
187JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 93 (1996).
188Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1163 (1957).
189United States v. Gomez Jesus, supra.
190Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/ (visited May 31, 2019).
191 Id.
192Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 495, (2001).
193Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, supra.
194 Art. XIII, Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State.
195 Art. XV, Sec. 8(1). All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete; adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development.
196Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education, supra note 77, at 819.
197 Supra note 195.
198 Sec. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
199 Sec. 12, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
200 Supra note 67.
201See Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510, 535 [1925]), where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/510/> (visited May 30, 2019).
Nevertheless, a shift of responsibility from the parent to the State is observed in the light of the compulsory education laws. (Brooke Wilkins [2005], Should Public Education be a Federal Fundamental Right?, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal, 2005[2], 261-290) <https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2005/iss2/8/> (visited May 30, 2019).
202See Art. 13, Sec. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provides that:
Sec. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than,those established by the public authorities x x x. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx> (visited May 30, 2019).
203 As a legal concept, supervision is usually understood in relation with the concept of control. Thus, in Bito-onon v. Yap Fernandez (403 Phil. 693, 702-703 [2011]), the Court held that "[s]upervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. [Officer] in control [lays] down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act."
204Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, supra note 190.
205 Bernas, Joaquin G. (1958), State "Supervision" and "Regulation" of Private Schools, Philippine Studies, 6(3) 295-314 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42719389> (visited May 30, 2019).
206 Id. at 303.
207 Id.
208The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., 557 Phil. 121, 140. (2007).
209 568 Phil. 658, 702 (2008).
210 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).
211 Supra note 190.
212Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991).
213 Article XV, Sec. 8(2).
214 CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. 13, Sec. 5, provides:
Sec. 5. x x x "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." x x x
215Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 672 (1993).
216 Id. at 672-673.
217 As notoriously stated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589, 603 [1967]), "academic freedom x x x is x x x a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/385/589/> (visited May 31, 2019).
218Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 215, at 674.
219 220 Phil. 379 (1985).
220 264 Phil. 98 (1990).
221 214 Phil. 319 (1984).
222 226 Phil. 596 (1986).
223 160-A Phil. 929, 943-944 (1975).
224 Id. at 944.
225 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) <https:/supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/354/234/> (visited May 31, 2019).
226 To illustrate, Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes that all educational institutions "shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency." These are understood as mere guidelines for the State.
227 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).
228 408 Phil. 132 (2001).
229See concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee in Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 949.
230Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 216.
231Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 943.
232 Supra note 215, at 661.
233 Republic Act No. 9155 (2001) or the GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
234Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, supra note 190.
235 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 2(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).
236 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 58 (August 29, 1986).
237 Id. at 53.
238 Art. 13(2). The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; [and]
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved. Supra note 202.
239 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13). (Twenty-first Session, December 8, 1999) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c22.html> (visited May 31, 2019).
240 Id.
241 Art. 26(1). Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.<https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> (visited May 31, 2019).
242 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; supra note 202, at Art. 13(2)(c).
243 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13), supra note 239.
244 Id.
245 Supra note 215, at 675-676.
246 Supra note 219, at 383-384.
247Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 217.
248 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 236.
249 B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.
250Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 17.
251 Id. at 100.
252 Id. at 101.
253 B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.
254Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, 590 Phil. 170, 203 (2008).
255Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, 549 Phil. 302, 322 (2007).
256 I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION 458 (August 24, 1993).
Senator Tolentino: Thank you, Mr. President.
Now, here is one question on which I would like to be enlightened. The Council here may provide for the minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications to faculty members. I assume that this law admission means admission to the college of law of the student. x x x x
I assume that minimum standards for law admission here refers [sic] to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to the law school. x x x
257Section 15. Prerequisites to Admission to Law School. - Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court prescribes: "No applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics." (Underscoring supplied)
258 I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION, supra note 256, at 456-457.
259 Id. at 711 (September 22, 1993).
260Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, 686 Phil. 357, 372-373 (2012).
261 Re: Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations.
262 Supra note 227, at 1005.
263Rollo (G.R. No. 230642 ), Vo1. 1, p. 305.
264 Id. at 305 and 1567-1568.
265 Id. at 1564.
266 Id. at 1569.
267 Id. at 1582.
268Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 782-784.
269 259 Phil. 1016, 1021-1022 (1989).
270Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 945.
271See Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 6 (1996) <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-6-s-1996/> (visited May 31, 2019).
272 Id.
273See CHED Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-2/> (visited September 3, 2019).
274 The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2018 to 2019 provide:
Standard 503. ADMISSION TEST
A law school shall require each applicant for admission as a first-year J.D. degree student to take a valid and reliable admission test to assist the school and the applicant in assessing the applicant's capability of satisfactorily completing the school's program of legal education. In making admissions decisions, a law school shall use the test results in a manner that is consistent with the current guidelines regarding proper use of the test results provided by the agency that developed the test.
Interpretation 503-1
A law school that uses an admission test other than the Law School Admission Test sponsored by the Law School Admission Council shall demonstrate that such other test is a valid and reliable test to assist the school in assessing an applicant's capability to satisfactorily complete the school's program of legal education.
Interpretation 503-2
This Standard does not prescribe the particular weight that a law school should give to an applicant's' admission test score in deciding whether to admit or deny admission to the applicant.
Interpretation 503-3
(a) It is not a violation of this Standard for a law school to admit no more than 10% of an entering class without requiring the LSAT from:(1) Students in an undergraduate program of the same institution as the J.D. program; and/or(b) Applicants admitted under subsection (a) must meet the following conditions:
(2) Students seeking the J.D. degree in combination with a degree in a different discipline.(1) Scored at or above the 85th percentile on the ACT or SAT for purposes of subsection (a)(1), or for purposes of subsection (a)(2), scored at or above the 85th percentile on the GRE or GMAT; and<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter5.pdf> (visited May 31, 2019).
(2) Ranked in the top 10% of their undergraduate class through six semesters of academic work, or achieved a cumulative GPA of 3.5 or above through six semesters of academic work.
275 16. Separability Clause - If any part or provision of this memorandum order is declared invalid or unconstitutional, all other provisions shall remain valid and effective.
276Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 779.
277Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, pp. 119-120.
278 Id. at 123.
279 LEBMO No. 7-2016, provides:
x x x x
13. General Average - Beginning in Academic/School Year 2018-2019, the requirement of a general average of not less than eighty percent (80%) or 2.5 for admission in the basic law course under Section 23 of [LEBMO No. 1-2011] shall be withdrawn and removed.
280 Supra note 277, at 123 and 136-137.
281 702 Phil. 191, 201 (2013).
282 G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018.
283Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, supra note 164, at 1674.
284 Supra note 277, at 133.
285 Supra note 277, at 191-192.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur in the result,1 but I tender this opinion to briefly explain my reasons as to why the provisions of Legal Education Board (LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 20162 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) that mandatorily require the passing of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a pre-requisite for admission to any law school violate institutional academic freedom and hence, unconstitutional.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."3 According to case law; "[t]his institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom' encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) [w]ho may teach, (2) [w]hat may be taught, (3) [h]ow it shall be taught, and (4) [w]ho may be admitted to study."4 This fourth freedom of law schools to determine "who may be admitted to study" is at the core of the present controversy involving the PhiLSAT.
The PhiLSAT is essentially a standardized aptitude test measuring the examinees' communications and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.5 It is designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.6 One of the essential provisions of LEBMO No. 7-20.16 is paragraph 9, which states that passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school in the Philippines, and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two (2) years before the start of the study. The PhiLSAT has a passing score of 55%.7 To concretize the mandatory nature of the PhiLSAT, paragraph 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 provides that law schools that violate the issuance shall be administratively sanctioned and/or fined in the amount of up to P10,000.00 for each infraction. The administrative sanctions direly encompass: (a) termination of the law program (closing the law school); (b) phasing out of the law program; and (c) provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the substandard law school under Permit Status.8 As the PhiLSAT is a requirement mandatorily imposed by LEBMO No. 7-2016, non-compliance therewith would result into these potential consequences.
Compliance with the PhiLSAT effectively means a surrender of the law schools' academic freedom to determine who to admit to their institutions for study. This is because the PhiLSAT operates as a sifting mechanism that narrows down the pool of potential candidates from which law schools may then select their future students. With the grave administrative sanctions imposed for non-compliance, the surrender of this facet of academic freedom is clearly compulsory, because failing to subscribe to the PhiLSAT requirement is tantamount to the law school risking its complete closure or the phasing out of its law program. This effectively results in the complete control - not mere supervision - of the State over a significant aspect of the institutions' academic freedom.
Notably, the core legal basis for the PhiLSAT is derived from Section 7 (e) of Republic Act No. 76629 which empowers the LEB "to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission x x x." On a broader scale, Section 7 (b) of the same law empowers the LEB "to supervise the law schools in the country x x x." This is a specific iteration of Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he State x x x shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions."10"Reasonable supervision," as the Framers intended, meant only "external" and not "internal" governance; as such, it is meant to exclude the right to manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit, and dominate.11
As elucidated in the fairly recent case of Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education:12
The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:As pointed out by Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria (Dean Candelaria) in his Amicus Brief, "[w]hen [the] LEB took over the functions of the [Commission on Higher Education (CHED)] in relation to law schools, it is safe to presume that the scope of power of [the] LEB should be no more than what [the] CHED had traditionally exercised over law schools."14 As to what he insinuates as "reasonable supervision" over institutions of higher learning, the State may, through the appropriate agency, determine the: (a) minimum unit requirements for a specific academic program; (b) general education distribution requirements; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be stipulated by the various licensing entities.15 These activities may ostensibly fall under the category of "external governance" and hence, "reasonable supervision," as compared to a mandatory, exclusively State crafted aptitude test which not only operates as a predetermination of the schools' potential candidates for admission but also brandishes the total closure of the institution or phasing out of the academic program as punishment for noncompliance. The latter is, to my mind, a form of State domination that translates to "internal governance" and hence, the exercise of the State's control over academic freedom. As earlier intimated, this strays from the intent of the Framers of our Constitution.Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate.13 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
Endnotes:
1 See fallo of the ponencia, pp. 101-103.
2 "POLICIES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF A NATIONWIDE UNIFORM LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST FOR APPLICANTS TO THE BASIC LAW COURSES IN ALL LAW SCHOOLS IN THE COUNTRY," issued on December 29, 2016.
3 Emphases supplied.
4Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000); emphases and underscoring supplied.
5Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.
6 See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 2.
7 See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 14.
8 See LEBMO No. 2-2013, "LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD MEMORANDUM ORDER No. 2: ADDITIONAL RULES IN THE OPERATION OF THE LAW PROGRAM" (June 1, 2014), Section 32.
9 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1993," approved on December 23, 1993.
10 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
11 See Amicus Brief dated March 27, 2019 of Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, p. 5; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
12 See G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 and 218465, October 9, 2018.
13 See id.
14 See Amicus Brief, p. 12.
15 Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 12-13.
17 See Justice Leonen's Separate Dissenting and Concurring Opinion.
18 See id.
19 Strict scrutiny applies to "laws dealing with freedom of the mind." It is also "used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection." (See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 462-463 [2009].)
20Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 602 Phil. 625, 663 (2009); underscoring supplied.
21 See Republic Act No. 7662, Section 2.
22 See TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 171-182.
LEONEN, J.:
The provisions permitting the imposition of the Philippine Law School Admission Test, as well as the entire concept of the Legal Education Board, are unconstitutional for intruding on the academic freedom of law schools and the universities and colleges to which they belong. The State has no business in deciding and substituting its judgment for the academic institutions. Any government attempt to dictate upon universities the qualifications of their studentry or interfere with their curriculum undermines the school's academic freedom.
Institutions of learning perform a vital function in nurturing and sharpening the people's understanding and intellect. They ensure an educated and thriving citizenry on whom a nation's civilization and life depend. Education leads to an economically productive populace through learned skill. More importantly, it gears the people toward thinking more prudently and critically.
Without educational institutions, our country will inevitably approach a shallow and dismal future. Thus, the State has a paramount interest in guaranteeing that they flourish and function robustly. Part and parcel of this guarantee is to allow them to freely determine for themselves their "aims and objectives and how best to attain them."1
One (1) of the four (4) essential academic freedoms is the academic institutions' right to determine who they will admit to study. In ascertaining who to admit in their institutions, law schools should be given autonomy in establishing their own policies, including the examination that they will employ.
The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion into this essential freedom. The government's imposition of a passing score as a bar to admission violates the educational institutions' academic freedom to determine who to admit to study. The existence of the Legal Education Board, on the other hand, interferes with the right of academic institutions with respect to how to teach and who to teach.
SECTION 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State; The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. The· State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters for specially gifted citizens.From this, the 1973 Constitution provided a broader protection by giving the same guarantee to private educational institutions.2
For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."4 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)Garcia concerned a Petition for Mandamus filed by Epicharis Garcia, a woman, to compel the Loyola School of Theology to allow her to continue her studies in the seminary. In dismissing the Petition, this Court upheld the discretion of educational institutions to choose who may be admitted to study.5Garcia referred to the four (4) essential freedoms as the parameters of academic freedom:
Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."6 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)Justice Claudio Teehankee's concurring opinion in Garcia is also instructive. He recognized that courts have neither the competence nor the inclination to decide who shall be admitted to an educational institution. Instead, they will only overturn the judgment of academic institutions after an exhaustion of administrative remedies and upon showing of arbitrariness on the school's part. He explained:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.In Licup v. University of San Carlos,13 the petitioners were students who had been denied readmission to the university after a chaotic assembly that resulted in violations of the university handbook rules. They were also found to have academic deficiencies. In upholding the university's decision, this Court held that the students were not deprived of due process during the investigation, and that their serious breach of discipline and failure to maintain the academic standard forfeited their contractual right to continue studying in the university.14 This Court ruled similarly in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration,15Magtibay v. Garcia,16University of San Agustin v. Court of Appeals,17 and Spouses Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran.18
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. . . .
