EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2581. December 2, 1948. ]
FIDEL C. QUERUBIN, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Fourth Division) and FELIPE S. MAMURI, Respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTIONS; APPEAL IN ELECTION CONTEST; PROVISIONS AS TO TIME WITHIN WHICH TO DISPOSE APPEAL, NATURE OF. — The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contests be decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken," the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, is directory in nature.
2. ID.; ID.; INTENTION OF THE LAW LIMITING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TO DISPOSE THE APPEAL. — The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible. Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests.
3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OR APPEAL FOR FAILURE OF COURTS TO RENDER FINAL DECISION WITHIN THE TIME AS THEREIN PROVIDED FOR, IS UNJUSTIFIED. — To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.
4. ID.; ID.; FORMER PRECEDENTS ABANDONED, THE DOCTRINE OF "STARE DECISIS." — The doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."
2. ID.; ID.; INTENTION OF THE LAW LIMITING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TO DISPOSE THE APPEAL. — The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible. Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests.
3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OR APPEAL FOR FAILURE OF COURTS TO RENDER FINAL DECISION WITHIN THE TIME AS THEREIN PROVIDED FOR, IS UNJUSTIFIED. — To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.
4. ID.; ID.; FORMER PRECEDENTS ABANDONED, THE DOCTRINE OF "STARE DECISIS." — The doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."
D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of the appeal in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin v. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA — 2843-R, concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three- month period provided for in section 178 of the Revised Election Code, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 178. Appeal from the decision in election contests. — From any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in protest against the eligibility or the election of provincial governors, members of the provincial board, city councilors, and mayors, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days after being notified of the decision, for its revision, correction, annulment or confirmation, and the appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case. Such appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken. (C. A. 357-172.)"
The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On August 23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22, 1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be terminated within one year."cralaw virtua1aw library
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 15, 1948, upon the ground that the period within which appellant had to file his brief had not as yet expired.
The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contests be decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken", the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, is directory in nature. The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible.
Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests.
To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.
The doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition is dismissed.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Feria and Bengzon, JJ., concur in the result.
"Sec. 178. Appeal from the decision in election contests. — From any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in protest against the eligibility or the election of provincial governors, members of the provincial board, city councilors, and mayors, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days after being notified of the decision, for its revision, correction, annulment or confirmation, and the appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case. Such appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken. (C. A. 357-172.)"
The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On August 23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22, 1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be terminated within one year."cralaw virtua1aw library
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 15, 1948, upon the ground that the period within which appellant had to file his brief had not as yet expired.
The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contests be decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken", the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, is directory in nature. The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible.
Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests.
To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.
The doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition is dismissed.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Feria and Bengzon, JJ., concur in the result.
