1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; BAIL; SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 682 (PEOPLE’S COURT ACT), CONSTRUED IN LIGHT OF CONSTITUTION. — The proviso of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People’s Court Act) regarding bail must be read and understood in the light of such provisions of Constitution as may bear on the subject so as to harmonize the former with the latter and avoid their conflicting with each other. Of course, where harmonization is impossible and conflict inevitable, the statute gives way to the Constitution. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that "in construing statutes with relation to constitutional provisions, the courts take into consideration the principle that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution and that the Constitution and a statute involving constitutional rights will be construed together as one law." (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 96.)

2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHO ARE ENTITLED UNDER CONSTITUTION. — Under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, "shall before conviction be bailable." the only exception being when the charge is for a capital offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETION OF COURT IN CAPITAL OFFENSES. — Capital offenses are bailable, in the discretion of the court, before conviction. And such discretion has no other reference than to the determination as to whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DISCRETION PROVIDED IN PEOPLE’S COURT ACT. — Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, and since the language used by this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that the discretion provided in said Act is the same discretion provided in the Constitution and similar statutes, that discretion having reference only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The discretion of the court is not absolute nor beyond control. Indeed, its very concept repels the idea of unlimited power. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Since judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge’s individual opinion, the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided and controlled by certain well-known rules which, while allowing the judge a rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, present them form getting out of control.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, HOW CONTROLLED. — Inferior courts are controlled in the exercise of their discretion first, by the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which the Supreme Court may promulgate under the authority of Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution; and, third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY PEOPLE’S COURT. — Upon the basis of constitutional, legal and reglementary provisions combined with well-known principles of practice and procedure, the People’s Court should follow these steps; (1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose; (2) but if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail; (3) when, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce - provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANTING OF BAIL BY PEOPLE’S COURT IN ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION OR EVIDENCE OF GUILT. — The People’s Court, in the exercise of its discretion, can consider no evidence that has not properly been presented to it by the parties, and that, when the special prosecutor elects not to oppose the application for bail and, consequently, refuses to present any evidence, "the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF GUILT NOT TO BE SECURED IN PRIVATE INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. — The procedure adopted by the People’s Court, after the third hearing of January 28, 1946, whereby it examined the special prosecutor’s evidence in a private inquiry without the presence of the petitioner, and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein it denied the application for bail, is improper, arbitrary, and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

10. ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO GRANT PROVISIONAL RELEASE IN CERTIORARI AND HABEAS CORPUS; CASE AT BAR. — In a special civil action for certiorari, this court has the power to grant "such of the relief prayed for as the petitioner is entitled to, with or without costs, as justice requires." (Rule 67, sec. 8.) One of the reliefs prayed for in the instant case is that the petitioner be granted directly by this court provisional release under bail, and considering the unjustified delays suffered by the petitioner due to the insistent attitude of the People’s Court in disregarding the law and the Constitution as construed by this court, the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for in the interest of justice. Particularly so in the instant case which is a combined proceeding of certiorari and habeas corpus. To hold this court powerless to grant bail directly under the circumstances of the instant case is certainly to destroy the great function of the highest tribunal of the land created by the Constitution as the ultimate bulwark of the liberties of the people.

On February 16, 1946, we approved a minute resolution ordering that "petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee, upon her filing in this Court of a bond in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) and upon said bond being duly approved, be forthwith set at liberty." This is now written to set forth at length the reasons underlying such order.

Petitioner was one of the persons detained by the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army mentioned in the Court’s decision in case of Raquiza v. Bradford (75 Phil., 50). As said in that decision, petitioner was apprehended by the said Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) "active collaboration with the Japanese," and (b) "previous association with the enemy." (Ibid., p. 56.) When she, along with her co-detainees and co-petitioners in that case, was delivered by the United States Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that charge. And under the same charge she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government during all the time herein referred to.

Until the instant case was submitted for decision, no information had been filed against the petitioner under the People’s Court Act and the correlative provisions of the penal laws. When petitioner submitted to the People’s Court her petition dated October 2, 1945, seeking temporary release under bail, said court by its order dated October 4, 1945, signed by Judge Antonio Quirino, directed the Solicitor General, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, "to file his comment and recommendation, as soon as possible." In compliance with said order, the Office of Special Prosecutors filed its recommendation dated October 5, 1945, wherein it was manifested "that on the strength of the evidence at hand, the reasonable bail recommended for the provisional release of the petitioner be fixed at fifty thousand pesos (50,000)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Presiding Judge Leopoldo Rovira of the People’s Court, in view of said recommendation, entered an order dated October 9, 1945, referring the petition for consideration by the Fifth Division of the Court, but adding that in his opinion "it should be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of fifty thousand pesos (50,000)." And on that same date Judge Pompeyo Diaz of the same court entered an order disposing of the petition, as well as the recommendation of the Solicitor General, in these words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of Special Prosecutors recommends as high as fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) for her provisional release, it is ordered that the said petition for provisional release be, as it is hereby denied."cralaw virtua1aw library

A motion to reconsider this order was denied by Judge Diaz on October 13, 1945.

Petition filed with this court a petition for certiorari and mandamus (Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil., 634), praying that the orders above mentioned be set aside, they having been entered with abuse of discretion and without hearing granted to petitioner. This court, on December 20, 1945, rendered a judgment the dispositive part of which provides and decrees as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Wherefore, it is the judgment of this court that (a) the order of the People’s Court, dated October 9, 1945, denying petitioner’s petition for provisional release under bail, and the order of said court, dated October 13, 1945, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said order of October 9, 1945, which we declare to have been entered with grave abuse of discretion, be set aside; and (b) that for the proper application of the pertinent constitutional, statutory, and reglementary provisions alluded to in the body of this decision, a hearing of petitioner’s application for bail be held before the People’s Court with due notice to the Solicitor General, as well as to the petitioner, as hereinabove outlined, said hearing, whether summary or otherwise, to be such as would enable the People’s Court to exercise its sound discretion in the disposal of the aforesaid petition. Without costs. So ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library