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.12 (Citations omitted)
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:An academic institution's right to discipline its students was held applicable even to students' activities outside campus premises. In Angeles v. Sison,21 this Court ruled that the school's power over its students does not absolutely cease when they set foot outside the school premises. Moreover, the students' conduct, if directly affecting the school's good order and welfare, may be subject to its discipline:(1) Who may teach,The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."20 (Citations omitted)
A college, or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students. One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility.In the more recent case of Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy,23 this Court reiterated that a school's right to discipline its students is part of the third essential freedom. There, this Court upheld the Philippine Military Academy's enforcement of its internal rules pursuant to its academic freedom. The petitioner in Cudia was a graduating honor student who was dismissed for violating the institution's Honor Code. Affirming the dismissal, this Court ruled that the academy enjoys academic· freedom to impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit:
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property. The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
. . . .
Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in or off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the academic community. Hence, when as in the case at bar, the misconduct complained of directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no reason why the school cannot impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place inside the campus.22
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.24 (Citations omitted)Nevertheless, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,25 this Court clarified that the discretion of educational institutions is not absolute as to impinge on the students' constitutional rights. In Villar, the petitioners took part in an assembly and were subsequently denied admission by the university, which claimed that the students flunked. In finding that some of the petitioners did not violate the school's academic standards, this Court ruled that while the institution can deny admission to students with academic deficiencies, the academic freedom it enjoys cannot be used to discriminate against qualified students who exercise their constitutional rights.26 This Court held:
The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.27Similarly, in Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.,28 this Court ruled against the university's refusal to admit the petitioner as its, student. Explaining that "academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license[,]" it held that the university cannot hide behind the shroud of academic freedom to act arbitrarily in dismissing a student.29Malabanan v. Ramento,30Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University,31Guzman v. National University,32Non v. Dames II33 were ruled in the same vein.
[The] exercise of academic freedom grants the University the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among Its graduates it shall confer academic recognition, based on its established standards. And the courts may not interfere with such exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and expertise in granting honors to graduating students of the University, courts do not have the competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee and substitute their judgment for that of the University officials.35Nevertheless, this Court has affirmed in the past the State's power to intrude-in very limited circumstances-into the admission process of schools imbued with public interest. Specifically, students applying to medical schools have to take and pass a state-sponsored examination as a condition to their admission.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.Department of Education, Culture, and Sports highlighted the special character of the medical profession, which justifies the three-flunk rule in the National Medical Admission Test in force at that time. As the medical profession "directly affects the very lives of the people,"45 this Court found that the three-flunk rule was valid insofar as it seeks to admit only those who are academically qualified to study in a medical school.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced (sic). Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the National Medical Admission Test and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.44 (Citation omitted)
Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot impugn these BOR directives on the ground of academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected.47Reyes, therefore, resolved an issue that was not so much a question of whether the State violated institutional academic freedom, but whether it was the proper academic unit that asserted this freedom.
Notwithstanding the increasingly broad reach of academic freedom and the current emphasis on the essentiality of autonomy for academic institutions, the freedom of individual faculty members against control of thought or utterance from either within or without the employing institutions remains the core of the matter. If this freedom exists and reasonably adequate academic administration and methods of faculty selection prevail, intellectual interchange and pursuit of knowledge are secured. A substantial degree of institutional autonomy is both a usual prerequisite and a normal consequence of such a state of affairs. . . . Hence the main concern over developing and maintaining academic freedom in this country has focused upon encouragement and protection of the freedom of the faculty member.58 (Emphasis supplied)Academic freedom is anchored on the recognition that academic institutions perform a social function and its business is conducted for the common good; that is, it is a necessary tool for critical inquiry of truth and its free exposition. The guarantee of academic freedom is complementary to freedom of expression and of the mind.
The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality. It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself who emphasized that man's "inviolate character" should be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person", so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve complete fulfillment. His freedom to seek his own happiness would mean nothing if the same were not given sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles".Academic freedom is intertwined with intellectual liberty. It is inseparable from one's freedom of thought, speech, expression, and the press.62 Thus, the institutions' and individuals' right to pursue learning must be "free from internal and external interference or pressure."63
. . . This individual freedom and right to happiness should be recognized and respected not only by the State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate; for as Laski stressed: "Without freedom of the mind . . . a man has no protection in our social order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly, . . . Yet a denial of his right . . . is a denial of his happiness. Thereby he becomes an instrument of other people's ends, not himself an end".
As Justice Holmes pronounced, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out".
The human mind is by nature an inquiring mind, whether of the very young or of the very old or in-between; for freedom of speech in the words of John Milton is the "liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties."
What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article [X]V of the 1973 Constitution. The issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual - the very core of human liberty.
Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning - which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the university professor - the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited provision of our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators but also the members of the student body. While it is true that the university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to him by his students. In this respect, the student - specially a graduate student - must not be restrained from raising questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas, whether theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and academic freedom.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die.66Freedom of expression is a cognate of academic freedom. Hence, the zealous protection accorded to freedom of expression must necessarily be reflected in the level of protection that covers academic freedom. Any form of State intrusion against academic freedom must be treated suspect.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law[.]The due process clause is commonly referred to as the "right to be let alone" from the State's interference.77 The essence of due process is the freedom from arbitrariness. In Morfe v. Mutuc:78
"There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases."79 (Citation omitted)Due process is the protection of the sphere of individual autonomy. It aims to "prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals."80 Thus, it imposes a burden on the government to observe two (2) separate limits: (1) procedural and (2) substantive due process. In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila:81
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process". Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.Substantive due process answers the question of whether "the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property."83 To pass this test, the State must provide a sufficient justification for enforcing a governmental regulation.84
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process, more so than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.82 (Citations omitted)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.When governmental action is checked against the due process requirement under the Constitution - particularly substantive due process - it must be shown that such action was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Respondent failed to show this.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law[.]87
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE LEONEN:Respondent Legal Education Board has not conducted any scientific and empirical study prior to its decision to impose a national standardized test for the admission of students in law schools. All that it has as basis is the study for the Law School Admission Test of the United States. There was no showing of how this foreign experience is applicable, or even relevant, to the Philippine context. For lack of any substantial basis, the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test is arbitrary.
Okay, next. Was there a study conducted by the LEB prior to imposing the national test relating to the correlation of passing the test and passing the bar? Because according to you the declaration of policy states, to improve the quality of the bar. Or was this anecdotal in nature? And if there is a test, a scientific study, will you be able to provide the Court? Was there a study done prior to imposing the national exam in an exclusionary character prior to giving the test?
. . . .
DEAN AQUENDE:
We have none, Your Honor, but we relied on the LSAT study, Your Honor, in the United States.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, the LSAT study conducted by the United States. We are a different country and you are saying that you looked at a different culture so what they did in India, in America, in Canada, maybe even in Japan but not Filipinos, and the Filipinos have particular needs in our archipelago. Certainly, Tagum is different from Siargao, different from Baguio City, different from Cebu, so, you are saying that the LEB imposed this without, isn't this arbitrary, Chair?
DEAN AQUENDE:
We looked at, Your Honor, at the result or the correlation result of the law school qualifying test administered by the CEM and in that particular study, the correlation is that the . . . (interrupted)
. . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You said that it was correlation, what was the degree of confidence?
DEAN AQUENDE:
I do not have right now.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, probably you can provide us with a copy.
DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Because in order not to be a grave abuse of discretion, it must be reasonable.
DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that, freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy Reyes pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the level of scrutiny should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I would think it would apply strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no study that supported it, then perhaps, may be stricken down as unreasonable and therefore, a grave abuse of discretion . . . .
. . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
. . . . the English proficiency that you mentioned, what are your statistics on that?
DEAN AQUENDE:
The . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
That law schools are admitting law students that do not have English proficiency . . . .
DEAN AQUENDE:
That ties up, Your Honor, with the public interest that we are looking at and that is . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, yes, what are your statistics on that?
DEAN AQUENDE:
. . . . and that is the weigh stage . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
What are your numbers?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Actually, Your Honor, it's the weigh stage of the human capital resulting problem . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I'm not asking about the concept.
DEAN AQUENDE:
. . . . in the bar examination, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
What are your numbers?
DEAN AQUENDE:
It's the bar examination, Your Honor, that seventy-five percent (75%) of all the . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You see all the examinations?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You mean to say, those that flunked the exams is because of English?
DEAN AQUENDE:
No, Your Honor, but that is the competency . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In other words, in looking at the law schools, you made a claim that the English proficiency of undergraduates going into law schools is deteriorating, correct? And because you are an academic body, you should have a scientific study to back yourself up? Can you submit that to the Court? Have you made that study?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Which particular . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You cannot operate to supervise academic institutions deep in science on the basis of anecdotal references. That would be unreasonable. That is grave abuse of discretion.
DEAN AQUENDE:
No. Your Honor, please, if the question is . . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You said it was English proficiency, logic, correct? That's why you imposed this exam. By the way, Chair, how many law schools are there?
DEAN AQUENDE:
One hundred twenty-two (122) law schools, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Have you taught in all those environments?
DEAN AQUENDE:
None, not, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, have you taught in more than five law schools?
DEAN AQUENDE:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
How many law schools have you taught in?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Just two (2), Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Just two (2), and you make a conclusion based on your experience in two (2) law schools multiplied by the number of experiences of all your members of the Board with 120? Shouldn't you have done a scientific study on English proficiency of incoming first year of law schools at the very least before you put in this policy so that it becomes reasonable for us?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Well, we looked at the LSAT correlation, Your Honor.88
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: "The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body." From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming "the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'" a university "seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary."91 (Citations omitted)In Grutter, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a holistic evaluation of an applicant by considering several factors such as academic ability, talents, experiences, including other information through a personal statement, letters of recommendation, together with the applicant's undergraduate grade point average, Law School Admission Test score, and other "soft variables," including the applicant's racial and ethnic status. In effect, the law school affords an individualized consideration to all applicants regardless of race. There is no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a single variable.
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.95In my concurring opinion in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City:96
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the constitutional protection of due process are better understood dynamically and from a frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood integrally, operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.Ultimately, the right to life is intertwined with the right to pursue an education. Right to life, after all, is not merely the right to exist, but the right to achieve the "fullness of human potential[.]"98 This is real in attaining a degree of one's own choice. Education does not only enhance and sharpen intellect, but also opens up better opportunities. It improves the quality of life. When a person obtains a degree, there is economic and social mobility. Thus, when the State interferes and prevents an individual from accessing education, it impliedly infringes on the right to life and liberty.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life, liberty, and security of person" and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." As the American Declaration of Independence postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that they may be secured. Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not merely operating on factual gives but enabling the pursuit of ideals.
"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential: not merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an empowering existence. "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this empowering existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the bedrock of our social and political conceptions.97 (Citations omitted)
Differential access to achievement-related resources may occur at the level of a child's family, school, or neighborhood.Merit is a manifestation of elitism. Meritocracy opposes democratization and opportunity for all.105
The relative achievement formulation of socioeconomic status would encompass family characteristics such as parental income, education, occupation, and wealth. A variety of studies have demonstrated positive relationships between early academic achievement and parental income, education, and occupation.104 (Citations omitted)
[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to "predict" academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law. The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to "merit."108Here in the Philippines, our education system's obsession with examination-based meritocracy must be tempered, not further celebrated. Legal education must not be an exclusive good for the elite. There must be a conscious move to eliminate the socio-economic barriers that cement this elitism. The Philippine Law School Admission Test does the exact opposite by reinforcing a faulty method that does not necessarily admit the most qualified students, but only favors the economically privileged.
In this intergenerational relay race, children born to wealthy parents start at or near the finish line, while children born into poverty start behind everyone else. Those who are born close to the finish line do not need any merit to get ahead. They already are ahead, The poorest of the poor, however, need to traverse the entire distance to get to the finish line on the basis of merit alone. In this sense, meritocracy strictly applies only to the poorest of the poor; everyone else has at least some advantage of inheritance that places them ahead at the start of the race.An educational system that rewards on the basis of loosely defined merits assumes an equality of educational opportunity.116 It fails to recognize that the most privileged in society are provided with much greater opportunities to succeed and fewer chances to fail compared with those from less privileged backgrounds.117
In comparing the effects of inheritance and individual merit on life outcomes, the effects of inheritance come first, then the effects of individual merit follow-not the other way around.115
SECTION 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:The majority concludes that while the State may administer the Philippine Law School Admission Test, it should not be imposed on law schools as a mandatory part of their admission process.120 Relying on Tablarin, it sustained admission tests as a legitimate exercise of the State's regulatory power.121
. . . .
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.]
Endnotes:
1Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 943 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
2 J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 951 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
3 160-A Phil. 929 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
4 Id. at 943.
5 The institutional academic freedom reflected in Garcia was reiterated in the later case of University of the Philippines v. Ayson, 257 Phil. 580, 584-585 (1989) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], where this Court held that the abolition of the UP College Baguio High School as a decision of the UP Board of Regents is within its exercise of academic freedom. Thus, as an "institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education."
6Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
7 J. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 949 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
8 221 Phil. 601 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].
9 Id. at 611-612.
10 274 Phil. 414 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].
11 294 Phil. 654 (1993) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
12 Id. at 675.
13 258-A Phil. 417 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
14 Id. at 423-424.
15 244 Phil. 8 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
16 205 Phil. 307 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
17 300 Phil. 819 (1994) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
18 697 Phil. 31 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
19 401 Phil. 431 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
20 Id. at 455-456.
21 197 Phil. 713 (1982) [Per J. Fernandez, Second Division].
