FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8318. June 29, 1956.]
PEDRO F. SIOCHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE T. TIRONA, Defendant-Appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for appellee.
Tomas Tria Tirona for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; POSTPONEMENTS; PARTIES ENTITLED TO A TIMELY NOTICE OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT. — While attorneys should not assume that a motion for postponement would be granted, they are nonetheless entitled to a timely notice of its denial, to know what to do to protect the interest of their client, it being the business or concern of the law office representing the party (and not for the court to assume) to determine whether one or the other of two or more partners can handle the trial.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
The plaintiff-appellee filed an action against the defendant- appellant in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the collection of a sum of money. The trial was set for October 1, 1951, notice of which was served upon counsel for appellant on September 24, 1951. The next day Attys. Tirona and Navarro, counsel for appellant, filed an ex parte urgent motion for postponement (signed by Atty. Navarro) based on the ground that counsel had a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila set for hearing for the same day. On October 1 neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared, whereupon the court denied the motion for postponement and proceeded to receive the evidence presented by the appellee, and accordingly to render a decision in appellee’s favor. A motion (signed by Atty. Tirona) was filed to set aside said decision and for a new trial, and as the same was denied the present appeal was interposed by the appellant.
The latter, in assailing the action taken by the trial court, argues that early action should have been taken by it on the motion for postponement so that in case of denial, counsel for appellant could act accordingly; that at any rate no prejudice would be caused to any of the parties by its granting whereas its denial on the very day of the trial in effect deprived the appellant of his day in court.
We are of the opinion that appellant’s position is well taken. The motion for postponement, which was the first, was filed several days before the trial. While attorneys should not assume that a motion for postponement would be granted, they are none the less entitled to a timely notice of its denial, to know what to do to protect the interest of their client, it being the business or concern of the law office representing the party (and not for the court to assume) to determine whether one or the other of two or more partners can handle the trial. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the answer sets up the defenses of partial payment and the fact that the appellant was a mere accommodation party which, if proven, would naturally alter the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for a new trial and corresponding judgment.
So ordered, without costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
The latter, in assailing the action taken by the trial court, argues that early action should have been taken by it on the motion for postponement so that in case of denial, counsel for appellant could act accordingly; that at any rate no prejudice would be caused to any of the parties by its granting whereas its denial on the very day of the trial in effect deprived the appellant of his day in court.
We are of the opinion that appellant’s position is well taken. The motion for postponement, which was the first, was filed several days before the trial. While attorneys should not assume that a motion for postponement would be granted, they are none the less entitled to a timely notice of its denial, to know what to do to protect the interest of their client, it being the business or concern of the law office representing the party (and not for the court to assume) to determine whether one or the other of two or more partners can handle the trial. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the answer sets up the defenses of partial payment and the fact that the appellant was a mere accommodation party which, if proven, would naturally alter the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for a new trial and corresponding judgment.
So ordered, without costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
