THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152797, September 18, 2019
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, v. PAULINO REYES, DANILO BAON, PACITA D. VADURIA, JULIE MONTOYA, MERCEDES RAMOS, GERONIMO DERAIN, FELICIANO D. BAON, PACIFICO DERAIN, EUTERIO SEVILLA, MAMERTO B. ESPINELI, CARMELITA GRAVADOS, AVELINO E. PASTOR, ANTONIO BUHAY, TIRZO GULFAN, JR., FELIX SOBREMONTE, ERNESTO SOBREMONTE, BEN PILIIN, PASCUAL V. DISTREZA, JACINTO P. BACALAG, ADELAIDA BAYANI, ELMERT BAYANI, EGLESIA SOBREMONTE, NICASIO TINAUGISAN, VICENTE VILLALUNA, MEYNARDO VILLALUNA, LEOPOLDO DE JOYA, LENIE DE JOYA, LIBERATO DE JOYA, CRESENCIANA DE JOYA, FRESCO CATAPANG, ROSITA CATAPANG, DOMINGO P. LIMBOC, VIRGILIO A. LIMBOC, VICENTE LIMBOC, MARIO H. PERNO, LAZARITO CABRAL, CARLITO CAPACIA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 189315]
PAULINO REYES, DANILO BAON, PACITA D. VADURIA, JULIE MONTOYA, BENIGNO BAON, BEATRIZ DERAIN, MARILOU SEVILLA, MAMERTO B. ESPINELLI, CARMELITA GRANADOS, ANTONIO BUHAY, FELIX SOBREMONTE, NICASIO TINAMISAN, CRESCENCIANA DE JOYA, FRESCO CATAPANG, SONNY CATAPANG, MARIO H. PERNO, CARLITO CAPACIA, AQUILINA BAUTISTA, FELECITO BARCELON, LUIS MANGI, BAYANI ORIONDO, BASILISA DERAIN, GUILLERMO BAUTISTA, BEATRIZ SEVILLA, NICOLAS ASAHAN, ROSITA MERCADO, LAMBERTO BAUTISTA, REXIE DINGLES, JOSE QUIROZ, PETITIONERS, v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 200684]
NOLITO G. DEL MUNDO, GABRIEL A. MAULLON, MARIA L. TENORIO, NOEL G. DEL MUNDO, RACQUEL DEL MUNDO-REDUCA, TEODORICO D. AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, NOMER G. DEL MUNDO, PETITIONERS, v. THE MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In carrying out its mandate, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through its Secretary, may investigate acts that are directed toward the circumvention of the law's objectives. Its findings are accorded great weight and respect, especially when supported by substantial evidence.
Before this Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari involving Hacienda Looc in Nasugbu, Batangas. Portions of the property had previously been awarded to farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award, but these certificates were canceled on the ground that the lands covered were excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 1527971 questions the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47497, which affirmed then Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao's (Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao) Order3 declaring 70 hectares of the 1,219.0133 hectares of Hacienda Looc as covered land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 1893154 challenges the Decision5 and Resolution6 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60203, which upheld the Office of the President's Decision affirming the same Order7 issued by Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao.
Finally, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 2006848 assails the Decision9 and Resolution10 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111965, which affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's Decision11 upholding the cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award previously granted to farmer-beneficiaries of Hacienda Looc.