22 Id. at 724-726.
23 754 Phil. 590 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
24 Id. at 655-656.
25 220 Phil. 379 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].
26 Id. at 384.
27 Id.
28 298 Phil. 382 (1993) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
29 Id. at 387-388.
30 214 Phil. 319 (1984) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].
31 221 Phil. 470 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].
32 226 Phil. 596 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
33 264 Phil. 98 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
34 487 Phil. 449 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
35 Id. at 474.
36 236 Phil. 768 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
37 Id. at 774.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 776-777.
40 Id. at 782.
41 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
42 Id. at 1018.
43 Id. at 1019.
44 Id. at 1021-1023.
45 Id. at 1023.
46 272 Phil. 241 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, En Banc].
47 Id. at 254.
48 Ponencia, p. 85.
49 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 7.
50 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 9.
51 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 11.
52 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 15.
53 Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of Information (2019), available at <https://cem-inc.org.ph/nmat/files/upload/BOI_NMAT_Regular2019_web.pdf> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
54 Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) delegates the determination of the National Medical Admission Test cut-off score to the respective medical schools. Available at <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-2/> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
55 Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of Information, 6 (2019), available at <https://www.cem-inc.org.ph/National Medical Admission Test/files/upload/BOI_National Medical Admission Test_Summer_2019.pdf> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
56 Ponencia, p. 87.
57 Id.
58 Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom: Its Basic Philosophy, Function and History, 28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 431, 433 (1963), available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2963&context=lcp> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
59 David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227, 230 (1990), available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4057&context=lcp> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
60 Id.
61 J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Technology, 160-A Phil. 929, 954-956 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
62Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, 292 Phil. 654, 672-673 [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
63 Id. at 673.
64 See J. Douglas, Dissenting Opinion in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), where the U.S. Supreme Court first mentioned academic freedom as a constitutional right. In Adler, Justice Douglas stated that "[t]he Constitution guarantees freedom of though and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher. The public school is in most respects the cradle of our democracy . . . the impact of this kind of censorship in the public school system illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from censorship; See also J. Frankfurter, Dissenting Opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
65 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
66 Id. at 251.
67 Ponencia, p. 81.
68 Id.
69 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY 17-18 (2016).
70 Id.
71 David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227, 272 (1990), available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4057&context=lcp> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
72 Law School Admission Council, About the Law School Admission Council, available at <https://www.Isac.org/about> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
73 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicions Effects of Rankings, 81 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 322, 323 (2006). Available at <http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/81/81_1_Johnson.pdf> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
74 The Princeton Review, ABA Accredited Law School, available at <https://www.princetonreview.com/law-school-advice/law-school-accreditation> (last accessed August 27, 2019).
75 See Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and Access to Justice, 61RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1014 (2009). Available at <https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=cl_pubs> (last visited on September 9, 2019). Even the Law School Admissions Council, which administers the LSAT, cautions law schools against over-reliance on LSAT scores in the admissions process.
76 Id.
77See Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
78 Id.
79 Id. at 432-433.
80White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
81 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
82 Id. at 461-462.
83City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
84 Id.
85Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
86 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
87 Id. at 1165.
88 TSN dated March 5, 2019, pp. 171-179.
89 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
90 Id. at 329.
91City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 316 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
95City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 317 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc] citing Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
96 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
97 Id. at 1142-1143.
98 Id.
99Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63801> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
100 Id.
101 Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN, March 20, 2017, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-inequality-theresa-may-donald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
102 Id.
103 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic Development 3 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf> (last visited on September 9, 2019); and R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2001), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
104 R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061 (2001), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283711> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
105 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic Development, 7 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
106 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic Development 3 (2010). Available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf> (last visited on September 9, 2019); R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 1062 (2001). Available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
107 J. Thomas, Dissenting Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361 (2003).
108 Id. at 367-368.
109 Id. at 107.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Hannah Arendt, The Crisis in Education (1954) <http://www.digitalcounterrevolution.co.uk/2016/hannah-arendt-the-crisis-in-education-full-text/> (last accessed September 12, 2019).
113 Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN, March 20, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-inequality-theresa-maydonald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
114 Id.
115 STEPHEN MCNAMEE AND ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 49 (2004).
116 Id. at 102.
117 Id.
118 Republic Act No. 7662 (1993).
119 Ponencia, p. 77.
120 Id. at 78.
121 Id. at 81-84.
122 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
123 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5(2) provides:
SECTION 5. . . .
. . . .
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
124 CONST., art. III, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
125 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5(3) provides:
SECTION 5. . . .
. . . .
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
126 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5) provides:
SECTION 5. . . .
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
JARDELEZA, J.:
x x x The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it, and none needs it more than the teacher.In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Wieman v. Updegraff,17 where it struck down as unconstitutional a "loyalty oath" statute18 required of state employees, including the faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, which had the effect of excluding persons from state employment solely on the basis of membership in organizations tagged as "subversive," regardless of their knowledge of the activities and purposes of said organizations.19
The public school is, in most respects, the cradle of our democracy. The increasing role of the public school is seized upon by proponents of the type of legislation represented by New York's Feinberg law as proof of the importance and need for keeping the school free of "subversive influences." But that is to misconceive the effect of this type of legislation. Indeed, the impact of this kind of censorship on the public-school system illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from censorship.x x x x
The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms-all long forgotten-become the ghosts of a harrowing present. Any organization committed to a liberal cause, any group organized to revolt against an (sic) hysterical trend, any committee launched to sponsor an unpopular program, becomes suspect. These are the organizations into which Communists often infiltrate. Their presence infects the whole, even though the project was not conceived in sin. A teacher caught in that mesh is almost certain to stand condemned. Fearing condemnation, she will tend to shrink from any association that stirs controversy. In that manner, freedom of expression will be stifled.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is pursued· in any of our , educational institutions. When academic teaching - freedom and its corollary, learning-freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain. But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.27Finally, in the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,28 the Supreme Court overturned its decision in Adler, and extended First Amendment protection to academic freedom. Keyishian involved faculty members and a non-teaching employee of the State University of New York whose employment contracts were terminated or not renewed when they refused (or failed) to submit a "Feinberg Certificate"29 required under Section 3021 of the New York Education Law. Under such document, the individual certifies that he is not a Communist and that he has never advocated or been a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the Government.30 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, citing Shelton v. Tucker,31 held that though the governmental purpose may have been legitimate and substantial, that purpose could not be undertaken too broadly as to "stifle fundamental personal liberties."32
Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters for specially gifted citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)It was restated in the 1973 Constitution in Article XV, Section 8(2) and. was expanded in application to cover both private and public institutions of higher learning, to wit:
Sec. 8. x x xThe above provision on academic freedom as a constitutional right was further refined and developed through its amendment in the 1987 Constitution in Article XIV, Section 5(2):x x x x
(2) All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 5. x x xThis amendment in the academic freedom clause was explained as a categorical shift from the previous conception that academic freedom was solely institutional in nature, to be enjoyed only by the institutions themselves, to the present belief that said grant is given not only to the institutions themselves, but to the individual stakeholders (teachers, researchers and students) within said institution as well.33x x x x
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (Emphasis supplied.)
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often: identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his . studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Mciver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution." As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines."Garcia and subsequent cases would show the Court's attempts to outline the distinction between academic freedom as a right enjoyed by the educational institution,39 or its individual stakeholders such as the teacher/researcher/educator40 or student.41
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher-recognized and effectively guaranteed by society-to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning." x x x38 (Underscoring supplied.)
(1) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement would inevitably lead to a decrease in law student enrollees which will, in turn, "result to an increase in tuition fees x x x to recover lost revenue x x x" and "in effect puts law schools away from the reach of the poor students in the provinces;"43Of the six foregoing issues, only one (issue No.2) textually references the concept of academic freedom. Indeed, the freedom to determine who may be admitted to study is among the "four essential freedoms" accorded an educational institution. This freedom, however, is by no means absolute; it must be balanced with important state interests "which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority."50 It is beyond cavil that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education and the general welfare of the people.51
(2) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement "arbitrarily encroaches on the academic freedom of the Dean of St. Thomas More to choose its students" on the basis of "values, character, sense of honesty, ethics, and sense of service to others and to society;"44
(3) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement is unfair and unreasonable;45
(4) The LEB Law clearly provides that the intent was to improve legal education, not regulate access thereto;46
(5) The ruling of the Court in Tablarin v. Judge Gutierrez47 sustaining the constitutionality of the National Medical Admissions Test (NMAT) is inapplicable;48 and
(6) The LEB Law is an undue delegation of legislative power.49
x x x MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.Furthermore, contrary to the ponencia's findings, I do not see any difference in how the NMAT and the PhiLSAT are meant to (or even actually) operate.58 Both are, in fact, exclusionary exams. Permit me to explain.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. (Emphasis supplied.)
17.3 Minimum Standards for AdmissionThus, even under the present rule, students who fail to get an NMAT score of 40th percentile (or the declared cut-off score of their chosen medical school, whichever is higher) will not be issued a Certificate of Eligibility and therefore cannot be admitted to medical school. Clearly, the NMAT is no different from the PhiLSAT insofar as it also employs an exclusionary (or, in the words of the ponencia, "totalitarian") scheme in terms of student admissions.61 I therefore see no reason why both tests should merit different treatment. The principle behind this Court's ruling in Tablarin should be applied here.
Applicants seeking admission to the medical education program must have the following qualifications:
- Holder of at least a baccalaureate degree;
- Must have taken the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) not more than two (2) years from the time of admission, with a percentile score equivalent to or higher than that currently prescribed by the school or the [CHED], whichever is higher;
- The applicant shall submit the following documents to the medical schools:
• x x x17.4 Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to Medical School
• x x x
• Certified true copy of NMAT score17.5 NMAT Score cut off
- On the basis of foregoing documents, the medical school is responsible for and accountable for the issuance of the Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to medical school.
- x x x
- Likewise, it is also the responsibility of the medical school to verify the authenticity of the NMAT score against the master list provided by the recognized testing center.
- An NMAT score cut-off of at least 40th percentile will be implemented by all higher educational institutions offering medical program.
- Medical schools are hereby required to declare their NMAT cut-off score as part of their Annual Report (electronic and hard copy) to be submitted to CHED.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
x x x Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.65 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)I submit that the Court should refrain from resolving the challenges against the reasonableness of the LEB Law (and related issuances) at this time. Taking issue at reasonableness, equity or fairness of a state action, in a vacuum and divorced from the factual circumstances that suffer the same, would mean that this Court will have to adjudicate (in my view, wrongly) based on conjectures and unsupported presuppositions. As it appears, this Court will be settling controversies based on unsupported allegations66 or, worse, grounds not even pleaded or raised by the parties.67 Allegations and counter-allegations against the constitutionality and/or reasonableness of a challenged state action need to be proven in evidence, otherwise they may be no more than uncorroborated rhetoric.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its [face,] which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus:The tall order, therefore, to overturn the constitutional presumption in favor of a law must be through a conclusive "factual foundation," the absence of which must inevitably result in the upholding of the constitutionality of the challenged law."The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the [specific] method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute."
No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of [facts], the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.70 (Emphasis supplied.)
Endnotes:
1Abayata, et al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea, et al. (G.R. No. 242954) and Pimentel, et al. v. Legal Education Board (G.R. No. 230642).
2 Otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, hereinafter referred to as "LEB Law"
3Ponencia, pp. 37-53.
4Id. at 88.
5Id. at 86.
6 G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730.
7Ponencia, p. 87.
8 Pacifico Agabin, Academic Freedom and the Larger Community, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 52, 336, 336 (1977) Phil. L.J. 336, 336 (1977).
9 Enrique M. Fernando, Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 52, 289, 290 (1977); citing Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its basic Philosophy, Function and History, in BAADE (ed.).
10 J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real about the "Four Freedoms" of a University, Georgetown University Law Center, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 929-953 (2006).
11Id. at 930.
12 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
13Id. at 498. The Civil Service Law of New York, Section 12(a) thereof made ineligible for employment in any public school any member of any organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force, violence or any unlawful means.
14Id. at 493. According to the Court:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a school room. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of officials and teachers of the school system, the state may very properly inquire into the company they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations and persons with whom they associate.
If, under the procedure set up in the New York law, a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified from employment in the public school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice. Certainly such limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its police power. to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.
15 As concurred in by Justice Black.
16Supra note 12 at 508-509 (1952).
17 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18 The Oklahoma Stat. Ann, 1950, Tit. 51, Section 37.1-37.9 required each state officer and employee, as a condition of his employment, to take a "loyalty oath" stating, inter alia, that he is not, and has not been for the preceding five years, a member of any organization listed by the Attorney General of the U.S. as "communist front" or "subversive."
19Wieman v. Upegraff, 344 U.S. 485, 193 (1952); The Court, in the main, found a violation of the Due Process Clause ("Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.") and held that the Government's efforts at countering threats of subversion must not be at the expense of democratic freedoms.
20Id. Justice Hugo elucidated thus:
Governments need and have ample power to punish treasonable acts. But it does not follow that they must have a further power to punish thought and speech, as distinguished from acts. Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will, in the long run, have it for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost. (Italics supplied.)
21Wieman v. Upegraff, supra note 19 at 196; Justice Frankfurter explained:
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States against infraction by national or State government. (Italics supplied.)
22Supra note 12.
23 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957).
24Id. at 262-263, Justice Frankfurter's opinion further added:
x x x This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor. x x x
To further emphasize the nature and design of a university and the import of its academic freedom as rooted in freedom of expression and thought, Justice Frankfurter quoted a statement from a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand, to wit:"In a university, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.' This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.25 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the concern of the university.
