1. INTERNATIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; TREATY OF PARIS; POWER OF UNITED STATES TO DETERMINE POLITICAL STATUS OF INHABITANTS OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. — By the treaty of Paris, Spain ceded to the United States the territory known as the Philippine Islands. The second paragraph of Article IX of said treaty stipulating that the political status of the native inhabitants of the territory thus ceded "shall be determined by Congress," was not necessary, except perhaps as regards the status of those who might choose to preserve their allegiance to Spain (Article IX, par. 1, Treaty of Paris), because the power and authority to determine the political status of said inhabitants was inherently vested in the United States.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF STIPULATION REGARDING SPANISH SUBJECTS IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS NOT BORN IN SPAIN; CHANGE OF CITIZENSHIP, HOW MADE. — The lack of treaty stipulation regarding Spanish subjects residing in the Philippine Islands, who were not born in Spain, was merely due to an oversight. It was not deliberate for the purpose of reverting them to the citizenship of their country of origin, for a change of citizenship must be voluntary or by an act, expressed or implied, of the citizen or subject. Hence, it may safely be asserted that the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris is not a limitation upon the power of the United States to determine the political status of all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and continued to reside therein.

3. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF SECTION 4 OF ACT OF CONGRESS OF JULY 1, 1902 AND SECTION 2 OF ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 29, 1916. — Section 4 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and section 2 of Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, conferring Philippine citizenship on "all inhabitants" of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, include not only native inhabitants thereof but also all inhabitants who were native and naturalized subjects of Spain.

4. ID.; ID.; LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP; CAUSES BEFORE ENACTMENT OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED. — Before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, there was no law providing for causes which may result in the forfeiture of Philippine citizenship, but international law recognizes expatriation, naturalization in a foreign country, military service rendered in and for another country, and marriage of a female citizen to a foreigner - to cite some instances - as causes which may give rise to the loss of citizenship.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OR MISAPPREHENSION. — Mistake or misapprehension as to one’s citizenship is not a sufficient cause or reason under the law for the forfeiture of Philippine citizenship, and may not constitute estoppel.

In 1941 Carlos Palanca applied for citizenship under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Hearing on the petition was held but no decree was entered because the Pacific War supervened. On 11 September 1944, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the Japanese sponsored Republic of the Philippines entered a decree granting the petition upon the evidence heard before the outbreak of the war. However, the petitioner did not take the prescribed oath as a condition precedent to the issuance of the certificate of naturalization. After the reconstitution of the record of the proceedings which had been destroyed as a result of the battle for the liberation of Manila, the petitioner took the oath and he was issued certificate of naturalization No. 1000.

On 3 July 1945, the Solicitor General filed a motion which he amended on 8 August, praying for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner, on the ground that the latter does not and did not possess good moral character, that he has not conducted himself in an "irreproachable manner in his relation with the constituted government," that he is not loyal to the Commonwealth Government of which he desires to be citizen, and that citizenship being a political status, the decree granting it entered by a court exercising judicial powers under the authority of the enemy sponsored Government is null and void.

At the hearing of the motion for cancellation, when Solicitor Pedro S. Reyes was starting to present the evidence for the Government, counsel for the petitioner asked leave of the court to be allowed to prove that the petitioner is a Filipino citizen, and informed the court that upon that ground he would join in the move to cancel the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner (p. 17, t. s. n.) . The leave having been granted, counsel for the petitioner submitted evidence which shows that —

Carlos Palanca arrived in the Philippines in the year 1884 and that since his arrival he continually resided in the City of Manila with the exception of the occasion, in the year 1902, when he left the Philippines for two months to attend the burial of his uncle, Don Carlos Palanca, which took place in China; that in 1894 he wanted to marry a Filipina, and because the Archbishop of Manila had decreed that a Chinaman, even if Christian, could not marry a native of the Philippines, in that year (it must have been in 1893) he applied for Spanish citizenship; that in connection with said application he received from the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes the document Exhibit A, dated January 19, 1894, wherein the petitioner, Carlos Palanca, was informed of the Royal Decree of the Regent, the Queen Maria Cristina, of November 30, 1893, by which he was granted the Spanish citizenship in accordance with the laws of the Monarchy, which was to be effective upon giving his oath provided for in such cases and after he shall have renounced his foreign allegiance; that, in addition to Exhibit A, petitioner also received and presented as Exhibit B a notification to the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes from the Secretaryship of the General Government whereby the former was informed of the Royal Decree of the Regent, Queen Maria Cristina, dated November 30, 1893, by which the applicant, Carlos Palanca was granted the Spanish citizenship to enter into effect upon his giving the corresponding oath (In this communication the text of the Royal Decree is quoted); that on the day following the receipt of Exhibit A, the petitioner repaired to Malacañan and there gave his oath of allegiance and received the corresponding certificate of Spanish citizenship, which was burned in his house at Taft Avenue during the battle for the liberation of Manila on the return of the Americans in 1945; that Exhibit B was the communication referred to as having been received by the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes from the Secretaryship of the General Government; that on February 4, 1894, and after having acquired the Spanish citizenship, Carlos Palanca Tan Tiaojua (Quian Lay) married Cesarea Cano Torres, native and resident of the District of Binondo, Manila (Exhibit D); that from then on the petitioner, Carlos Palanca, considered himself a Spanish subject, was registered as such in the Spanish Consulate General in Manila and has as late as March 2, 1942, received from said Consulate Duplicate Certificate No. 548 issued by the Spanish Consul General, Jose del Castano (Exhibit C); that because the petitioner, Carlos Palanca, believed himself to be a Spanish subject and desirous of acquiring Filipino citizenship by naturalization, he instituted this case in 1941, and when he married on April 12, 1945, his present wife, Rosa Gonzales, prior to the receipt of his Certificate of Naturalization No. 1000, he made it appear therein that he was of Spanish nationality; and that during the course of his application for Filipino citizenship by naturalization, he also adduced evidence to show that he had acquired the Spanish nationality during the Spanish regime in these Islands. (Order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated 7 January 1946.)