Hacienda Looc is an 8,650.7778-hectare property in Nasugbu, Batangas12 that is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2871913 and registered in the name of the Development Bank of the Philippines (Development Bank).14 Development Bank acquired the property from Magdalena Estate, Inc. and the Philippine National Bank.15
In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 14, transferring Development Bank's certain assets and liabilities to the government, including Hacienda Looc. Following the conveyance, the government entered into an agreement with the Asset Privatization Trust, in which the latter was appointed as trustee of the property.16
On June 28, 1990, Asset Privatization Trust, through a Memorandum of Agreement,17 offered to sell portions of Hacienda Looc to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme of Republic Act No. 6657.18
Through this agreement, Asset Privatization Trust transferred the physical possession of Hacienda Looc to the Department of Agrarian Reform. In effect, the Department of Agrarian Reform was allowed to: (1) identify and segregate areas that were covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; (2) purchase the segregated areas; and (3) return portions of the property that were not covered.19
From 1991 to 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform distributed 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award covering 3,981.2806 hectares of land:
LOT NO. | LOCATION | CLOA NO. | AREA (Has.) |
1 | LOOC | 6639 | 480.5125 |
2 | LOOC | 4795 | 46.0099 |
3 | LOOC | 5514 | 328.7855 |
4 | LOOC | 4796 | 46.4415 |
5 | CALAYO | 4152 | 117.2230 |
6 | CALAYO | 4153 | 50.6760 |
8 | CALAYO | 4154 | 4.7502 |
9 | CALAYO | 4156 | 21.5041 |
10 | CALAYO | 4155 | 0.7274 |
11 | CALAYO | 4157 | 135.2297 |
12 | CALAYO | 4158 | 133.4841 |
13 | CALAYO | 4159 | 79.4639 |
14 | PAPAYA | 4474 | 113.0728 |
15 | PAPAYA | 4476 | 30.6594 |
16 | PAPAYA | 4475 | 234.3264 |
17 | PAPAYA | 4527 | 79.8230 |
18 | PAPAYA | 4526 | 91.4672 |
19 | PAPAYA | 4478 | 266.8548 |
20 | PAPAYA | 4477 | 43.8803 |
21 | PAPAYA | 4995 | 48.6447 |
22 | PAPAYA | 4994 | 266.5072 |
23 | BULIHAN | 5373 | 720.6063 |
24 | BULIHAN | 5513 | 387.0644 |
31 | PAPAYA | 5614 | 195.5431 |
32 | CALAYO | 6662 | 58.02320 |
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1993, Asset Privatization Trust offered to sell its rights and interests in Hacienda Looc through public bidding. Bellevue Properties, Inc. (Bellevue), which emerged as the winning bidder, then assigned its right to purchase Hacienda Looc to the Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (Manila Southcoast).21
By virtue of the assignment, Asset Privatization Trust executed a Deed of Sale22 transferring all its rights, claims, and benefits over Hacienda Looc to Manila Southcoast.23 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-28719 was canceled and a new certificate of title was issued in Manila Southcoast's name.24 Manila Southcoast was able to register portions of Hacienda Looc in its name.25
On April 10, 1995, Manila Southcoast filed a Petition26 before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Region IV.27 It sought, among others, the cancellation of the 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award, the resurvey of Hacienda Looc, and the reconveyance of the excluded areas.28
The Petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. 3468, was referred to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Batangas.29 Provincial Adjudicator Antonio C. Cabili initially handled the case but later inhibited himself from further hearing the Petition. The case was, thus, elevated to the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang (Regional Adjudicator Arche-Manalang).30
Instead of filing an answer, the farmer-beneficiaries moved for the Petition's dismissal. Manila Southcoast, in turn, opposed the motions.31 The parties exchanged pleadings,32 but before the pending incidents could be resolved, several of the farmer-beneficiaries entered into amicable settlements with Manila Southcoast.33
Between January and June 1996, Regional Adjudicator Arche-Manalang rendered three (3) Partial Summary Judgments and an Order canceling 15 Certificates of Land Ownership Award:
dated January 8, 1996 | ||
February 16, 1996 | ||
Judgment36 dated May 16, 1996 | ||
dated June 14, 1996 |
WHEREFORE, given these different recommendations of four different Committees and Task Forces, after a careful study of the proceedings of the different committees and Task Forces, this Order is hereby issued as follows:
1. Coverage of the following agriculturally developed areas, re documentation of the same under CARP acquisition and award to individual beneficiaries found to be qualified under the CARL:
a. Lot No. 5: 2.3029 hectares as farmlots and 0.0666 as homelots, the homelots to be awarded to actual occupants thereof. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; b. Lot No. 6: 12.8467 hectare farmlot. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; c. Lot No. 11: 1.1234 hectares farmlot and 0.6388 homelots to be awarded to actual occupants thereof. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; d. Lot No. 12: 13.894 hectares as farmlots. Some 2.3674 has. and .4586 has. were deducted from the claim of Mr. Jaime Sobremonte and Mr. Leonardo Caronilla, respectively, as these already exceed the three hectares award ceiling. The area has been scraped by previous bulldozing by the applicant such that it becomes impossible for the team to determine the actual agricultural development of the area. In view of this situation, the Task Force deemed it proper to award the land to the claimants as the presumption must tilt in their favor, there being no contrary evidence presented by the applicant. The award shall not exceed three hectares per claimant UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; e. Lot No. 13: 0.2251 hectare farmlot. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; g. (sic) Lot No. 15: 7.6376 hectares as farmlot. However, the coverage of the areas identified as fishponds shall be suspended until the Courts resolve the constitutionality of the law exempting fishponds from the coverage of agrarian reform. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; h. (sic) Lot No. 16: 14.2026 hectares as farmlots. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; i. (sic) Lot No. 19: 16.5695 hectares as farmlots. Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land; j. (sic) Approval of the distribution of homelots in Lots No. 9 and 20. As manifested, the total area of 65.38 hectares shall be distributed primarily as homelots to actual occupants. The area within Lot 20 which is agriculturally developed shall be subjected to further verification as to its CARPability and the same shall also be awarded as farmlots, covered by Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). Priority for the award of the farmlot will be the claimant, UNLESS there is reason to disqualify him and said award shall not result in the claimant becoming an owner of more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land;
2. Maintaining the coverage of some 1,197 hectares, more or less of lands under Operation Land Transfer and conducting a survey of the actual tillers of the land for purposes of awarding the same/re-allocating the same to its actual tillers in accordance with the land to the tiller principle[;]
3. On the matter of Environmental Protection. In areas that will be exempted by virtue of Section 10, of RA 6657, any development thereon, should be consistent with the intent of the law to preserve these lands for forest cover and soil conservation. It is therefore recommended that the DENR study the development of the area with this end in view in its issuance of ECCs.
Particularly, it is recommended that a buffer zone be established by the DENR to ensure protection of OLT and CARP lands from damage or erosion, as a result of any development to be implemented in excluded areas;
4. Re-conveyance of the exempt parcels to the Asset Privatization Trust, or its successors in-interest, after the CLOAs are properly cancelled by the proper forum;
5. Nullifying the alleged sale or transfer of rights over the CLOAs as contrary to the provisions of agrarian law; and
6. Directing the Regional Director to post a copy of this Order, including the maps attached hereto in the baranggay (sic) halls of Bgys. Calayo and Papaya to afford all parties the opportunity to be notified and to cause the amendments of CLOAs issued.
SO ORDERED.55
For Lot 780-12: Antonio Buhay, Mamerto Espineli, Carmelita Granados, Tirso Gulfan, Jr., Heirs of Avelino Pastor (represented by Felipe G. Pastor), Heirs of Benjamin Piliin (represented by Hermie M. Piliin), Felix Sobremonte, and Heirs of Egliceria Sobremonte (represented by Dionisio Sobremonte) (hereafter collectively known as the Lot 780-12 Claimants); and
For Lot 780-13: Adelaida S. Bayani, Elmer Bayani, Heirs of Jacinto Cabalag (represented by Lauriana Cabalag), Heirs of Pascual Destreza (represented by Eulogia D. Sobremonte), Ernesto Sobremonte, and nicasio Tinamisan (hereafter collectively known as the Lot 780-13 Claimants).98
The requirements of a special power of attorney in Article 1878 of the Civil Code and of a special authority in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court refer to the nature of the authorization and not its form. The requirements are met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act. As early as 1906, this Court in Strong v. Gutierrez-Repide stated that such a mandate may be either oral or written, the one vital thing being that it shall be express. And more recently, We stated that, if the special authority is not written, then it must be duly established by evidence:… the Rules require, for attorneys to compromise the litigation of their clients, a special authority. And while the same does not state that the special authority be in writing the Court has every reason to expect that, if not in writing the same be duly established by evidence other than the self-serving assertion of counsel himself that such authority was verbally given him.139 (Citations omitted)
. . . Waive, renounce and cede, in favor of [Fil-Estate] any and all rights to exclusive ownership or co-ownership, past, present or future, contingent or otherwise, whether or not with merit or validity, which they may have over Lot 780-12 and Lot 780-13 . . . based on CLOA No. 4158 (for Lot 780-12) and CLOA No. 4159 (for Lot 780-13)[.]150
SECTION 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act or other agrarian reform laws shall not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years.
. . . lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerates four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.
. . . The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v. Ellano, we held that the waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.152 (Citation omitted)
SECTION 54. Certiorari. — Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.
. . . .
SECTION 61. Procedure on Review. — Review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals, however, may require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, after which the case is deemed submitted for decision.
We agree with the appellate court that petitioners' reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 "is not merely a mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous appeal from the assailed Orders." For in relying solely on Section 54, petitioners patently ignored or conveniently overlooked Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides that:An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision. . . .
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include:Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions . . . except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-95 dated May 16, 1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular was incorporated in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, "an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed." Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal.156
Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-legislative acts. Where two (2) rules on the same subject, or on related subjects, are apparently in conflict with each other, they are to be reconciled by construction, so far as may be, on any fair and reasonable hypothesis. Validity and legal effect should therefore be given to both, if this can be done without destroying the evident intent and meaning of the later act. Every statute should receive such a construction as will harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws.
Harmonizing DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, with SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 and Sec. 54 of R.A. No. 6657 would be consistent with promoting the ends of substantial justice for all parties seeking the protective mantle of the law. To reconcile and harmonize them, due consideration must be given to the purpose for which each was promulgated The purpose of DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, is to provide a mode of appeal for matters not falling within the jurisdictional ambit of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) under R.A. No. 6657 and correct technical errors of the administrative agency. In such exceptional cases, the Department Secretary has established a mode of appeal from the Department of Agrarian Reform to the Office of the President as a plain, speedy, adequate and inexpensive remedy in the ordinary course of law. This would enable the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, to review technical matters within the expertise of the administrative machinery before judicial review can be resorted to by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the purpose of SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95, now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is to invoke the constitutional power of judicial review over quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform under R.A. No. 6657 and the Office of the President in other cases by providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 is consistent with SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 and Ru1e 43 in that it establishes a mode of appeal from the DARAB to the Court of Appeals.
. . . .
As a valid exercise of the Secretary's rule-making power to issue internal rules of procedure, DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the President. Thus, petitioner Valencia filed on 24 November 1993 a timely appeal by way of a petition for review under Ru1e 43 to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Office of the President, which was received on 11 November 1993, well within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.
an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government.158 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the DENR.
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory except a decision or a portion thereof involving solely the issue of just compensation.
RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading
SECTION 5. Certification Against Forum Shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identify of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.174
Prior to any colonization, various ethnolinguistic cultures had their own customary laws governing their property relationships. The arrival of the Spanish introduced the concept of encomienda, or royal land grants, to loyal Spanish subjects, particularly the soldiers. Under King Philip II’s decree, the encomienderos or landowners were tasked "to maintain peace and order" within their encomiendas, to protect the large estates from external attacks, and to support the missionaries in converting the natives into Christians. In turn, the encomienderos had the right to collect tributes or taxes such as gold, pearls, cotton cloth, chickens, and rice from the natives called indios. The encomienda system helped Hispanicize the natives and extended Spanish colonial rule by pacifying the early Filipinos within the estates.
There were three (3) kinds of encomiendas: the royal encomiendas, which belonged to the King; the ecclesiastical encomiendas, which belonged to the Church; and the private encomiendas, which belonged to private individuals. The local elites were exempted from tribute-paying and labor, or polo services, required of the natives.
The encomienda system was abused by the encomienderos. Filipinos were made to pay tribute more than what the law required. Their animals and crops were taken without just compensation, and they were forced to work for the encomienderos.
