THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181721, September 09, 2015
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT, ROSARIO E. RAÑOA, Petitioner, v. ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution1 dated January 24, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration of its Decision2 dated September 27, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97804.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) is engaged in the business of building, repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales. In connection with its operations and maintenance of boat storage facilities, it charges a boat storage fee of Two Hundred Seventy-Two US Dollars (US$272.00) per month with interest of 4% per month for unpaid charges.
Sometime in June 1997, Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager.
During his empolyment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within Watercraft1 s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees.
On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the said amount.
Thus, on July 7, 2005, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4534-MN, and raffled to Branch 1703 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City.
In his Answer, Wolfe claimed he was hired as Service and Repair Manager, instead of Shipyard Manager. He denied owing Watercraft the amount of US$16,324.82 representing storage fees for the sailboat. He explained that the sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part of an agreement between him and Watercraft1 s then General Manager, Barry Bailey, and its President, Ricky Sandoval, for it to be repaired and used as training or fill-in project for the staff, and to be sold later on. He added that pursuant to a central Listing Agreement for the sale of the sailboat, he was appointed as agent, placed in possession thereof and entitled to a ten percent (10%) sales commission. He insisted that nowhere in the agreement was there a stipulation that berthing and storage fees will be charged during the entire time that the sailboat was in Watercraft's dockyard. Thus, he claimed to have been surprised when he received five (5) invoices billing him for the said fees two (2) months after his services were terminated. Fie pointed out that the complaint was an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case he filed against Watercraft which had been decided in his favor by the Labor Arbiter.
Meanwhile, finding Watercraft's ex-parte application for writ of preliminary attachment sufficient in form and in substance pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the RTC granted the same in the Order dated July 15, 2005, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, let a Writ of Preliminary Attachment be issued accordingly in favor of the plaintiff, Watercraft Ventures Corporation conditioned upon the filing of attachment bond in the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine and 25/100 Pesos (Php3,231,589.25) and the said writ be served simultaneously with the summons, copies of the complaint, application for attachment, applicant's affidavit and bond, and this Order upon the defendant.Pursuant to the Order dated July 15, 2005, the Writ of Attachment dated August 3, 2005 and the Notice of Attachment dated August 5, 2005 were issued, and Wolfe's two vehicles, a gray Mercedes Benz with plate number XGJ 819 and a maroon Toyota Corolla with plate number TFW 110, were levied upon.
SO ORDERED.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Order dated March 20, 2006 and the Order dated November 10, 2006 of respondent Judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Writ of Attachment issued on August 3, 2005, the Notice of Attachment dated August 5, 2005 and the Notice of Attachment and Levy dated September 5, 2005 are hereby also declared NULL and VOID, and private respondent is DIRECTED to return to their owners the vehicles that were attached pursuant to the Writ.The CA ruled that the act of issuing the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x In Cosiquien [v. Court of Appeals], the Supreme Court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn a Resolution dated January 24, 2008, the CA denied Watercraft's motion for reconsideration of its Decision, there being no new or significant issues raised in the motion."Where a judge issues a fatally defective writ of preliminary attachment based on an affidavit which failed to allege the requisites prescribed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the defendant fatally defective. The judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of jurisdiction. In fact, the defect cannot even be cured by amendment. Since the attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposed the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, the rule authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of defendant. It is the duty of the court before issuing the Avrit to ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with. Otherwise, a judge acquires no jurisdiction to issue the writ." (emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIn the instant case, the Affidavit of Merit executed by Rosario E. Rañoa, Watercraft's Vice-President, failed to show fraudulent intent on the part of Wolfe to defraud the company. It merely enumerated the circumstances tending to show the alleged possibility of Wolfe's flight from the country. And upon Wolfe's filing of the Motion to Discharge the Writ, what the respondent Judge should have done was to determine, through a hearing, whether the allegations of fraud were true. As further held in Cosiquien:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary"When a judge issues a writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte, it is incumbent on him, upon proper challenge of his order to determine whether or not the same was improvidently issued. If the party against whom the writ is prayed for squarely controverts the allegation of fraud, it is incumbent on the applicant to prove his allegation. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party making such allegation. This finds support in Section 1, Rule 131 Rules of Court. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed." (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryAs correctly noted by Wolfe, although Sec. 1 of Rule 57 allows a party to invoke fraud as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment, the Rules require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity, pursuant to Rule 8, Section 5. The Complaint merely stated, in paragraph 23 thereof that "For failing to pay the use [of] facilities and services in the form of boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud which entitles the Plaintiff to a Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon the property of the Defendant as security for the satisfaction of any judgment herein." This allegation does not constitute fraud as contemplated by law, fraud being the "generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated." In this instance, Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to [insidious] machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.
