1. ATTACHMENT; ISSUANCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHEREIN THE CIVIL ACTION IS NEITHER WAIVED NOR RESERVED. — According to Rule 107, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately." In the estafa case at bar, since the offended persons did not either waive or reserve their right to institute their civil action separately, the same is deemed instituted with the criminal action. There were, therefore, in the estafa case two actions before the court: the criminal action for the punishment of the accused, and the civil action for recovery of the money fraudulently taken by her. If the court had jurisdiction over the civil action, it must necessarily have jurisdiction of all its necessary incidents. Indeed, it is expressly provided in Rule 124, section 6, that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules." One of the auxiliary writs to carry into effect the jurisdiction of the court over the civil action is the preliminary writ of attachment without which the judgment of the court awarding civil indemnity may be nugatory. Other processes which the court may issue are those which refer to the execution of such judgment where the rules applicable in civil cases should be followed.

2. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT OF RULING IN UNITED STATES v. NAMIT (38 PHIL., 926), AND PEOPLE v. MORENO (60 PHIL., 674). — It is true that in United States v. Namit (38 Phil., 926), and in People v. Moreno (60 Phil., 674), it was held that preliminary attachment is not proper in criminal cases. But this ruling is predicated fundamentally upon the theory that preliminary attachment is a purely statutory remedy and there was then no clear legal provision making it applicable in criminal proceedings. All doubts on this question have, however, disappeared upon the promulgation of the new Rules of Court wherein, by clear authority of Rule 124, section 6, above quoted, a criminal court having jurisdiction over the civil action arising from the offense charged, is now permitted to issue all the auxiliary writs necessary to carry such jurisdiction into effect. A similar legal principle was recognized before in scattered provisions of law or decisions (see Act No. 136, section 19; Revised Administrative Code, section 145-G; Act No. 190, section 610; Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333, 344), applicable only in some courts and in certain cases, and does not seem to cover the question now before this court. Now, it is made general and applicable in all cases and in all courts provided the requirements therein specified are present.

3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES WHERE OFFENDED PERSONS RESERVED RIGHT TO INSTITUTE CIVIL ACTION SEPARATELY. — In the criminal cases for murder and frustrated murder, since the offended persons reserved their right to institute their civil action separately, preliminary attachment is not proper. As the court in said criminal cases has no jurisdiction of the civil actions arising from the offenses charged, there is nothing before the court to which the preliminary attachment may be considered as an auxiliary writ and, therefore, the court has no jurisdiction to issue such writ.

4. CERTIORARI; MANDAMUS; WRITS LIE AGAINST JUDGE WHO FOLLOWED FORMER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. — It has been suggested that as the respondent judge merely followed former decisions of this court, he should not be blamed therefor and that accordingly the writ does not lie against him. This suggestion confuses the basic ground for the writ. The personal motives of the respondent judge as well as his good or bad faith are in no way material for the grant or denial of the writ. The only issue before this court is whether the action taken by him constitutes a mistake of law.