Thus, the indios, who once freely cultivated the lands, became mere share tenants or dependent sharecroppers of the colonial landowners.
In the 1899 Malolos Constitution and true to one (1) of the principal concerns of the Philippine Revolution, then President General Emilio Aguinaldo declared "his intention to confiscate large estates, especially the so-called [f]riar lands." Unfortunately, the First Philippine Republic did not last long.
The encomienda system was a vital source of revenue and information on the natives for the Spanish crown. In the first half of the 19th century, the cash crop economy emerged after the Philippines integrated into the world market, increasing along with it the powers of the local elites, called principalias, and landlords.
The United States arrived later as the new colonizer. It enacted the Philippine Bill of 1902, which limited land area acquisitions into 16 hectares for private individuals and 1,024 hectares for corporations. The Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No. 496) established a comprehensive registration of land titles called the Torrens system. This resulted in several ancestral lands being titled in the names of the settlers.
The Philippines witnessed peasant uprisings including the Sakdalista movement in the 1930's. During World War II, peasants and workers organizations took up arms and many identified themselves with the Hukbalahap, or Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon. After the Philippine Independence in 1946, the problems of land tenure remained and worsened in some parts of the country. The Hukbalahaps continued the peasant uprisings in the 1950s.
To address the farmers' unrest, the government began initiating various land reform programs, roughly divided into three (3) stages.
The first stage was the share tenancy system under then President Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957). In a share tenancy agreement, the landholder provided the land while the tenant provided the labor for agricultural production. The produce would then be divided between the parties in proportion to their respective contributions. On August 30, 1954, Congress passed Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act), ensuring the "equitable division of the produce and [the] income derived from the land[.]"
Compulsory land registration was also established under the Magsaysay Administration. Republic Act No. 1400 (Land Reform Act) granted the Land Tenure Administration the power to purchase or expropriate large tenanted rice and corn lands for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants who owned less than six (6) hectares of land. However, Section 6 (2) of Republic Act No. 1400 set unreasonable retention limits at 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for corporations, rendering President Magsaysay's efforts to redistribute lands futile.
On August 8, 1963, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) and abolished the share tenancy system, declaring it to be against public policy. The second stage of land reform, the agricultural leasehold system, thus began under President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965).
Under the agricultural leasehold system, the landowner, lessor, usufructuary, or legal possessor furnished his or her landholding, while another person cultivated it until the leasehold relation was extinguished. The landowner had the right to collect lease rental from the agricultural lessee, while the lessee had the right to a homelot and to be indemnified for his or her labor if the property was surrendered to the landowner or if the lessee was ejected from the landholding.
Republic Act No. 3844 also sought to provide economic family-sized farms to landless citizens of the Philippines especially to qualified farmers. The landowners were allowed to retain as much as 75 hectares of their landholdings. Those lands in excess of 75 hectares could be expropriated by the government.
The system finally transitioned from agricultural leasehold to one of full ownership under President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-1986). On September 10, 1971, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6389 or the Code of Agrarian Reform.
Republic Act No. 6389 automatically converted share tenancy into agricultural leasehold. It also established the Department of Agrarian Reform as the implementing agency for the government's agrarian reform program. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the whole country as a land reform area.
On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27, or the Tenants Emancipation Decree, superseded Republic Act No. 3844. Seeking to "emancipat[e] the tiller of the soil from his bondage," Presidential Decree No. 27 mandated the compulsory acquisition of private lands to be distributed to tenant-farmers. From 75 hectares under Republic Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 27 reduced the landowner's retention area to a maximum of seven (7) hectares of land.
Presidential Decree No. 27 implemented the Operation Land Transfer Program to cover tenanted rice or corn lands. According to Daez v. Court of Appeals, "the requisites for coverage under the [Operation Land Transfer] program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein."
. . . .
Following the People Power Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992) fulfilled the promise of land ownership for the tenant farmers. Proclamation No. 131 instituted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Executive Order No. 129 (1987) reorganized the Department of Agrarian Reform and expanded it in power and operation. Executive Order No. 228 (1987) declared the full ownership of the land to qualified farmer beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27.
. . . .
