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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-2886. August 22, 1952. ]

GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAZ TUASON DE PATERNO and JOSE VIDAL, Defendants-Appellants.

Araneta & Araneta for Appellant.

Ramirez & Ortigas for defendants and appellants.

Perkins, Ponce Enrile & Contreras and La O & Feria for Appellee.

SYLLABUS


1. CONTRACTS; SALE; MORTGAGE. — The proviso in a contract of sale of real estate that 10 per cent of the purchase price should be paid only after the mortgage on the property should have been cancelled, is not onerous or unusual. It was not onerous or unusual for the vendee to withhold a relatively small portion of the purchase price before all the impediments to the final consummation of the sale had been removed.

2. ID.; DECEIT IN ITS EXECUTION. — A vendor could not be considered to have been deceived into signing a deed of sale of real estate, where the circumstances show (1) that she is intelligent and well educated and had been managing her affairs; (2) that she had an able attorney who was assisting her in a lawsuit; and (3) that she has a son who is a leading citizen and a business man and knew the English language very well if she did not. If she signed the deed of sale without being apprised of its import, it can hardly be conceived that she did not have her attorney or her son, who took active part in the negotiations, read it to her afterwards.

3. CORPORATIONS; CORPORATE ENTITY. — The fiction of corporate entity of a corporation, which has long been organized and has engaged in real estate business, will not be disregarded apart from the members of the corporation, where the corporate entity was not used to circumvent the law or perpetrate deception and the disregard of the technicality would pave the way for the evasion of a legitimate and binding commitment. "The courts will not ignore the corporate entity in order to further the perpetration of a fraud." (18 C. J. S., 381.)

4. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; AGENT, DEFINED; CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1459. — An agent, in the sense used in article 1459 of the Civil Code, is one who accepts another’s representation to perform in his name certain acts of more or less transcendancy. (10 Manresa, 46th ed., 100.)

5. ID.; ID; ID. — The ban of paragraph 2 of article 1459 connotes the idea of trust and confidence; and so, where the relationship does not involve considerations of good faith and integrity, the prohibition should not, and does not apply. To come under the prohibition, the agent must be in a fiduciary relation with his principal.

6. ID.; ID.; ID. — A person who acts as a go-between or middleman between the vendor and the vendee, bringing them together to make the contract themselves, without any power or discretion whatsoever which he could abuse to his advantage and to the owner’s prejudice, is not an agent within the meaning of article 1459 of the Civil Code.

7. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1459. — Attorneys are only prohibited from buying their client’s property which is the subject of litigation (Art. 1459, No. 5, Spanish Civil Code). Where the questioned sale of the property of the client was effected before the subject thereof became involved in the present action, the prohibition does not lie.

8. BANKS AND BANKING; CERTIFICATION OF CHECK; DEPOSIT DURING JAPANESE OCCUPATION NULLITY OF, UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 49. — Under banking laws and practice, by the certification "the funds represented by the check were transferred from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder, and, for all intents and purposes, the latter became the depositor of the drawee bank with rights and duties of one in such relation" ; the transfer of the corresponding funds from the credit of the depositor to that of the payee had to be co-extensive with the life of the checks, which in this case was 90 days. If the checks were not presented for payment within that period, they became invalid and the funds were automatically restored to the credit of the drawer though not as a current deposit but as special deposit. Where the checks were never collected and the account against which they were drawn was not used or claimed, and since that account "was opened during the Japanese occupation and in Japanese currency," the checks "became obsolete as the account subject thereto is considered null and void in accordance with Executive Order No. 49 of the President of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

9. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PAYMENT BY CHECK, WHICH WERE LOST OR DESTROYED. — The stipulation that the seller "shall not hold the vendee responsible for any loss of these checks," which were to be void if not presented for payment at the Bank within 90 days from date of acceptance," was unconscionable, void and unenforceable in so far as the said stipulation would stretch the vendor’s liability for those checks beyond 90 days. It was not in accord with law, equity or good conscience to hold a party responsible for something he or she had no access to and could not make use of but which was under the absolute control and disposition of the other party.

