EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14245. December 29, 1960]
SOLEDAD ABIJUELA, DOROTEA LAGAMAYO and REYNALDO LAGUIDAO, plaintiffs and appellants, v. HOSPICIA DOLOSA and MARCOS AUMENTADO, defendants and appellees. ESPERANZA ABIJUELA, third party defendant and appellee.
Gajo & Gajo for Appellants.
Vicente M. Salumbides for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL AND ERROR; NOTICE TO APPEAL ON QUESTION OF LAW; WAIVER TO RAISE QUESTION OF FACT. — By categorically and specifically stating in their notice of appeal that they were appealing "to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence and definitely stating the question of law to be raised, and praying that "the Clerk of Court be ordered to certify" and transmit the record on appeal and the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented at the trial of the case to the Supreme Court, Held: That the appellants have waived their right to raise question of fact in their brief.
2. REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LANDS; TITLE REGISTERED IN "ENCARGADO’S NAME; EFFECT ON OWNER’S TITLE. — The title obtained under the Land Registration Act by an "encargado" or overseer in his name over a parcel of land without the knowledge or consent of the owner does not affect the right of ownership and title of the latter.
2. REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LANDS; TITLE REGISTERED IN "ENCARGADO’S NAME; EFFECT ON OWNER’S TITLE. — The title obtained under the Land Registration Act by an "encargado" or overseer in his name over a parcel of land without the knowledge or consent of the owner does not affect the right of ownership and title of the latter.
D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon to recover possession of two parcels of land situate in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, described in the amended complaint, damages and attorney’s fees, and to be declared owners thereof (civil No. 748). With previous leave of court obtained, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against Esperanza Abijuela, who answered it.
After trial, the Court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint; declaring the defendants owners of the two parcels of land in controversy and entitled to their possession; dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therefore issued; and dismissing the defendant’s third-party complaint; with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have appealed.
On 12 May 1956 the Clerk of court forwarded the appealed case to the Court of Appeals where on 22 May 1956 the records were received (C.A. - G.R. No. 17848-R). On 10 March 1958 the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are involved. On 18 August 1958, this court resolved to have the case "provisionally docketed." (G.R. No. L-14245.)
The preliminary question raised in this appeal is whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction of the case. In their notice of appeal filed with the trial court on 21 December 1955, the appellants stated —
That they hereby make a formal Notice of Appeal of their intention to appeal, as they hereby appeal, the decision of this court in the above entitled case in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, copy of said decision was received by the plaintiffs thru their counsel on Dec. 1, 1955, to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence, to wit: Can the indefeasible and absolute character according to law of O.C.T. Nos. 1465 and 1967 of spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo granted and issued, after hearing in 1931 be successfully attacked and rendered without force and effect after 24 years from its issuance? (pp. 77-78, rec. on app.)
and in their prayer for approval of the record on appeal, they asked that —
. . . the Clerk of Court be ordered to certify same and be transmitted to the Supreme Court together with all the evidence presented during the hearing of this case, both oral and documentary which are made part of this appeal. (P. 79, supra.)
However, in their brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, they charge the trial court, among others, with having —
. . . erred in holding that O.C.T. No. 1465 (Exh. A) and O.C.T. No. 1967 (Exh. B), both in the name of spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo, issued in 1931, covering the land in question, do not affect the previous property rights of Esperanza Abijuela, the predecessor in interest of the defendants for the said original certificates of title were issued to a mere "encargado" and hence null and without effect. (pp. 2 and 5, appellants’ brief).
and dispute its finding that Jorge Abijuela, the appellants’ husband, father and father-in-law, was a mere "encargado" or overseer of the third-party defendant.
Section 3, Rule 42, of the Rules of Court, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Where the appeal is based purely on questions of law, the appellant shall so state in his notice of appeal, and then no other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence need not be elevated.
Section 31, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
All cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.
