EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4814. April 27, 1953. ]
LEA AROJO DE DUMELOD, LEONARDO DUMELOD, ANICETO DUMELOD, FELICITAS DUMELOD and JOSE DUMELOD, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BUENAVENTURA VILARAY, Defendant-Appellant.
F. S. Galutera for Appellant.
Pedro C. Flores for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LANDS; HOMESTEADS; SALE THEREOF PROHIBITED WITHIN FIVE YEARS; WHEN PERIOD COMMENCES TO RUN. — The starting point of the computation of the period of the prohibition provided in section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517, is the date of the homestead patent or grant, not the date of the certificate of title which is to be issued by the register of deeds. (Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija v. Director of Lands, 40 Off. Gaz., 954; Villacorta v. Ulanday, 41 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 870-872.)
D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
Section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 116. Except in favor of Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements of crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations or corporations."cralaw virtua1aw library
The sole question for decision on this appeal involves the construction of the above-quoted provisions, to wit: whether the five- year period provided therein commences from the date of the issuance of the patent or from the date the certificate of title was issued and registered in the office of the register of deeds. This appeal is from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya sustaining the latter theory, on the authority of Bundoc v. Hilario, CA-G.R. No. 2267 (40 Off. Gaz., 176).
The same question as herein raised was squarely presented in the case of Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija v. Director of Lands (40 Off. Gaz., 954), decided on June 13, 1941. In that case the court held that the starting point of the computation was the date of the homestead patent or grant and not the date of the certificate of title, which was issued by the register of deeds in accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496. And this opinion was reaffirmed in Villacorta v. Ulanday (41 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 870-872), decided in December, 1942, "as a correct interpretation of the law." In that case, the court expressly overruled the decision of the Court of Appeals before mentioned.
Upon the facts of the case at bar, the present appeal must be sustained. Here, the patent was issued to the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest on November 15, 1933, the patent was recorded and certificate of title was issued on March 21, 1934, and the patentee, plaintiffs’ grandfather, sold the land to the defendant on November 16, 1938. Thus, the sale was effected within five years from the date of the registration of the patent but outside of five years if this period is to be reckoned, as it should be, from November 15, 1933, the date of the grant.
The appealed judgment therefore is reversed, with costs against the appellees.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
"SEC. 116. Except in favor of Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements of crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations or corporations."cralaw virtua1aw library
The sole question for decision on this appeal involves the construction of the above-quoted provisions, to wit: whether the five- year period provided therein commences from the date of the issuance of the patent or from the date the certificate of title was issued and registered in the office of the register of deeds. This appeal is from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya sustaining the latter theory, on the authority of Bundoc v. Hilario, CA-G.R. No. 2267 (40 Off. Gaz., 176).
The same question as herein raised was squarely presented in the case of Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija v. Director of Lands (40 Off. Gaz., 954), decided on June 13, 1941. In that case the court held that the starting point of the computation was the date of the homestead patent or grant and not the date of the certificate of title, which was issued by the register of deeds in accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496. And this opinion was reaffirmed in Villacorta v. Ulanday (41 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 870-872), decided in December, 1942, "as a correct interpretation of the law." In that case, the court expressly overruled the decision of the Court of Appeals before mentioned.
Upon the facts of the case at bar, the present appeal must be sustained. Here, the patent was issued to the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest on November 15, 1933, the patent was recorded and certificate of title was issued on March 21, 1934, and the patentee, plaintiffs’ grandfather, sold the land to the defendant on November 16, 1938. Thus, the sale was effected within five years from the date of the registration of the patent but outside of five years if this period is to be reckoned, as it should be, from November 15, 1933, the date of the grant.
The appealed judgment therefore is reversed, with costs against the appellees.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