10. SALE; LOSS OF THE FUNDS REPRESENTED BY CHECKS IN PAYMENT; TIME FOR PAYMENT. — In adjudging the vendee to be the party to shoulder the loss of the amount of the check issued in payment of the obligation, and ordering the vendee to pay the amount to the vendor, the judgment was not intended to be in the nature of an extension of time of payment.

11. CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS; RESCISSION; CASUAL BREACH OF CONTRACT. — "The general rule is that recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties." (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil., 821, 827.)

12. ID.; INTEREST, SUSPENSION OF THE RUNNING OF, ALTHOUGH DEBT HAS NOT BEEN PAID. — The matter of the suspension of the running of interest on the loan is governed by principles which regard reality rather than technicality, substance rather than form. Good faith of the offeror or ability to make good the offer should in simple justice excuse the debtor from paying interest after the offer was rejected. A debtor cannot be considered delinquent who offered checks backed by sufficient deposit or ready to pay cash if the creditor chose that means of payment. Technical defects of the offer cannot be adduced to destroy its effects when the objection to accept the payment was based on entirely different grounds. Thus, although the defective consignation made by the debtor did not discharge the mortgage debt, the running of interest on the loan is suspended by the offer and tender of payment.

13. ID.; DEBT MORATORIUM. — The mortgagor is not entitled to suspension of payment under the debt moratorium law or orders because the bulk of the debt was a pre-war obligation and the moratorium order as to such obligation has been repealed except where the debtor has suffered war damage and has filed claim for it. Moreover, the debtor herself caused her creditor to be brought into this case which resulted in the filing of the cross-claim to foreclose the mortgage.


D E C I S I O N


TUASON, J.:


This is a three-cornered contest between the purchasers, the seller, and the mortgagee of certain portions (approximately 40,703 square meters) of a big block of residential land in the district of Santa Mesa, Manila. The plaintiff, which is the purchaser, and the mortgagee elevated this appeal. Though not an appellant, the seller and mortgagor has made assignments of error in her brief, some to strengthen the judgment and others for the purpose of new trial.

The case is extremely complicated and multiple issues were raised.

The salient facts in so far as they are not controverted are these. Paz Tuason de Paterno is the registered owner of the aforesaid land, which was subdivided into city lots. Most of these lots were occupied by lessees who had contracts of lease which were to expire on December 31, 1953, and carried a stipulation to the effect that in the event the owner and lessor should decide to sell the property, the lessees were to be given priority over other buyers if they should desire to buy their leaseholds, all things being equal. Smaller lots were occupied by tenants without a formal contract.

In 1940 and 1941 Paz Tuason obtained from Jose Vidal several loans totalling P90,098 and constituted a first mortgage on the aforesaid property to secure the debt. In January and April, 1943, she obtained additional loans of P30,000 and P20,000 upon the same security. On each of the last-mentioned occasions the previous contract of mortgage was renewed and the amounts received were consolidated. In the first novated contract the time of payment was fixed at two years and in the second and last at four years. New conditions not relevant here were also incorporated into the new contracts.

There was, besides, a separate written agreement entitled "Penalidad del Documento de Novacion de Esta Fecha" which, unlike the principal contracts, was not registered. The tenor of this separate agreement, all copies, of which were alleged to have been destroyed or lost, was in dispute and became the subject of conflicting evidence. The lower court did not make categorical findings on this point, however, and it will be our task to do so at the appropriate place in this decision.

In 1943 Paz Tuason decided to sell the entire property for the net amount of P400,000 and entered into negotiations with Gregorio Araneta, Inc. for this purpose. The result of the negotiations was the execution on October 19, 1943, of a contract called "Promesa de Compra y Venta" and identified as Exhibit "1." This contract provided that subject to the preferred right of the lessees and that of Jose Vidal as mortgagee, Paz Tuason would sell to Gregorio Araneta, Inc. and the latter would buy for the said amount of P400,000 the entire estate under these terms.

"El precio sera pagado como sigue: un 40 por ciento juntamente con la carta de aceptacion del arrendatario, un 20 por ciento del precio al otorgarse la escritura de compromiso de venta, y el remanente 40 por ciento al otorgarse la escritura de venta definitiva, la cual sera otorgada despues de que se hubiese cancelado la hipoteca a favor de Jose Vidal que pesa sobre dichos lotes. La comision del 5 por ciento que corresponde a Jose Araneta sera pagada al otorgarse la escritura de compromiso de venta.