By categorically and specifically stating in their notice of appeal that they were appealing "to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence," and definitely stating the question of law to be raised, and praying that "the Clerk of court be ordered to certify" and transmit the record on appeal and the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented at the trial of the case to the Supreme Court, the appellants have waived their right to raise questions of fact in their brief. In Millar v. Nadres, 74 Phil., 307, where the appellant stated in his notice of appeal that he was appealing to this Court because ninety per cent of the questions involved were of law, and caused the record to be elevated thereto, this Court construed those statements as a waiver of his right to raise any question of fact. In Portea v. Pabellon, 84 Phil., 298; 47 Off. Gaz., 655, where the petitioner stated in his notice of appeal that his appeal was "on the ground that the question involved is one of law; and in the record on appeal filed by him and approved by the trial court, it was prayed that the case be certified and elevated to the Supreme Court, as only a question of law is involved," this Court followed the rule laid down in the first mentioned case. Lastly, in Flores v. Plasina, 94 Phil., 327; 50 Off. Gaz., 1073, this court held that "In bringing this appeal to this Court upon the claim that plaintiffs would merely raise questions of law, appellants waived their right to dispute the findings of fact of the lower court which under the rules and precedents are deemed final and are binding upon this Court." Hence, in the case at bar, only questions of law may be raised and it is this Court that has appellate jurisdiction of the case.
The following are the findings of the trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Tratase de la demanda de reinvindicación de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en el municipio de Sorsogon, provincia de Sorsogon, y mas particularmente descritas en el parrafo 3 de la demanda enmendada, presentada por Soledad Abijuela, Dorotea Lagamayo y Reynaldo Laguidao contra Hospicia Dolosa y Marcos Aumentado. A petición de los demandantes se expidió ex-parte en esta causa orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar contra los demandados.
En el curso de la tramitación de esta causa, los demandados, previo permiso del Juzgado, presentaron demanda de terceria contra Esperanza Abijuela, de quien alegan haber comprado de buena fe dichas propiedades.
De las pruebas resulta qué los esposes Jorge Abijuela, quien desapareció en 1943 y hasta ahora no ha vuelto, y la demandante Dorotea Lagamayo eran dueños de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestión; que la otra demandante, Soledad Abijuela, es hija de dichos maridables, y esta casada con el demandante Reynaldo Laguidao; que, el 3 de julio de 1928, dicho Jorge Abijuela vendió las dos citadas parcelas de terreno, que entonces formaban una sola, a favor de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela (Exhibit I), demandada en la demanda de terceria presentada por los demandados, sin embargo, dichos esposos Jorge Abijuela y Dorotea Lagamayo, con el permiso de su hermana y como encargado de Esperanza Abijuela de dichas propiedades, siguieron viviendo en la casa que tenia levantada en una de dichas parcelas hasta que dicho Jorge Abijuela desapareció, y desde entonces los demandantes se trasladaron a vivir en el barrio de Abuyog, del mismo municipio de Sorsogon, pero alegan haber continuado en posesión de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestión hasta el año 1948, en que los demandados se posesionaron de los mismos, en concepto de dueños, por haberlas comprado de Esperanza Abijuela; que en 1952, cuando se presentó la demanda original y con la expedición de la orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar a favor de los demandantes, los demandados fueron desposeidos de la possesión de los citados terrrenos; que durante el tiempo de la posesión de los demandados, estos cosecharon los productos.
Asi mismo resulta de las pruebas que no obstante haberse vendido en julio 3, 1928, el terreno en cuestión, ahora compuesto de dos parcelas por la medición catastral, por Jorge Abijuela a favor de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela, aquel consiguió titularlas a su nombre y a su esposa, la demandante Dorotea lagamayo, como propiedad ganancial de los mismos en junio 10 y 11 de 1931, respectivamente, a espaldas y sin conocimiento de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela (Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465, Exhibit B y A), las cuales parcelas de terreno siguen hasta ahora tituladas y registradas a nombre de los referidos esposos Jorge Abijuela y Dorotea Lagamayo; que dichos Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465 fueron rescatados y pagados por los demandantes los gastos correspondientes solamente el 11 de julio de 1952, o sea, mas de 20 años despues de la expedición de los mismos; que Esperanza Abijuela, ignorando de que su hermano y encargado Jorge Abijuela habia gestionado y obtenido la titulación de los dos lotes de terreno en cuestión, los vendió el noviembre 15, 1958, a los demandados Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia Dolosa (Exhibit 1), por la cual se posesionaron de los mismos y los declararon a su nombre para el pago de amillaramiento (Exhibits 3 y 4), desde entonces han venido pagando la contribución territorial de los mismos (Exhibits 4, 4-A al 4-G).