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. (Emphasis supplied.)"
26 Id. at 114-115, 130. Here, petitioner, a former graduate student and teaching fellow at the University of Michigan, refused to answer questions posed to him in an investigation being conducted by a Congressional Subcommittee into alleged Communist infiltration into the field of education. For his refusal, he was fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six months. The Court, after balancing the competing public and private interests involved, found that petitioner's claim that the "investigation was aimed not at the revolutionary aspects, but at the theoretical classroom discussion of communism x x x rests on a too constricted view of the nature of the investigatory process, and is not supported by a fair assessment of the record x x x."
27Id. at 113.
28 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
29Id. at 595-596; taken from the Feinberg Law which required the measure.
30Id.
31Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY, id. at 602; citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479; United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Sup. 362, 372 (1943).
32Id. Affirming the significance of academic freedom, and it rationalized:
"x x x The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." (De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 [1937])
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." (Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY, supra note 28 at 603. Underscoring supplied.)
33 Delegate Adolf Azcuna's explanation, in sponsoring said amendment, as cited in Pacifico Agabin's Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 64, 139-140 (1989):MR. AZCUNA: In the 1973 Constitution, this freedom is given to the institution itself. All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. So, with this proposal, we will provide academic freedom in the institutions-enjoyed by students, by the teachers, by the researchers and we will not freeze the meaning and the limits of this freedom. Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept and we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore we will leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom. We just say that it shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.34Supra note 8 at 338.
35Id. at 339, citing Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen, 28 Law and Contemp. Prob. 525 (1968); Dean Pacifico Agabin posited:Expression if it is to be free, is not limited to the trivial and the inconsequential. It may strike deep at our most cherished beliefs or speak up for the most unorthodox doctrines. Expression cannot be subjected to prior censorship for fear of serious injury or controversy.36 Agabin's Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom, supra note 1; see also Onofre D. Corpuz's Academic Freedom and Higher Education: The Philippine Setting, Vol. 52, 1977, at 273.x x x x
This does not mean that freedom of expression is confined to the four walls of the classroom. This would be a very parochial view of free speech. The spirit of free inquiry cannot be cut off, like a water tap, once the student steps out of his classes. It is therefore important that the University encourage discussion and debate outside the classroom, for an atmosphere and ferment in the academic community at large may be more meaningful to the student than freedom of discussions within the confines of the class.
37 G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277. This case involved a mandamus proceeding where the student prayed that the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology be ordered to allow her to continue pursuing her Master of Arts in Theology. The Court, in the name of academic freedom, would go on to uphold the school's "wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students."
38Id. at 283-284.
39 The Court in Garcia; iterated the "four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds (I) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study, and ultimately found that the Faculty Admission Committee had sufficient grounds to deny the student's admission. Id. at 293.
40 In the case of Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. L-44251, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 321, 327, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, quoted Robert MacIver, and echoed the Sweezy definition of academic freedom as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.
41 The Court's holding in Garcia, was subject of a strong dissent from Justice Felix Makasiar who argued that academic freedom, although at the time textually granted only to the academic institutions, should be deemed to have been granted to the students themselves as well, as the students constitute part of the institution itself, without whom the institution can neither exist nor operate. According to Justice Makasiar:What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article [V] of the 1973 Constitution. The issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual - the very core of human liberty.42Ponencia, pp. 59-64, 71.
Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the university professor (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 1962 ed., 489)-the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited provision of our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators but also the members of the student body. While it is true that the university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to him by his students. In this respect, the student-specially a graduate student-must not be restrained from raising questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas whether theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and academic freedom. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 37 at 295.
43Rollo, p. 304. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.
44Id. at 304-305.
45Id. at 305-306.
46Id. at 307.
47Supra note 6.
48Rollo, p. 309. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.
49 Id. at 310-313.
50 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377, 390.
51Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines, et al. v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018.
52Ponencia , p. 88.
53 See Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 812-813 (1955), a case involving challenges to Act No. 2706, as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 which provides for a "previous permit system" before a school or any other educational institution can operate. There, the Court, quoting a report commissioned by the Philippine Legislature at the time, upheld the challenged Acts as a valid exercise of police power to correct a "great evil," thus:x x x An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. x x x54Ponencia , p. 39.
55 For example, Republic Act No. 6139, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate Tuition And Other School Fees Of Private Educational Institution, Providing For The Settlement Of Controversies Thereon And For Other Purposes. See also Lina, Jr. v. Carino. G.R. No. 100127, April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 515, where this Court sustained the legal authority of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of tuition and other school fees and to issue guidelines for the imposition and collection thereof.
56Ponencia, p. 85.
57Supra note 6.
58Ponencia, p. 86.
59 Also known as the Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) Program.
60 Which now regulates the study of medicine, among others, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7722, otherwise known the Higher Education Act of 1994.
61Ponencia, p. 87.
62Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, citing City of Raleigh v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 165 S.E.2d 745 (1969).
63Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, supra, citing Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954) Cited in Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Jardeleza in Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019.
64 G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
65 Id.
66 Including, for example, that of PhiLSAT being pro-elite and anti-poor, or the converse but equally unverified arguments that PhiLSAT is sound and properly designed to measure the necessary aptitude of prospective law students.
67 Including, for example, the power of the LEB to prescribe the qualifications and classifications of faculty members and deans of graduate schools of law.
68 G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
69 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
70Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note 68 at 857.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia. I write this opinion only to further expand on the points raised therein, with emphasis on the primordial issue of academic freedom.
The Scope of the Court's Review
The ponencia declares as constitutional the power of the Legal Education Board (LEB) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools, minimum qualifications of law school faculty members, and the minimum requirements for admission to legal education, granted under Sections 7(c) and 7(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7662.1
In turn, the ponencia declares as unconstitutional for encroaching upon the Court's rule-making powers the powers of the LEB to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar examinations,2 and to adopt a system of continuing legal education for lawyers.3 The ponencia also declares as unconstitutional for being ultra vires a number of resolutions, memoranda, and circulars issued by the LEB for violating the law schools' academic freedom.
I agree with the scope and extent of the Court's disposition in the instant case, as indeed, the Court is not limited only to the issue of the requirement of Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT). Apart from the reasons already stated in the ponencia, I note that the petitioners, particularly those in G.R. No. 230642, questioned the entire law, not just the provision empowering the LEB to impose standards for admission into law schools. Moreover, the substantive issues in this case had been expanded in the Advisory for the oral arguments, to cover the following:
Clearly, the issues now before the Court go beyond the PhiLSAT. As there are other pressing concerns about the operations of the LEB-vis-a-vis academic freedom, the ponencia was correct in looking into the LEB's issuances and rulings beyond those covering the PhiLSAT. Stated otherwise, the Court is called upon to look at the entirety of R.A. 7662, as well as the issuances of the LEB, and to test their validity on the basis of the primordial issue of whether they violate the academic freedom of law schools: an exercise the Court is actually called upon to do given that there are no factual issues involved.
- Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 violates the academic freedom of law schools, specifically:
a. Section 7(c) which empowers the LEB to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities[;]
b. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum standards for law admission;
c. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[;]
d. Section 7(f) which empowers the LEB to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study; and- Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 is a valid police power measure.4
x x x By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. x x xI submit that the Court not only has the opportunity but, in fact, the duty to settle the disputes given the serious allegations of infringement of the Constitution. The Court should thus not foster lingering or recurring litigation as this case already presents the opportune time to rule on the constitutionality of the LEB's statutory powers and how the LEB exercises the same. Hence, I maintain that the Court's disposition of the instant case should not be unduly restricted to only the question of the PhiLSAT's constitutionality.
x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:Much like the ponencia, I have undertaken the same exercise of evaluating, through the lens of academic freedom, the powers of the LEB and how the same are and have been exercised. As a result, I have identified several other LEB issuances beyond those identified by the ponencia which are arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus null and void.
a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Act[;]
b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein enumerated;
c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar;
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practising lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
MR. GUINGONA. x x xFurther, the Constitutional Commission deliberations on September 9, 1986 also discuss:
x x x x
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
x x x x
Delegate Clemente, chairman of the 1973 Constitutional Convention's Committee on Education, has this to say about supervision and regulation, and I quote:While we are agreed that we need some kind of supervision and regulation by the State, there seems to be a prevailing notion among some sectors in education that there is too much interference of the State in the management of private education. If that is true, we need some kind of re-examination of this function of the State to supervise and regulate education because we are all agreed that there must be some kind of diversity, as well as flexibility, in the management of private education. (Minutes of the November 27, 1971 meeting of the Committee on Education of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, pages 10 and 11.)10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
MR. MAAMBONG. What I am trying to say is that we have bogged down in this discussion because we do not see how we can reconcile a concept of state regulation and supervision with the concept of academic freedom.In sum, "reasonable supervision and regulation" by the State over educational institutions does not include the power to control, manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit, and dominate.
MR. GASCON. When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does not mean dictation, because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the pursuit of knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much academic freedom as it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of guidelines and others. We do not believe that the State has any right to impose its ideas on the educational institution because that would already be a violation of their constitutional rights.
There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of regulations, we speak of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining curricula, et cetera, but that does not give any mandate to the State to impose its ideas on the educational institution. That is what academic freedom is all about.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:In the exercise of this power, however, the LEB has grossly violated the academic freedom of law schools by going beyond reasonable supervision and regulation in their issuances. To illustrate:
x x x x
c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
x x x x
e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.] (Underscoring supplied)
Section 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a Ll.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees, to teach specific subjects.LEB Resolution No. 2014-02 and LEB Memorandum Order No. 17, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 17-2018), which implement the foregoing provision, mandate that law schools comply with the following percentages and schedules, under pain of downgrading, phase-out, and eventual closure. LEB Resolution No. 2014-02 provides:
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master oflaws degree:To ensure compliance with the foregoing, LEBMO No. 17-2018 imposes strict reportorial requirements, including the regular submission of various certifications and even the faculty members' LLM diplomas.362.1. School Year - 2017-2018 - 20%In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.
2.2. School Year - 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year - 2019-2020 - 60%
2.4. School Year - 2020-2021 - 80%The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
- Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
3.1 Supreme Court; 3.2 Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals; 3.3 Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General; 3.4 Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws; 3.5 Regional Trial Court Judges; 3.6 DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure; 3.7 Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law, Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects; 3.8 Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers; 3.9 Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective bureaus are implementing; 3.10 Ambassadors, Ministers and other diplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach International Law or related subjects; 3.11 Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation of their deans; and 3.12 Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided they teach the subjects of their expertise. (Underscoring supplied)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:Undoubtedly, the LEB overreaches its authority in requiring an LLM as a "minimum qualification." In imposing the foregoing requirement, the LEB arbitrarily usurped an institution's academic authority to gauge and to evaluate the qualifications of its educators on an individual basis, and hastily reduced the pool of expertise available for selection - to the detriment of the institution, the faculty, the students, and the profession as a whole.
Okay, on page seven (7) of your Brief, you mentioned that the master's requirement while laudable, may not be easily realizable in light of the practical difficulties in accessing and maintaining enrollment in graduate programs. Can you inform the Court exactly what [these] practical difficulties are?
DEAN CANDELARIA:
Your Honor, I teach at least in two (2) schools where there is graduate degree being offered, the Ateneo and San Beda Graduate School of Law with the consortium with the academy, and I have seen the difficulties in particular, for instance, for sitting deans or faculty members, to appropriate the time to actually access the centers for learning, because we don't have as much presence, perhaps, in the Visayas or Mindan[a]o. And of course, we have to ad[a]pt now, because some schools now are going out there, like Ateneo De Naga, has actually requested on-site the offerings. So, difficulties really abound insofar as remote areas are concerned. Manila is not so much problematic, for those who teach in Manila. But for those who would have to fly, from Samar, I know I have a student from Samar, from Mindanao, who would tranche a weekend curriculum, let's say at San Beda . . .
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
So, in other words, Dean, what you are saying is that, as an example, the physical location or the topography of the area is such that, insisting on this requirement would be a grave prejudice to these other law schools because they cannot, in fact, access further higher learning to comply with the requirements of [the] LEB.
DEAN CANDELARIA:
At this stage, Your Honor, as the lack of institutions is really evident, I think we may have to work on this progressively in the near future. With the cooperation of the Bench, the Bar, the Association of Law Schools, and also the Philippine Association of Law Professors, to be able to achieve that goal.39
Section 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his appointment as dean.The unreasonableness of the foregoing provisions is exemplified by the fact that deans are primarily "school administrators." While certainly, many legal luminaries have occupied, and currently occupy, the position of dean, there is no justifiable reason to absolutely require (rather than encourage or recommend) an LLM (for law deans) and Doctorate Degree (for graduate law deans), when the same would not necessarily improve the management or administration of a law institution. On the other hand, if legal scholarship and authority were to be made the standard, it is peculiar that even a retired Member of the Court would prove unfit, unless otherwise approved by the members of the LEB.
Section 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they have penned towards the degree ad eundem of Master of Laws. (Underscoring supplied)
JUSTICE LEONEN:Fifth. Finally, the LEB impairs institutional academic freedom by categorizing faculty members and interfering with faculty load, as follows:
Excuse me, for a moment, you are requiring from all Deans, which you supervise, [and] law professors that they have an advanced degree, yet the LEB does not have an advanced degree, how do you explain this?
[MR.] AQUENDE:
Your Honor, the justification or the rationale that was prepared by the previous Board because it was not approved during our term, the previous Board looked into the function of the LEB and which is not academic in nature, Your Honor.
x x x x
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And in LEB, maybe, even perhaps, you should take care first that the LEB members are all, at minimum, have masteral degrees from reputable law schools here or abroad or a doctoral degree for that matter before you apply it to your constituents, but my point is, isn't that unreasonable x x x
x x x x
x x x that you require deans to take an advance[d] degree x x x
x x x x
In other words, you imposed an educational requirement on law schools and certainly according to our jurisprudence, who to teach is an academic matter? It is a mission of a school and it is protected by academic freedom on the basis of your LLB or JD degrees?