"Paz Tuason se obliga a entregar mediante un propio las cartas que dirigira a este efecto a los arrendatarios, de conformidad con el formulario adjunto, que se marca como Apendice A.

"Expirado el plazo arriba mencionado, Paz Tuason otorgara las escrituras correspondientes de venta a los arrendatarios que hayan decidido comprar sus respectivos lotes.

"9. Los alquileres correspondientes a este año se prorratearan entre la vendedora y el comprador, correspondiendo al comprador los alquileres correspondientes a Noviembre y Diciembre de este año, y asimismo sera por cuenta del comprador el amillaramiento correspondiente a dichos meses.

"10. Paz Tuason, reconoce haber recibido en este acto de Gregorio Araneta, Inc., la suma de Ciento Noventa Mil Pesos (P190,000) como adelanto del precio de venta que Gregorio Araneta, Inc., tuviere que pagar a Paz Tuason.

"La cantidad que Paz Tuason recibe en este acto sera aplicada por ella a saldar su deuda con Jose Vidal, los amillaramientos, sobre el terreno cuyo pago ya han vencido y solo el saldo que quedare sera utilizado por Paz Tuason para otros fines.

"11. Una vez determinados los lotes que Paz Tuason podra vender a Gregorio Araneta, Inc., Paz Tuason otorgara una escritura de venta definitiva sobre dichos lotes a favor de Gregorio Araneta, Inc.

"Gregorio Araneta, Inc., pagara el precio de venta como sigue: 90 por ciento del mismo al otorgarse la escritura de venta definitiva descontandose de la cantidad que entonces se tenga que pagar el adelanto de P190,000 que se entrega en virtud de esta escritura. El 10 por ciento remanente se pagara a Paz Tuason, una vez se haya cancelado la hipoteca que pesa actualmente sobre el terreno.

"No obstante lo dispuesto en el parrafo 8, cualquier arrendatario que decida comprar el lote que ocupa con contrato de arrendamiento podra optar por pedir el otorgamiento inmediato a su favor de la escritura de venta definitiva pagando en el acto el 50 por ciento del precio (ademas del 40 por ciento que debio incluir en su carta de aceptacion) y el remanente de 10 por ciento inmediatamente despues de cancelarse la hipoteca que pesa sobre el terreno.

"12. Si la mencionada cantidad de P190,000 excediere del 90 por ciento de la cantidad que Gregorio Araneta, Inc., tuviere que pagar como precio de venta de los lotes que Paz Tuason pudiere vender a dicho comprador, el saldo sera pagado inmediatamente por Paz Tuason, tomandolo de las cantidades que reciba de los arrendatarios como precio de venta."cralaw virtua1aw library

In furtherance of this promise to buy and sell, letters were sent the lessees giving them until August 31, 1943, an option to buy the lots they occupied at the price and terms stated in said letters. Most of the tenants who held contracts of lease took advantage of the opportunity thus extended and after making the stipulated payments were given their deeds of conveyance. These sales, as far as the record would show, have been respected by the seller.

With the elimination of the lots sold or to be sold to the tenants there remained unencumbered, except for the mortgage to Jose Vidal, Lots 1, 8-16 and 18 which have an aggregate area of 14,810.20 square meters; and on December 2, 1943, Paz Tuason and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. executed with regard to these lots an absolute deed of sale, the terms of which, except in two respects, were similar to those of the sale to the lessees. This deed, copy of which is attached to the plaintiff’s complaint as Exhibit A, provided, among other things, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The aforesaid lots are being sold by the Vendor to the Vendee separately at the prices mentioned in paragraph (6) of the aforesaid contract entitled "Promesa de Compra y Venta," making a total sum of One Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Eighty-three pesos and Thirty-two centavos (P139,083.32), ninety (90%) per cent of which amount, i.e., the sum of One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand One Hundred Seventy-four Pesos and Ninety-nine centavos (P125,174.99), the Vendor acknowledges to have received by virtue of the advance of One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P190,000) Pesos made by the Vendee to the Vendor upon the execution of the aforesaid contract entitled "Promesa de Compra y Venta." The balance of Sixty-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-five Pesos and One centavo (P64,825.01) between the sum of P190,000 advanced to the Vendor and the aforesaid sum of P125,174.99, has been returned by the Vendor to the Vendee, which amount the Vendee acknowledges to have received by these presents;