Pursuant to this decision, the People’s Court proceeded to hear the petition for provisional release under bail in the presence of the petitioner on December 27, 1945. At such hearing, notwithstanding the special prosecutor’s statement that he had no objection to the petition, Judge Antonio Quirino asked him questions tending to compel disclosure of the prosecution’s evidence, to which petitioner objected upon the ground that, under the circumstances, the only thing for the court to do was to grant the petition. The court reserved its decision, but petitioner came to this court to raise the issue in the same case (Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra) in a motion filed on January 2, 1946. This court, on January 11, 1946, resolved said motion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Considering the motion of petitioner’s counsel in G.R. No. L-101, Haydee Herras Teehankee, Petitioner, v. Leopoldo Rovira Et. Al., Respondents, filed on January 2, 1946, and the answer thereto filed by respondent Hon. Antonio Quirino, as Associate Judge of the People’s Court, dated January 3, 1946; it appearing on page 16 of the transcript Annex D of said motion that at the hearing held before the People’s court on December 27, 1945, pursuant to the decision of this court, counsel for petitioner made a verbal petition asking the People’s Court to issue an order for petitioner’s release on bail in the amount of P50,000, said counsel announcing that should the People’s Court deny his said petition, he will seek the corresponding extraordinary legal remedy before this court, and it appearing that the People’s Court reserved its decision on the said oral petition, which is, therefore, still pending resolution, which fact makes petitioner’s motion of January 2, 1946, premature; said motion is denied, but with instruction for the People’s court to render its decision on the aforesaid verbal petition, taking into account that when the Special Prosecutor in capital cases like the present, does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose; but if the court has reasons to believe that the Special Prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, it may ask him question to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail; when, however, the Special Prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may no compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the same date, January 11, 1946, at 4:05 p. m., the People’s Court was served with a copy of the above-quoted resolution. Since its receipt of said copy until this case was submitted, said court has failed to decide petitioner’s verbal application for release under bail presented on December 27, 1945, and which it was instructed to decide; but on the contrary, respondent Judge Antonio Quirino, for the second time, called said application for hearing on January 15, 1946, and insisted on addressing to the Special Prosecutor practically the same questions as those which he had addressed to him at the hearing of December 27, 1945, and upon said prosecutor’s declining to answer with the presentation of a certificate, dated January 14, 1946, of the Solicitor General to the effect "that the office of Special Prosecutors is not, for the present, in a position to disclose the strength or nature of the evidence which it has at hand in the case of the herein petitioner as it believes it would imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest." ordered the arrest of said special prosecutor (Liwag) for alleged contempt of court, and the application for bail was left undecided. That detention of Private Prosecutor Liwag gave rise to the habeas corpus proceedings instituted in his behalf in case G. R. No. L-237 (42 Off. Gaz., 934), on January 15, 1946, which resulted in the release of said official pursuant to an order, of the same date, by Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Associate Justice of this Court. The order issued by Justice Perfecto was predicated upon the instructions contained in our resolution of January 11, 1946, above quoted, to the effect that even where the People’s Court believes that the special prosecutor’s attitude in not opposing the petitioner for provisional release under bail is not justified, if the Solicitor General files a statement under his official oath to the effect that the disclosure of the evidence in the hands of the prosecutor may imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the authority of the People’s Court to inquire into the prosecution’s evidence ceases and, therefore, the prosecutor cannot be held guilty of contempt for refusing to answer the questions of the court. Respondent Judge Antonio Quirino filed before this Court on January 17, 1946, a motion to reconsider the order issued by Justice Perfecto which in truth was a motion to reconsider our instructions aforementioned, and this court by unanimous vote denied the motion.

Based upon what had erroneously been done by the People’s Court at this second hearing, petitioner filed a verified motion in said case G. R. No. L-101 1 dated January 16, 1946, asking this Court to grant her directly provisional release under bail. We denied the motion with the qualification that "there having been unnecessary delay in the disposition by respondents of the petition for provisional release under bail, said respondents are hereby directed to act on and dispose of said petition without any further delay." This order of denial was founded on the circumstance that the People’s Court had not yet rendered its decision on the verbal petition, and we then believed that, with the order of release issued by Justice Perfecto in the habeas corpus proceedings instituted by Special Prosecutor Liwag and with unanimous denial by this Court of the motion for reconsideration filed by Judge Quirino, our instructions had become clear to the People’s Court and that, therefore, they would be followed in subsequent proceedings by said court if no new circumstances should develop. But after the People’s Court had been served with a copy of our order of denial, it held another hearing on January 28, 1946, the third on the same petition, after which, instead of acting upon the verbal application for provisional release under bail, it entered an order dated January 31, 1946, purporting to pass upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the People’s Court’s order of October 9, 1945, which had been set aside by our decision of December 20, 1945. However, in the body of its order the People’s Court held that, under the circumstances, it still had absolute discretion on the matter, contrary to the instructions contained on our resolution of January 11, 1946; and upon the basis of a secret knowledge acquired in a private conference had with the special prosecutor at the back of the petitioner, it held further that there was "a myriad points which would establish the guilt of the petitioner, contrary to our first resolution dated December 20, 1945, above quoted, wherein we held that the hearing should be in the presence of the petitioner or at lease with the notice to her.

With the foregoing background, the instant proceedings were commenced and prosecuted. Petitioner’s original petition dated February 2, 1946, was for the writ of habeas corpus which, in substance, alleges the facts stated in the preceding paragraphs except the last order of the People’s Court dated January 31, 1945, of which petitioner has not yet been notified. After receiving copy thereof, petitioner filed a supplementary petition for certiorari dated February 4, 1946, praying that she be declared entitled to provisional liberty; that the People’s Court’s order of January 31 be declared null and void because it is contrary to the Constitution and the rules of court and entered with grave abuse of discretion, and that her immediate liberty under such bail as the court might fix, be decreed. In paragraph 3 of said supplementary petition, counsel states that, in view of the aforesaid order of the People’s Court of January 31, he agrees that this proceeding be considered as a combined proceeding in certiorari and habeas corpus, the latter in aid of the former.

Under date of February 4, 1946, the Director of Prisons, who is one of the respondents herein represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed his return wherein it is submitted that the said petition for the writ of habeas corpus is improper. Under date of February 6, 1946, the said Director of Prisons, by the same counsel, filed a "constancia" wherein he manifests that, in connection with the supplementary petition, he reiterates what has been alleged in his aforesaid return or answer dated the 4th of the same month.

It is significant that no answer to the aforesaid supplementary petition has been filed by the People’s Court.

On February 8, 1946, this Court by resolution ordered as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Solicitor General having filed a ’constancia’ to the supplementary petition, . . ., and the time to file the People’s Court’s answer to said supplementary petition having expired; it is ordered that the case be set for hearing . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

None of the parties appeared when the case was called for oral argument.

The original petition for the writ of habeas corpus was verified. The supplementary petition was not, it is true. But this omission is immaterial, since the facts upon which the present decision is based are those appearing of record, those within the judicial notice of the Court, those alleged in the verified petition, and those alleged or admitted in the respondents’ answer.

Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People’s Court Act), in its pertinent part, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the aforesaid political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People’s Court, after due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail even prior to the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the Court finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense."cralaw virtua1aw library

We have held in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira (supra), that this proviso must be read and understood in the light of such provisions of the Constitution as may bear on the subject so as to harmonize the former with the latter and avoid their conflicting with each other. Of course, where harmonization is impossible and conflict inevitable, the statute gives way to the Constitution. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that "in construing statutes with relation to constitutional provisions, the courts take into consideration the principle that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution and that the Constitution and a statute involving constitutional rights will be construed together as one law." (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 96.)

Section 1, paragraph 16, of Article III, of the Constitution, provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, Excessive bail shall not be required." (Italics supplied.)

As we have held in the same case of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira (supra), "This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed; it lays down the rule that all person shall before conviction be bailable, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their liberty may have occasion to seek the benefit of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefit to one against whom the proper authorities may yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with a criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17), a fortiori this presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged, although already arrested or detained."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is argued that the subsequent words "before conviction" and "except those charged with capital offenses," used in the aforequoted constitutional provision evidently qualify the words "all persons," which should be read "persons charged or defendants." This is reading into the Constitution a qualification that is absent therefrom, and its effect is to curtail individual freedom which is one of the most previous treasures jealousy protected in our Constitution. The words "all persons" to mean "persons charged or defendants," because a person merely arrested with still no information against him is also a person before conviction; i. e., one who has not been convicted. All the phrase "except those charged with capital offenses," being an exception to the general rule concerning "all persons," cannot be construed as qualifying the meaning of the words "all persons." The function of an exception is neither to color nor dominate nor destroy the general rule. Indeed, it is often said that an exception confirms the general rule. The rule the must seek in an exception the reasons for its being, cannot justify its existence.

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of many of the states provides that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is great." (6 C. J., sec. 168, pp. 953, 954.)