[MR.] AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor. The point, Your Honor, is that the fact that the members of the LEB [do] not have x x x higher degrees [is] because the law does not require it. However, that does not mean that we could not x x x
x x x x
JUSTICE LEONEN:
If the law does not require it, it doesn't mean that anything you do will be reasonable. You have to actually prove to us because, again, from my point of view, the degree of judicial scrutiny of any interference On academic freedom x x x the degree of Scrutiny should be very tight. So again, my point is, perhaps you can address the reasonability of the requirement, etcetera x x x40
Section 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.The foregoing provisions unequivocally show that the LEB has not only overreached its authority to set minimum qualifications for faculty members, it has arbitrarily dabbled in the internal affairs of law schools, including the grant of faculty positions and titles, the regulation of work hours and occupations, and the assignment of work load. While presumably imposed for the benefit of the students and the professor, the imposition of the foregoing is better left to the individual institution which would be in a better position to determine the needs and capacities of its students and its faculty.
a) A full-time faculty member is one: 1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO NO. 1; 2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school; 3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and 4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution. b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time professor as enumerated in the preceding number.
Section 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified, in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with these rules.
Section 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours.41 (Underscoringsupplied)
First Year50In relation thereto, Section 58.2 of the same issuance particularly describes each course, the required units and hours per week, and even the manner by which each class should be conducted. Sample course descriptions' of the first year courses of JD degree are shown below:
1st SEMESTER 2nd SEMESTER COURSE UNIT COURSE UNIT Introduction to Law 1 Obligations and Contracts 5 Persons and Family Relations 4 Constitutional Law II 3 Constitutional Law I 3 Criminal Law II 4 Criminal Law I 3 Legal Technique and Logic 2 Statutory Construction 2 Legal Writing 2 Philosophy of Law 2 Basic Legal Ethics 3 Legal Research and Thesis Writing 2 Legal Profession 1 TOTAL 18 TOTAL 19
The LEB mandate that law schools offer specifically described subjects during a specific semester is a manifest violation of academic freedom, both individual and institutional.51 It does not only deprive the faculty member of his or her academic right to design the coverage of the course and to conduct classes as he or she sees fit, but also unreasonably usurps the academic institution's right to decide for itself 1) the subjects law students must take (core subjects) and the subjects law students may opt to take (non-core subjects/electives); 2) the coverage and content of each subject; and 3) the sequence by which the subjects should be taken.
COURSE NAME/NUMBER OF UNITS/CONTACT HOURS/ PREREQUISITES COURSE DESCRIPTION First Year - First Semester INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Cases, recitations and lectures;
1 hour a week;
1 unit A general course given to freshmen, providing for an overview of the various aspects of the concept of law, with emphasis on the relationship between law, jurisprudence, equity, courts, society and public policy, presented through selected provisions of law, cases and other materials depicting settled principles and current developments, both local and international, including a review of the evolution of the Philippine legal system. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Cases, recitations and lectures;
4 hours a week;
4 units A basic course on the law of persons and the family which first views the effect and application of laws, to examine the legal norms affecting civil personality, marriage, property relations between husband and wife, legal separation, the matrimonial regimes of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, and complete separation of property; paternity and filiation, ad[o]ption, guardianship, support, parental authority, surnames, absence and emancipation, including the rules of procedure relative to the foregoing. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Cases, recitations and lectures;
3 hours a week;
3 units A survey and evaluation of basic principles dealing with the structure of the Philippine Government. CRIMINAL LAW I
Cases, recitations and lectures;
3 hours a week;
3 units A detailed examination into the characteristics of criminal law, the nature of felonies, stages of execution, circumstances affecting criminal liability, persons criminally liable[,] the extent and extinction of criminal liability as well as the understanding of penalties m criminal law, their nature and theories, classes, crimes, habitual delinquency, juvenile delinquency, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Probation Law. The course covers Articles 1-113 of the Revised Penal Code and related laws. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Cases, recitations and lectures;
2 hours a week;
2 units A course that explores the use and force of statutes and the principles and methods of their construction and interpretation. PHILOSOPY OF LAW
2 hours a week;
2 units A study of the historical roots of law from Roman times, the schools of legal thought that spurred its growth and development, and the primordial purpose of law and legal education. LEGAL RESEARCH AND THESIS WRITING
Lectures, reading and practical work;
2 hours a week;
2 units The course will introduce structures to the methodology of legal research and the preparation of legal opinions, memoranda, or expository or critical paper on any subject approved by the faculty member teaching it. LEGAL PROFESSION
Cases, recitations and lectures
1 hour a week;
1 unit The history and development of the legal profession in the Philippines, its current problems, goals, and role in society. Also covered are the methodologies in the preparation of J.D. thesis First Year - Second Semester OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
Cases, recitations and lectures;
5 hours a week;
5 units An in-depth study of the nature, kinds and effect of obligations and their extinguishment[,] contracts m general, their requisites, form and interpretation[,] defective contracts, quasi contracts, natural obligations, and estoppel. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Cases, recitations and lectures;
3 hours a week;
3 units A comprehensive study of the Constitution, the bill of rights and judicial review of the acts affecting them. CRIMINAL LAW II
Cases, recitations and lectures;
4 hours a week;
4 units A comprehensive appraisal of specific felonies penalized in Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, their nature, elements and corresponding penalties. LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC
Recitations and lectures;
2 hours a week;
2 units A course on the methods of reasoning, syllogisms, arguments and expositions, deductions, the truth table demonstrating invalidity and inconsistency of arguments. It also includes the logical organization of legal language and logical testing of judicial reasoning. LEGAL WRITING
Lectures, reading and practical work;
2 hours a week;
2 units An introduction to legal writing techniques; it involves applied legal bibliography, case digesting and reporting analysis, legal reasoning and preparation of legal opinions or memoranda. BASIC LEGAL ETHICS
Cases, recitations and lectures;
3 hours a week;
3 units A course that focuses on the canons of legal ethics involving the duties and responsibilities of the lawyer with respect to the public or society, the bar or legal profession, the courts and the client.
While suggesting electives may be acceptable and even commendable, LEB Memorandum Order No. 14, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 14-2018) has 1) atrociously prohibited law schools from offering elective subjects not falling within the LEB's "suggested" list of electives, without prior LEB approval57 and 2) penalized the same with fines, and threats of downgrading, phase out, and/or eventual closure.58 This is grave abuse of the power to prescribe "basic curricula."SUGGESTED ELECTIVES (DESCRIPTION)
x x x x
JURIS DOCTOR (J.D.) PROGRAM
ADMIRALTY
The course covers the history or the genesis of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, up to the advent of the contentious Hague Rules of 1924, Hague Visby Rules of 1968 and Hamburg Rules of 1978, including aspects of bills of lading, charter parties, collision, salvage, towage, pilotage, and the Ship Mortgage Act. (2 units)
ADVANCED TAXATION
A seminar designed for students who are seriously considering tax practice. It examines the procedural requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. This includes a detailed look at the audit process from the examination of a return, and ending with a consideration of the questions surrounding the choice of a forum when litigation is appropriate. It also exposes students to some of the intellectual rigors of a high level tax practice. (Prerequisites: Taxation I and Taxation II) (2 units)
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
The course is designed to provide students with the skills necessary to successfully litigate appeals before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Emphasis will be placed on practical training including appellate procedure, oral and written presentation and methodology. Brief writing and other aspects of modern appellate practice are also covered. (2 units)
ARBITRATION LAWS
A study of the Philippine laws on Arbitration, the ICC Rules on Arbitration, the Conventions on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. (2 units)
BANKING LAW I (GENERAL BANKING)
The course covers the study of the rules and regulations governing banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, including the New Central Bank Act, the General Banking Law of 2000, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars, rules and regulations. (2 units)
BANKING LAWS II (INVESTMENT BANKING)
A study of the Finance Company Act, the Investment House Law and the Investment Company Act, and related Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. (1 unit)
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS LAW
This elective course aims to introduce the students to the legal framework of protection for children and the psycho-social dimensions of handling children's rights cases. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is used to provide the background on an international level. The course is divided further into specific clusters of rights of children in relation to Philippine laws, issuances, rules of court and jurisprudence. In each cluster the legal and psycho-social issues affecting certain groups of children (sexually and physically abused children in conflict with the law, child laborers, children in situations of armed conflict, trafficked children, displaced and refugee children, indigenous children, etc. . .) are discussed in order to understand in a holistic manner the plight of children within the legal system. The methods used in teaching the course include lectures, workshop exercises and mock trial. Students will also be exposed to actual case handling. (2 units)
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION I AND II
Supervised student practice under Rule 138-A (Law Student Practice Rule) of the Rules of Court including conference with clients, preparation of pleadings and motions, appearance in court, handling of trial, preparation of memorandum. The course will include the use of video equipments and computers to enhance training in direct and cross-examination techniques. (4 units)
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS
An introduction to the collective bargaining process, negotiations, mediation, and arbitration as experienced in both the private and government sectors, with emphasis on practice. (2 units)56
Section 4. Advanced Subjects and Back Subjects. As a general rule, a student shall not be permitted to take any advanced subject until he has satisfactorily passed the prerequisite subject or subjects.In relation thereto, LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016) dictates "what subjects need to be taken and passed by students in the basic law courses before being allowed to take the advanced subjects"60 as follows:
The foregoing cannot, in any way, be construed as falling within the' LEB's power to prescribe basic curricula. The basis for delineating "pre requisites" vis-a-vis "advanced subjects" is not only arbitrary, it is fundamentally flawed. To illustrate:
ADVANCED SUBJECT(S) PRE-REQUISITE SUBJECT(S)Administrative and Election Laws or Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law Constitutional Law I Agency, Trust and Partnership Obligations and Contracts Civil Law Review I Persons and Family Relations Property
SuccessionCivil Law Review II Civil Law Review I Civil Procedure Persons and Family Relations
Obligations and ContractsCommercial Law Review Agency, Trust and Partnership
Transportation
Credit Transaction
Corporation Law
Negotiable Instruments Law
InsuranceConstitutional Law Review Constitutional Law I
Constitutional Law IICriminal Law Review Criminal Law I
Criminal Law IICredit Transaction Obligations and Contracts Criminal Law II Criminal Law I Criminal Procedure Criminal Law I
Criminal Law IIEvidence Criminal Procedure
Civil ProcedureHuman Rights Law Constitutional Law II Insurance Obligations and Contracts Labor Law II Labor Law I Labor Law Review Labor Law I
Labor Law IILegal Forms Obligations and Contracts
Property
Sales
Credit Transactions
Negotiable Instruments Law
Agency, Trust and Partnership
Land Titles and Deeds
Criminal Procedure
Civil ProcedureLegal Counseling and Social Responsibility Basic Legal Ethics
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics
Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
EvidenceLegal Medicine Criminal Law II Obligations and Contracts Persons and Family Relations Practice Court I Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Evidence
Special Proceedings
Legal FormsPractice Court II Practice Court I Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Basic Legal Ethics Property Obligations and Contracts Remedial Law Review I Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Evidence
Special ProceedingsRemedial Law Review II Remedial Law Review I Sales Obligations and Contracts Special Proceedings Succession Succession Persons and Family Relations Property Taxation I Constitutional Law I Taxation II Persons and Family Property
Taxation I
SuccessionTorts and Damages Obligations and Contracts Transportation Obligations and Contracts
1) | Persons and Family Relations has been made a pre-requisite for Obligations and Contracts, while Persons and Family Property and Succession have been made pre-requisites for Taxation II,61 even though knowledge of the aforementioned "pre-requisite" may not necessarily be essential for studying the corresponding "advanced subject;" |
2) | Persons and Family Relations, Property, and Succession have been made pre-requisites to Civil Law Review I and Civil Law Review II, but curiously, Obligations and Contracts was not made a pre requisite for either of the Civil Law Review subjects;62 |
3) | Agency, Trust and Partnerships has been made a pre-requisite for Commercial Law Review,63 even though it has traditionally been treated as a Civil Law subject in the Bar; and |
4) | Legal Forms (a mere 2-unit subject) has been arbitrarily assigned 9 pre-requisites while Practice Court (which is not even a Bar subject) has been assigned 5 pre-requisites.64 |
DEAN CANDELARIA:While the Court does not pass upon questions regarding the wisdom of the LEB's prescribed curriculum, the Court is duty-bound to uphold an educational institution's right to determine and evaluate the propriety of assigning pre-requisites as an aspect of its right to determine what to teach and how to do so.
x x x [O]n student tenure, there had been changes in recent years, whereby they add or split courses. I'll give you an example concretely. When I took Administrative Law, it was offered with Public Corporation, I think it was also with Election Law, and Public Officers. That has been the experience for a long time. In more recent times, there had been splits by the Legal Education Board, and the problem that students who have taken it, or who are about to take it for instance, would be displaced in terms of the ladder of courses that they will take. So, we've had students who have had tenure problems, because they have to take one which, at that time, was actually not offered so, there is an administrative problem imputing the number of units, that's one concrete problem. On faculty for instance, the assignment, there have been changes when it comes to faculty assignments and I think the problem with many law schools also, is hiring. Faculty members who may have to teach new courses also that are now being required by the Legal Education Board. I think for instance, Environmental Law. I know Environmental Law is booming in this country, there is a roster of lawyers right now who have gone into Environmental Law. But there are other subjects, of course, that are being introduced that may really be not, I think, easily taught by incumbent faculty members. And the last one is tuition rates. When you start tampering with the number of units, in a law school operation, and recommending changes, it will affect tuition rates for many law schools. At least those who are reliant on private tuition.66 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Per Section 13 of RA 7722, the higher education institution shall exercise academic freedom in its curricular offerings but must comply with the minimum requirements for specific academic programs, the general education distribution requirements and the specific professional courses.Similarly worded provisions appear in the Standards and Guidelines for degrees in Computer Engineering,70 Political Science,71 Communications,72 Business Administration,73 Statistics,74 Education,75 among others.