"The aforesaid sum of P190,000 was delivered by the Vendee to the Vendor by virtue of four checks issued by the Vendee against the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No. C-286445 in favor of Paz Tuason de Paterno P13,476.62

No. C-286444 in favor of the City Treasurer,Manila 3,373.38

No. C-286443 in favor of Jose Vidal 30,000.00

No. C-286442 in favor of Jose Vidal 143,150.00

________

Total P190,000 00

"The return of the sum of P64,825.01 was made by the Vendor to the Vendee in a liquidation which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hemos recibido de Da. Paz Tuason de

Paterno la cantidad de Sesenta y Cuatro

mil OchocientosVeinticinco Pesos y

un centimo (P64,825.01) enconcepto

de devolucion que nos hace del

excesode lo pagado a ella de P190,000.00

Menos el 90% de P139,083.32, importe

de los lotesque vamos a comprar 125,174.99

_________

Exceso P64,825.01

=========

Cheque BIF No. D-442988 de

Simplicio del Rosario P21,984.20

Cheque PNB No. 177863-K de L. E.

Dumas 21,688.60

Cheque PNB No. 267682-K de

Alfonso Sycip 20,000.00

Cheque PNB No. 83940 de Josefina

de Pabalan 4,847.45

Billetes recibidos de Alfonso Sycip 42.96

________

P68,563.21

Menos las comisiones de 5% recibidas

deJosefina de Pabalan P538.60

L. E. Dumas 1,084.43

Angela S. Tuason 1,621.94 3,244.97

_______

P65,318.24

Menos cheque BIF No. C-288642 a favor

de Da. Paz Tuason de Paterno

que le entregamos como exceso 493.23

_______

P64,825.01

========

"Manila, Noviembre 2, 1943

"GREGORIO ARANETA, INCORPORATED

"Por:(Fdo.)

"JOSE ARANETA

Presidente

"Recibido cheque No. C-288642 BIF-P493.23.

"Por:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(Fdo.) "M. J. GONZALEZ"

"In view of the foregoing liquidation, the Vendor acknowledges fully and unconditionally, having received the sum of P125,174.99 of the present legal currency and hereby expressly declares that she will not hold the Vendee responsible for any loss that she might suffer due to the fact that two of the checks paid to her by the Vendee were issued in favor of Jose Vidal and the latter has, up to the present time, not yet collected the same.

"The ten (10%) per cent balance of the purchase price not yet paid in the total sum of P13,908.33 will be paid by the Vendee to the Vendor when the existing mortgage over the property sold by the Vendor to the Vendee is duly cancelled in the office of the Register of Deeds, or sooner at the option of the Vendee.

"This Deed of Sale is executed by the Vendor free from all liens and encumbrances, with the only exception of the existing lease contracts on parcels Nos. 1, 10, 11, and 16, which lease contracts will expire on December 31, 1953, with the understanding, however, that this sale is being executed free from any option or right on the part of the lessees to purchase the lots respectively leased by them.

"It is therefore clearly understood that the Vendor will pay the existing mortgage on her property in favor of Jose Vidal.

"The liquidation of the amounts respectively due between the Vendor and the Vendee in connection with the rents and real estate taxes as stipulated in paragraph (9) of the contract entitled ’Promesa de Compra y Venta’ will be adjusted between the parties in a separate document.

"Should any of the aforesaid lessees of lots Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 17 fail to carry out their respective obligations under the option to purchase exercised by them so that the rights of the lessee to purchase the respective property leased by him is cancelled, the Vendor shall be bound to sell the same to the herein Vendee, Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated, in conformity with the terms and conditions provided in the aforesaid contract of ’Promesa de Compra y Venta’;

"The documentary stamps to be affixed to this deed will be for the account of the Vendor while the expenses for the registration of this document will be for the account of the Vendee.

