1. EJECTMENT; GROUNDS FOR; NON-PAYMENT OF RENTS; RENTAL LAW (COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 689 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 66). — Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 689, amending Commonwealth Act No. 689, a lessee cannot be ejected even for non-payment of rents, where such non-payment is not willful and deliberate and the lessor does not need the property for himself and the lessee has never subleased it without authority. In other words, a lessee who is unable to pay on time the agreed rents because of poverty or of any other circumstance beyond his control cannot, under the present law, be ejected from the leased property, if the other to circumstances are not present.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RETROACTIVE EFFECT. — By the very nature its purpose, this measure of social justice (the Rental Law), which is temporary in character (four years), is applicable to all lessees or occupants at the time the law was passed, regardless of the dates of their contracts.

3. ID.; ID.; LESSOR NEED OF BUILDING LEASED. — One of the exceptions provided by the Rental Law under which a lessee or occupant may be ejected is "when the lessor has to occupy the building leased." This exception refers only to the lessor. It does not apply when the lessor needs the building for others.

Alejandro R. Santos, plaintiff-appellee herein, filed a suit in ejectment for the premises designated as No. 22, Altura Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, occupied since September 1942 by defendants-appellants, Catalina de Alvarez, Carlos Tanseco, and Manuel Alvarez. Santos obtained judgment in his favor in the municipal court of Manila, which was affirmed on appeal to the Court of First Instance. This appeal is now from the judgment of the Court of First Instance wherein defendants Alvarez, Et. Al. are ordered to vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff back rent from April 1, 1945, at the rate of P35 a month up to the time the premises are vacated, and to pay the costs of the suit.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 66, amending Commonwealth Act No. 689, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In a suit for ejection or for the collection of rents due and payable by virtue of a contract of lease of buildings destined solely dwelling, not being a room or rooms of an hotel, and lots, the that the rents are unjust and unreasonable shall constitute a valid defense. Except as provided in section twelve of this Act, no lessee or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate nonpayment of rents or when the lessor has to occupy the building leased." (Emphasis ours.)

Under this provision, a lessee cannot be ejected even for non-payment of rents, where such non-payment is not willful and deliberate and the lessor does not need the property for himself and the lessee has never subleased it without authority. In other words, a lessee who is unable to pay on time the agreed rents because of poverty or of any other circumstance beyond his control cannot, under the present law be ejected from the leased property, if the other two circumstances are not present. The purpose of the law is evidently to relieve the present situation arising from the scarcity of housing facilities by protecting particularly the thousands of impoverished people who in the war of liberation lost their houses together with almost all their belongings and found shelter in houses owned by others. By the very nature of its purpose, this measure of social justice, which is temporary in character (four years), is applicable to all lessees or occupants at the time the law was passed, regardless of the dates of their contracts. Manifestly the law seeks to relieve an existing condition affecting the life and happiness of the people, a condition that is not less important because of its age. Indeed, a poor lessee does not cease to be poor because his contract bears an earlier date than that of the law. It is expressly ordained by said law that "no lessee or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate non-payment of rents," a negative and all-inclusive expression which is mandatory and embraces within its protection all lessees and occupants without distinction at the time the law was passed. The only exceptions to the rule as above indicated are (1) when the lessee or occupant subleased the property without the consent of the lessor; (2) when there has been willful and deliberate non-payment of rents; or (3) when the lessor has to occupy the building leased. Under the facts of the instant case, the first and second exceptions cannot be invoked. As regards the third, the lessor, according to his testimony reiterated in his brief, wishes to secure the premises for his two sons or near relatives. But the exception applies only when the lessor "has to occupy the building leased." It does not apply when the lessor needs the building for others. In other words, the need contemplated by law is only the lessor’s need. His sons or near relatives are not the lessors. The sons should live with their father if they are minors, and if they are of age they are no longer dependents of their father. The near relatives have no standing in the lease, hence their need cannot be considered.

Moreover, there is the defendant’s allegation that plaintiff has other properties which he has been leasing to others rather than to his two sons and near relatives, which allegation is not denied and is indirectly admitted in appellee’s brief.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed in so far as it fixes the monthly rent for the premises in question at P35, and reversed in so far as it orders defendants-appellants to vacate said premises and to pay the costs. Plaintiff-appellee will pay the costs of this suit.

Pablo, Bengzon Hontiveros and Tuason, JJ., concur.



FERIA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the opinion of the majority.