As to the allegation that Wolfe is a flight risk, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ, the same lacks merit. The mere fact that Wolfe is a British national does not automatically mean that he would leave the country at will. As Wolfe avers, he and his family had been staying in the Philippines since 1997, with his daughters studying at a local school. He also claims to be an existing stockholder and officer of Wolfe Marine Corporation, a SEC-registered corporation, as well as a consultant of projects in the Subic Area, a member of the Multipartite Committee for the new port development in Subic, and a member of the Subic Chamber of Commerce. More importantly, Wolfe has a pending labor case against Watercraft - a fact which the company glaringly failed to mention in its complaint - which Wolfe claims to want to prosecute until its very end. The said circumstances, as well as the existence of said labor case where Wolfe stands not only to be vindicated for his alleged illegal dismissal, but also to receive recompense, should have convinced the trial court that Wolfe would not want to leave the country at will just because a suit for the collection of the alleged unpaid boat storage fees has been filed against him by Watercraft.
Neither should the fact that Wolfe's Special Working Visa expired in April 2005 lead automatically to the conclusion that he would leave the country. It is worth noting that all visas issued by the government to foreigners staying in the Philippines have expiration periods. These visas, however, may be renewed, subject to the requirements of the law. In Wolfe's case, he indeed renewed his visa, as shown by Special Working Visa No. 05-WV-0124P issued by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Visa Processing Office on April 25, 2005, and with validity of two (2) years therefrom. Moreover, his Alien Certificate of Registration was valid up to May 11, 2006.
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that the writ was improvidently issued. It is well to emphasize that "[T]he rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature. If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Thus, in this case, Watercraft failed to meet all the requisites for the issuance of the writ. Thus, in granting the same, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Watercraft argues that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment, and in finding that the affidavit of merit only enumerated circumstances tending to show the possibility of Wolfe's flight from the country, but failed to show fraudulent intent on his part to defraud the company.I.
WHETHER THE EX-PARTE ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER IS VALID.II.
WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT CONCERNING FRAUD ARE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x xAfter a careful perusal of the foregoing; allegations, the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5,24 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.
4. Sometime in June 1997, the Defendant was hired as Watercraft's Shipyard Manager.
5. Soon thereafter, the Defendant placed his sailboat, the Knotty Gull, within the boat storage facilities of Watercraft for purposes of storage and safekeeping.
6. Despite having been employed by Watercraft, the Defendant was not exempted from paying Watercraft boat storage fees for the use of the said storage facilities.
7. By virtue of his then position and employment with Watercraft, the Defendant was very much knowledgeable of the foregoing fact.
8. All throughout his employment with Watercraft, the Defendant used the boat storage facilities of Watercraft for his Knotty Gull.
9. However, all throughout the said period of his employment, the Defendant never paid the boat storage fees in favor of the Plaintiff.
10. The Defendant's contract of employment with Watercraft was terminated on 07 March 2002.
11. [Sometime] thereafter, that is, in or about June 2002, the Defendant pulled out the Knotty Gull from the boat storage facilities of Watercraft.
12. Instead of settling in full his outstanding obligations concerning unpaid storage fees before pulling our the Knotty Gull, the Defendant signed a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated 29 June 2002 wherein he merely acknowledged the then outstanding balance of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-four and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82), representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period commencing June 1997 to June 2002, that he owed Watercraft.
13. By reason of Defendant's mere accomplishment of the said Boat Pull-Out Clearance with acknowledgment of his outstanding obligation to Watercraft in unpaid boat storage fees, Mr. Franz Urbanek, then the Shipyard Manager who replaced the Defendant, contrary to company policy, rules and regulations, permitted the latter to physically pull out his boat from the storage facilities of the Plaintiff without paying any portion of his outstanding obligation in storage fees.
14. Several demands were then made upon the Defendant for him to settle his outstanding obligations to the Plaintiff in unpaid storage fees but the same went unheeded.
15. As of 02 April 2005, the outstanding obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff in unpaid boat storage fees stands at Three Million Two Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine and 25/100 Pesos (Php3,231,589.25) inclusive of interest charges.
16. For failing to pay for the use [of] facilities and services—in the form of boat storage facilities—duly enjoyed by him and for failing and refusing to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud which entitles the Plaintiff to a Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon the property of the Defendant as security for the satisfaction of any judgment in its favor in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (d), Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
17. The instant case clearly falls under the said provision of law.
18. Furthermore, lawful factual and legal grounds exist which show that the Defendant may have departed or is about to depart the country to defraud his creditors thus rendering it imperative that a Writ of Preliminary Attachment be issued in favor of the Plaintiff in the instant case.