Section 3. The Articles that follow set minimum standards and other requirements and prescriptions that all HEIs must adopt. These standards are expressed as a minimum set of desired program outcomes, as enumerated under Article IV, Section 6. The CHED designed the curricula to attain such outcomes. These curricula are shown in Article V, Section 9 as sample curricula. The numbers of units for these curricula are herein prescribed as the "minimum unit requirement" pursuant to Section 13 of RA 7722. In designing the curricula, the CHED employed a curriculum map for each program, samples of which are shown in Article V, Section 10.
Using an outcomes-based approach, the CHED also determined the appropriate curriculum delivery methods shown in Article V, Section 11. The sample course syllabus given in Article V, Section 12 shows some of these methods.
x x x x
Section 4. In recognition of the HEIs' vision, mission and contexts under which they operate, the HEIs may design curricula suited to their own needs. However, the HEIs must demonstrate that the same leads to the attainment of the required minimum set of outcomes. In the same vein, they have latitude in terms of curriculum delivery and in specifying and deploying human and physical resources as long as they attain the program outcomes and satisfy program educational objectives. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
FR. BERNAS. What I am concerned about, and I am sure the committee is concerned about also, is the danger always of the State prescribing subjects. I recall that when the sponsor was the dean of Arts and Sciences in La Salle, his association of private school deans was precisely fighting the various prescriptions imposed by the State - that the schools must teach this, must teach that. Are we opening that up here?In sum, the LEB's authority to prescribe the "basic curricula" is limited by the Constitutional right of law schools to academic freedom and to the due process standard of reasonableness. When the LEB (or any branch of government for that matter) interferes with Constitutional rights and freedoms and overreaches its authority, as it has done in this case, it is the Court's Constitutional duty to make it tow the line.
MR. VILLACORTA. The Commissioner is right in describing these as guidelines. This is not to say that there will be specific subjects that will embody these principles on a one to-one correspondence. In other words, we are not saying that there should be a subject called nationalism or ecology. That was what we were fighting against in the Association of Philippine Colleges of Arts and Sciences. The government always came up with what they called thrusts, and therefore the corresponding subjects imposed on schools that are supposed to embody these thrusts. So, we had current issues. It was a course that was required on the tertiary level. Then there was a time when they required subjects that dealt with green revolution; and then agrarian reform. Taxation is in fact still a required course. We are not thinking in those terms. These are merely guidelines.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, while the State will give the goals and guidelines, as it were, how these are to be attained is to be determined by the institution by virtue of its academic freedom.
MR. VILLACORTA. That is right, Mr. Presiding Officer. I invite, of course, my fellow members in the committee who might have some reservations on the points I raised.
FR. BERNAS. But I guess what I am trying to point out is: Are we really serious about academic freedom?
MR. VILLACORTA. Definitely, we are. Would the Commissioner have certain misgivings about the way we defined it?
FR. BERNAS. I would, if the committee goes beyond mere guidelines, because if we allow the State to start dictating what subjects should be taught and how these would be taught, I think it would be very harmful for the educational system. Usually, legislation is done by legislators who are not educators and who know very little about education. Perhaps education should be left largely to educators, with certain supervision, and so forth.
MR. VILLACORTA. Excuse me, Mr. Presiding Officer, if I may interject. I am sure the Honorable Bernas, being very much experienced in education, is aware of the fact that there is this great need to develop certain priority concerns in the molding of our youths' mind and behavior. For example, love of country is something that is very lacking in our society and I wonder if the Honorable Bernas would have any reservation against giving emphasis to nationalism.
FR. BERNAS. I have nothing against motherhood concepts, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. VILLACORTA. But this is always the dilemma of educators. To what extent do we give freedom as to the subject matter and manner of teaching versus certain imperatives of national development? In the last dispensation, we found a lopsided importance given to so-called national development which turned out to be just serving the interest of the leadership. The other members of the committee are fully aware of the dangers inherent in the State spelling out the priorities in education, but at the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that there are certain areas which must be emphasized in a developing society. Of course, we would wish that we shall not always be a developing society bereft of economic development as well as national unity. But we like the advise of the Honorable Bernas, as well as our colleagues in the Commission, on how we can constitutionalize certain priorities in educational development as well as curricular development without infringing necessarily on the goals of academic freedom. Moreover, jurisprudence accords academic freedom only to institutions of higher learning.
FR. BERNAS. So, I am quite satisfied that these are guidelines.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.To my mind, the ponencia correctly holds that the aforequoted provision encroaches on the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe the requirement for admission to the Bar as provided under Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.In his Amicus Brief, Dean Candelaria also noted that some of the provisions of R.A. 7662 are in apparent conflict with the power of the Court to promulgate rules and that law practice internship and mandatory continuing legal education are both subjects of Court rules and issuances.116
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.Additionally, after reviewing the various issuances of the LEB beyond those covering the PhiLSAT, I also vote to declare the following as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the institutional academic freedom of the law schools as well as the individual academic freedom of the law faculty:
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
- Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
- Section 7(e) of. R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
- Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to State supervision and control;
- Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
- Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
- Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
- The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
- Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course;
- LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the taking and passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law schools.
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic freedom; and- Sections 15; 16, 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011[.]
- The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
- Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
- Resolution No. 2014-02;
- Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2; [and]
- LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018; and (sic)
- The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
- Resolution No. 2015-08;
- Sections 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
- Sections 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.117
Endnotes:
1 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
2 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (g).
3 Id. at par. (h).
4 Advisory, p. 3.
5 391 Phil. 84 (2000).
6 Id. at 107-108.
7Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000).
8Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975).
9 Art. XV, Sec. 8, par. (1).
10 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 56-57.
11 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 441.
12 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1: "Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions." (Underscoring supplied)
13Amicus Brief, p. 6.
14 CONSTITUTION, (1987), Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. (2).
15Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 943.
18 LEB Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), Section 31.1. A PERMIT entitles a law school to open and to offer the subjects of the first year of the law curriculum. A permit must be obtained before each academic year to enable the law school to operate on the succeeding academic year.
19 Id. at Sec. 33.1, par. (4). See also Section 20 of the same LEBMO, which states that "The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science, properly equipped with the necessities of legal education, particularly library facilities including reliable internet access as well as suitable classrooms and a Moot Court room. There shall likewise be provided a faculty lounge for the convenience of members of the faculty."
20 Id. at par. (5); underscoring supplied.
21 Id. at par. (7); underscoring supplied.
22 Id. at par. (8); underscoring supplied.
23 Id. at Sec. 34.
24 Id. at par. (d); underscoring supplied.
25 Id. at Sec. 35, par. (3).
26 Id. at Sec. 31.2. "A RECOGNITION constitutes full mandatory accreditation. It allows the law school to graduate its students, to confer upon them their degrees and titles and to endorse them to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the Bar Examinations."
27 Id. at Sec. 35, par. (1).
28 Id. at Sec. 37.
29 Sec. 31, par. (2), which defines that "[a]s indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law or their ratings in the students' and deans' evaluations are below 75% or its equivalent in other scoring system;" underscoring supplied.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at par. (1).
35 Id.
36 Sec. 8.
37 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1983), provides:
SEC. 15. Qualifications. - No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
x x x x
SEC. 26. Qualifications. - No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. (Underscoring supplied)
38Amicus Brief, p. 7.
39 TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 102-103.
40 Id. at 173-175.
41 LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 33-35. See also LEB Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 14-2018).
42Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.
43Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, 754 Phil. 590, 655 (2015).
44 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (f).
45 Sec. 33, par (6) and 53.
46 Id. at Sec. 54.
47 Id. at Sec. 55.
48 Id. at Sec. 58.
49 Sec. 3.
50 LEBMO No. 1-2011, Sec. 55.2.
51Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.
52 LEBMO No. 1-2011, Sec. 58.1 and 58.2, Second Year, First Semester, 2-unit subject, described as "A study of Presidential Decree No. 27, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and related laws and regulations, and the Special Security Act and the. Government Service Insurance Act."
53 Id. at Sec. 58.2, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "This is an elective subject that allows for more concentrated study on any of the following possible areas of international law: a. International Criminal Law: that should be taken with reference to R.A. 9851; b. The Law of the Sea: which should be of special interest to the Philippines because we are an archipelagic state; and c. International Trade Law: particularly the regime of the World Trade Organization."
54 Id. at Sec. 58, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "Study focused on the aspects of protecting, defending and seeking redress for violations of human rights in the Philippines."
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Par. (3).
58 Id. at par. (7).
59 LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016), par. (4).
60 Id. at par. (1).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65Amicus Brief, p. 7.
66 TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 106-107.
67 R.A. 7722, Sec. 13.
68 Id.
69 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR IN JOURNALISM (B JOURNALISM) AND BACHELOR OF ARTS IN JOURNALISM (BA JOURNALISM) PROGRAMS, May 12, 2017.
70 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER ENGINEERING (BSCPE) EFFECTIVE (AY) 2018-2019, CHED Memorandum Order No. 087-17, December 4, 2017.
71 POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR THE BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (BA POS) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 051-17, May 31, 2017.
72 REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES (PSGS) FOR BACHELOR OF ARTS IN COMMUNICATION (BA COMM) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 035-17, May 11, 2017.
73 REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, CHED Memorandum Order No. 017-17, May 9, 2017.
74 POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN STATISTICS (BS STAT) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 042-17, May 17, 2017.
75 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SECONDARY EDUCATION (BSED), CHED Memorandum Order No. 075-17, November 2, 2017.
76 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 77 (August 29, 1986).
77 LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 7-11,
78Section 7. School Records of a Student. The school record of every student shall contain the final rating in each subject with the corresponding credits, and the action thereon preferably indicated by "passed" or "failed". No final record may contain any suspensive mark such as "Inc.". The student must either be given a passing or a failing grade in the final record.
79 Sec. 24.
80 Id. at Sec. 15.
81 Id. at Sec. 25.
82 Id. at Sec. 26.
83 Id. at Sec. 27.
84 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (a).
85 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(1).
86 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(2).
87 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(3).
88 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(4).
89Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.
90Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, supra note 43, at 655-656.
91 Id. at 657-658, citing University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 306-308 (1999).
92 Sec. 15.
93 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (d).
94 Id. at par. (c).
95 Id. at Sec. 8.
96 Id. at Sec. 9.
97 Sec. 30.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at Sec. 31.
101 Id. at Sec. 31.1.
102 Id. at Sec. 31.2.
103 Id. at Sec. 20.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at Sec. 24. In LEB Memorandum Order No. 23, Series of 2019 (LEBMO No. 23-2019), the LEB saw fit, under pain of administrative sanctions, to regulate the establishment of Law Journals, including the composition, position, and powers of the Editorial Board, the frequency of publication, and even a Law Journal's format and style.
108 Id. at Sec. 33.1.
109 Id. at Sec. 21.
110 Id. at Sec. 34, par. (d).
111 Id.
112 Id. at Sec. 37.
113 Id. at Sec. 43.
114Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1005 (1988).
115Ponencia, p. 102.
116Amicus Brief, p. 4.
117Ponencia, pp. 101-103.
REYES, J. JR., J.:
The question in the instant case is simple - may the State, under the guise of improving the quality of legal education forbid its own citizens from pursuing a course in law?
In the instant consolidated Petitions for Prohibition, and Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional RA No. 7662, or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993. They principally target Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 ("LEBMO NO. 7"), which established the Philippine Law School Admission Test ("PhilSAT"), and the subsequent Legal Education Board Memorandum Orders and Circulars issued in relation thereto, particularly Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 ("LEBMO No. 11") which supplies transitional provisions for LEBMO No. 7 and Legal Education Board Memorandum Circular No. 18 ("LEBMC No. 18"), which enumerates the PhilSAT eligibility requirements for freshmen law students for academic year 2018-2019.1
The ponencia focused its scrutiny on LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, LEBMO No. 11, Series of 2017, and LEBMO No. 18, which were all declared to be unconstitutional. This examination was based on the assumption that the objection against the PhilSAT lies at the core of all the Petitions.2
I agree with the ponencia in striking as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7, and all its adjunct orders. I further concede that they must be struck down on the basis of police power, and for being violative of the institutions' and students' academic freedom. In addition, I wish to highlight certain important matters that were not mentioned in the ponencia.
The Importance of Education in the Philippine Setting
Education is a continuing concern that is impressed with public interest. The importance of education in our country is apparent from the numerous Constitutional provisions highlighting the obligation of the State to nurture and protect our educational systems, viz.:
"ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLESThe common thread that runs through these Constitutional provisions is the State's priority towards education. This stems from the reality that "education and total human development [are] the gateway not only to intellectual and moral development but also to economic advancement and the cultivation of the yearning for freedom and justice."3 It leads to the promotion of "total human liberation and development."4
Article II, Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
ARTICLE XIV. EDUCATION
Article XIV, Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
Article XIV, Section 2. The State shall:
1. Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
2. Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
3. Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;
4. Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
5. Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article XIV, Section 4. The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions."