On June 10, 1988, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, to supersede Presidential Decree No. 27.
The compulsory land acquisition scheme under Republic Act No. 6657 empowers the government to acquire private agricultural lands for distribution to tenant-farmers. A qualified farmer beneficiary is given an emancipation patent, called the Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which serves as conclusive proof of his or her ownership of the land.179 (Citations omitted)
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
. . . .
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS PROVINCE AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector compromising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternante in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.
Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.
All proclamations, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of November, in the year if Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-Five.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.
To determine the chief intent of PP 1520, reference to the "whereas clauses" is in order. By and large, a reference to the congressional deliberation records would provide guidance in dissecting the intent of legislation. But since PP 1520 emanated from the legislative powers of then President Marcos during martial rule, reference to the whereas clauses cannot be dispensed with.
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector compromising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are.
The Court had in fact passed upon a similar matter before. Thus in DAR v. Franco, it pronounced:Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority, has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the eneactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance. . . .
While the above pronouncement in Franco is an obiter, it should not be ignored in the resolution of the present petitions since it reflects a more rational and just interpretation of PP 120. There is no prohibition in embracing the rationale of an obiter dictum in settling controversies, or in considering related proclamations establishing tourism zones.191(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co v. CA, the Court made it clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004, came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatA….
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:
(1) Recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangay, islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas’ development; or (2) Recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. . . .) and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas’ development; could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition" (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan." (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memo. Circular Prescribing Guidelines for MC 54, S. 1995, Sec. 2)
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.
Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverage . . . .
D. . . . .
The DAR's reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.
Apart from PP 1520, there are similarly worded proclamations declaring the whole of Ilocos Norte and Bataan Provinces, Camiguin, Puerto Prinsesa, Siquijor, Panglao Island, parts of Cebu City and Municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in Cebu Province as tourism zones.
Indubitably, these proclamations, particularly those pertaining to the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Bataan, did not intend to reclassify all agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands in one fell swoop. The Court takes notice of how the agrarian reform program was — and still is — implemented in these provinces since there are lands that do not have any tourism potential and are more appropriate for agricultural utilization.
Relatedly, a reference to the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 provides a parallel orientation on the issue. Under said Act, several towns and cities encompassing the whole Philippines were readily identified as economic zones. To uphold Roxas & Co.'s reading of PP 1520 would see a total reclassification of practically all the agricultural lands in the country to non-agricultural use. Propitiously, the legislature had the foresight to include a bailout provision in Section 31 of said Act for land conversion. The same cannot be said of PP 1520, despite the existence of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 or the Tenant Emancipation Decree, which is the precursor of the CARP.
. . . .
Given these martial law-era decrees and considering the socio-political backdrop at the time PP 1520 was issued in 1975, it is inconceivable that PP 1520, as well as other similarly worded proclamations which are completely silent on the aspect of reclassification of the lands in those tourism zones, would nullify the gains already then achieved by PD 27.192 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. —. . . .
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedling research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.200 (Citation omitted)
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.208 (Citations omitted)
. . . for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor."213
Endnotes:
1Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 27-97.
2 Id. at 99-114. The March 26, 2002 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 149-159. The Order was dated March 25, 1998.
4Rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 11-78.
5 Id. at 79-90. The February 27, 2009 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Seventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
6 Id. at 91-92. The August 25, 2009 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Vicente S.E. Veloso of the Special Former Seventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
7 Id. at 273-282.
8Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 8-42.
9 Id. at 43-63-A. The September 28, 2011 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia R. Dimagiba of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
10 Id. at 64-67. The February 20, 2012 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia R. Dimagiba of the Former Tenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
11 Id. at 341-390. The January 25, 2005 Order was penned by Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes and concurred in by Secretary Rene C. Villa and Undersecretaries Severino T. Madronio and Ernesto G. Ladrido III, as well as Assistant Secretaries Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Delfin B. Samson.
12Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), p. 101.
13 Id. at 31.
14Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), p. 15.
15Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), p. 31.