19. The possibility of flight on the part of the Defendant is heightened by the existence of the following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. The Special Working Visa issued in favor of the Defendant expired in April 2005;cralawlawlibrary20. All told, the Defendant is a very serious flight risk which fact will certainly render for naught the capacity of the Plaintiff to recover in the instant case.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. The Defendant is a British national who may easily leave the country at will;cralawlawlibrary
c. The Defendant has no real properties and visible, permanent business or employment in the Philippines; and
e. The house last known to have been occupied by the Defendant is merely being rented by him.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the allegation that Wolfe is a (light risk, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ, the same lacks merit. The mere fact that Wolfe is a British national does not automatically mean that he would leave the country at will. As Wolfe avers, he and his family had been staying in the Philippines since 1997, with his daughters studying at a local school. He also claims to be an existing stockholder and officer of Wolfe Marine Corporation, a SEC - registered corporation, as well as a consultant of projects in the Subic Area, a member of the Multipartite Committee for the new port development in Subic, and a member of the Subic Chamber of Commerce. More importantly, Wolfe has a pending labor case against Watercraft - a fact which the company glaringly failed to mention in its complaint - which Wolfe claims to want to prosecute until its very end. The said circumstances, as well as the existence of said labor case where Wolfe stands not only to be vindicated for his alleged illegal dismissal, but also to receive recompense, should have convinced the trial court that Wolfe would not want to leave the country at will just because a suit for the collection of the alleged unpaid boat storage fees has been filed against him by Watercraft.Meanwhile, Watercraft's reliance on Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan34 is displaced. It is well settled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Neither should the fact that Wolfe's Special Working Visa expired in April 2005 lead automatically to the conclusion that he would leave the country. It is worth noting that all visas issued by the government to foreigner staying in the Philippines have expiration periods. These visas, however, may be renewed, subject to the requirements of the law. In Wolfe's case, he indeed renewed his visa, as shown by Special Working Visa No. 05-WV-0124P issued by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Visa Processing Office on April 25, 2005, and with validity of two (2) years therefrom. Moreover, his Alien Certificate of Registration was valid up to May 11, 2006.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty," or "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought," the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the writ was based - and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued - the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryBe that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in this case because when Wolfe filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity of the factual averments in Watercraft's application and affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the discharge of the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud. No trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such motion will be had since only the sufficiency of the factual averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2112 dated July 16, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; rollo, pp. 35-37.
2Id. at 38-50.
3 Presided by Hon. Benjamin T. Antonio.
4Rollo, p. 65. (Emphasis in the original)
5Id. at 49. (Emphasis in the original; Citations omitted)
6Rollo, pp. 44-47. (Citations omitted)
7Id. at 21-22.
8 Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. - x x x. (a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;cralawlawlibrary
x x x x
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
9Rollo, p. 25.
10Torres, et al., v. Satsatin, et al., 620 Phil. 468, 480 (2009), citing Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260.
11Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, 560 Phil. 219, 240 (2007).
12D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas, 269 Phil. 450, 457 (1990).
13Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, supra note 12.
14 Under Section 2, Rule 57, it may also be issued by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
15 Section 4. Condition of applicant's bond. — The party applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
16 Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. — An order of attachment shall be granted only when it ppears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.
17 Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;cralawlawlibrary18La Granja, Inc. v. Samson, 58 Phil. 378, 380 (1933)
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part: thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;cralawlawlibrary
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;cralawlawlibrary
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
19Id.
20Supra note 9.
21Id.
22Rollo, pp. 61-63.
23Id. (Emphasis added)
24 Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
25 G.R. No. 104405, May 13, 1993, 222 SCRA 37. (Citation omitted)
26Id.
27 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (Provisional Remedies), Second Edition (1985), p. 23, citing, 4 Am Jur. 833.
28Metro Inc., et al. v. Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc., et al., 621 Phil. 162, 170 (2009).
29D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas, supra note 13, at 456.
30Phil. National Construction Corp. v. Hon. Dy, 509 Phil. 1, 12 (2005).
31Rollo, p. 62.
32Supra note 9.
33Rollo, pp. 45-46.
34 402 Phil. 795 (2001).
35Id. at 816, citing Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. CA, 254 Phil. 480 (1989); Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26. (Emphasis added)
36 a. The Special Working Visa issued in favor of the Defendant expired in April 2005;cralawlawlibrary
b. The Defendant is a British national who may easily leave the country at will;cralawlawlibrary
c. The Defendant has no real properties and visible, permanent business or employment in the Philippines; and
d. The house last known to have been occupied by the Defendant is merely being rented by him. (Rollo, p. 62)
37Rollo, pp. 56-57.
38FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x x
18. The failure and adamant refusal of the Defendant to pay the plaintiff the said boat storage fees has prejudiced the latter in the total amount of Three Million Two Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine and 25/100 Pesos (Php3,231,589.25) representing unpaid boat storage fees from June 1997 to June 2002, inclusive of interest charges but exclusive of legal interest which should be computed as of the date of demand for the payment of the Defendant's obligation until full payment is made.SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x x
20. As an example for the public good and as a deterrent against other individuals similarly disposed as the Defendant who callously ignore and refuse to honor due and deniandable obligations which action not only works to the grave prejudice of business entities like that of the Plaintiff but likewise severely undermines the lawful conduct of business especially in a free port zone area, the Defendant should likewise be held liable for Exemplary Damages in the amount of not less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000)THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x x
22. By reason of the Defendant's adamant refusal to comply with several demands to pay and his unjustified failure to pay his outstanding obligations in unpaid boat storage fees, the Plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of counsel and to institute the instant suit. Consequently, the Defendant should be held liable to Plaintiff in the total amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000) as Attorney's Fees as well as the Costs of this suit. (Id. at 55-56; emphasis in the original)
39Phil. Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 271, 282 (2001).