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Act;Latching on to its power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission, on December 29, 2016, the LEB released LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, which provides for the implementation of a nationwide uniform law school admission test - the PhilSAT. It is an aptitude exam that is designed to "measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law," through a series of questions that gauge his/her proficiencies in communications, language, critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.8
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."In Philippine jurisprudence, one of the earliest definitions of this term emerged from the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology where the Court held that "the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (i) admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure."17
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . ." Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."16
"educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study."25Indeed, institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their own policies - academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. This includes the creation of their own distinct policies, standards or criteria in the selection of their students, in accordance with their vision-mission and objectives. Remarkably, this prerogative is essential to their very functioning and identity. For sure, the schools' body politic serves as a representation of their standards, an embodiment of their vision, and a reflection of their ideals.
MR. GASCON: When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does not mean dictation, because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the pursuit of knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much academic freedom it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of guidelines and others. We do not believe that the State has any right to impose its ideas on the educational institution because that would already be a violation of their constitutional rights.In fact, even the legislative and executive branches of government protect this liberty. Particularly, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, as amended, the State affirms the objective of establishing and maintaining a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development.29 Further, Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 232 recognizes that to achieve this goal, the determination of admission standards should be left to the schools, and not to the State, viz.:
There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of regulations, we speak of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining curricular et cetera, but that does not give any mandate to the State to impose its ideas ·on the educational institution. That is what academic freedom is all about.28
Sec. 13. Rights of Schools. - In addition to their rights provided for by law, school shall enjoy the following:Of course, this is not to relegate the State to being an impotent commander or a mere passive guardian. The State may set minimum admission requirements, provided that these are reasonable and equitable in their application, both for the school and the applicant.30 Said standards must never transgress upon Constitutional rights.
1. The right of their governing boards or lawful authorities to provide for the proper governance of the school and to adopt and enforce administrative or management systems.
2. The right for institutions of higher learning to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of the study and research. (Emphasis supplied)
JUSTICE A. REYES:Concededly, although the PhilSAT measures a person's aptitude or ability to cope with the rigors of law school, this is but a one-sided assessment. It fails to consider the person's diligence, drive or zeal - which are equally important in successfully obtaining a degree in law. Surely, one who may not be as proficient in language or reasoning, but is filled with a passion and a desire to learn, may perform as well as another who is innately intelligent, but who is apathetic and indifferent. There are certainly other extraneous factors, traits or characteristics that make a good student, which the law school must be allowed to consider, should it so desire.
All right. But then you would always state that it is not a guarantee that a student will pass law school because he passed the law entrance exam?
DEAN CANDELARIA:
I agree, Your Honor, in fact in my conversations with Father Bernas who has a longer stay with me in the law school, I think he has even said that any students catch up, let [sic] say, people who may have studied in other regions, they easily catch up once they go to Manila, at least in the Ateneo when he was Dean and I've observed this also during my tenure that there are people who have caught up with the rest come second year. . ."31
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. - In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:More so, as adverted to by the ponencia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "[e]veryone has a right to education. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."44
1. The right to receive, primarily through competent instruction, relevant qualify education in line with national goals and conducive to their full development as person with human dignity.
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.43 (Emphasis supplied)
by expressly guaranteeing academic freedom the new provision implicitly distinguishes academic freedom from a citizen's political right of free expression. Litigation on this new freedom, therefore will force the courts to search for standards of adjudication, standards not necessarily identical with those that have already been established for the general freedom of expression. Academic freedom is freedom not just in the context of a political freedom but also in the context of a narrower academic community. The implication of this distinction must be explored. The search for standards for academic freedom must take into consideration not just the general theory of freedom of expression but also the functions of a university.46More so, beyond the Philippine laws and Constitution, the right to knowledge is a universal human right, protected no less by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICPR").
Article 19Indeed, freedom of expression, which includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds, is a civil and political right. It is an inalienable right that stems from a person's inherent dignity. It is likewise the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. in the world.48 As such, this essential guarantee may only be restricted insofar as it violates the rights and reputation of others, or if absolutely necessary to protect national security and public order.49
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.47
"JUSTICE A. REYES: But you are not in the pursuit of the study of law not in the pursuit of being a lawyer. Is there a need for an entrance exam if he just wants to study the law itself as a person?Lest it be forgotten, the law is not only a profession, but it is first and foremost, a field of study. It is an interesting and practical science, that proves useful for everyday life, and for one's personal growth and career. For instance, the Law on Obligations and Contracts is practical for one engaged in business; Constitutional Law piques the interest of one desirous to learn about the workings of the government and the citizen's fundamental rights; and Criminal Law, inflames one curious about society's penal laws and systems. For others, obtaining a Bachelor's Degree or a Juris Doctor in Law serves as a gateway to promotion. These are but a few examples of a myriad of realities pertaining to the law's importance as an academic field.
x x x x
He doesn't want to become a lawyer, he just wants to be a student of the law. He has a lot of time on his hands, he has all the money. He just wants to study law, is there anything wrong with that?"51
Preventing anyone from going to law school who can afford to go to school pay for his own tuition fees, that's unreasonable. Even if he scores only one percent (1%), if the school is willing to accept him, he is willing to pay, you cannot stop him.53Also, as eloquently articulated by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that, freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy Reyes pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the level of scrutiny should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I would think it would apply strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no study that supported it, then perhaps, it may be stricken down as unreasonable, and therefore, grave abuse of discretion. x x x54It is therefore apparent that an individual's right to knowledge and the manner by which such knowledge is pursued, are entitled to a high degree of protection by the State and its agencies. Our State is in no way autocratic. It is not repressive, and should not prevent its citizens from gaining knowledge that will promote their personal growth.55 These are simple realities that cannot be ignored. To deprive a person of his right to knowledge, which is an adjunct of one's freedom of expression, may not be done under flimsy and vague pretexts. This Constitutional protection to freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the spectrum of rights, and is certainly entitled to the highest level of scrutiny.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions."57 (Emphasis in the original)Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State must be reasonable. This "reasonableness" in no way grants a warrant for the State to exercise oppressive control over the schools. In the case of the PhilSAT, in addition to being arbitrary and oppressive, the LEB likewise failed to establish that the means employed will serve its purpose of improving the quality of legal education.
Endnotes:
1 Petition, p. 1148.
2 Main Decision, p. 15.
3 Deliberations for the I 987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 170; Bernas, p. 91.
4 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Sec. 17.
5 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2(3).
6 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2(1).
7 REPUBLIC ACT No. 7662 - An Act Providing for Reforms in the Legal Education, Creating for the Purpose, A Legal Education Board and For Other Purposes.
8 LEBMO No. 7.
9 Id.
10 LEBMO No. 7; LEBMO No. 2-2013, Section 32.
11 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 4(1).
12 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5(2).
13The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 627 Phil. 669, 683 (2010).
14University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 306-307 (1999).
15 Bernas, p. 1294.
16Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 674 (1993).
17 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975).
18Mercado, et al. v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., 632 Phil. 228, 251 (2010), citing Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000).
19The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co, supra note 13.
20Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 17.
21 Id. at 943.
22 Id.
23University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 819, 833 (1994).
24Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 16.
25 Id. at 673.
26 Supra note 23.
27 Id. at 833 citing Licup, et al. v. University of San Carlos (USC), et al., 258-A Phil. 417, 423-424 (1989).
28 Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 441.
29 Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Sec. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy.
30 Bernas, p. 1306.
31 Transcript of Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, p. 122.
32 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5(3).
33 Supra note 16.
34 Id.
35 Bernas, p. 1295.
36 Id.
37 Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 438.
38 Id. at 439.
39 Id. at 438.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 439.
43University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 832-833.
44 Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
45 Bernas, pp. 1298-1299.
46 Bernas, p. 1301.
47 Article 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
48 Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
49 Article 12, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
50Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).
51 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 123.
52 Id.
53 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 184.
54 Transcript, Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 173.
55Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 50 at 1005.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1004-1005.
58 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 172.
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 230642, it seeks to nullify Republic Act No. 7662 and abolish the Legal Education Board (LEB); and in G.R. No. 242954, to annul and set aside LEB Memorandum Order Nos. 7-2016 and 11-2017, dated December 29, 2016 and April 20, 2017, respectively, and LEB Memorandum Circular No. 18-2018, dated October 5, 2018.
I vote to partly grant the consolidated petitions.
There is a stereotype that the study of law is a precursor for the practice of law. However, the study of law is not that simple. There may be instances when a person studies law for its philosophy, wisdom, and concepts; and choose not to take the bar examinations as he or she is not interested in becoming a lawyer. Thus, the study of law does not always result into the practice of law. Nonetheless, even after hurdling the bar, lawyers and judges are still mandated to continue the study of law. It is a well-settled rule that the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process.1
The study of the law is not an exact science with definite fields of black and white and unbending rules and rigid dogmas. The beauty of this discipline in the words of Justice Holmes, is the "penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to another," that gives rise to those honest differences of opinion among the brotherhood as to its correct interpretation. Honest differences are allowed and, indeed, inevitable, but we certainly must frown on stilted readings to suit one's motives, especially if they are less than noble. The law does not permit this, and much less, for that matter, does equity.2
Academic Freedom of Institutions of Higher Learning
It is clear that the study of law is within the domain of academic freedom. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,3 the Court stated that the term "academic freedom", which has evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, it has been identified with the right of individuals in universities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure. Obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where this freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure.4
Academic freedom has long been recognized by our organic laws. Section 5, Article XIV, of the 1935 Constitution states that universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. Likewise, Section 8, Article XV, of the 1973 Constitution states that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. Under the present Constitution, Section 5, Article XIV, states that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Verily, institutions of higher learning, such as schools, colleges, and universities offering a degree program in law, all have constitutionally enshrined academic freedom.
Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning have the following essential freedoms: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.5 This was first discussed in the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire.6 In that case, Paul Sweezy, who was an economist and lecturer in the University of New Hampshire, was subpoenaed by the State Attorney General to answer several questions, which included inquiries regarding his lectures on Socialism at the university. Paul Sweezy refused to answer particular questions and was declared in contempt of court. The SCOTUS reversed the contempt charge on the basis of violation of academic freedom and stated that:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die.7In the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, he explained the importance of academic freedom in a university, viz:
"In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.' This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.In the subsequent case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,9 the SCOTUS held that a law cannot force teachers to sign an oath stating they are not members of certain communist parties pursuant to their academic freedom and because the law is overbreadth, to wit:
. . . .
"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the concern of the university.
. . . .
". . . It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."8 (emphasis supplied)
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."On the other hand, in University of California Regents v. Bakke,10 the SCOTUS tackled the legality of the university policy which requires a particular number of minorities for admission. It grounded its analysis on academic freedom and stated that "the university's use of race in its admission may use for the attainment of a diverse student body. Nothing less than the nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this United States. In seeking the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,' a university seeks to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. Both tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial."11 Nevertheless, while race may be considered as one of the several factors for admission, the SCOTUS ruled that the specific or fixed number of minorities for university admission is too unreasonable. The ruling in University of California Regents v. Bakke was affirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger,12 regarding admission in the University of Michigan Law School, Gratz v. Bollinger,13 regarding the point system admission policy of the University of Michigan, and Fisher v. University of Texas.14
The Equal Protection Clause did not enact a requirement that law schools employ as the sole criterion for admissions a formula based upon the LSAT and undergraduate grades, nor does it prohibit law schools from evaluating an applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to overcome. A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That applicant would be offered admission not because he is black, but because as an individual he has shown he has the potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior opportunities offered him. Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, that black applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year of law school, or even in the full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career his achievements may far outstrip those of his classmates whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional criteria. There is currently no test available to the Admissions Committee that can predict such possibilities with assurance, but the Committee may nevertheless seek to gauge it as best it can, and weigh this factor in its decisions. Such a policy would not be limited to blacks, or Chicanos or Filipinos, or American Indians, although undoubtedly groups such as these may in practice be the principal beneficiaries of it. But a poor Appalachian white, or a second generation Chinese in San Francisco, or some other American whose lineage is so diverse as to defy ethnic labels, may demonstrate similar potential and thus be accorded favorable consideration by the Committee41 (emphases supplied)On the other hand, in the United Kingdom (UK), there is a National Admissions Test for Law (LNAT), which was adopted in 2004.42 It is the only aptitude test currently used in the UK for the selection of people to the legal profession.43 It was established by a consortium of Universities, comprised of the following: University of Bristol, Durham University, University of Nottingham and University of Oxford, King's College London, LSE London School of Economics and Political Science, and University College London.44 The LNAT consists of a multiple choice test and a written essay and is designed to measure the following verbal reasoning skills: comprehension, interpretation, analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction. The test is used by participating UK law schools to aid in the selection of law students.45
Thus, the unified admission test in the future, spearheaded by the law schools, must impose only reasonable fees to the examinees. It should not be a money-making venture. The fees of the examination should only be for the exact expense in conducting the admission test; nothing more, nothing less. There should be no additional and unnecessary financial burden imposed on the examinees.
6. Q: What personal experience do you have with the PhilSAT exam? A: I first took the PhilSAT exam last April 2018. 7. Q: Where did you take the exam? A: Cebu City. 8 Q: Are you a permanent resident of Cebu? A: No. 9. Q: Where is your permanent residence? A: I am from Maasin City, Leyte. 10. Q: If you are from Leyte, why did you take the exam in Cebu City? A: The LEB offers the exam in only seven (7) testing centers across the country, Cebu being one of them. 11. Q: What effect did this limited number of available testing centers have on your PhilSAT experience? A: Since the exam would not be conducted in our area, I was compelled to travel from Leyte to Cebu City. We had to travel the day after my graduation in order for me to arrive in Cebu on time to take the exam. During the registration period, we also had to travel to another town around five (5) hours away just to deposit the testing fee since the bank in our locality did not accept checkbook as a mode of payment.58
Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.Section 5 provides several requirements for the admission to the bar. Nevertheless, these requirements also affect the curriculum offered by law school. In effect, for a law school to successfully field bar examinees, it must offer all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree. Thus, it cannot simply offer a two (2)-year short course on law.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics, and clinical legal education program.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.59
Sec. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a ce1iificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.The above-quoted provision provides that any potential law student must have a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. If a law school admits students without these completed courses, then it will not be able to produce bar examinees. Verily, this rule affects the admission policy of the institutes of higher learning with respect to law students.