I should have signed the said opinion, without writing this separate concurring one, were it not for the dissenting opinion or opinions based on the conclusion that Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66. is not applicable to the present case, for it can not be given a retroactive effect, and the laws applicable are those in force at the time the complaint in this case was filed the justice of the peace before said Act went into effect that is, the pertinent Provisions of the Civil Code, which conclusion is wrong for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 2 of said Act No. 689 as amended provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In a suit for ejection or for the collection of rents due and payable by virtue of a contract of lease of buildings destined solely for dwelling, not being a room or rooms of an hotel, and lots, the fact the rents are unjust and unreasonable shall constitute a valid defense. Except as provided in section twelve of this Act, no lessee or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate nonpayment of rents or when the lessor has to occupy the building leased."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the provisions above quoted, and taking into consideration the plain purpose of the law, it appears that the ,latter is clearly intended to temporarily supersede the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter, and to make it applicable to all pending and future litigations. For it provides that, "except as provided in section 12 of this Act, no see or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate nonpayment of rents or when the lessor has to occupy the building leased;" and a lessee or occupant can only be judicially ejected after the judgment an action of ejectment against him has become final. Had the intention of the Legislature been otherwise, it could have provided that "no action for ejectment shall be stituted against a lessee or occupant except, etc." And, besides, were it to apply prospectively or only to future actions instituted after said Act became effective, the apparent purpose of the law would not be fully accomplished, r it is of common or judicial notice that there were many cases of ejection then pending originally and on appeal in the courts at the time the law was enacted, and the scarcity of housing facilities was more acute before than after the promulgation of said Act.

From the provision of section 14 of said Act No. 689 as amended to the effect that "this Act shall be enforced for a period of four years after its approval," it does not follow that said Act because of said provision can not have a retrospective effect, for said period of four years is a mere limitation of the prospective effect of the Act as an emergency legislation, but has no bearing on the retrospective effect thereof.

"There is some conflict of opinion as to whether a case should be determined according to the law in effect when the judgment was rendered in the lower court, or according to the law in effect at the time the cause is disposed of by the reviewing court, but both reason and the right of authority point to the view that the case must be determined in the light of the law as it exists at the time of the decision by the appellate court, where the statute changing the law is intended to be retroactive and apply to pending litigation or is retroactive in its effect; and this is true thought it may result in the reversal of a judgment which was correct at the time it has rendered by the trial court. The general rule is, of course, subject to limitation here rights have been acquired which may not be divested by legislative changes in the law. In other words, while, as a general rule, the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not, if, subsequently to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rules which govern, the law must be obeyed, unless it is unconstitutional.’’ (3 American Jurisprudence, pp). 668, 669.)

It is elementary that all courts have inherent power to decide whether or not a law is retrospective or of retroactive effect, because if they hold the affirmative they merely declare what the law is or the intention of the legislature in enacting it. It is, therefore, clearly erroneous the contention in the dissenting opinion that this Court cannot give retroactive effect to Act No. 689 without usurping a legislative function. Of course, the courts should not construe the law as retrospective if such a construction would make it unconstitutional. The only question therefore to be determined in this case, although the dissenting opinion does not discuss it, is whether Act No. 689 is violative of the Constitution.

Our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property without due process of law, that is, do not divest rights of property and vested rights. It is obvious that the plaintiff and appellee in the present case had not acquired and right vested by the judgment appealed from to have the appellant ousted, because the judgment had not yet become final and was pending appeal at the time said act was enacted; and it is also clear that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code having been temporarily repealed and superceded by said Act, the case must be determined on the law as it stands at the time the judgment of this Court is rendered, there being no saving clause excluding cases pending at that time Act No. 689 from the effects of said Act.

But even assuming that the appellee had a property or vested right to recover the possession of the property leased by him to the appellant at the expiration of the term of the lease, ’No rule in constitutional law is better settled than the principle that all property is held subject to the right of the state reasonably to regulate its use under the police power in order to secure the general safety, public welfare, public convenience and general prosperity, and the peace, good order and morals of the community" (11 Am. Jur. section 268). Act No. 689 as amended was enacted under the emergency police power of the state.

The police power to a large extent rests on the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." Another principle involved in the police power is expressed by the well-known maxim, "salus populi est suprema lex." It has been said that this maxim is the foundation principle of all civil government and that for ages it has been a ruling principle of jurisprudence. "A specific application of the doctrine that the police power is based on public necessity finds its application in statutes which have been passed different occasions during emergencies to cope with the unusual exigencies arising. The general rule that while emergency does not create power, increase granted power, or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power applies with full force and effect to police measures. Thus, a limit in time to tide over a passing trouble may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change. It must be considered, however, that an emergency does not automatically lift all constitutional restraints and that a law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change, even though it was valid