It is to be observed that the word "charged" is not used in the American constitutions, the reason being that no one would apply for bail unless he is detained for some charge either oral or in writing made either by a private individual or by a public officer. Certainly the charge need not be a formal information in order that a person detained may apply for bail. Thus, it has been said that:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"By the common law all offenses, including treason, murder, and other felonies, were bailable before indictment found, although the granting or refusing of such bail in case of capital offenses was a matter within the discretion of the court." (6 C. J., sec. 167, p. 953; italics ours.)

The provisions of our Rules of Court on the matter of bail which are intended to make effective the constitutional provision on the same matter, contain a clear distinction between persons formally charged and persons merely arrested. It is a distinction favorable to the petitioner. Thus, sections 3 and 4 of Rule 110 use the words "the defendant" in providing for instances in which such defendant may be bailed as of right or in the discretion of the court. Whereas section 6 which refers precisely to capital offenses uses the words "persons in custody for the commission of a capital offense" in providing that he shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is not strong. Had this provision, which is interpretative of the Constitution, been intended to refer only to persons formally charged, it would have used the word "defendant" as the other provisions above mentioned. The petitioner’s case falls squarely under this section 6 of Rule 110, for she is a "person in custody for the commission of a capital offense," and, therefore, she is entitled to bail if the evidence of her guilt is not shown to be strong.

Technical and useless efforts have been made to draw a distinction between the situation of a person detained and that of a person already charged so as to exclude the former from the constitutional protection. But the more efforts are made in that direction, the clearer becomes the distinction in favor of the detainee. The presumption of innocence in favor of one against whom there already is a formal charge (Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17) should clearly be stronger in favor of one not yet so charged, though already arrested or detained. And since the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is predicated upon the presumption of innocence, such guarantee should obviously be stronger in favor of a person merely arrested or detained than of a person already accused. The right to freedom is a sacred right, complementing the right to life, and the guarantee contained in the fundamental law for the preservation of such sacred right should not be lightly brushed aside. All doubts that may arise in the construction of the Constitution — and, in the instant case none exists — should be resolved in favor of individual freedom.

We reiterate now that, under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, "shall before conviction be bailable," the only exception being when the charge is for a capital offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong. The power of the court to make such finding implies a full exercise of judicial discretion. It is for this reason that capital offenses are said to be bailable in the discretion of the court. In construing section 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that "all prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with the commission of capital offenses when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong," which is substantially the same as Article III, section 1, paragraph 16, of our Constitution, this Court, through Mr. Justice Moreland, said: "It is clear that even capital offenses are bailable in the discretion of the Court before conviction." (Italics ours; United States v. Babasa, 19 Phil., 198.)

And such discretion has no other reference than to the determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, in Marcos v. Cruz (67 Phil., 82), this Court, through Justice Imperial, held that "when the crime charged is punishable with death, the right to be admitted to bail is discretionary on the court, depending on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong." And this was a mere reiteration of a ruling laid down in a former case (Montalbo v. Santamaria, 54 Phil., 955). In that case the accused was charged with murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The accused applied for provisional release under bail. The judge refused to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong upon the belief that he had no discretion to grant the application. The accused filed a petition for mandamus against him with this Court. And this Court, through Mr. Justice Villamor, held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The object of this application is to require the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty of considering and deciding whether the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant, for the purpose of granting or denying his provisional liberty. Suppliant does not ask that the matter be decided one way or the other, but simply that it be decided. In other words, it is proposed not to interfere with the judicial discretion to grant or deny the motion for provisional liberty, but to enforce the exercise of said discretion according to the judgment and discretion of the Respondent. In this case a judge has declined to make a decision which the law enjoins upon him." (Italics ours.)

And in the dispositive part this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Wherefore, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to determine whether in the case at bar the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant, and to exercise judicial discretion in denying or granting the petition for provisional liberty. Without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered." (Italics ours.)

And this is the rule in the United States:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Although the right to bail is capital cases, except those in which the proof is evident or the presumption great, is generally absolute, the determination as to whether the evidence in any particular case comes within these exceptions is a matter for the sound discretion of the court or officer hearing the application." (Italics ours; 8 C.J.S., p. 56 on Bail.)

"Primarily the prisoner cannot demand bail as a matter of right where the offense is a capital one, since, upon ascertaining the character of the charge against him, the next question would be as to the degree of proof and the nature of the presumption of guilt. Therefore the power to admit to bail generally becomes a matter of judicial discretion in this class of cases, and, although the exercise of this discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly abused, it should be exercised with great caution." (Italics ours; 6 C.J., sec. 170, pp. 954, 955.)

It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that "all statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are, therefore, to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts . . ." (59 C. J., 1038.)

Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law and since the language used by this Court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that the discretion provided in said Act is the same discretion having reference only, as above stated, to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, and this is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction.

"A statute, which provides that ’a person charged with an offense may be admitted to bail before conviction, as follows: 1st, as a matter of discretion in all cases where the punishment is death; 2nd, as a matter of right in all other cases, and that "no person shall be admitted to bail when he is charged with an offense punishable with death, when the proof is evident and the presumption great," ’ is inconsistent with the constitutional provision that ’all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great,’ since it denies bail as a matter of absolute right in capital cases where the proof is not evident nor the presumption great." (People v. Tinder, 19 Cal., 539, 542; 81 Am. Dec., 77.)

It is to be observed in this connection that we hold no portion of the People’s Court Act to be unconstitutional, but, upon the contrary, we rely upon the presumption of constitutionality, and because of that presumption we construe the Act in consonance with the mandates of the Constitution.

"It is an elementary principles that where the validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible, interpretations, by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional and by the other it would be valid, the court should adopt the construction which would uphold it. It is the duty of courts to adopt a construction of a statute that will bring it into harmony with the Constitution, if its language will permit." (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 97.)

However, the discretion of the Court, as above described, is not absolute nor beyond control. Indeed, its very concept repels the idea of unlimited power. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Since judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge’s individual opinion, the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided and controlled by certain well- known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, present them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion is a misnomer. It is fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion, when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humor; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful; but legal and regular." (Rex v. Wilkee, 4 Burr., 2527, 2539; 98 Reprint, 327, cited in note 26 [a], 6 C. J., p. 954.)

"The policy pervading our jurisprudence is to commit as little as possible to judicial discretion, presuming that ’ system of laws is best which confides as little as possible to the discretion of the judge — that judge is best who relies as little as possible upon his opinion.’ In pursuance of this policy, ever since the provisions "that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, where the proof is great,’ became a part of the settled constitutional and statutory laws of nearly all the states of the Union, the courts have endeavored, with more or less success, to formulate some stable rules to guide their judgment." (In re Thomas, 20 Okl., 167, 171; 93 P., 980; 39 L. R. A., N. S., 752 and note, cited in 6 C. J., p. 955, note 31 [a].)

"How exercised. The discretion exercised by the court in granting or refusing bail is not an arbitrary but a judicial one; it is governed or directed by known and established rules, and in truth cannot be otherwise applied then to decide whether or not the facts bring the case within their operation." (6 C. J., p. 954.)

In this jurisdiction inferior courts are controlled in the exercise of their discretion, first, by the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which the Supreme Court may promulgate under the authority of Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution; and, third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. Upon the basis of constitutional, legal and reglementary provisions combined with well-known principles of practice and procedure, this Court in its resolution of January 11, 1946, above quoted, gave the following instructions to the People’s Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;

(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;

(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the director and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.