Lastly, even after earning a law degree, the Supreme Court continues to participate in the study of law. Bar Matter No. 850, which was adopted by the Court on August 22, 2000, provides for the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirement for members of the Bar. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.60Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
Section 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrolment period.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:Some of the powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662 can be harmonized with the Constitution. For instance, Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 states:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:Said provision states that the LEB has the power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools. However, it also provides for a reasonable limitation on the exercise of such power: it should not encroach the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. With this, the law schools are safeguarded that the LEB will not arbitrarily exercise its power to set the standards of accreditation because of the reasonable limitation of academic freedom. This reasonable limitation should also be read together with the, other powers provided by R.A. No. 7662 so that the LEB will not encroach upon the constitutional rights of law schools. Pursuant to this interpretation, majority of the powers of the LEB listed under the law will conform to the organic law and the Court will not be required to pass upon the constitutionality of these statutory provisions.
x x x x
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning[.] (emphasis supplied)
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:The provision clearly covers the continuing legal education of practicing lawyers. However, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court has the exclusive judicial power to: "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged." Accordingly, only the Court has the power to prescribe rules with respect to the continuing practice of lawyers.
x x x x
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] (emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1Heirs of Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, 623 Phil. 178, 188 (2009).
2Royal Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 570, 575 (1986).
3 294 Phil. 654 (1993).
4 Id. at 672-673.
5 Id. at 673.
6 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
10 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11 Id.
12 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
13 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
14 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
15 408 Phil. 132 (2001).
16 Id. at 145.
17 Id. at 145-146.
18 I60-A Phil. 929 (1975).
19 Id. at 945.
20 Supra note 3.
21 Id. at 675.
22 258-A Phil. 417 (1989).
23 Id. at 423.
24 298 Phil. 382 (1993).
25 Id. at 388.
26 487 Phil. 449 (2004).
27 Id. at 466.
28Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).
29 236 Phil. 768 (1987).
30See Developing and Assembling the Law School Admission Test, Ronald Armstrong, Dmitry Belov, Alexander Weissman, Interfaces, Vol. 35, No. 2, March - April 2005, p. 141.
31See Standard 503, Chapter 5, Admission and Student Services, 2017-2018 American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure.
32 Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology-Or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy Has the Makings of a Lawyer, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 454, 463-464 (1929).
33 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
34 WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, A History of the Law School Admission Council and the LSAT, Keynote Address, 1998 LSAC Annual Meeting.
35 Id. at 5-6.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 6 & 8.
38 Id. at 10.
39 Id. at 8.
40 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The ponencia therein denied the petition questioning the Admission Policy of University of Washington Law School in treating minorities differently in their admission to law school. It was essentially denied because the petitioner therein will already complete his law school studies, hence, the petition was moot.
41 Id.
42 New entry test for law students, BBC News, February 2, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/3451897.stm [last accessed September 3, 2019].
43 Aptitude Testing and the Legal Profession, Dr. Chris Dewberry, Birkbeck, University of London, June 6, 2011, p. 61, (2011).
44 WHY JOIN LNAT?, LNAT National Admission Test for Law, https://lnat.ac.uk/why-join-lnat/ [last accessed September 3, 2019].
45 Supra note 43 at 61-62.
46 In the UK, undergraduate grades are measured through A-Levels and General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE).
47 Supra note 44.
48 The Pearson Guide to the LLB Entrance Examinations, Edgar Thorpe and Showick Thorpe, Pearson Education India, p. 22, 2008.
49 Id.
50 NLUs enter into new CLAT MoU, ensuring full participation of all 16 NLUs (except NLU Delhi), Shrivastava, Prachi, Legally India, https://www.legallyindia.com/pre-law/all-16-nlus-can-now-conduct-clatunlike-earlier-7-20141103-5262 [last accessed September 3, 2019].
51 PALS reelect UE Dean Valdez, University of the East News, March 16, 2012, [https://www.ue.edu.ph/news/?p=2786 last accessed August 15, 2019].
52See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), citing B. Hoffmann, The Tyranny of Testing 91-92 (1962).
53See Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 7662.
54Bito-onon v. Hon. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702 (2001).
55Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146, 152 (1994).
56 Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. No. 245954, p. 33.
57 Sec. 5, LEB Memorandum Order No. 7, series of 2016.
58 Judicial Affidavit of petitioner Gretchen M. Vasquez, Annex F of Memorandum of Abayata, et al., p. 3.
59 As amended by A.M. 19-03-24-SC, Amendment of Rule 138, Section 5 in relation to the Revision of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, July 23, 2019.
60 Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.
61 History of PHILJA, http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph/history.html [last accessed: June 6, 2019].
62See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); citing Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Tradlitional Criteria, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 332-333.
63 Dated June 25, 2019.
64See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Del Castillo, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 292, 357-363 (2016).
65David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529, 575 (2016).
66 Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.
67 Section 7(c) & (d).
68See Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 38-39.
69Atty. Villonco v. Atty. Roxas, A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Teacher: Q - What are fruits as they relate to our study of Obligations & Contracts?Each of us has distinct competencies. Some run quicker than others. A few love to ruminate. There are fifteen (15) Justices in the Court, and in a room full of lawyers and judges, this is as exclusive as it can get. Of the several hundreds who take the Bar, not everyone gets over the hurdle. In any World Cup, there are only a number of aspirants. The top-tier law schools cannot accommodate a slew of the applicants. It is not society's fault that not every Army officer comes from the Philippine Military Academy, or a lawyer can claim blue, maroon, red, yellow, or green as the color of his or her scholastic pedigree. The right of each citizen to select a course of study is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
Student - "The Obligations and contracts is very beneficial to our life. The fruit I relate is Banana. This fruit have a vitamins and it gave the beneficial like became taller."3
. . . . the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:A citizen - not any individual but a citizen - has the right to select a profession or a course of study leading to that chosen profession; however, the citizen is not guaranteed admission to the profession or to the course of study and school of his or her choosing. The right given to every citizen is to select - a profession or course of study. BUT this right does not necessarily give rise to and guarantee a right to pursue, and engage in, the chosen profession of the citizen or a right to be admitted to the course of study and school of the citizen's choosing. The citizen must have to consider the State's duty to regulate and supervise reasonably educational institutions, which would have to include measures to assure the citizen's access to quality education, as well as the express limitation inherent in every citizen's right to select a profession or course of study, i.e. - - - fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both public and private. When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others.
Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving it.7 (emphasis added)
We all have different competencies. Some of us are intellectually gifted, some of us athletically gifted, some of us are great listeners. Everyone has a different level of what they can do.In the context of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT), whose validity as a screening mechanism I stand by as my resolution to this Opinion's second issue. Indeed, nothing can be more liberating than taking the epigraphs to heart and to bear on one's aspirations in life.
Don't take on things you don't believe in and that you yourself are not good at. Learn to say no. Effective leaders match the objective needs of their company with the subjective competencies. As a result, they get an enormous amount of things done fast.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.Imposing regulatory and supervisory functions upon the members of the Court constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive functions. In resolving the first issue, we are duty bound not to overstep the Court's boundaries by taking over the functions of an administrative agency. We should abstain from exercising any function which is not strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on the Court by the Constitution.18 To stress, "the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions."19Do Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 and Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7, series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7) fall within the constitutionally permissible supervision and regulation? I submit that both Subsection 7(e) of RA7662 and LEBMO No. 7, series of 2016, as a minimum standard for admission to a law school, fall within the constitutionally-permissible reasonable supervision and regulation by the State over all educational institutions.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. (emphasis added)
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members . . . .The State objectives in the enactment of Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 are found in Sections 2 and 3 of the same statute:
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence. Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.The objectives of Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 are pressing and substantial. This is because they arise from, or at least relate to, the objective of achieving quality of education (including of course legal education), which the Constitution has seen proper to elevate as a normative obligation.
Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self-improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms. (emphasis added)
. . . . the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards.27Subsection 7(e) impairs the right of a citizen to select a profession and a course of study and the academic freedom of every law school only as little as reasonably possible. For Subsection 7(e) prescribes only minimum standards of law admission and faculty competence and compensation.
Accepting that quality legal education is a pressing and substantial objective, the screening of law students and the provision of minimum levels of competency and compensation standards for law faculty are logical necessary steps towards achieving this objective.YEAR, MONTHPASSING RATE2017, April81.43%2017, September57.76%2018, April61.39%2018, September56.78%2019, AprilUnreleased29
[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards.30I now apply the proportionality test to determine the reasonableness of LEBMO No. 7.
[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards.34PhiLSAT as devised is proportionate to PhiLSAT's objectives. The following proportionality inquiry proves this conclusion.
1. Policy and Rationale. - To improve the quality of legal education, all those seeking admission to the basic law courses leading to either a Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree shall be required to take the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT), a nationwide uniform admission test to be administered under the control and supervision of the [Legal Education Board].No. 1 of LEBMO No. 7 states the animating purpose, to improve the quality of legal education, for requiring the taking of the PhiLSAT by applicants for admission to a law school.
2. Test Design. - The PhiLSAT shall be designed as a one-day aptitude test that can measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. It shall test communications and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. (emphasis added)
7. Passing Score - The cut off or passing score for the PhilSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.This stage of the analysis requires us to refer to Nos. 10 and 11 of LEBMO No. 7:
8. Test Results - Every examinee who passed the PhilSAT shall be issued by the testing administrator a CERTIFICATE OF LEGIBILITY (COE), which shall contains the examinees test score/rating and general average to the bachelor's degree completed. Examinees who fail to meet the cut-off or passing score shall by issued a Certificate of Grade containing his/her test score/rating. The COE shall be valid for two (2) years and shall be submitted to the admitting law school by the applicant.
9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhilSAT as a requirement for admission to any law School in the Philippines. Upon the affectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhilSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid COE as proof thereof. (emphasis added)
10. Exemption. - Honor graduates granted professional civil service professional eligibility pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 907 who are enrolling within two (2) years from their college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT from for purposes of admission to the basic law course.No. 11 of LEBMO No. 7 itself expressly recognizes the right of law schools to impose screening measures in addition to the taking or writing of PhiLSAT, such as but not limited to a PhiLSAT score of higher than 55%, additional admission tests, and personal interview of the applicant.
11. Institutional Admission Requirements. - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality of the applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant (emphasis added)
Are Subsections 7(g) and (h) of RA 7662 ultra vires for encroaching into the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.These provisions read:
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.We can opt to read these provisions niggardly or reasonably, the first resulting in an obvious conflict with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the practice or procedure before our courts and other decision-making bodies and over members of the Bar, while the second seeks a middle way that does not strain the wording of these provisions.38I opt to read these provisions with respect and deference to the legislative intent not to violate the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court. This is consistent with enshrined principles of statutory construction.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary.
The Court further declares:Pray tell, what can the LEB do now without encroaching on the academic freedom of law schools - if it is unconstitutional for LEB to require a qualifying examination such as PhiLSAT, when LEB can only recommend but not impose? Where does the exercise of regulation and supervision in this kind of ruling come in? Truly, the Decision takes with its left hand what it gives with its right. We are back to square one.
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions. of higher learning; and
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
Endnotes:
1 A to Z Quotes at https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.htm (last accessed July 23, 2019), attributed to Michelle Bachmann.
2 A to Z Quotes at https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.htm (last accessed July 23, 2019), attributed to Peter Drucker.
3 Quoted with permission, name of school, teacher, and student purposely withheld.
4Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R No. 216930, October 9, 2018.
5 Ibid.
6 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
7Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines, Supra note 4.
8 Id. at 1251-1252.
9 G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.
10 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, citing IV RECORD 258-260.
11 G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987.
12 The Subsection read: "(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members . . . ."
13 The Subsections read: "(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary."
14 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Secs. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19.
15 The provision reads: "The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions."
16 In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, 248 Phil. 487 (1988).
17 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
18 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., Id.
19 Noblejas v. Teehankee, 131 Phil. 931 (1968).
20 Nos. 7 and 9, LEBMO No. 7.
21 No. 2, LEBMO No. 7.
22 No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.
23 No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.
24 No. 11, LEBMO No. 7.
25 Manila Memorial Park Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 175356. December 3, 2013: Because all laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, courts will uphold a law's validity if any set of facts may be conceived to sustain it. On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject regulation's validity absent clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately concluded that business establishments have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on their investments considering (1) not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the level of its profit margins on goods and services offered to the general public. Concurrently, Congress may have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the establishments, which will be required to extend the 20% discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing strategy so that whatever reduction in profits or income/gross sales that they may sustain because of sales to senior citizens, can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from other products not subject of discounts. As a result, the discounts resulting from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive. (emphasis added).
26 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
27 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
28 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
29 The list of names of passers for the April 2019 PhiLSAT exam has been released. However, the passing rate has not been released by either the official PhiLSAT website or any other media outlet, article, or post.
30 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
31 No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.
32 No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.
33 No. 15, LEBMO No. 7.
34 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
35 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.
36 Emita-Malate Motel and Hotel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967: "Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside . . . ." It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside." (emphasis added)
37 236 Phil. 768, (1987).
38 Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law." Philippine long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 (1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."
39 Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law;" Philippine long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 (1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."
40 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 196-197, citing Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916).
41 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 148, Supra note 40, citing Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. Natividad, 43 Phil. 803 (1922), Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918).
42 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40, citing Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922), Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956).
43 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40.