Holding that the petitioner is a Filipino citizen pursuant to section 4 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902 and section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, the trial court granted the motion for cancellation of the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner, not upon the grounds alleged in the motion but for the reason that the certificate of naturalization was unnecessary. From this order the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government appeals.

It is earnestly urged by the Solicitor General that, because of the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris which stipulated that —

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress,

section 4 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902, which provides —

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, . . . shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands . . . .

and section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, which provides —

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, . . . shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, . . . .

should be construed to refer not to all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands but only to native inhabitants thereof. Stated differently, the term "all inhabitants" means native inhabitants only, according to the interpretation and contention of the Solicitor General. The provisions of the Acts of Congress quoted above do not have the import given them by the Solicitor General, even if they were construed in connection with the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris also quoted above. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded to the United States the territory known as the Philippine Islands. There was no need of stipulating on the future political status of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands thus ceded, except perhaps on the status of those who might choose to preserve their allegiance to Spain (Article IX, par. 1, Treaty of Paris), because the power and authority to determine the political status of said inhabitants was inherently vested in the United States. There could be no limitation upon the power and authority to determine the political status of said inhabitants by the United States, and for that reason the enactment of a law by the latter declaring that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided therein, are citizens thereof, cannot be construed to contravene the treaty stipulation referred to. The plenipotentiaries of Spain who signed the Treaty of Paris could not have been solicitous only about the future political status of her subjects born in Spain and residing in the Philippine Islands and neglectful of the status of her subjects residing in the Philippine Islands who were not born in Spain. If Spain had allowed her subjects born in Spain who were residing in the Philippine Islands to become citizens of the latter upon their failure to preserve their allegiance to her (Spain), it could not have been her intention not to allow her subjects residing in the Philippine Islands who were not born in Spain to become citizens of the country of their residence, in the same way that she had allowed her subjects born in Spain and residing in the Philippine Islands to become citizens of the latter, or, by failing to stipulate on their future political status, to make them citizens of their country of origin, the citizenship of which they had renounced by becoming Spanish subjects. There seems to be no doubt that the lack of treaty stipulation regarding Spanish subjects residing in the Philippine Islands, who were not born in Spain, was merely due to an oversight. It was not deliberate for the purpose of reverting them to the citizenship of their country of origin, for a change of citizenship must be voluntary or by an act, expressed or implied, of the citizen or subject. Hence, it may safely be asserted that the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris is not a limitation upon the power of the United States to determine the political status of all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and continued to reside therein. There being no limitation, as there could be none, the petitioner, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902 and of section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

Before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, there was no law providing for causes which may result in the forfeiture of Philippine citizenship, but international law recognizes expatriation, naturalization in a foreign country, military service rendered in and for another country, and marriage of a female citizen to a foreigner — to cite some instances — as causes which may give rise to the loss of citizenship. The evidence does not show that the petitioner had expatriated himself, that he had been naturalized in a foreign country, or that he had rendered military service in and for another country. Except an absence of two months in 1902 he has never been out of the Philippines.

His holding out as Spanish subject, as shown in his two marriage certificates (Exhibits D and F) and in his registration in the Spanish Consulate as such subject, has been satisfactorily explained. He only came to know after he had filed his petition for naturalization that, under the Treaty of Paris and the Acts of Congress of the United States already referred to, he is a Filipino citizen. A proof thereof is his application for citizenship in 1941. But his mistake or misapprehension as to his citizenship is not a sufficient cause or reason under the law for the forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship. Neither may such mistake or misapprehension constitute estoppel.

The motion for cancellation is based upon the provisions of section 18 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 473. But the trial court ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s certificate of naturalization, not because he had obtained it fraudulently or illegally, but because he does not need it, as he is a Filipino citizen. Upon the facts established, it cannot be held that the petitioner secured his certificate of naturalization fraudulently or illegally. Thus, under the law invoked by the Solicitor General, the cancellation prayed for cannot be granted for lack of evidence to show fraud or illegality on the part of the petitioner in the obtainment of the certificate of naturalization. At most, the certificate may be held illegal because it was issued pursuant to a decree entered by a court exercising judicial powers under the authority of the enemy sponsored Republic of the Philippines. Logically, however, the cancellation was correctly ordered, because a Filipino citizen need not apply for such citizenship by naturalization or have a certificate of naturalization to be citizen of the Philippine Islands of which he is already a citizen.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.



PERFECTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Appellee Carlos Palanca was a Chinese citizen by birth and continued to be so until November 30, 1893, when he was granted Spanish citizenship in accordance with the laws of the monarchy, by a royal decree of the regent, the queen Maria Cristina of Spain. He wanted to marry a Filipina but the Archbishop of Manila had decreed that a Chinaman, even if Christian, could not marry a native of the Philippines. To accomplish the marriage, appellee applied for Spanish citizenship.

On February 4, 1894, after having acquired Spanish citizenship, Palanca married Cesarea Cano Torres. Since then he considered himself a Spanish subject. He registered as such in the Spanish Consulate General in Manila and has as late as March 2, 1942, received from the said consulate duplicate certificate No. 548. In 1941 he instituted this case to acquire Filipino citizenship. On April 12, 1945, when he married Rosa Gonzales, his present wife, he made it appear in the contract of marriage that he was of Spanish nationality.

The above facts are stated in the brief for appellee Palanca.

In these naturalization proceedings, after the Solicitor General had filed on July 3, 1945, a motion to set aside the certificate of naturalization issued to Carlos Palanca pursuant to a decision rendered during the Japanese regime on September 11, 1944, the lower court issued on January 7, 1946, an order declaring Carlos Palanca, a Filipino citizen, which is now under our consideration.

The motion to set aside the certificate of naturalization issued to Carlos Palanca reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Now come the undersigned counsel on behalf of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines and to this Honorable Court, with leave first being had, respectfully set forth and allege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That the above-entitled case was heard and tried before the Court of First Instance of Manila in the month of November, 1941, and was pending decision therein when the Commonwealth Government was overthrown and displaced by the Imperial Japanese Forces in the early part of 1942;

"2. That the applicant, after the Japanese Military Administration had ordered the suspension of action on cases of this nature, in his motion dated July 29, 1944, asked the Court of First Instance of Manila organized and existing under the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines, that the case be decided and given due course asserting that the applicant was neither hostile to nor an enemy of the Japanese Empire;

"3. That on September 11, 1944, Judge Roman A. Cruz of the Court of First Instance of Manila during the regime of the Japanese- sponsored Republic of the Philippines, promulgated the decision decreeing that the applicant, Carlos Palanca, satisfied the requirements of law to become a Filipino citizen and ordering the issuance of a certificate of naturalization in his favor once the decision becomes final;

"4. That on the basis of the said decision, upon oral petition of the applicant and on the strength of the certificate dated April 14, 1945, one by Honorable Sixto de la Costa, Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines, and the other by Macario M. Ofilada, Acting Assistant Clerk of the Honorable Court, the applicant was allowed on the same date to take the oath of allegiance before Judge Arsenio P. Dizon of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II; and as result thereof the proper naturalization certificate was issued to the applicant by the Clerk of this Honorable Court on April 16, 1945;

"5. That on April 17, 1945, the said Judge Arsenio P. Dizon motu proprio, ordered and directed the cancellation of the oath and the certificate of naturalization referred to in paragraph 4, on the ground that before the applicant could legally take the oath of allegiance, the records of the case which had been burned or lost sometime in February, 1945, must first be reconstituted in accordance with law;

"6. That upon motion of the applicant dated April 24, 1945, and the submission of an authentic copy of the decision rendered by Honorable Roman A. Cruz on September 11, 1944, this Honorable Court on April 30, 1945, declared the records of these proceedings as reconstituted, and allowed the applicant to take the prescribed oath of allegiance and the Clerk of this Honorable Court to issue the corresponding certificate of naturalization;

"7. That on April 30, 1945, the applicant took the prescribed oath of allegiance before this Honorable Court, and on the same date the certificate of naturalization was issued to him by the Clerk of this Honorable Court;

"8. That Carlos Palanca during the period of enemy occupation, holding himself before the public as a citizen and subject of Spain, a country which is Pro-Axis in sympathy, was president of the ’ASOCIACION CHINA PRO-NIPONA,’ an association which, from its very name, was engaged, among other things, in collecting contributions, especially of money, for the support of the Japanese Imperial Army and to which he himself gave a personal contribution of P60,000; and that as a consequence of his sympathy, work, aid and support of the enemy, he enjoyed privileges from the Japanese Military Authorities, especially by way of a big alcohol quota for his distillery;

"9. That the facts alleged in the paragraph immediately preceding are supported by the affidavit of Maria Teresa Palanca Cuartero (Teresa del Rio) hereto annexed as ’Annex A-1,’ and that of Benigno del Rio, hereto annexed as ’Annex A-2,’ both of which are attached as integral parts hereof;

"10. That Carlos Palanca was at one time confined in Bilibid Prisons from 1896 to 1899, as shown by the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) ’Se ha recibido en este Establecimiento al Chino Carlos Palanca Tan Tiao Jun alias Tan Cuin Lay en clase de preso provisional a disposición del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Binondo a resultas de la causa No. 7766 por estafa y falsificación de documento mercantil, seg