The first instruction is predicated upon section 7 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in connection with sections 15 and 22 of the People’s Court Act. Section 15 of the People’s Court Act, in entrusting the Office of Special Prosecutors with "the direction and control of the prosecution" in cases mentioned in said Act "the provisions of any law or rules of court to the contrary notwithstanding," necessarily confers upon said office the exclusive power, coupled with the correlative responsibility, of deciding, among others, such questions as to whether or not it will oppose bail petitioned by a detainee in any of said cases, whether or not it should adduce evidence, and the kind of quantity thereof, or whether or not to reveal such evidence at the hearing of any such petitions. The law assigns to the court and the public prosecutor their respective powers and responsibilities in the judicial elucidation of these cases, just as in all others. The very exigencies of an orderly and efficient administration of justice demand that the judge should not invade the province of the prosecutors any more than the latter can invade that of the former. If the prosecutor prosecutes, and the judge judges, each within his proper sphere, neither need have any compunction over the discharge of his own mission.

Section 22 of the People’s Court Act provides that the prosecution and trial of cases before said court should be in accordance with the rules of court, and section 7 of Rule 110 provides that at the "hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution." The prosecutor is free to satisfy or not to satisfy that burden. The Solicitor General is free to oppose or not to oppose the application for bail, as above stated, according to what he believes to be in the best interests of the state. And it is unnecessary to say that if he refuses to satisfy his burden because he does not oppose the application for bail, the usual course open to the court leads to the granting of the bail.

When the first proviso of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 and Article III, section 1, paragraph 16, of the Constitution, refer to the case where the court finds that there is strong "evidence" of the commission of a capital offense, they necessarily mean evidence properly adduced by the parties or any of them before it, in the manner and form prescribed by the laws and rules of judicial procedure. If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court’s clear duty would be to adopt that course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power — nor discretion — of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the application for bail.

Let not the case of Payao v. Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), be invoked in respondents’ favor. True, in said case this Court approved of the action of the trial court in considering the record of the preliminary investigation in determining the question of bail. But it must be remembered, in the first place, that at the same preliminary investigation the accused must, under the law, be presumed to have been present; confronted with the witnesses against her; had the right to cross-examine them, make objections, present her own evidence, and to be heard in her own defense; and, in the second place, the provincial fiscal presented said record at the hearing (vide, page 214, volume cited on the question of bail) again in the presence of the accused who again had a right to interpose objections, adduce evidence and be heard in defense. Had the fiscal not presented said record at the hearing, it would not have been considered by the Court of First Instance, since, generally, the record of the preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace is not by itself a part of the record on the case in the Court of First Instance (United States v. Abuan, 2 Phil., 130).

In the case of Marcos v. Cruz (67 Phil., 82), involving a capital crime, a preliminary investigation ex parte was conducted by the Judge of First Instance previous to the arrest of the defendants. After their arrest, the defendants asked for provisional release under bail, and the petition was denied by respondent judge upon the ground that the evidence disclosed at the ex parte preliminary investigation was strong and that, therefore, the defendants were not entitled to bail. This Court disapproved the procedure followed by respondent judge as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Se arguye que el Juez recurrido, antes de expedir el mandamiento de arresto de los acusados, examino a los dos testigos de cargo que presento el Fiscal y que estas pruebas establecieron asimismo la presuncion de culpabilidad de los acusados y el requerimiento adicional de que las pruebas de culpabilidad deben ser evidentes. No podemos prestar nuestro asentimiento a esta pretension. No debe olvidarse que tales pruebas se recibieron en ausencia de los acusados y estos no tuvieron oportunidad de verles declarar ni de repreguntarles. . . . Otras razones que impiden el que tales pruebas se puedan tener en cuenta contra los acusados son: que el Fiscal no las produjo no ofrecio en la vista de las peticiones de libertad bajo fianza. . . . En tales circunstancias era deber del Juez recurrido requerir al Fiscal que presente sus pruebas para demostrar que el delito imputado era capital, que las pruebas eran evidentes y que la presuncion de culpabilidad era fuerte."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is thus clear that the People’s Court, in the exercise of its discretion, can consider no evidence that has not properly been presented to it by the parties, and that, when the special prosecutor elects not to oppose the application for bail and, consequently, refuses to present any evidence, "the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library

We said "in the proper exercise of its discretion," for the reason that, since such discretion has reference to the weight of evidence, it should be exercised in favor of the applicant when there is no evidence — much less strong evidence — presented by the prosecution. In other words, the discretion should be exercised as if the court, after examining the evidence, found none against the applicant. Of course, the discretion is negligible when no evidence is presented by the prosecutor, but some amount of discretion still remains, for, as stated in our first instruction, the discretion should be exercised in favor of the applicant "as a general rule," for there may be an exception, as that referred to in the second instruction.

The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecution as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail.

The course followed by the respondents was obviously predicated on this implied authority, but the power of the court to that effect must have its limitation founded equally on the paramount interest of justice. And we come now to our third instruction. The questions made by the court to the prosecutor may involve a disclosure of evidence that may imperil the success of the prosecution or jeopardize the public interest. In such event, according to our third instruction, the prosecutor may not be compelled to make the disclosure "if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as Head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not even at the trial be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the right of the defendant or detainee."cralaw virtua1aw library

It must be observed that the court is made to reply upon the official statement of the Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial. In this connection, we bear in mind what Chief Justice Marshall said in Burr’s trial with reference to the power of the court to determine whether or not a document in the possession of the President contains secret information. Chief Justice Marshall said that "much reliance must be placed on the declaration of the President" and that "the court ought to consider the reasons which would induce the President to refuse to exhibit such a letter as conclusive on it." Of course, the Solicitor General is not the President, but the question involved was one that might affect the trial on the merits, unlike the matter before us which is a mere incident concerning bail. Thus, to a certain extent the rule may be adopted by analogy. The Solicitor General is a high officer of the Government, made responsible by law for the prosecution of offenses before the People’s Court, and he is in a better position than anyone else, including the court itself, to determine the risks which a disclosure of his evidence may entail. Since the judgment of the Solicitor General on this simple matter may be deemed to be reliable and there being no way for the court to verify it without running the risks sought to be avoided, it is made final. If further developments show the Solicitor General to have betrayed his trust, he may surely be called to account.

The power of the Solicitor General is not, however, unlimited under our third instruction. He cannot refuse to make a disclosure when his refusal shall prejudice the right of the defendant or detainee. The prosecutor may not, for instance, choose to make disclosures damaging to the applicant, and later refuse to disclose other evidence favorable to her, on the pretext that such disclosure may imperil the success of the prosecution.

It may be said that there is nothing in these instructions expressly indicating the course to be followed by the People’s Court in case the Solicitor General refuses validly to disclose his evidence under our third instruction. This is so, because things that are self- evident need not be expressly stated. The situation is clear. If the Solicitor General refuses validly to disclose his evidence and, for that reason, no evidence lies before the court, then the situation comes under our first instruction, and the petition for bail should be granted. We do not need to state this expressly, for it is self- evident from the instructions themselves. We, do not have to repeat in the third instruction what is already covered in the first. These instructions, which are simple and clear, having reference to three different possibilities simply and clearly defined, are directed to judges who are presumed to be versed in the law, and should not be clogged with repetitions that can in no measure add to their lucidity.