16 Id. at 31.
17 Id. at 169-171.
18 Id. at 101. Otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
19 Id. at 32.
20 Id. at 728-729.
21 Id. at 102.
22 Id. at 172-177.
23 Id. at 33-34.
24Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 18-19.
25Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 732-733.
26 Id. at 178-201.
27 Id. at 102.
28 Id. at 198-199.
29Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 271-273.
30Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 733-734.
31Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 370-378.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 378-379.
34Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 202-218.
35 Id. at 219-228.
36Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), p. 309.
37Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 229-233.
38Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), p. 383.
39 Id. at 300-303.
40 Id. at 321.
41 Id. at 304-333.
42 Id. at 341-390.
43Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 37-38.
44 Id. at 1008-1011.
45 Id. at 1009.
46 Id. at 738.
47 Id. at 1079.
48 Id. at 738-740.
49 Id. at 1068-1083.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 742 and 1084-1086.
52 Id. at 241-244.
53 Id. at 742-743.
54 Id. at 149-159.
55 Id. at 156-158.
56 Id at. 750-752.
57 The Petition was filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
58Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 45-46.
59 Id. at 752.
60 Id. at 48-49.
61 Id. at 109.
62 Id. at 50.
63 Rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 137-139.
64 Id. at 538-609.
65 Id. at 584-589 and 599-605.
66Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 50-51.
67 Id. at 51.
68 544 Phil. 203 (2007) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division].
69Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 99-114.
70 Id. at 114.
71 Id. at 110.
72 Id. at 111-112.
73 Id. at 112-113.
74 Id. at 113.
75Rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 79-90.
76 Id.
77Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 10 and 43.
78 Id. at 57.
79 Id. at 507-510.
80 Id. at 57-58.
81 Id. at 43-63-A.
82 In its Decision, the Court of Appeals cited the Third Partial Summary Judgment of Regional Adjudicator Arche-Manalang. However, it was the Order dated March 10, 1998 of Regional Adjudicator Minas that ordered the cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award Nos. 5373 and 5513.
83Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), p. 61.
84 Id. at 62-63.
85 Id. at 64-67.
86Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 27-97.
87 Id. at 1524.
88 Id. at 1538-1687.
89Rollo (G.R. No.189315), pp. 11-78.
90 Id. at 116-181.
91 Id. at 767-768.
92 Id. at 794-821.
93Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 8-42.
94 Id. at 503-526.
95 Id. at 492.
96Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 1733-1746.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1737-1738.
99 Id. at 1750-1751.
100 Id. at 1744-1745, 1752.
101 Id. at 1750.
102 Id. at 1747-1754.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1761-1827.
105 Id. at 1831-1832.
106 Id. at 1872.
107 Id. at 1643-1646.
108 Id. at 1646-1656.
109 Id. at 1657-1667 and rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 165-175.
110 Id. at 1670-1675 and rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 157-165.
111 Id. at 1680-1685.
112 Id. at 1581.
113 Id. at 1589-1592.
114 Id. at 1587-1592.
115 Id. at 1594-1596.
116 Id. at 1596-1597.
117Rollo (G.R. No. 189315), pp. 55-61.
118Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 1601-1602.
119Rollo (G.R. No. 189315), p. 52.
120 Id. at 68-70 and rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 1602-1604.
121Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), pp. 23-25.
122 Id. at 30-31.
123 Id. at 26-30.
124 Id. at 32-33.
125 Id. at 36.
126 Id. 503-505.
127 Id. at 507-510.
128 Id. at 510-512.
129 Id. at 510-512.
130Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio, 810 Phil. 497, 529 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
131 Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 779-780 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
132 CIVIL CODE, art. 2035.
133 CIVIL CODE, art. 1409(1).
134 CIVIL CODE, art. 1409(1).
135 CIVIL CODE, art. 2036.
136 CIVIL CODE, art. 1878(3) provides:
ARTICLE 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
. . . .
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]
137 Bumanlag v. Alzate, 228 Phil. 455, 455-456 (1986) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
138 200 Phil. 685 (1982) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
139 Id. at 693.
140Rollo (G.R. No. 152797) pp. 1761-1827.