En virtud do los hechos establecidos, arriba relatados, se presentan las cuestiones siguientes: (a) Que efecto legal tienen los Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465 sobre el derecho de propiedad de Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente del de los demandados, los esposos Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia Dolosa, en las parcelas de terreno objeto de dichos titulos, que estan litigadas; y (b Se puede legalmente declarar dueña a Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente a los demandados de las mencionadas parcelas de terreno no obstante dichos titulos? (pp. 71-75, rec. on app.)
The Court held as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
El Juzgado es de opinión que los citados titulos no afectan ni anulan el dercho de propriedad de Esperanza Abijuela ni de los demandados sobre las parcelas de terreno en cuestión, porque cuando se titularon dichas propiedades a nombre de Jorge Abijuela, esta era un mero encargado de dichas propiedades, o fideicomisario de las mismas, asi que la adquisición de dichos titulos es ilegal. La razon es obvia, porque la ley como regla general no autoriza la titulación de propiedades en fideicomiso a favor del fideicomisario y, por tanto, los mismos deben declararse per se nulos y de ningun valor. Aun suponiendo que dichos titulos fueran validos, el Juzgado cree que el derecho de Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente de los demandados no ha cambiado, por la razon de que dichos titulos siguen siendo hasta ahora a nombre del antique dueño, Jorge Abijuela, y las propiedades no se han traspasado por ningun proceso legal a otras personas ni existe tercera persona o comprador de buena fe de dichas propiedades que puede ser perjudicado. La demandante Dorotea Lagamayo, esposa de Jorge Abijuela, tampoco puede reclamar ni la mitad de dichas propiedades, porque al tiempo de ser vendidas las mismas, su esposo, Jorge Abijuela, estaba facultado por las leyes entonces vigentes de vender bienes gananciales sin necesidad del consentimiento marital.
La reconvención de los demandados no fué debidamente probada. (pp. 75-76, rec. on app.)
Since Jorge Abijuela, the appellants’ husband, father and faither-in-law, had sold to his sister Esperanza, the third-party defendant, the parcels of land in question, and the latter only allowed him, as her "encargado" or overseer, to stay in one of the parcels of land, the registration of the two parcels of land as conjugal property of the spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo, without her knowledge and consent, did not affect the right of ownership and title of the true and real owner, the third-party defendant, and her right to alienate them to the appellees. No cogent reason may be found for reversing the judgment appealed from, except that the appellant Dorotea Lagamayo and the clerk of Court of first Instance of Sorsogon, in behalf of Jorge Abijuela, because of his absence and his whereabouts unknown, be ordered to execute a document transferring and reconveying the two parcels of land to Esperanza Abijuela and upon the strength of the deed executed by the latter in favor of the appellees, the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Sorsogon, upon payment of the lawful fees, to cancel the original certificates of title Nos. 1465 and 1967 and to issue in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title in the name of the appellees.
Modified as above stated, the judgment appealed from is in all other respects affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutiérrez, David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
After trial, the Court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint; declaring the defendants owners of the two parcels of land in controversy and entitled to their possession; dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therefore issued; and dismissing the defendant’s third-party complaint; with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have appealed.
On 12 May 1956 the Clerk of court forwarded the appealed case to the Court of Appeals where on 22 May 1956 the records were received (C.A. - G.R. No. 17848-R). On 10 March 1958 the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are involved. On 18 August 1958, this court resolved to have the case "provisionally docketed." (G.R. No. L-14245.)
The preliminary question raised in this appeal is whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction of the case. In their notice of appeal filed with the trial court on 21 December 1955, the appellants stated —
That they hereby make a formal Notice of Appeal of their intention to appeal, as they hereby appeal, the decision of this court in the above entitled case in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, copy of said decision was received by the plaintiffs thru their counsel on Dec. 1, 1955, to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence, to wit: Can the indefeasible and absolute character according to law of O.C.T. Nos. 1465 and 1967 of spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo granted and issued, after hearing in 1931 be successfully attacked and rendered without force and effect after 24 years from its issuance? (pp. 77-78, rec. on app.)
and in their prayer for approval of the record on appeal, they asked that —
. . . the Clerk of Court be ordered to certify same and be transmitted to the Supreme Court together with all the evidence presented during the hearing of this case, both oral and documentary which are made part of this appeal. (P. 79, supra.)