"The remaining area of the property of the Vendor subject to Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 60471 and 60472, are lots Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 17, all of the Consolidation of lots Nos. 20 and 117 of plan II-4755, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7680."cralaw virtua1aw library

Before the execution of the above deed, that is, on October 20, 1943, the day immediately following the signing of the agreement to buy and sell, Paz Tuason had offered to Vidal the check for P143,150 mentioned in Exhibit A, in full settlement of her mortgage obligation, but the mortgagee had refused to receive that check or to cancel the mortgage, contending that by the separate agreement before mentioned payment of the mortgage was not to be effected totally or partially before the end of four years from April, 1943.

Because of this refusal of Vidal’s, Paz Tuason, through Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, commenced an action against the mortgagee in October or the early part of November, 1943. The record of that case was destroyed and no copy of the complaint was presented in evidence. Attached to the complaint or deposited with the clerk of court by Attorney Ponce Enrile simultaneously with the docketing of the suit were the check for P143,150 previously turned down by Vidal, another certified check for P12,932.61, also drawn by Gregorio Araneta, Inc., in favor of Vidal, and one ordinary check for P30,000 issued by Paz Tuason. These three checks were supposed to cover the whole indebtedness to Vidal including the principal and interest up to that time and the penalty provided in the separate agreement.

But the action against Vidal never came on for trial and the record and the checks were destroyed during the war operations in January or February, 1945; and neither was the case reconstituted afterward. This failure of the suit for the cancellation of Vidal’s mortgage, coupled with the destruction of the checks tendered to the mortgagee, the nullification of the bank deposit on which those checks had been drawn, and the tremendous rise of real estate value following the termination of the war, gave occasion to the breaking off of the schemes outlined in Exhibits 1 and A; Paz Tuason after liberation repudiated them for the reasons to be hereafter set forth. The instant action was the offshoot, begun by Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to compel Paz Tuason to deliver to the plaintiff a clear title to the lots described in Exhibit A free from all liens and encumbrances, and a deed of cancellation of the mortgage to Vidal. Vidal came into the case in virtue of a summon issued by order of the court, and filed a cross- claim against Paz Tuason to foreclose his mortgage.

It should be stated at the outset that all the parties are in agreement that Vidal’s loans are still outstanding. Paz Tuason’s counsel concede that the tender of payment to Vidal was legally defective and did not operate to discharge the mortgage, while the plaintiff is apparently uninterested in this feature of the case considering the matter one largely between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, although to a certain degree this notion is incorrect. At any rate, the points of discord between Paz Tuason and Vidal concern only the accrual of interest on the loans, Vidal’s claim to attorney’s fees, and the application of the debt moratorium law which the debtor now invokes. These matters will be taken up in the discussion of the controversy between Paz Tuason and Jose Vidal. The principal bone of contention between Gregorio Araneta, Inc. and Paz Tuason was the validity of the deed of sale Exhibit A on which the suit was predicated. The lower court’s judgment was that this contract was invalid and was so declared, "sin perjuicio de que la demandada Paz Tuason de Paterno pague a la entidad demandante todas las cantidades que habia estado recibiendo de la referida entidad demandante, en concepto de pago de los terrenos, en moneda corriente, segun el cambio que debia regir al tiempo de otorgarse la escritura segun la escala de ’Ballentine’, descontando, sin embargo, de dichas cantidades cualesquiera que la demandante haya estado recibiendo como alquileres de los terrenos supuestamente vendidos a ella." The court based its opinion that Exhibit A was invalid on the theory that it was at variance with Exhibit 1. His Honor, Judge Sotero Rodas, agreed with the defendant that under paragraph 8 of Exhibit 1 there was to be no absolute sale to Gregorio Araneta, Inc., unless Vidal’s mortgage was cancelled.

In our opinion the trial court was in error in its interpretation of Exhibit 1. The contemplated execution of an absolute deed of sale was not contingent on the cancellation of Vidal’s mortgage. What Exhibit 1 did provide (eleventh paragraph) was that such deed of absolute sale should be executed "una vez determinado los lotes que Paz Tuason podra vender a Gregorio Araneta, Inc." The lots which could be sold to Gregorio Araneta, Inc. were definitely known by October 31, 1943, which was the expiry of the tenants’ option to buy, and the lots Included in the absolute deed of sale, executed on December 2, were the lots of which the occupants’ option to buy had lapsed unconditionally. Such deed as Exhibit A was then in a condition to be made.