It is our considered opinion that the procedure adopted by the People’s Court, after the third hearing of January 28, 1946, whereby it examined the special prosecutor’s evidence in a private inquiry without the presence of the petitioner, and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein it denied the application for bail, is improper, arbitrary, and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Firstly, because it violates our order of December 20, 1945, wherein it was held that the hearing on applications for bail should be in the presence of the applicant or at least with due notice to her, and, therefore, such private inquiry cannot be a part of the hearing. The knowledge or information thus obtained was without the safeguards of confrontation, cross-examination and opportunity to be heard in defense on the part of the prisoner and cannot be a proper ground for denying bail, as ruled expressly by this court in Marcos v. Cruz, supra;

Secondly, because such private inquiry is inconsistent with our three instructions above mentioned. The procedure outlined in said three instructions is such as to allow no room for a private conference between the court and the special prosecutor. It such kind of conference were permissible, we would not have to qualify or limit the power of the court to inquire in the three instances contemplated in our three instructions. The nature of such instructions is such as clearly to show that nothing can be used against the applicant that has not been brought properly before the court in her presence. It is precisely for this reason that the Solicitor General is given the final word on the question of whether the disclosure of the prosecution’s evidence may endanger the success of the prosecution because there is no way for the court to make such determination without having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant and without thus running the risks sought to be avoided. If private conference were permissible, we would not have required the solemn statement of the Solicitor General, and, instead, we would have provided that, upon the prosecutor’s refusal to disclose evidence in the presence of the applicant, the court may call him to a private conference. But we did not do so, because a private conference is strongly repugnant to the requirements of a hearing provided by law, and thus the solemn statement of the Solicitor General is made the end of the court’s power to inquire legally in a case where the prosecutor does not oppose the granting of the bail; and

Thirdly, the knowledge acquired in such private conference is not different in character from a Judge’s personal or special knowledge, upon which, by well-settled rules of evidence, he, as judge, has no right to act.

". . . and it is hardly necessary to state that the judge has no right to act upon his own personal or special knowledge of facts as distinguished from that general knowledge which might properly be important to other persons of intelligence. More than two hundred years ago in Sir John Fenwick’s trial, it was said by the solicitor general: ’I do not say that a judge upon his private knowledge ought to judge, he ought not. But if a judge knows anything whereby the prisoner might be convicted or acquitted (not generally known), then I do say he ought to be called from the place where he state and go to the bar and give evidence of his knowledge.’ In a Utah case one of the briefs contained the statement: ’The fact that the Utah Nursery Company, a corporation, is a foreign corporation, was personally known to the county judge, had been admitted in oral argument by counsel for appellant and did not need to be proven.’ The court said that nothing in the record supported the statement that it was admitted by counsel that the corporation was a foreign corporation, and counsel would not seriously contend that the personal knowledge of the judge meets the requirements of the law that proof of the facts shall be made. The law is well settled upon the point that the judge’s personal knowledge cannot be used — in criminal cases he should be, if not a witness, certainly not a judge — in civil cases, his knowledge must not be made apparent to the jury." (1 Jones on Ev., 2d ed., pp. 644, 645, sec. 133.)

In a case where a Public Utility Commission issued a regulation of telephone rates upon data gathered in a private investigation, Justice Cardozo said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the standpoint of due process — the protection of the individual against arbitrary action — a deeper vice is this, that even now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which the Commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a trial, the party against whom they are offered may see the evidence or hear it and parry its effect. Even if they are copied in the findings without preliminary proof, there is at least an opportunity in connection with a judicial review of the decision to challenge the deductions made from them. The opportunity is excluded here. The Commission, withholding from the record the evidential facts that it has gathered here and there, contents itself with saying that in gathering them it went to journals and tax lists, as if a judge were to tell us, "I looked at the statistics in the Library of Congress, and they teach me thus and so.’ This will never do if hearings and appeals are to be more than empty forms. What the Supreme Court of Ohio did (in sustaining the order of the Commission) was to take the word of the Commission as to the outcome of a secret investigation, and let it go at that.’A hearing is not judicial, at least in any adequate sense, unless the evidence can be known.’" (Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S., 292; 57 Sup., 724.)

We shall now proceed to resume the attitude observed by respondent judges in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner. It must be recalled that in our first decision of December 20, 1945, we held, in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner, that the People’s Court should hold a hearing with due notice to both the Solicitor General and the applicant, and that the order issued by the People’s Court denying such application without such hearing was null and void. It must be observed, furthermore, that the People’s Court then denied the petition only because the Solicitor General recommended a bail of P50,000 from which it inferred that the crime involved must be serious, when said court admittedly granted bail in the same amount to other detainees of the same class as the herein petitioner. After the People’s Court was notified of our aforesaid order, it held a hearing on December 27, 1945, wherein the herein petitioner filed a verbal application for bail, which the special prosecutor to compel him to reveal his evidence. The applicant, without waiting for the decision of the People’s Court granting or denying the application for bail, came to this Court asking that the People’s Court to render its decision on the aforesaid verbal petition in conformity with the three instructions above mentioned. The People’s Court called another hearing on January 15, 1946, and notwithstanding the special prosecutor’s having reiterated that he had no objection to the application for bail, the court insisted on addressing to him practically the same questions as those made at the hearing of December 27, 1945. And upon the prosecutor’s declining to answer, supported by his presentation of a certificate of the Solicitor General that the answer to said questions may imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest, respondent court, through Judge Antonio Quirino, in violation of our third instruction above mentioned, ordered the arrest of the special prosecutor for alleged contempt of court. The petitioner came to this Court asking that she be granted bail in view of the grave abuse of discretion committed by the People’s Court, particularly by Judge Quirino. We likewise denied that motion to give the People’s Court the chance to dispose of the case in accordance with law and the Constitution as construed by this Court. But the People’s Court called another hearing on January 28, 1946, in which again the special prosecutor reiterated that he had no objection to the release under bail applied for, but the People’s Court after asking him some unimportant questions called him to a private hearing at the back of the applicant, to inquire from him the strength of his evidence. Thereafter, the People’s Court issued an order disregarding, either knowingly or unwittingly, all the instructions issued by this Court, and maintaining its alleged unbridled discretion on the matter, a theory which we have rejected in our previous decision and instructions. And, what is worse, the People’s Court, relying on information acquired in private conference with the special prosecutor, declared that there was "a myriad of points" against the applicant and denied the application. It will thus be observed that, in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner, the People’s Court has disregarded the law and the Constitution, not only once but as many as four times—first, on October 9, 1945; second, on December 27, 1945; third, on January 15, 1946, when it ordered the arrest of the special prosecutor who was acting in conformity with our instructions; and fourth, on January 28, 1946, when it held a private conference with the special prosecutor. On the first three occasions we exhausted all the measures to make the People’s Court act in accordance with its discretion vested by the law and the Constitution as construed by this Court in its order and instructions. But all to no avail. Considering that this attitude of the People’s Court seriously affects petitioner’s sacred right of individual freedom guaranteed by the Constitution which has been delayed for nearly four months, this Court directly granted her request for release under bail instead of ordering the People’s Court to do so. Further delay was thus avoided.

It is maintained that this body has no authority to grant provisional release under bail in a petition for certiorari. The argument is advanced that all this Tribunal may do is to annul the People’s Court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. We recognize no such limitation. In several certiorari cases, this Court in addition to annulling the attacked decision or order, issued such other directives as were found to be necessary in the interest of justice. (Cf. Javier v. Paredes and Gregorio, 52 Phil., 910; Beech v. Jimenez and Crossfield, 12 Phil., 212.) And it must be recalled that this is a combined proceeding for certiorari and habeas corpus, the latter in aid of the former, as above stated. And, furthermore, in a special civil action for certiorari, this Court has the power to grant "such of the relief prayed for as the petitioner is entitled to, with or without costs, as justice requires." (Rule 67, sec. 8.) One of the reliefs prayed for in the instant case is that the petitioner be granted directly by this Court provisional release under bail, and considering the unjustified delays suffered by the petitioner due to the insistent attitude of the People’s Court in disregarding the law and the Constitution as construed by this Court, it is our considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for in the interest of justice. Particularly so in the instant case which is a combined proceeding of certiorari and habeas corpus.