However, in their brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, they charge the trial court, among others, with having —
. . . erred in holding that O.C.T. No. 1465 (Exh. A) and O.C.T. No. 1967 (Exh. B), both in the name of spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo, issued in 1931, covering the land in question, do not affect the previous property rights of Esperanza Abijuela, the predecessor in interest of the defendants for the said original certificates of title were issued to a mere "encargado" and hence null and without effect. (pp. 2 and 5, appellants’ brief).
and dispute its finding that Jorge Abijuela, the appellants’ husband, father and father-in-law, was a mere "encargado" or overseer of the third-party defendant.
Section 3, Rule 42, of the Rules of Court, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Where the appeal is based purely on questions of law, the appellant shall so state in his notice of appeal, and then no other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence need not be elevated.
Section 31, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
All cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.
By categorically and specifically stating in their notice of appeal that they were appealing "to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence," and definitely stating the question of law to be raised, and praying that "the Clerk of court be ordered to certify" and transmit the record on appeal and the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented at the trial of the case to the Supreme Court, the appellants have waived their right to raise questions of fact in their brief. In Millar v. Nadres, 74 Phil., 307, where the appellant stated in his notice of appeal that he was appealing to this Court because ninety per cent of the questions involved were of law, and caused the record to be elevated thereto, this Court construed those statements as a waiver of his right to raise any question of fact. In Portea v. Pabellon, 84 Phil., 298; 47 Off. Gaz., 655, where the petitioner stated in his notice of appeal that his appeal was "on the ground that the question involved is one of law; and in the record on appeal filed by him and approved by the trial court, it was prayed that the case be certified and elevated to the Supreme Court, as only a question of law is involved," this Court followed the rule laid down in the first mentioned case. Lastly, in Flores v. Plasina, 94 Phil., 327; 50 Off. Gaz., 1073, this court held that "In bringing this appeal to this Court upon the claim that plaintiffs would merely raise questions of law, appellants waived their right to dispute the findings of fact of the lower court which under the rules and precedents are deemed final and are binding upon this Court." Hence, in the case at bar, only questions of law may be raised and it is this Court that has appellate jurisdiction of the case.
The following are the findings of the trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Tratase de la demanda de reinvindicación de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en el municipio de Sorsogon, provincia de Sorsogon, y mas particularmente descritas en el parrafo 3 de la demanda enmendada, presentada por Soledad Abijuela, Dorotea Lagamayo y Reynaldo Laguidao contra Hospicia Dolosa y Marcos Aumentado. A petición de los demandantes se expidió ex-parte en esta causa orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar contra los demandados.
En el curso de la tramitación de esta causa, los demandados, previo permiso del Juzgado, presentaron demanda de terceria contra Esperanza Abijuela, de quien alegan haber comprado de buena fe dichas propiedades.
De las pruebas resulta qué los esposes Jorge Abijuela, quien desapareció en 1943 y hasta ahora no ha vuelto, y la demandante Dorotea Lagamayo eran dueños de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestión; que la otra demandante, Soledad Abijuela, es hija de dichos maridables, y esta casada con el demandante Reynaldo Laguidao; que, el 3 de julio de 1928, dicho Jorge Abijuela vendió las dos citadas parcelas de terreno, que entonces formaban una sola, a favor de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela (Exhibit I), demandada en la demanda de terceria presentada por los demandados, sin embargo, dichos esposos Jorge Abijuela y Dorotea Lagamayo, con el permiso de su hermana y como encargado de Esperanza Abijuela de dichas propiedades, siguieron viviendo en la casa que tenia levantada en una de dichas parcelas hasta que dicho Jorge Abijuela desapareció, y desde entonces los demandantes se trasladaron a vivir en el barrio de Abuyog, del mismo municipio de Sorsogon, pero alegan haber continuado en posesión de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestión hasta el año 1948, en que los demandados se posesionaron de los mismos, en concepto de dueños, por haberlas comprado de Esperanza Abijuela; que en 1952, cuando se presentó la demanda original y con la expedición de la orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar a favor de los demandantes, los demandados fueron desposeidos de la possesión de los citados terrrenos; que durante el tiempo de la posesión de los demandados, estos cosecharon los productos.
