EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-15092. September 29, 1962. ]
ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., Defendants-Appellee.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The appellee Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company has filed two motions to reconsider, urging that our decision be set aside to gibe way for the consideration of the issues of fact raised in its original answer to appellant’s complaints, and for their resolution either by the court a quo or by the Court of Appeals.
We can not see our way clear to granting the motions, taking into account that the court of first instance, in its appealed decision dismissing the complaint, limited itself exclusively to the questions of law posited by the defendant Company, now appellee, and ignored all its other defenses based on questions of fact. The appellee Company, in turn, even when made aware of the intention of the plaintiffs to appeal to this Court, did not ask the court below to make any findings on the issues of fact raised by its other defenses. Neither has it called our attention, during the period of more than two years that the appeal has been pending in this Court, to the necessity of considering such factual defenses. Indeed, appellee’s brief has been limited to argue the issue of law that was raised by it and which was upheld by the court of origin.
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellee had more than ample opportunity to point out to the Court that the resolution of the issues of law would not bar its other defenses. Even more, as appellee, it could have discussed, under the Court’s doctrines, its other defenses in its brief, by way of support of the dismissal made by the court of first instance. As pointed out in several decisions, an appellee, who is not an appellant, may even assign errors in his brief where his purpose is only to maintain the judgment on other grounds, although not to have the judgment modified or reversed. 1 In fact, appellee could have asked this Court to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the issues of fact.
Appellee has taken none of these various options. Instead, it submitted the case for decision exclusively on the issue of law, and has called attention to the issues of fact only when the decision went against it. Now it wants the case remanded for another trial, another decision, and in all probability, another appeal, with all the attendant delays.
Plainly, the course suggested can not be countenanced. The delay in the administration of justice and the clogging of court dockets have been a constant source of complaints in our country, and the policy of this court has ever been to discourage piecemeal appeals. Thus, this Court has consistently ruled that a party defendant who demurs to the evidence presented by the plaintiff, and obtains a dismissal on the basis of its insufficiency, should not, in case that the dismissal is reversed on appeal, be allowed to submit evidence in its own behalf. As ruled in Moody, Aronson & Company v. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil. 198 (followed in many subsequent cases),
"The efforts of the courts should be concentrated on providing rules which will avoid lengthy and expensive litigation, and which will assist in the speedy disposition of cases." 2
Again, by resolution of 23 March 1956, this Court refused to entertain a claim that a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals was void for lack of jurisdiction over the amount in issue, ruling that a party who allows an appeal to be considered and decided by the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have waived so much of its claim as is in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in order to discourage the practice of accepting a decision, if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 3
Consistently with these precedents, the appellee in the case at bar, having submitted the case on its legal issue without adverting to its factual defenses until the case was decided, despite ample opportunity to do so, must be regarded as having waived all such defenses. Its inaction, in fact, is evidence of its intention to so waive.
Finally, the appellee Company contends that our judgment is illegal in that the precise amount of sugar to which appellants are entitled is not determined. This argument is untenable, for the court has fixed the additional percentages of sugar that under the contract appellants ought to have received in each of the crop years specified in the decision, so that the exact amount of piculs due becomes a matter of arithmetical computation on the basis of the production records for each year. This determination, like that of the interest on the market value of the sugar improperly withheld by the milling Company, to run from the time the various quantities of sugar should have been delivered, can be ascertained by the court of origin in supplementary proceedings in aid of execution under Rule 34, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court (Buenaventura v. Fernan, G.R. No. L-14282, December 29, 1959; Deliva v. Surtida, 48 O.G. (10) 4339; Villones v. Nable, 85 Phil. 43). Such supplementary proceedings in aid of execution are neither a new trial nor a rehearing of the original case (Villones v. Nable, ante).
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
We can not see our way clear to granting the motions, taking into account that the court of first instance, in its appealed decision dismissing the complaint, limited itself exclusively to the questions of law posited by the defendant Company, now appellee, and ignored all its other defenses based on questions of fact. The appellee Company, in turn, even when made aware of the intention of the plaintiffs to appeal to this Court, did not ask the court below to make any findings on the issues of fact raised by its other defenses. Neither has it called our attention, during the period of more than two years that the appeal has been pending in this Court, to the necessity of considering such factual defenses. Indeed, appellee’s brief has been limited to argue the issue of law that was raised by it and which was upheld by the court of origin.
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellee had more than ample opportunity to point out to the Court that the resolution of the issues of law would not bar its other defenses. Even more, as appellee, it could have discussed, under the Court’s doctrines, its other defenses in its brief, by way of support of the dismissal made by the court of first instance. As pointed out in several decisions, an appellee, who is not an appellant, may even assign errors in his brief where his purpose is only to maintain the judgment on other grounds, although not to have the judgment modified or reversed. 1 In fact, appellee could have asked this Court to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the issues of fact.
Appellee has taken none of these various options. Instead, it submitted the case for decision exclusively on the issue of law, and has called attention to the issues of fact only when the decision went against it. Now it wants the case remanded for another trial, another decision, and in all probability, another appeal, with all the attendant delays.
Plainly, the course suggested can not be countenanced. The delay in the administration of justice and the clogging of court dockets have been a constant source of complaints in our country, and the policy of this court has ever been to discourage piecemeal appeals. Thus, this Court has consistently ruled that a party defendant who demurs to the evidence presented by the plaintiff, and obtains a dismissal on the basis of its insufficiency, should not, in case that the dismissal is reversed on appeal, be allowed to submit evidence in its own behalf. As ruled in Moody, Aronson & Company v. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil. 198 (followed in many subsequent cases),
"The efforts of the courts should be concentrated on providing rules which will avoid lengthy and expensive litigation, and which will assist in the speedy disposition of cases." 2
Again, by resolution of 23 March 1956, this Court refused to entertain a claim that a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals was void for lack of jurisdiction over the amount in issue, ruling that a party who allows an appeal to be considered and decided by the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have waived so much of its claim as is in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in order to discourage the practice of accepting a decision, if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 3
Consistently with these precedents, the appellee in the case at bar, having submitted the case on its legal issue without adverting to its factual defenses until the case was decided, despite ample opportunity to do so, must be regarded as having waived all such defenses. Its inaction, in fact, is evidence of its intention to so waive.
Finally, the appellee Company contends that our judgment is illegal in that the precise amount of sugar to which appellants are entitled is not determined. This argument is untenable, for the court has fixed the additional percentages of sugar that under the contract appellants ought to have received in each of the crop years specified in the decision, so that the exact amount of piculs due becomes a matter of arithmetical computation on the basis of the production records for each year. This determination, like that of the interest on the market value of the sugar improperly withheld by the milling Company, to run from the time the various quantities of sugar should have been delivered, can be ascertained by the court of origin in supplementary proceedings in aid of execution under Rule 34, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court (Buenaventura v. Fernan, G.R. No. L-14282, December 29, 1959; Deliva v. Surtida, 48 O.G. (10) 4339; Villones v. Nable, 85 Phil. 43). Such supplementary proceedings in aid of execution are neither a new trial nor a rehearing of the original case (Villones v. Nable, ante).
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
Endnotes:
1. See cases collected in I Moran Comments on the Rules of Court p. 712, footnotes 19 and 20.
2. see Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 499; Demetrio v. Lopez, 50 Phil. 45; Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 531.
3. L-10096, Tyson Tan v. Filipinas Cia Seguros.