"So also the writ has always been held to be available to a prisoner entitled to be admitted to bail and to whom such right has been denied.

"Farrel v. Hawley, 78 Conn., 150; 61 Atl., 502; 112 A. S. R., 98; c Ann. Cas., 874; 70 L. R. A., 686;

"In re Schriber, 19 Idaho, 531; 114 P., 29; 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) , 693;

"Hight v. United States, Morris (Ia.) 407; 43 Am. Dec., 111;

"Ex Parte Alexander, 59 Mo., 598; 21 Am. Rep. 393.

"Peo. v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N. Y.) , 377; 25 Wend., 483; 37 Am. Dec. 328;

"In re Thomas, Okl., 167; 93 P., 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) , 752;

"In re Williamson, 26 Pa. St., 9; 67 Am. Dec., 374;

"Ex Parte Newman, 38 Tex. Crim., 164; 41 S. W., 628; 70 A. S. R., 740;

"State v. Foster, 84 Wash., 58 146 P., 169; L. R. 1915 E., 340 and note."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Denial of Bail. — Subject to statutory limitations, the writ of habeas corpus may be used to procure the admission to bail of a party entitled thereto, whether in a criminal case or a civil action, unless admittance is a matter of discretion and has been refused by the proper authorities without any abuse of discretion." (Italics supplied.) (29 C. J., sec. 84, p. 94.)

"U. S. — U. S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall., 17; 1 Law ed., 490.

"Ala. — Ex. p. State, 205 Ala., 11; 87 S., 594; State v. Lowe, 204 Ala., 288; 85 S., 707; Ex p. Croom, 19 Ala., 561.

"Ariz. — In re Haigler, 15 Ariz., 150; 137 P., 423.

"Ark. — Ex p. White, 9 Ark., 222.

"Cal. — Ex p. Curtis, 92 Cal., 188; 28 P., 223; Ex p. Duncan, 53 Cal., 410.

"Colo. — Romero v. Downer, 69 Colo., 281; 193 P., 559.

"Fla. — Russel v. State, 71 Fla., 236; 71 S., 27; Ex p. Nathan, 50 S., 38; Benjamin v. State, 25 Fla., 675; 6 S., 433; Holley v. State, 15 Fla., 688; Finch v. State, 15 Fla. 633.

"Ind. — Ex p. Richards, 102 Ind., 260; 1 N. E., 639; Ex p. Sutherlin, 56 Ind., 595; Ex p. Moore, 30 Ind., 197; Ex p. Hefren, 27 Ind., 87; Lumm v. State, 3 Ind., 293; State v. Best, 7 Blackf., 611.

"Iowa. — Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa, 243; 156 N. W., 513.

"Kan. — In re Rolf, 30 Kan., 758; 1 P., 523.

"Mich. — In re Tubbs, 139 Mich., 102; 102 N. W., 626.

"Miss. — Marley v. State, 109 Miss., 169; 68 S., 75, 770; Street v. State, 43 Miss., 1; Ex p. Gray, 30 Miss., 673.

"Mo. — Alexander’s Pet., 59 Mo., 598; 21 Am. R., 393.

"Nev. — Ex p. Nagel, 41 Nev., 86; 167 P., 689.

"N. I. — Peo. v. Folmsbee, 60 Barb., 480.

"N. C. — State v. Herndon, 107 N. C., 934; 12 SRE., 268;

State v. Wiley, 64 N. C., 821; State v. Edney, 60 N. C., 463.

"The power of the Supreme Court or a justice thereof, to bail in all cases, whether it be treason, murder, arson, or any other offense, is indisputable. (People v. Van Horne, 8 Barb., 158; People v. Perry, 8 Abb. Pr., N. S., 27, cited in note on p. 758, 39 L. R. A., new series.)

"The Supreme Court of the United States has power to admit to bail on a charge of high treason." (U. S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall., 17; 1 Law. ed., 490, cited in note on pp. 758, 759; 39 L. R. A., new series.)

To hold this Court powerless to grant bail directly under the circumstances of the instant case is certainly to destroy the great function of the highest tribunal of the land created by the Constitution as the ultimate bulwark of the liberties of the people.

No costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur.



PARAS, J., concurring in the result:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the result for the simple reasons stated in our concurring and dissenting opinion in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira (75 Phil., 634), in which the main (questions raised were the same as those involved in this case.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We concur in the following pronouncements of the decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That "in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner, the People’s Court has disregarded the law and the Constitution, not only once but as many as four times — first, on October 9, 1945; second, on December 27, 1945; third, on January 15, 1946, when it ordered the arrest of the special prosecutor who was acting in conformity with our instruction; and fourth, on January 8, 1946, when it held a private conference with the special prosecutor.

"2. That this Supreme Court has authority to grant provisional release under bail in a petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, "in several certiorari cases, this Court in addition to annulling the attacked decision or order, issued such other directives as were found to be necessary in the interest of justice.

"3. That in a special civil action for certiorari, this Court has the power to grant" ’such of the relief prayed for as the petitioner is entitled to, with or without costs, as justice requires.’" (Rule 67, sec. 8.)

4. That "considering the unjustified delays suffered by petitioner due to the insistent attitude of the People’s Court in disregarding the law and Constitution as construed by this Court, it is our considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for in the interest of justice. Particularly so in the instant case which is a combined proceeding of certiorari and habeas corpus."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. That "subject to statutory limitations, the writ of habeas corpus may be used to procure the admission to bail of a party entitled thereto, whether in a criminal case or a civil action, unless admittance is a matter of discretion and has been refused by the proper authorities without any abuse of discretion."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. That "the power of the Supreme Court or of a justice thereof, to bail in all cases, whether it be treason, murder, arson, or any other offense, is indisputable."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. That "to hold this Court powerless to grant bail directly, under the circumstances of this instant case, is certainly to destroy the great functions of the highest tribunal of the land, created by the Constitution as the ultimate bulwark of the liberties of the people."cralaw virtua1aw library

8. That "under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, ’shall before conviction be bailable,’ the only exception being when the charge is for a capital offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong."cralaw virtua1aw library

9. That "it is clear that even capital offense are bailable in the discretion of the court before conviction." (United States v. Babasa, 19 Phil., 198.)

10. That "in capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose," although we disagree with the qualification that it is general rule only, because, to our mind, the true rule must be unqualified, without exception, and compulsory.

11. That the Solicitor General" ’is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not even at the trial be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the right of the defendant or detainee.’"

12. That "the very exigencies of an orderly and efficient administration of justice demand that the judge should not invade the province of the prosecutors any more than the latter can invade that of the former. If the prosecutor prosecutes, and the judge judges, each within his proper sphere, neither need have any compunction over the discharge of his own mission."cralaw virtua1aw library

13. That section 15 of the People’s Court Act confers upon the office of special prosecutors "the exclusive power, coupled with the correlative responsibility, of deciding, among others, such questions as to whether or not it will oppose bail petitioned by a detainee in any of said cases (the once provided for in the Act), whether or not it should adduce evidence, and the kind or quantity thereof, or whether or not to reveal such evidence at the hearing of any such petitions" for bail.