Asi mismo resulta de las pruebas que no obstante haberse vendido en julio 3, 1928, el terreno en cuestión, ahora compuesto de dos parcelas por la medición catastral, por Jorge Abijuela a favor de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela, aquel consiguió titularlas a su nombre y a su esposa, la demandante Dorotea lagamayo, como propiedad ganancial de los mismos en junio 10 y 11 de 1931, respectivamente, a espaldas y sin conocimiento de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela (Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465, Exhibit B y A), las cuales parcelas de terreno siguen hasta ahora tituladas y registradas a nombre de los referidos esposos Jorge Abijuela y Dorotea Lagamayo; que dichos Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465 fueron rescatados y pagados por los demandantes los gastos correspondientes solamente el 11 de julio de 1952, o sea, mas de 20 años despues de la expedición de los mismos; que Esperanza Abijuela, ignorando de que su hermano y encargado Jorge Abijuela habia gestionado y obtenido la titulación de los dos lotes de terreno en cuestión, los vendió el noviembre 15, 1958, a los demandados Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia Dolosa (Exhibit 1), por la cual se posesionaron de los mismos y los declararon a su nombre para el pago de amillaramiento (Exhibits 3 y 4), desde entonces han venido pagando la contribución territorial de los mismos (Exhibits 4, 4-A al 4-G).
En virtud do los hechos establecidos, arriba relatados, se presentan las cuestiones siguientes: (a) Que efecto legal tienen los Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465 sobre el derecho de propiedad de Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente del de los demandados, los esposos Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia Dolosa, en las parcelas de terreno objeto de dichos titulos, que estan litigadas; y (b Se puede legalmente declarar dueña a Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente a los demandados de las mencionadas parcelas de terreno no obstante dichos titulos? (pp. 71-75, rec. on app.)
The Court held as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
El Juzgado es de opinión que los citados titulos no afectan ni anulan el dercho de propriedad de Esperanza Abijuela ni de los demandados sobre las parcelas de terreno en cuestión, porque cuando se titularon dichas propiedades a nombre de Jorge Abijuela, esta era un mero encargado de dichas propiedades, o fideicomisario de las mismas, asi que la adquisición de dichos titulos es ilegal. La razon es obvia, porque la ley como regla general no autoriza la titulación de propiedades en fideicomiso a favor del fideicomisario y, por tanto, los mismos deben declararse per se nulos y de ningun valor. Aun suponiendo que dichos titulos fueran validos, el Juzgado cree que el derecho de Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente de los demandados no ha cambiado, por la razon de que dichos titulos siguen siendo hasta ahora a nombre del antique dueño, Jorge Abijuela, y las propiedades no se han traspasado por ningun proceso legal a otras personas ni existe tercera persona o comprador de buena fe de dichas propiedades que puede ser perjudicado. La demandante Dorotea Lagamayo, esposa de Jorge Abijuela, tampoco puede reclamar ni la mitad de dichas propiedades, porque al tiempo de ser vendidas las mismas, su esposo, Jorge Abijuela, estaba facultado por las leyes entonces vigentes de vender bienes gananciales sin necesidad del consentimiento marital.
La reconvención de los demandados no fué debidamente probada. (pp. 75-76, rec. on app.)
Since Jorge Abijuela, the appellants’ husband, father and faither-in-law, had sold to his sister Esperanza, the third-party defendant, the parcels of land in question, and the latter only allowed him, as her "encargado" or overseer, to stay in one of the parcels of land, the registration of the two parcels of land as conjugal property of the spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo, without her knowledge and consent, did not affect the right of ownership and title of the true and real owner, the third-party defendant, and her right to alienate them to the appellees. No cogent reason may be found for reversing the judgment appealed from, except that the appellant Dorotea Lagamayo and the clerk of Court of first Instance of Sorsogon, in behalf of Jorge Abijuela, because of his absence and his whereabouts unknown, be ordered to execute a document transferring and reconveying the two parcels of land to Esperanza Abijuela and upon the strength of the deed executed by the latter in favor of the appellees, the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Sorsogon, upon payment of the lawful fees, to cancel the original certificates of title Nos. 1465 and 1967 and to issue in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title in the name of the appellees.
Modified as above stated, the judgment appealed from is in all other respects affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutiérrez, David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