Vidal’s mortgage was not an obstacle to the sale. An amount had been set aside to take care of it, and the parties, it would appear, were confident that the suit against the mortgagee would succeed. The only doubt in their minds was in the amount to which Vidal was entitled. The failure of the court to try and decide that case was not foreseen either.

This refutes, we think, the charge that there was undue rush on the part of the plaintiff to push across the sale. The fact that simultaneously with Exhibit A similar deeds were given the lessees who had elected to buy their leaseholds, which comprise an area about twice as big as the lots described in Exhibit A, and the further fact that the sales to the lessees have never been questioned and the proceeds thereof have been received by the defendant, should add to dispel any suspicion of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. If anyone was in a hurry it could have been the defendant. The clear preponderance of the evidence is that Paz Tuason was pressed for cash and that the payment of the mortgage was only an incident, or a necessary means to effectuate the sale. Otherwise she could have settled her mortgage obligation merely by selling a portion of her estate, say, some of the lots leased to tenants who, except two who were in concentration camps, were only too anxious to buy and own the lots on which their houses were built.

Whatever the terms of Exhibit 1, the plaintiff and the defendant were at perfect liberty to make a new agreement different from or even contrary to the provisions of that document. The validity of the subsequent sale must of necessity depend on what it said and not on the provisions of the promise to buy and sell.

It is as possible proof of fraud that the discrepancies between the two documents bear some attention. It was alleged that Attorneys Salvador Araneta and J. Antonio Araneta who the defendant said had been her attorneys and had drawn Exhibit A, had not informed or had misinformed her about its contents; that being in English, she had not read the deed of sale; that if she had not trusted the said attorneys she would not have been so foolish as to affix her signature to a contract so one-sided.

The evidence does not support the defendant. Except in two particulars, Exhibit A was a substantial compliance with Exhibit 1 in furtherance of which Exhibit A was made. One departure was the proviso that 10 per cent of the purchase price should be paid only after Vidal’s mortgage should have been cancelled. This provisional deduction was not onerous or unusual. It was not onerous or unusual that the vendee should withhold a relatively small portion of the purchase price before all the impediments to the final consummation of the sale had been removed. The tenants who had bought their lots had been granted the privilege to deduct as much as 40 per cent of the stipulated price pending discharge of the mortgage, although this percentage was later reduced to 10 as in the case of Gregorio Araneta, Inc. It has also been seen that the validity of the sales to the tenants has not been contested; that these sales embraced in the aggregate 24,245.40 square meters for P260,916.68 as compared to 14,811.20 square meters sold to Gregorio Araneta, Inc. for P139,083.32; that the seller has already received from the tenant purchasers 90 per cent of the purchase money.

There is good reason to believe that had Gregorio Araneta, Inc. not insisted on charging to the defendant the loss of the checks deposited with the court, the sale in question would have gone the smooth way of the sales to the tenants. Thus Dindo Gonzales, defendant’s son, declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"P. Despues de haberse presentado esta demanda, recuerda usted haber tenido convereacion con Salvador Araneta acerca de este asunto?

"R. Si, señor.

"P. Usted fue quien se acerco al señor Salvador Araneta?

"R. Si, señor.

"P. Quiero usted decir al Honorable Juzgado que era lo que usted dijo al señor Salvador Araneta?

"R. No creo que es propio qua yo diga, por tratarse de mi madre.

"P. En otras palabras, usted quiere decir que no quiere usted que se vuelva decir o repetir ante este Honorable Juzgado lo que usted dijo al señor Salvador Araneta, pues, se trata de su madre?

"R. No, señor.

"P. Puede usted decirnos que quiso usted decir cuando dijo que no quisiera decir?

"R. Voy a decir lo que yo tuve con el señor Araneta: yo me acerque a Don Salvador Araneta, y yo le dije ’que es una verg
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