14. That at" ’the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution’ (sec. 7, of Rule 110). The prosecutor is free to satisfy or not to satisfy that burden."cralaw virtua1aw library

15. That "if for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law or rule exists by which he may be so compelled and the court before which the case is pending has to act without the evidence and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power — nor discretion — of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the application for bail."cralaw virtua1aw library

16. That "the procedure adopted by the People’s Court, after the third hearing of January 28, 1946, whereby it examined the special prosecutor’s evidence in a private inquiry without the presence of the petitioner, and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein it denied the application for bail, is improper, arbitrary, and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the strength of the legal principles, doctrine and rules maintained in our several opinions in Duran v. Abad Santos (75 Phil., 410), and in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira (75 Phil., 634), and of the above pronouncements of the majority opinion in this case, we concurred in the resolution adopted on February 16, 1946, ordering that "petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee, upon her filing in this Court of a bond in the sum of P50,000 and upon said bond being duly approved, be forthwith set at liberty."cralaw virtua1aw library

The present case is the third recourse resorted to by petitioner to obtain from this Supreme Court relief against here detention, the first being the petition in Raquiza v. Bradford (75 Phil., 50), and the second the one in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra.

After twelve months of detention, after the ordeals of legal battles she fought in the People’s Court and in this Supreme Court, petitioner’s endeavors were at last, although belatedly, crowned with success, with the resolution in the present case, ordering her release on bail, exactly as we have repeatedly proposed months ago in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra.

To win this last battle for personal liberty, it has been necessary for petitioner to wage a series of the most relentless legal fights known in judicial history, with the characteristic steadfastness of one who is fully convinced that reason and law are on one’s side, and for the highest tribunal of the land to undergo one of the most speedy and heartening doctrinal evolutions in the brief span of a few months, in which the last development resulted in an outright reversal of the position originally taken on the same question.

The initial position was taken in the several months old, but already obsolete case of Duran v. Abad Santos, supra, where it was our lot to be a lone dissenter against doctrines now happily scrapped and discarded. Several evolutionary phases appear in the decision and directive orders issued in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra. The present stage of the evolution as it appears in the decision rendered in this case, reverses the position taken in the Duran case, although we believe it needs some additional progressive steps in order to meet fully the requirements of the letter and spirit of the Constitution regarding the great question of personal liberty. Upon this we have to refer to our opinions in Raquiza v. Bradford, supra, People v. Bañes, and People v. Samano (Res. 41 Off. Gaz., 888), People v. Abad (Res., 42 Off. Gaz., 532 and 43 Off. Gaz., 5030), and People v. Barrera de Reyes (46 Off., Gaz., 981).

There are things to be deplored in petitioner’s case. One of them, the crux in this case, is the judicial stubbornness which caused such a miscarriage of justice that will remain forever as an unerasable blot in our government. Such manifestation of statement had not been cured even by the specific instructions and directives which this Supreme Court, with utmost fatherly complaisance and maternal forbearance, vouchsafed to an erring inferior court in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra, so much so that against its effects the authority of the Supreme Court had to be invoked to protect the rights of and restored to freedom one of the special prosecutors of the government, who in the honest performance of his official duties and in his courageous efforts to protect the high interest of state and justice, has been illegally imprisoned. (Tañada v. Quirino, 42 Off., Gaz., 934.)

No better manifestation of such ungovernable headstrongness may be shown than the one displayed by an inferior court when, by insisting on giving effect to its order which was set aside in a final and executory decision rendered by the Supreme Court, it showed wanton contempt and disregard for the authority of the highest tribunal of the country, and in disregarding the law and Constitution, not only once, but as may as four times.

The order dated January 31, 1946, issued by respondent judges, copy of which is attached to their answer dated February 4 as Annex a, is expressly intended to restore and give full effect to the order of the People’s Court dated October 9, 1945, which is one of the two orders specifically set aside by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on December 20, 1945, in Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, supra. as having been rendered "with grave abuse of discretion."cralaw virtua1aw library

This manifestation of defiant disobedience and contempt to a legal decision of a duly constituted authority, such as the Supreme Court, should not, lest we expose ourselves to be tattooed with the stigma of judicial flanerie or accessorial condescension, be allowed to pass unnoticed and without our irrevocable reproof and our sternest objurgation if we have to avoid in our judiciary, in our government, in our country, the reign of official insubordination and the enthroning of irresponsible anarchy. Indiscipline and lawlessness in any bracket or government are not better than lawlessness and terrorism in any segment of the community. The contagion of official bad example inevitably attacks the social consciousness and moral equilibrium of the ruck. The evil effects of the resulting demoralization, of unpredictable extent, shall then be hard to check and cure.

Courts and judges will be recreant to their official duty if, by actual practice, they fail to make an example of respectful subordination to higher organs, agencies, and functionaries in the official hierarchy, of official discipline in the exercise of their functions, of obedience to and respect for final and irrevocable order of superior authority. Their official conduct is a mirror for the people to look upon. They are among the first who should set the example of respect to law and authority. Public officials cannot trample upon the Constitution, the laws and constituted authority without producing alarm and disturbance in all social strata. The crystalline surface of the pool of public conscience cannot remain unrippled at the impact of the fall of the stone of public scandal thrown into it. Such effects must be, in the interest of social order, avoided at all costs. The survival of human society demands it.

Among the three power of government, the judiciary is in the material sense the weakest. Although its function is society is as noble and important as the ones entrusted to the legislative and executive powers, and there is none loftier that our mind may conceive or to which the most ambitious heart may aspire, it needs the active and positive help of other agencies to make it effective. Congress must provide for the adequate budget, and the executive power the necessary force to make effective the orders and decisions of tribunals.

To compensate for that comparative physical weakness of the judicial power, it is necessary that judges and courts should acquire the unbounded moral force which springs from the general faith and confidence of government and people alike. That moral force, although intangible, immeasurable and imponderable, is as effective as any cosmic force, if not more. We hold as an axiom that spiritual energy is stronger than atomic energy, the mighty basic force of material universe. But to obtain and retain public faith and confidence, it is necessary that courts and judges should show by their acts that they are actually entitled to such faith and confidence. Recalcitrant insubordination and indiscipline are not the means. On the contrary, they will only provoke public suspicion and distrust, if not popular wrath and condemnation.

Let all remember that any showing of insubordination, indiscipline, obstinate disobedience on the part of any public officer, sooner or later, will rebound multiplied against the guilty one. Then, it will be too late to complain and deplore that his own authority is ignored, despised, or trampled upon. Such faults become veritable boomerang which might cause disaster to the very functionaries who dare to perpetrate them in utter defiance of higher authority. They need vigorous corrective measures, the least one a strong reprimand, to avoid their recurrence, by annihilating, obliterating, or neutralizing the first bacilli at the inception of such official infectious morbidity.

We feel happy that our brethen had, at last, voted for the decision concerning the petitioner which permits us to concur in, although we cannot but regret that so much time and effort were lost in the past in fruitless attempts to attain justice, the one belatedly given now to petitioner. With a weaker heart, she would have accepted her former failures and defeats with the fatalistic submission shown by petitioner in Duran v. Abad Santos, and justice would have been deprived of the belated opportunity of shining as lastly it did in this case.

Never yielding to defeatist despair, we are convinced that the long and bitter travails and failures precluding the final success of petitioner, as all intense human experiences, will garner new sparkles to the wisdom treasured by our tribunals. Experience is the praecognitum of the dialectics of progress in human history. Hope and faith in the ultimate good are the driving forces behind all endeavors towards an ideal.

