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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-4130. September 30, 1953. ]

Testate Estate of Narciso A. Padilla, deceased; YSABEL B. DE PADILLA, executrix-appellant, v. CONCEPCION PATERNO, Defendant-Appellee.

Ambrosio Padilla for Appellant.

Claro M. Recto for Appellee.


SYLLABUS


1. LEADING AND PRACTICE; JUDGMENT, IF FINAL AND EXECUTORY, IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. — Although the Supreme Court may later hesitate to ratify some propositions contained in a final and executory judgment, it is the law of the case.

2. ESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; APPRAISAL OF VALUES OF PROPERTIES OF DECEDENT MAY BE MADE AS OF DATE OF PARTITION. — n the process of winding up a decedent’s estate the report of the Committee on Claims and Appraisals in the inventory made by it, is only the beginning. If the proceedings take a long time and the values have suffered some alteration, there is nothing to prevent a new valuation when the lest stage is reached, i. e., the actual division or partition comes, so long as all the properties are newly appraised in reference to the same period of time.


D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.:


Narciso A. Padilla died February 12, 1934, leaving a childless widow, Concepcion Paterno, whom he had married in 1912. His last will, which was probated in due course, instituted his mother, Ysabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla as universal heiress.

In the proceedings for the settlement of his estate in Manila (civil cases 46058-63) his widow moved for delivery of her paraphernal property together with some reimbursements and indemnities, and for one-half of the conjugal partnership property. She also asked that her usufructuary right as surviving spouse be imposed on the corresponding portion of her husband’s assets. The heiress, who was executrix, opposed several such claims.

After hearing evidence on both sides, the court rendered on January 15, 1940, a decision which, as amended by its resolution of April 24, 1940, declared as paraphernal certain personal and real properties. Other realties, although originally paraphernal, were considered part of the conjugal assets because of buildings erected thereon during coverture, but reimbursement of their value was directed. The main bulk was adjudged conjugal property. The court ordered the appointment of commissioners to estimate the amounts to be reimbursed, to divide the matrimonial assets into two equal parts for the spouses, and to determine the specific portion of the deceased’s estate to be encumbered with the widow’s usufruct (1/3). Other minor directives are omitted for the sake of brevity.

The executrix appealed to this Supreme Court, wherein, dated October 4, 1943, a decision was promulgated, upholding the judgment of the Manila court with a slight modification as to payment of interest.

(That year Concepcion Paterno died. She is now represented by her testate heirs and legatees.)

For compliance with the decision, the records went back to the Manila court. Therein three commissioners were duly appointed: Vicente A. Rufino, chosen by the widow’s side, Augusto J. D. Cortes by the heiress-executrix and V. H. Endaya by the court.

After hearings held before the said committee, (May-November, 1947) Vicente A. Rufino submitted his report dated July 9, 1948 which was concurred in toto by V. H. Endaya. A few days later Agusto J. D. Cortes filed his own report, wholly at variance with his colleagues’ recommendations on many important particulars.

In December, 1948, counsel for the executrix interposed legal and factual objections to the Rufino report. In May, 1949, Atty. Claro M. Recto, for the Paterno relatives, replied to said objections, and prayed that they be overruled with the approval of the aforesaid report.

On July 3, 1950, Judge Rafael Amparo of the Manila court approved the majority report except that he declared: (1) lot No. 50 on Juan Luna Street was conjugal and (2) the usufruct of the widow shall be constituted on one-third of the estate.

Before us presently lies the appeal by the executrix. According to her counsel, "only six (6) pieces of realty are now in controversy" namely, "those at Arquiza, Juan Luna, Martin Ocampo, Camba, R. Hidalgo and De la Fe."cralaw virtua1aw library

I. The first two lots (Arquiza and Juan Luna) are subject-matter of the second assignment of error.

The decision of the court of first instance in 1940 as confirmed by this Court in 1943 in effect declared: (a) Both lots were originally paraphernal property of Concepcion Paterno; (b) during coverture buildings were constructed thereon by the conjugal partnership; (c) therefore, the buildings and the lots were conjugal assets, but indemnity must be made to the wife for the value of the lots including that of the camarin previously existing on the Arquiza lot which was demolished; and (d) the commissioners shall determine such indemnity.

The Rufino report which is printed in full on pages 169-192 of the Record on Appeal, states that the buildings constructed by the partnership on the two lots were destroyed by fire during the battle of liberation of Manila in 1945. Then it goes on to adjudicate:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As already stated, the conjugal improvements on the lots on Arquiza and Juan Luna have been destroyed by fire, and the Supreme Court having held that the lands on which said improvements were erected remained paraphernal until the value of said lands were paid to the widow Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, said lands must be returned to the testate estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla.

"However, any amount due or that may be received from the War Damage Commission for the improvements that were destroyed on those two pieces of property shall be divided share and share alike between the estate of Ysabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla and the estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla." (Record on Appeal, p. 177. )The executrix earnestly challenges the first paragraph, contending that the lots became conjugal properties from the time the buildings were erected thereon, and the subsequent destruction of such buildings did not make them paraphernal. She also argues that the indemnity to the widow for said lots should be their value at the time of the construction of the buildings, or at most, at the time of the dissolution of the partnership in 1934.

These contentions may not be upheld in view of the decision of the Manila court and the confirmatory decision of this tribunal in 1943. There are, to be sure, some propositions in said decision which we may now hesitate to ratify, especially the pronouncement that the lot continued to be paraphernal until its value had been actually paid. 1 But that judgment is now the law of the case. It specifically ordered that the indemnity shall be the value at the time of the liquidation. Yet it would be of no profit presently to discuss whether the lot continues to be paraphernal to be returned to the wife, or it is conjugal and its value should be handed to her, because whether one or the other, no substantial advantage accrues to the herein appellant, assuming, as we must, that the lots are properly appraised.

As to lot No. 50 we find no error in the Rufino report. It was correctly treated as conjugal property, although in the division it fell to the half-share of the Paternos for the amount of P987.50, and such appraisal is not disputed.

II. Arguing that as to the Camba lot the previous decision of the Manila Court as amended had said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . la sociedad conyugal construyo en dicha parcela de terreno un edificio de dos pisos avaluado aproximadamante en P4,000, seg
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