141 For Lot 780-12: Antonio Buhay, Mamerto Espineli, Carmelita Granados, Tirso Gulfan, Jr., Heirs of Avelino Pastor (represented by Felipe Sobremonte, and Heirs of Egliceria Sobremonte (represented by Dionisio Sobremonte) (hereafter collectively known as the Lot 780-12 Claimants); and
142Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 1770-1776.
143Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), p. 1881.
144 Id. at 1868.
145 Id. at 1881.
146 CIVIL CODE, art. 1311.
147Limpo v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 529, 534-535 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Seccond Division].
148 Id. at 534.
149Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 1736-1743.
150 Id. at 1738.
151 660 Phil. 456 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
152 Id. at 463-464.
153 364 Phil. 622 (1999) [Per J. Purisma, Third Division].
154 Id. at 630-631.
155 445 Phil. 595 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
156 Id. at 606-607.
157 449 Phil. 711 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
158 Id. at 726-729.
159Soriano v. Bravo, 653 Phil. 72, 85 (2010) [Per J. Leonardo De Castro, First Division] citing Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, 493 Phil. 570 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Special First Division].
160 DAR Administrative Order No. 06 (2000); DAR Administrative Order No. 03 (2003); DAR Administrative Order No. 03 (2017).
161 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board New Rules of Procedure (1994); Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure (2003); Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure (2009).
162 DAR Administrative Order No. 06 (2000); DAR Administrative Order No. 03 (2003); DAR Administrative Order No. 03 (2017).
163 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board New Rules of Procedure (1994); Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure (2003); Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure (2009).
164Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), p. 149 in relation to Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 10 (1994).
165Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 430, 442 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division]. See also Spouses Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc., 523 Phil. 158, 162 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Second Division].
166Spouses Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc., 523 Phil. 158, 163 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval Gutierrez, Second Division].
167 Id.
168Torres v. De Leon, 778 Phil. 491, 501-502 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
169Dy v. Mandy Commodities, 611 Phil. 74, 84 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
170 Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, 457 Phil. 740, 748 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
171Dy v. Mandy Commodities, 611 Phil. 74, 84 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
172 Id. at 85.
173 611 Phil. 74 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
174 Id. at 85-86.
175Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), p. 389.
176 Id. at 1680-1685.
177 Republic Act No. 6657 (1988), sec 2.
178 809 Phil. 965 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
179 Id. at 985-998.
180 G.R. Nos. 186432 and 186964, March 12, 2019, [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
181 Id.
182 Republic Act No. 6657 (1988), sec. 50.
183 Republic Act No. 6657 (1988), sec. 49.
184Vda. De Santos v. Garcia, 118 Phil. 194, 197 (1963) [Per J. Regala, En Banc].
185 Id.
186Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 149-159.
187 Id. at 150.
188 Id at 1077-1079.
189 Id. at 150-156.
190 622 Phil. 37 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
191 Id. at 60-61.
192 Id. at 61-66.
193Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 248-250.
194Bautista v. Puyat Vinyl Product, Inc., 416 Phil. 305, 308 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
195 Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
196 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.
197Pilar Development Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 230 Phil. 301, 307 (1986) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
198 Id.
199Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
200 Id. at 182-183.
201Perez v. Cruz, 452 Phil. 597, 606-607 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
202Lim v. Commission on Audit, 447 Phil. 122, 126 (2003) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
203Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 524, 532 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
204Rollo (G.R. No. 152797), pp. 149-159.
205Garcia v. Judge De la Peña, 299 Phil. 817, 824 (1994) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
206 Id.
207 299 Phil. 817 (1994) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
208 Id. at 824.
209Pagoda Philippines. Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., 509 Phil. 339, 345 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
210 Id. at 346.
211 Id.
212 509 Phil. 339 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
213 Id. at 346.
214 606 Phil. 687 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division].
215Rollo (G.R. No. 200684), p. 27.
216Dadizon v. Bernadas, 606 Phil. 687, 694 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division]. See also Tropical Homes, Inc. v. Fortun, 251 Phil. 83 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
217Lim-Bungcaras v. Commission on Elections, 799 Phil. 642, 671 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].