BRIONES, M., conforme y disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

La proposicion de que el articulo 19 de la Ley No. 682 que crea el Tribunal del Pueblo (People’s Court) es nada mas que una derivacion del Articulo I, inciso 16, Titulo III de la Constitucion del Commonwealth, es coso que ha sido definitivamente resuelta en nuestra decision de 20 de diciembre, 1945, recaida en el presente caso. Alli dijimos clara y categoricamente que la disposicion constitucional de que "todo acusado podra, antes de su condena, ser puesto en libertad bajo fianza con garantia suficiente, excepto en casos de delito capital cuando existan pruebas claras de su culpabilidad" es aplicable no solo a los acusados bajo dicha ley sino tambien a los detenidos simplemente, en los casos en que se trata de un delito en el articulo 114 del Codigo Penal Revisado. En las muy detenidas y laboriosas discusiones que precedieron y culminaron en dicha decision de 20 de diciembre se explayaron con toda amplitud las razones y argumentos que sobre este punto importante algunos Sres. Magistrados exponen ahora en sus disidencias, y la Corte, antes de firmar y promulgar aquella sentencia, se hizo perfecto cargo de tales argumentos y razones. Es una lastima que premuras de tiempo y de trabajo hayan impedido que estas disidencias se escribieran y dieran a publicidad entonces, en lugar de que sus distinguidos autores se limitaran a la frase sacramental de "I concur in the result" o "conforme con la parte dispositiva." No cabe duda de que con ello y con los fundamentos de la opinion de la mayoria vigorosamente expuestos en la ponencia del Magistrado Hilado, el Tribunal del Pueblo, la judicatura, el foro y el publico, en general, hubieran reportado los beneficios de una amplia y comprensiva ilustracion acerca de tan importante punto constitucional y juridico.

Acaso se digo que sobre esta cuestion constitucional no habia mayoria en la referida sentencia de 20 de diciembre, puesto que la suscribieron incondicionalmente solo tres Magistrados: el ponente, el Presidente del Tribunal y el que suscribe. Pero esto nada mas que aparente. Habia mayoria porque otros tres Magistrados los Sres. Ozaeta, Paras y Perfecto que concurrieron en parte y disintieron en parte, hicieron constar categoricamente en su distamen separado que estaban conformes con la doctrina sentada en la ponencia de que el Articulo I, incisos 16 y 17, Titulo III de la Constitucion del Commonwealth era aplicable al presente caso, en relacion con la primera disposicion del articulo 19 de la Ley No. 682 (creando el Tribunal del Pueblo) y los articulos 3 al 8, regla 110, Reglamento de los Tribunales, que tratan de la prestacion de fianza en causas criminales.

Me parece, pues, que en estos momentos ya no sirve ningun interes ni proposito perentoriamente util el discutir si un detenido politico bajo la Ley No. 682 es a creedor, por derecho propio y constitucional, a gozar de libertad provisional bajo fianza cuando las pruebas de que ha cometido un delito capital no son fuertes ni vehementes. Nuestra sentencia de 20 de diciembre, 1945, tiene fuerza de ley en la materia, y a menos que la doctrina se abrogue por esta Corte, la misma tiene que regir, siquiera en el presente caso.

Por lo demas, no parece necesario argumentar mucho sobre el entronque del articulo 19 de la Ley No. 682 con la Constitucion del Commonwealth. El aire del parentesco se revela en la analogia del lenguaje y en el sentido natural y logico de la fraseologia empleada. Cuando la Legislatura dicta una ley que por la letra y el espiritu roza con un precepto constitucional, la presuncion es que este ultimo se ha tenido en cuenta y la intencion del legislador ha sido el desenvolverlo e implementarlo en el terreno del derecho positivo. Es verdad que el referido articulo 19 habla no solamente de acusados sino tambien de detenidos antes de la presentacion de la correspondiente querella, pero esta diferencia, en vez de excluir la garantia constitucional en favor de estos ultimos, debe ser, por el contrario, motivo para incluirla, mas aun, para imponerla. La razon es sencilla: la Ley No. 682 contiene una radicalisima desviacion de las disposiciones legales en materia de detencion ampliando el tiempo permitido por el Codigo Penal Revisado para la detencion sin querella, de 6 horas a 6 meses, sin incluir el enciero bajo las autoridades del ejercito americano. Teniendo en cuenta la posibilidad de tan larga detencion era nada mas natural que la garantia constitucional sobre fianza se considerase tan buena para el detenido como para el acusado. No se debe olvidar que el espiritu que informa las constituciones democraticas como la nuestra es siempre el de proteccion maxima para los fueros y libertades del individuo.

Pero aun suponiendo inexistente ese entronque constitucional, estimo que ello es indiferente. Proveyendo como provee el citado articulo 19 que los detenidos por delito capital tienen derecho a fianza cuando las pruebas de cargo no son fuertes o vehementes, los tribunales de juticia tienen el deber de hacer efectivo tal derecho, fuese o no constitucional. Convengo en la asercion de que las garantias constitucionales son basicamente, primordialmente, un solido amparo contra los excesos y demasias del poder legislativo y poder ejecutivo; y que en estos conflictos, los tribunales de justicia constituyen precisamente el baluarte mas sequro para tales garantias. Pero a esto hay que añadir, ademas, que los tribunales de justicia actuan o deben actuar con igual celo, lo mismo si anda de por medio la constitucion que siuna simple ley, sin contruno contitucional.

Entonces por que disiento de la resolucion por virtud de la cual este Supremo Tribunal, directamente y por si mismo, ha autorizado la prestacion de fianza para la libertad provisional de la recurrente, en ves de dejar esta funcion al Tribunal del Pueblo? Mis razones y fundamentos se explanan a constinuacion.

(1) Creo que en este Tribunal ha sido unanime y definitiva la opinion de que la recurrente tenia derecho a ser oida en su solicitud pidiendo que el Tribunal del Pueblo la permitiera prestar fianza para su libertad provisional. Por eso que en la parte dispositiva de nuestra sentencia de 20 de dicienbre hemos declarado, bajo la firma y concurrencia de 7 Magistrados, que el Tribunal del Pueblo se extralimito en sus facultades y cometio un grave abuso de discrecion al denegar de plano la peticion de fianza sin la celebracion de previa audiencia en que se determinara si su caso era o no caucionable a tenor de la regla y de la excepcion provistas en el articulo 19 de la Ley No. 682, y hemos ordenado, despues de anular el auto denegatorio de la fianza, que se viera la solicitud en una audiencia que debia celebrarse ante el Tribunal del Pueblo con debida notificacion al Procurador General y a la peticionaria - audiencia que, "ya fuese de caracter sumario o algo por el estilo, deberia ser tal que capacitase al Tribunal del Pueblo para ejercer su sana discrecion en la disposicion de la mencionada solicitud." Digo que ha habido unanimidad en este punto porque si bien es verdad que 3 Magistrados disintieron redactando un dictamen separado y un Magistrado preparo y firmo una opinion concurrente separada, sus conclusiones no solo no eran incompatibles con la parte dispositiva de la ponencia, sino que, en realidad, implicaban algo mas radical e inclusive mas liberal para la peticionaria.

(2) Si nuestra opinion ha sido unanime, clara, categorica y terminante en cuanto a que debia de haber una audiencia (hearing) en que se investigase si habia o no pruebas fuertes o vehementes contra la peticionaria para los efectos de la determinacion de su derecho a prestar fianza