EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12103. February 28, 1961. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUPERTA MALAYAO, Defendant-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jovencio R. Gairanod, for Defendant-Appellee.
D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Appellee was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, of the crime of oral defamation. From the decision she appealed to the court of first instance before whom a new information for the same crime was filed. The case was set for trial on November 20, 1956.
On two occasions the hearing of the case was postponed on motion of the prosecution; once on the ground that complainant was too weak to undergo travel because she had just delivered a baby; and the other because complainant’s private prosecutor had another case before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. On the second motion for postponement, defense counsel agreed "on condition that this would be the last chance given to the prosecution and that if the prosecution could not attend trial on said date, the Court shall have to dismiss the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the date set, January 17, 1957, complainant did not appear. The trial court ordered a recess of five minutes to give her a chance to show up. After the said five minutes had elapsed without the complainant having yet appeared, Accused moved for dismissal of the case as had been agreed on. The case was dismissed without objection on the part of the provincial fiscal.
On the very same day, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses, together with her private prosecutor, had actually arrived in the courtroom five minutes after the order of dismissal had been promulgated. Attached to said motion were the affidavits of the complainant, of the private prosecutor, and of the driver of the car in which they rode to go to the court, attesting to the fact that, while on their way from Dipolog to Oroquieta, their car had a flat tire somewhere in sitio Tolon, Rizal, Zamboanga de Norte, and that they could have arrived earlier had it not been for that incident. Complainant’s affidavit also attested to the fact that she could not have lost interest in the case as shown by her effort in traveling a distance of 92 kilometers to go to court and employing her own counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Complainant appeals to this Court assigning as error the order of dismissal.
The only question posed before us is whether or not the lower court committed an abuse of discretion in dismissing the case and in denying the motion for reconsideration.
Considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned in the case before the trial court and complainant who lives 92 kilometers away from the place of trial was late for only five minutes after the court had ordered its dismissal, a better exercise of discretion would have been an ascertainment of the truth of the averments of the affidavits submitted by complainant in support of her motion for reconsideration. Moreover, as the motion was filed on the very same day of the dismissal of the case, no damage is perceived to the right of the accused to a speedy trial if the prosecution be given another chance to provide its case.
We wish to reiterate here our ruling in People v. Jaramilla (G.R. No. L-8030, November 18, 1955) where we set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 We ruled there that inasmuch as the judgment of the justice of the peace court was vacated upon appeal to the court of first instance in accordance with Section 8 Rule 119, of the Rules of Court, a new arraignment is necessary because the case stands as if it were a case originally instituted in that court, and as this was not done the reopening of the case cannot place the accused in double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court of first instance for further proceedings. So ordered.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
On two occasions the hearing of the case was postponed on motion of the prosecution; once on the ground that complainant was too weak to undergo travel because she had just delivered a baby; and the other because complainant’s private prosecutor had another case before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. On the second motion for postponement, defense counsel agreed "on condition that this would be the last chance given to the prosecution and that if the prosecution could not attend trial on said date, the Court shall have to dismiss the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the date set, January 17, 1957, complainant did not appear. The trial court ordered a recess of five minutes to give her a chance to show up. After the said five minutes had elapsed without the complainant having yet appeared, Accused moved for dismissal of the case as had been agreed on. The case was dismissed without objection on the part of the provincial fiscal.
On the very same day, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses, together with her private prosecutor, had actually arrived in the courtroom five minutes after the order of dismissal had been promulgated. Attached to said motion were the affidavits of the complainant, of the private prosecutor, and of the driver of the car in which they rode to go to the court, attesting to the fact that, while on their way from Dipolog to Oroquieta, their car had a flat tire somewhere in sitio Tolon, Rizal, Zamboanga de Norte, and that they could have arrived earlier had it not been for that incident. Complainant’s affidavit also attested to the fact that she could not have lost interest in the case as shown by her effort in traveling a distance of 92 kilometers to go to court and employing her own counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Complainant appeals to this Court assigning as error the order of dismissal.
The only question posed before us is whether or not the lower court committed an abuse of discretion in dismissing the case and in denying the motion for reconsideration.
Considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned in the case before the trial court and complainant who lives 92 kilometers away from the place of trial was late for only five minutes after the court had ordered its dismissal, a better exercise of discretion would have been an ascertainment of the truth of the averments of the affidavits submitted by complainant in support of her motion for reconsideration. Moreover, as the motion was filed on the very same day of the dismissal of the case, no damage is perceived to the right of the accused to a speedy trial if the prosecution be given another chance to provide its case.
We wish to reiterate here our ruling in People v. Jaramilla (G.R. No. L-8030, November 18, 1955) where we set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 We ruled there that inasmuch as the judgment of the justice of the peace court was vacated upon appeal to the court of first instance in accordance with Section 8 Rule 119, of the Rules of Court, a new arraignment is necessary because the case stands as if it were a case originally instituted in that court, and as this was not done the reopening of the case cannot place the accused in double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court of first instance for further proceedings. So ordered.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. The accused in this case had not been arraigned. After granting two motions for postponement due to the absence of the prosecution officials, the lower court dismissed the case on the 3rd day set for hearing for "lack of interest on the part of the prosecution."
